Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.     

When vying reveals lying: the timed antagonistic response alethiometer

Two experiments tested a new computer‐based lie‐detection technique. The Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer (TARA) manufacturers a situation in which, if respondents lie, they must perform two incompatible tasks, whereas if they tell the truth, they can perform two compatible ones. Both tasks involve repeatedly classifying target and control statements as true or false. The incompatible task combination, being more difficult, takes longer to complete correctly; hence, slower responses diagnose dishonesty. Experiment 1 found that, while concurrently classifying control statements honestly, participants invariably took longer to classify target statements dishonestly than honestly. Exploiting this effect, Experiment 2 found that separate groups of liars and truth‐tellers could be distinguished with about 85% accuracy. The properties and potential of the technique are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Errors of Omission and Commission during Alternative Reinforcement of Compliance: The Effects of Varying Levels of Treatment Integrity

We conducted two experiments to evaluate the effects of errors of omission and commission during alternative reinforcement of compliance in young children. In Experiment 1, we evaluated errors of omission by examining two levels of integrity during alternative reinforcement (20 and 60 %) for child compliance following no treatment (baseline) versus treatment at full (i.e., 100 %) integrity. Results indicated that compliance varied according to the level of integrity in place. In addition, compliance in the 60 % integrity condition was high and stable when it followed baseline, but was substantially lower for one participant and slightly lower for a second participant when it followed the full integrity condition. In Experiment 2, we evaluated errors of commission. For three participants, we compared treatment at full integrity to a condition in which errors of commission were made on every trial (i.e., 0 % integrity). For one of these three participants, we also compared treatment at full integrity to baseline and to a condition in which errors of commission were made on 50 % of trials. Results of all four evaluations again indicate that compliance varied according to the level of integrity in place: compliance was low in both the 0 and 50 % integrity conditions, regardless of the preceding condition. These results suggest that during alternative reinforcement of compliance, the effect of occasional errors of omission may depend on the immediately preceding context but that errors of commission are more detrimental.     

The role of multiple-choice tests in increasing access to difficult-to-retrieve information

Answering multiple-choice questions improves access to otherwise difficult-to-retrieve knowledge tested by those questions. Here, I examine whether multiple-choice questions can also improve accessibility to related knowledge that is not explicitly tested. In two experiments, participants first answered challenging general knowledge (trivia) multiple-choice questions containing competitive incorrect alternatives and then took a final cued-recall test with those previously tested questions and new related questions for which a previously incorrect answer was the correct answer. In Experiment 1, participants correctly answered related questions more often and faster when they had taken a multiple-choice test than when they had not. In Experiment 2, I showed that the more accurate and faster responses were not simply a result of previous exposure to those alternatives. These findings have practical implications for potential benefits of multiple-choice testing and implications for the processes that occur when individuals answer multiple-choice questions.     

签名对个体诚实度和道德感的影响

探讨签名的位置以及是否预告签名信息对个体诚实行为的影响, 同时探究不同承诺形式对个体道德行为的调节作用, 从而揭示签名对个体道德行为影响的机制。实验1比较不同签名的位置与是否预告签名信息两种条件下, 被试在有奖抛掷骰子的游戏中的诚实性表现。结果发现, 当游戏前告知需要签名时, 签名位置对被试的诚实行为没有显著影响; 而在游戏前不告知需要签名时, 上位签名的被试比下位签名的被试更倾向于做出诚实行为。实验2比较口头承诺方式与签名方式对个体诚实行为的影响, 结果发现, 口头承诺与上位签名均能促使个体做出诚实行为。结果表明, 签名对个体道德行为的影响, 是通过启动个体的自我认同感而实现的; 签名位置的效应, 实际上是由于启动的时段不同造成; 同时, 通过口头承诺的方式, 同样可以启动个体的自我认同感, 从而促进其实施道德行为。     

