共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation
for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices
that issue in evil, but fails to account for the fact that we often do make such choices. However, the argument developed
by Tierno, despite its initial appeal, embodies an important misunderstanding of the nature of free will theodicies and in
particular the libertarian conception of human freedom customarily employed by these theodicies. 相似文献
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If coherence is to have justificatory status, as some analytical philosophers think it has, it must be truth-conducive, if
perhaps only under certain specific conditions. This paper is a critical discussion of some recent arguments that seek to
show that under no reasonable conditions can coherence be truth-conducive. More specifically, it considers Bovens and Hartmann’s
and Olsson’s “impossibility results,” which attempt to show that coherence cannot possibly be a truth-conducive property.
We point to various ways in which the advocates of a coherence theory of justification may attempt to divert the threat of
these results. 相似文献
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D Mayo 《Suicide & life-threatening behavior》1985,15(3):196-199
A number of recent theorists, all proceeding on the assumption that there is no afterlife, argue that the notion of one's own death defies comprehension in ways that have important implications. Some argue this "ineffability" of death precludes a rational decision to die. Dr. Edwin Shneidman maintains that it makes the notion of our own death unintelligible to each of us. In this paper, these arguments are criticized. It is maintained that death is not so inscrutible as these theorists would have us believe. 相似文献
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John Cantwell 《Synthese》2010,173(2):127-152
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In three experiments, we examined the memory-undermining effects of daydreaming for (un)related stimuli. In Experiments 1 and 2, we tested whether daydreaming fosters forgetting of semantically interrelated material and hence, catalyzes false memory production. In Experiment 3, we examined the memory effects of different daydreaming instructions. In Experiment 1, daydreaming did not undermine correct recall of semantically interrelated words, nor did it affect false memories. In Experiment 2, we again failed to find that daydreaming exerted memory-undermining effects a. In Experiment 3, no memory effects were obtained using different daydreaming instructions. Together, our studies fail to show appreciable memory-undermining effects of daydreaming. 相似文献
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Jonah N. Schupbach 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):323-331
The success of Bovens and Hartmann’s recent “impossibility result” against Bayesian Coherentism relies upon the adoption of
a specific set of ceteris paribus conditions. In this paper, I argue that these conditions are not clearly appropriate; certain
proposed coherence measures motivate different such conditions and also call for the rejection of at least one of Bovens and
Hartmann’s conditions. I show that there exist sets of intuitively plausible ceteris paribus conditions that allow one to
sidestep the impossibility result. This shifts the debate from the merits of the impossibility result itself to the underlying
choice of ceteris paribus conditions.
相似文献
Jonah N. SchupbachEmail: |
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In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’.
According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable
stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I
seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He suggests that my argument presupposes
compatibilism. I respond by showing that my argument does not presuppose the denial of the capacity to have done otherwise. 相似文献
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Benoit Gaultier 《Ratio》2019,32(1):42-52
It seems to be a platitude that the belief that p is correct iff it is true that p. And the claim that truth is the correct‐making feature of belief seems to be just another way of expressing this platitude. It is often thought that this indicates that truth constitutes a normative standard or criterion of correctness for belief because it seems to follow from this platitude that having a false belief is believing wrongly, and having a true belief is believing rightly or correctly. In this paper, I aim to show that when we judge the platitude in question to be indisputably true, we do not endorse that truth is normative for belief but merely the triviality that the belief that p is true iff it is true that p. 相似文献
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On the alleged circularity of Skinner's concept of stimulus 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
M Hocutt 《Psychological review》1967,74(6):530-532
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Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2001,40(2):1-6
Those who advance the traditional argument from human freedom presume that human freedom provides an adequate explanation
of moral evil. I argue that this presumption is erroneous. An adequate explanation of our capacity to make choices that produce
moral evil must be distinguished from an adequate explanation of the actuality of such choices. Human freedom may account
for our ability to make choices that issue in moral evil. It cannot, by itself, account for our actually making such choices.
Something more than our potential for choices that produce moral evil is required to adequately explain the profusion of moral
evil that we actually find in the world. 相似文献
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