Modality effects in false recall and false recognition

R. E. Smith and R. R. Hunt (1998) reported a dramatic reduction in false remembering in a list-learning paradigm by switching from auditory to visual presentation at study. The current authors replicated these modality effects using written recall and visual recognition tests but obtained smaller effects than those in R. E. Smith and R. R. Hunt's study. In contrast, no modality effect occurred on auditory recognition tests. Manipulating study and test modality within-subjects (Experiment 2) and between-subjects (Experiment 3) yielded similar results. It was also found that subjects frequently judged critical nonstudied words as having been presented in the modality of their corresponding study lists. The authors concluded that subjects could retrieve distinctive information about a study list's presentation modality to reduce false remembering but only did so under certain conditions. The modality effect on false remembering is a function of both encoding and retrieval factors.     

The distinctiveness heuristic in false recognition and false recall

The effects of generative processing on false recognition and recall were examined in four experiments using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In each experiment, a Generate condition in which subjects generated studied words from audio anagrams was compared to a Control condition in which subjects simply listened to studied words presented normally. Rates of false recognition and false recall were lower for critical lures associated with generated lists, than for critical lures associated with control lists, but only in between-subjects designs. False recall and recognition did not differ when generate and control conditions were manipulated within-subjects. This pattern of results is consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999), a metamemorial decision-based strategy whereby global changes in decision criteria lead to reductions of false memories. This retrieval-based monitoring mechanism appears to operate in a similar fashion in reducing false recognition and false recall.     

The distinctiveness heuristic in false recognition and false recall

The effects of generative processing on false recognition and recall were examined in four experiments using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm (Deese, 1959 Deese, J. 1959. On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58: 17–22. [Crossref], [PubMed] , [Google Scholar]; Roediger & McDermott, 1995 Roediger, H. L. and McDermott, K. B. 1995. Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21: 803–814. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). In each experiment, a Generate condition in which subjects generated studied words from audio anagrams was compared to a Control condition in which subjects simply listened to studied words presented normally. Rates of false recognition and false recall were lower for critical lures associated with generated lists, than for critical lures associated with control lists, but only in between-subjects designs. False recall and recognition did not differ when generate and control conditions were manipulated within-subjects. This pattern of results is consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999 Schacter, D. L., Israel, L. and Racine, C. 1999. Suppressing false recognition in younger and older adults: The distinctiveness heuristic. Journal of Memory and Language, 40: 1–24. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), a metamemorial decision-based strategy whereby global changes in decision criteria lead to reductions of false memories. This retrieval-based monitoring mechanism appears to operate in a similar fashion in reducing false recognition and false recall.     

Experimenter effects on children's understanding of false drawings and false beliefs

Two experiments were conducted in which a variant of J. McGarrigle and M. Donaldson's (1975) "Naughty Teddy" intervention was applied to children's understanding of false drawings and false beliefs. The results showed that preschool children's understanding of the contents of an out-of-date drawing improved when the drawing was made by a capricious agent ("Naughty Snakey" glove puppet) rather than by the experimenter. The children's performance on a false belief task also improved when the events that set up the false belief were the result of the actions of the glove puppet. The results are discussed in terms of the role of children's sensitivity to the pragmatics of interactions in their development of a theory of mind.     

Children's emotional false memories

Eight- and 12-year-old children were presented with neutral and negative emotional Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists equated on familiarity and associative strength. Both recall and recognition (A') measures were obtained. Recall measures exhibited the usual age increments in true and false recollection. True neutral items were better recalled and recognized than true negative emotional items. Although the children showed more false recall for neutral than for negative emotional lists, false recognition was higher for negative emotional than for neutral items. A' analyses also showed that whereas true neutral information and false neutral information were easily discriminated by children regardless of age, the same was not the case for true and false negative emotional information. Together, these results suggest that although children may be able to censor negative emotional information at recall, such information promotes relational processing in children's memory, making true and false emotional information less discriminable overall.     