Conflicting desire and the child's theory of mind

We contrast the standard representational theory-of-mind approach to the understanding of mental states with an alternative view that theory-of-mind tasks require executive functioning or the inhibition of more “cognitively salient” information. Two experiments test the hypothesis that 3-year-olds' apparent problems on theory-of-mind tasks are not due to an inability to represent the mental contents of another, but rather lie in the informational structure of the task. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds were tested on their understanding of desire in others either when they themselves held a strong and conflicting desire or when they had no strong desire. Results showed that under the condition of having a strong and conflicting desire, only 5-year-olds were able to recognize that another person may desire something different. In contrast, when the children themselves held no strong desire, even 3-year-olds were able to judge another's desire correctly. Experiment 2 compared 3-year-olds' performance on a standard false-belief task with an equivalently structured desire task in which participants had again to inhibit their own strong and conflicting desire. Results showed similar performance on the traditional false-belief task and the new conflicting-desire task.     

Trait dissociation and commission errors in memory reports of emotional events

In 2 studies we examined whether trait dissociation is related to spontaneous commission errors (reports of events that did not occur) in free recall of emotional events. We also explored whether the functional locus of the dissociation-commission link is related to repeated retrieval or shallow encoding. In Experiment 1 participants were exposed to a staged incident and were repeatedly asked to add more information to their written accounts of the event. Dissociation levels were related to commission errors, indicating that people who report many dissociative experiences tend to make more commission errors. However, it was not the case that the overall increase in commission errors over successive retrieval attempts was typical for high dissociative participants. In Experiment 2 participants saw a video fragment of a severe car accident. During the video, half the participants performed a dual task, and the other half did not. Participants performing the dual task made more commission errors than controls, but this effect was not more pronounced in those with high trait dissociation scores. These studies show that there is a link between dissociation and spontaneous commission errors in memory reports of emotional events, but the functional locus of this link remains unclear.     

Cognitive control and counterproductive oculomotor capture by reward-related stimuli

Two experiments investigated the extent to which value-modulated oculomotor capture is subject to top-down control. In these experiments, participants were never required to look at the reward-related stimuli; indeed, doing so was directly counterproductive because it caused omission of the reward that would otherwise have been obtained. In Experiment 1, participants were explicitly informed of this omission contingency. Nevertheless, they still showed counterproductive oculomotor capture by reward-related stimuli, suggesting that this effect is relatively immune to cognitive control. Experiment 2 more directly tested whether this capture is controllable by comparing the performance of participants who either had or had not been explicitly informed of the omission contingency. There was no evidence that value-modulated oculomotor capture differed between the two conditions, providing further evidence that this effect proceeds independently of cognitive control. Taken together, the results of the present research provide strong evidence for the automaticity and cognitive impenetrability of value-modulated attentional capture.     

前瞻记忆后效的加工机制：对自发提取观点和抑制观点的检验

摘 要 实验1探究前瞻记忆后效的产生是否消耗认知资源,实验2进一步探究前瞻记忆后效产生过程中消耗的认知资源的去向。实验1结果显示在完成阶段,相比于基线条件,其它四种实验条件的进行中任务反应速度均较慢,实验2结果显示无论线索是否显著,前瞻记忆后效均会随着认知负荷的提高而提高。结果表明前瞻记忆后效产生过程中会消耗认知资源对原意向进行抑制。本研究支持了抑制的观点。     

Metacognitive monitoring during category learning: how success affects future behaviour

The purpose of this study was to see how people perceive their own learning during a category learning task, and whether their perceptions matched their performance. In two experiments, participants were asked to learn natural categories, of both high and low variability, and make category learning judgements (CLJs). Variability was manipulated by varying the number of exemplars and the number of times each exemplar was presented within each category. Experiment 1 showed that participants were generally overconfident in their knowledge of low variability families, suggesting that they considered repetition to be more useful for learning than it actually was. Also, a correct trial, for a particular category, was more likely to occur if the previous trial was correct. CLJs had the largest increase when a trial was correct following an incorrect trial and the largest decrease when an incorrect trial followed a correct trial. Experiment 2 replicated these results, but also demonstrated that global CLJ ratings showed the same bias towards repetition. These results indicate that we generally identify success as being the biggest determinant of learning, but do not always recognise cues, such as variability, that enhance learning.     

There is an ‘I’ in truth: How salient identities shape dynamic perceptions of truth

This research examined the hypothesis that people judge as true those claims aligned with the normative content of their salient social identities. In Experiment 1a, participants’ social identities were manipulated by assigning them to ‘inductive-thinker’ and ‘intuitive-thinker’ groups. Participants subsequently made truth judgements about aphorisms randomly associated with ‘science’ and ‘popular wisdom’. Those with salient inductive-thinker social identities judged science-based claims as more truthful than popular wisdom-based claims to a greater extent than those with salient intuitive-thinker social identities. Experiment 1b was a preregistered replication, with additional conditions eliminating an alternative semantic-priming explanation. In Experiment 2, American Conservatives and Liberals judged as more true claims associated with the ideological content of their social identities. This difference was attenuated through a manipulation that framed participants as more moderate than they had originally indicated. Overall, these experiments suggest an identity-truth malleability, such that making salient specific social identities can lead to related perceptions of truth normatively aligned with those identities.     

Remembrance of remembrance past

Arnold and Lindsay (2002) found that individuals more often failed to remember they had previously recalled an item if that item had been cued in a qualitatively different way on two recall occasions: the "forgot-it-all-along" (FIA) effect. Experiment 1 was designed to determine if the FIA effect arises because participants incorrectly believe they have not been previously tested for an item, or because they incorrectly believe they have failed to recall the item when previously tested. Experiment 2 measured participants' confidence in their incorrect prior-recall judgements, and Experiment 3 tested participants' ability to "recover" their previous recollection when the prior-recall context was restored. Results indicated that participants usually believed they had not previously been cued for the items they failed to remember previously recalling; they were often confident in their incorrect judgements of prior non-remembering; and re-introducing the context of prior remembering sometimes enabled them to recapture their memories of previous recall.     

Remembrance of remembrance past

Arnold and Lindsay (2002) found that individuals more often failed to remember they had previously recalled an item if that item had been cued in a qualitatively different way on two recall occasions: the “forgot-it-all-along” (FIA) effect. Experiment 1 was designed to determine if the FIA effect arises because participants incorrectly believe they have not been previously tested for an item, or because they incorrectly believe they have failed to recall the item when previously tested. Experiment 2 measured participants' confidence in their incorrect prior-recall judgements, and Experiment 3 tested participants' ability to “recover” their previous recollection when the prior-recall context was restored. Results indicated that participants usually believed they had not previously been cued for the items they failed to remember previously recalling; they were often confident in their incorrect judgements of prior non-remembering; and re-introducing the context of prior remembering sometimes enabled them to recapture their memories of previous recall.     

Control motivation and attributions for performance

Two experiments examined the relationship between the desire for effective control over performance outcomes and attributions of causality for those outcomes. In Experiment 1, subjects were led to believe that they had either succeeded at or failed a test that was either unimportant or important. As predicted, failure of the important test was attributed more to lack of effort (a controllable cause) and less to lack of ability (an uncontrollable cause) than was failure of the unimportant test. In Experiment 2, all subjects were led to believe that they had failed a test. Once again, subjects were informed that the test was either important or unimportant. In addition, half the subjects were told that they would be undergoing more tests in a later testing session, while half were not informed of any future testing. As in Experiment 1, subjects failing the important test attributed their failure less to lack of ability than did subjects failing the unimportant test. The anticipation of future testing interacted with test importance in its effects on attributions to ability. Subjects performing the unimportant task attributed their failure more to lack of ability when anticipating future performance than when not. Attributions of subjects performing an important task were not affected by the anticipation of future performance. Results were discussed in terms of the need for control over performance outcomes.     