Children's kinematic false memories

ABSTRACT

Individuals misrecognise as seen the never-presented natural continuation of an action. These false memories derive from the running of kinematic mental models of the actions seen, which rest on motor inferences from implicit knowledge. We verified an implied prediction: kinematic false memories should be detectable even in children. The participants in our experiments first observed photos in which actors were about to perform actions on objects. At recognition they were presented with the original photos, plus (a) distractors representing the unseen natural continuation of the original actions, (b) distractors representing the beginning of other actions on the same objects and (c) distractors representing completed different actions on the same objects. In contrast to the original studies in which participants expressed their confidence in recognition, in our experiments the participants catgorirzed the action as seen or not seen. After replicating the original results with the dichotomous recognition task (Experiment 1), we detected spontaneous false memories also in children (Experiment 2).     

Autonomy and false beliefs

The majority of current attention on the question of autonomy has focused on the internal reflection of the agent. The quality of an agent’s reflection on her potential action (or motivating desire or value) is taken to determine whether or not that action is autonomous. In this paper, I argue that there is something missing in most of these contemporary accounts of autonomy. By focusing overwhelmingly on the way in which the agent reflects, such accounts overlook the importance of what the agent is reflecting upon. Whichever of these current formulations of autonomy we accept, reflection could be undertaken in full accordance with the conditions set, and yet the action fail to be autonomous. This will occur, I argue, if the agent is mistaken about the object of her reflection. More precisely, if she has a particular kind of false belief about the action she is contemplating undertaking, then no amount of reflection can render that action autonomous. This suggests the need for externalist conditions to be incorporated into an account of autonomy.     

A closer look at self-reported suicide attempts: false positives and false negatives

The validity of self-reported suicide attempt information is undermined by false positives (e.g., incidences without intent to die), or by unreported suicide attempts, referred to as false negatives. In a sample of 1,385 Austrian adults, we explored the occurrence of false positives and false negatives with detailed, probing questions. Removing false positives decreased the rate of suicide attempters from 4.3% to 2.7%. Probing questions also revealed 0.8% false negatives. We recommend using probing questions with both those who report a suicide attempt and those who do not report a suicide attempt to increase the validity of self-reported suicide-related information.     

Statistical inference for false positive and false negative error rates in mastery testing

This paper describes an asymptotic inferential procedure for the estimates of the false positive and false negative error rates. Formulas and tables are described for the computations of the standard errors. A simulation study indicates that the asymptotic standard errors may be used even with samples of 25 cases as long as the Kuder-Richardson Formula 21 reliability is reasonably large. Otherwise, a large sample would be required.This work was performed pursuant to Grant No NIE-G-78-0087 with the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Huynh Huynh, Principal Investigator. Points of view or opinions stated do not necessarily reflect NIE position or policy and no official endorsement should be inferred. The editorial assistance of Joseph C. Saunders is gratefully acknowledged.     

Attentional cueing induces false memory

The fluency of stimulus processing significantly contributes to recognition memory judgments. We investigated the effect of processing fluency induced by attentional cueing on recognition judgments. Participants performed a Remember/Know recognition test, while their spatial attention was manipulated in the test session. Stimulus location was either predicted (congruent condition) or unpredicted (incongruent condition) using an arrow cue. The results revealed that familiarity-based false recognition increased in the incongruent condition wherein the participants may have attributed part of the perceived disfluency to the attentional cue, and they may have overestimated the fluency for the stimulus, leading to increased false recognition. However, in the congruent condition, the participants may have attributed some parts of the perceived fluency to the attentional cue and underestimated the fluency for the stimulus, leading to decreased false recognition. In sum, stimulus-irrelevant attentional cueing induces unintentional processing about the source of fluency and biases recognition memory.     

Presentation modality affects false memory

Roediger and McDermott (1995) rejuvenated interest in Deese’s (1959) paradigm for producing reliable intrusions and false alarms. Using this paradigm in three experiments, we demonstrated that visual study presentation dramatically reduces the rate of false memories. Only auditory study presentation resulted in equal production of studied and critical items. Correct recall and recognition were unaffected. The suggestion that visual presentation provides a means for discriminating between false and true memories was supported by Experiment 3: Pleasantness rating of study items significantly reduced the creation of false memories regardless of modality.     