Promising to tell the truth makes 8‐ to 16‐year‐olds more honest

Techniques commonly used to increase truth‐telling in most North American jurisdiction courts include requiring witnesses to discuss the morality of truth‐ and lie‐telling and to promise to tell the truth prior to testifying. While promising to tell the truth successfully decreases younger children's lie‐telling, the influence of discussing the morality of honesty and promising to tell the truth on adolescents' statements has remained unexamined. In Experiment 1, 108 youngsters, aged 8–16 years, were left alone in the room and asked not to peek at the answers to a test. The majority of participants peeked at the test answers and then lied about their transgression. More importantly, participants were eight times more likely to change their response from a lie to the truth after promising to tell the truth. Experiment 2 confirmed that the results of Experiment 1 were not solely due to repeated questioning or the moral discussion of truth‐ and lie‐telling. These results suggest that, while promising to tell the truth influences the truth‐telling behaviors of adolescents, a moral discussion of truth and lies does not. Legal implications are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

See no lies,hear no lies: differences in discrimination accuracy and response bias when watching or listening to police suspect interviews

In the present experiment, police officers attempted to detect truths and lies told by suspects in their police interviews in three different ways: They either saw the suspects (visual condition), only heard the suspects (audio condition) or both saw and heard the suspects (control condition). Research has demonstrated that vocal and speech‐related cues are better diagnostic cues to deceit than visual cues. Therefore, we predicted that participants in the visual condition would perform worst in the lie detection task. Having access only to visual cues may encourage observers to be more reliant on stereotypical beliefs when attempting to detect truths and lies. Since these stereotypes are related to the behaviour of liars, rather than to the behaviour of truth tellers, we further predicted that being exposed only to visual cues may result in a lie bias. The findings supported these hypotheses, and the implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Truth table tasks: The relevance of irrelevant

Two types of truth table tasks are used investigating mental representations of conditionals: a possibilities-based and a truth-based one. In possibilities tasks, participants indicate whether a situation is possible or impossible according to the conditional rule. In truth tasks participants evaluate whether a situation makes the rule true or false, or is irrelevant with respect to the truth of the rule. Comparing the two-option version of the possibilities task with the truth task in Experiment 1, the possibilities task yields logical answer patterns whereas the truth task yields defective patterns. Adding the irrelevant option to the possibilities task in Experiment 2 leads to a considerable amount of defective patterns in the possibilities task, but still to more logical patterns in the possibilities task than in the truth task. Experiment 3 shows that directionality matters since rule-to-situation tasks yield more logical answer patterns than do situation-to-rule tasks. We conclude that both task types are not comparable as such since wording, number of options and directionality influence the results.     

Effects of reiteration,hindsight bias,and memory on realism in eyewitness confidence

This study investigated the effects of repetition, memory, feedback, and hindsight bias on the realism in confidence in answers to questions on a filmed kidnapping. In Experiment 1 the participants showed overconfidence in all conditions. In the Repeat condition (‘how confident are you now that your previous answers are correct’) overconfidence was reduced as a consequence of the decrease in confidence in both correct and incorrect answers compared with the Repeat condition when the participants received feedback on their answers and were asked to remember their initial confidence, the confidence level was higher for correct and lower for incorrect answers. In Experiment 2, recalled confidence (the Memory condition) increased compared with the original confidence both for correct and incorrect answers; the effect of this was increased overconfidence. The Hindsight condition showed a decrease in confidence in incorrect answers. The results suggest that a unique hindsight effect may be more clearly present for incorrect than for correct answers. Our study gives further evidence for the malleability of the realism in eyewitness confidence and we discuss both the theoretical and forensic implications of our findings. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Priming voluntary autobiographical memories: Implications for the organisation of autobiographical memory and voluntary recall processes

The goal of this study was to show that voluntary autobiographical memories could be primed by the prior activation of autobiographical memories. Three experiments demonstrated voluntary memory priming with three different approaches. In Experiment 1 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their elementary school years. In a subsequent memory task primed participants were asked to recall memories from any time period, and they produced significantly more memories from their elementary school years than unprimed participants. In Experiment 2 primed participants were asked to recall what they were doing when they had heard various news events occurring between 1998 and 2005. Subsequently these participants produced significantly more memories from this time period than unprimed participants. In Experiment 3 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their teenage years. Subsequently these participants were able to recall more memories from ages 13–15 than unprimed participants, where both had only 1 second to produce a memory. We argue that the results support the notion that episodic memories can activate one another and that some of them are organised according to lifetime periods. We further argue that the results have implications for the reminiscence bump and voluntary recall of the past.