The persistence of false beliefs

Do false beliefs last? To explore this question, this study planted false beliefs or memories of a childhood experience with asparagus. We found that these false beliefs had consequences for subjects, when assessed directly after the suggestive manipulation. Moreover, subjects were brought back two weeks later to see if their false beliefs persisted. After two weeks, subjects' confidence in their new memories, and the consequences of those memories were diminished, but not extinguished. These false beliefs were found to be somewhat weaker than other subjects' true beliefs for the same events. Another novel finding was that the manipulation was sufficiently powerful to affect actual food choices.     

True photographs and false memories

Abstract— Some trauma-memory-oriented psychotherapists advise clients to review old family photo albums to cue suspected "repressed" memories of childhood sexual abuse. Old photos might cue long-forgotten memories, but when combined with other suggestive influences they might also contribute to false memories. We asked 45 undergraduates to work at remembering three school-related childhood events (two true events provided by parents and one pseudoevent). By random assignment, 23 subjects were also given their school classes' group photos from the years of the to-be-recalled events as memory cues. As predicted, the rate of false-memory reports was dramatically higher in the photo condition than in the no-photo condition. Indeed, the rate of false-memory reports in the photo condition was substantially higher than the rate in any previously published study.     

Building false memories without suggestions

People can come to remember doing things they have never done. The question we asked in this study is whether people can systematically come to remember performing actions they never really did, in the absence of any suggestion from the experimenter. People built LEGO vehicles, performing some steps but not others. For half the people, all the pieces needed to assemble each vehicle were laid out in order in front of them while they did the building; for the other half, the pieces were hidden from view. The next day, everyone returned for a surprise recognition test. People falsely and confidently remembered having carried out steps they did not; those who saw all the pieces while they built each vehicle were more likely to correctly remember performing steps they did perform but equally likely to falsely remember performing steps they did not. We explain our results using the source monitoring framework: People used the relationships between actions to internally generate the missing, related actions, later mistaking that information for genuine experience.     

Item-specific processing reduces false memories

We examined the effect of item-specific and relational encoding instructions on false recognition in two experiments in which the DRM paradigm was used (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Type of encoding (item-specific or relational) was manipulated between subjects in Experiment 1 and within subjects in Experiment 2. Decision-based explanations (e.g., the distinctiveness heuristic) predict reductions in false recognition in between-subjects designs, but not in within-subjects designs, because they are conceptualized as global shifts in decision criteria. Memory-based explanations predict reductions in false recognition in both designs, resulting from enhanced recollection of item-specific details. False recognition was reduced following item-specific encoding instructions in both experiments, favoring a memory-based explanation. These results suggest that providing unique cues for the retrieval of individual studied items results in enhanced discrimination between those studied items and critical lures. Conversely, enhancing the similarity of studied items results in poor discrimination among items within a particular list theme. These results are discussed in terms of the item-specific/ relational framework (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993).     

Semantic Holism is seriously false

Semantic Holism is the claim that any semantic path from inferential semantics (the indeterminate semantics forced by the classical inference rules of PC) reaches all the way to classical semantics if it is even one step long. In our joint paper Semantic Holism, Belnap and I showed that some such semantic paths are two steps long, but we left open a number of questions about the lengths of semantic paths. Here I answer the most important of these questions by showing that there are infinitely long semantic paths that begin at inferential semantics but that do not even reach classical semantics. I do this by showing how to construct such an infinite semantic path from the members of the family of (n–1)-out-of-n-disjunction connectives.     

Test-induced priming of false memories

Of interest was whether prior testing of related words primes false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. After studying lists of related words, subjects made old-new judgments about zero, three, or six related items before being tested on critical nonpresented lures. When the recognition test was self-paced, prior testing of list items led to faster false recognition judgments, but did not increase the rate of false alarms to lures from studied lists. Critically, this pattern changed when decision making at test was speeded. When forced to respond quickly—presumably precluding the use of monitoring processes—clear test-induced priming effects were observed in the rate of false memories. The results are consistent with an activation-monitoring explanation of false memories and support that retrieving veridical memories can be a source of memory error.