The shape of things to come: Exploring goal-directed prospection

Through the ability to preview the future (i.e., prospection), people can anticipate how best to think, feel and act in just about any setting. But exactly what factors determine the contents of prospection? Extending research on action identification and temporal construal, here we explored how action goals and temporal distance modulate the characteristics of future previews. Participants were required to imagine travelling to Egypt (in the near or distant future) to climb or photograph a pyramid. Afterwards, to probe the contents of prospection, participants provided a sketch of their imaginary experience. Results elucidated the impact of goal type and temporal distance on mental imagery. While a climbing goal prompted participants to draw a larger pyramid in the near than distant future, a photographic goal influenced only the compositional complexity of the sketches. These findings reveal how action goals and temporal distance shape the contents of future simulations.     

Subject relative clauses are not universally easier to process: Evidence from Basque

Studies from many languages consistently report that subject relative clauses (SR) are easier to process than object relatives (OR). However, Hsiao and Gibson (2003) report an OR preference for Chinese, a finding that has been contested. Here we report faster OR versus SR processing in Basque, an ergative, head-final language with pre-nominal relative clauses. A self-paced reading task was used in Experiments 1 and 2, while ERPs were recorded in Experiment 3. We used relative clauses that were ambiguous between an object or subject-gap interpretation and disambiguated later in the sentence. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 showed that SR took longer to read than OR in the critical disambiguating region. In addition, Experiment 3 showed that SR produced larger amplitudes than OR in the P600 window immediately after reading the critical disambiguating word. Our results suggest that SR are not universally easier to process. They cast doubts on universal hypotheses and suggest that processing complexity may depend on language-specific aspects of grammar.     

The shape of things to come: Psychoneural reduction and the future of psychology

I contrast Bickle's new wave reductionismwith other relevant views about explanation across intertheoretic contexts. I then assess Bickle's empirical argument for psychoneural reduction. Bickle shows that psychology is not autonomous from neuroscience, and concludes that at least some versions of nonreductive physicalism are false. I argue this is not sufficient to establish his further claim that psychology reduces to neuroscience. Examination of Bickle's explanations reveals that they do not meet his own reductive standard. Furthermore, there are good empirical reasons to doubt that the cognitive approach to mind should be abandoned. I suggest that the near future will not see a reduction of psychology to neuroscience, so much as a replacement of both sciences by an improved form of neuropsychology.     

Changing your mind about things unseen: Toddlers' sensitivity to prior reliability

The goal of this research was to investigate the extent to which young children use the past reliability of another person’s statements to make inferences about the accuracy of that person’s claims about a hidden toy. When children interacted with a previously reliable speaker, both 30- and 36-month-olds searched in the new location of the toy, in line with the speaker’s statement. When children interacted with an unreliable speaker, the 36-month-olds were less likely to rely on her false statement and instead searched either in the original location of the toy or in a neutral location. The 30-month-olds, however, searched in the location indicated by the speaker even when the speaker was unreliable. These results show that by 36 months of age, children begin to use reliability in processing a speaker’s episodic claims and can flexibly update their representations of absent objects depending on the reliability of the speaker.     

Good things come to those who wait: Time discounting differences between adult offenders and nonoffenders

Criminal behavior has been explained by the idea that offenders have a lack of self-control. Yet, Wilson and Daly reported that juvenile offenders exhibit time-discounting tendencies similar to those of nonoffending juveniles. As no previous study has compared time-discounting behavior of adult offenders with nonoffenders, we raise the question, do adult offenders exhibit shorter time horizons or the tendency to discount future rewards? To answer this question, 89 offenders (ex-prisoners and prisoners) and 106 nonoffenders completed a time-discounting measure containing 27 different monetary choices. Our results show that, counter to findings with juvenile offenders, adult offenders (ex-prisoners) exhibit significantly shorter time horizons and discount more than nonoffenders as delayed payoffs increase to medium and large rewards. Furthermore, both offenders and nonoffenders are less likely to discount as the reward of future gains increases to medium and large.     

Back to basics: Percentage agreement measures are adequate, but there are easier ways

Percentage agreement measures of interobserver agreement or "reliability" have traditionally been used to summarize observer agreement from studies using interval recording, time-sampling, and trial-scoring data collection procedures. Recent articles disagree on whether to continue using these percentage agreement measures, and on which ones to use, and what to do about chance agreements if their use is continued. Much of the disagreement derives from the need to be reasonably certain we do not accept as evidence of true interobserver agreement those agreement levels which are substantially probable as a result of chance observer agreement. The various percentage agreement measures are shown to be adequate to this task, but easier ways are discussed. Tables are given to permit checking to see if obtained disagreements are unlikely due to chance. Particularly important is the discovery of a simple rule that, when met, makes the tables unnecessary. If reliability checks using 50 or more observation occasions produce 10% or fewer disagreements, for behavior rates from 10% through 90%, the agreement achieved is quite improbably the result of chance agreement.     

Impaired configural body processing in anorexia nervosa: Evidence from the body inversion effect

Patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) suffer from severe disturbances of body perception. It is unclear, however, whether such disturbances are linked to specific alterations in the processing of body configurations with respect to the local processing of body part details. Here, we compared a consecutive sample of 12 AN patients with a group of 12 age‐, gender‐ and education‐matched controls using an inversion effect paradigm requiring the visual discrimination of upright and inverted pictures of whole bodies, faces and objects. The AN patients presented selective deficits in the discrimination of upright body stimuli, which requires configural processing. Conversely, patients and controls showed comparable abilities in the discrimination of inverted bodies, which involves only detail‐based processing, and in the discrimination of both upright and inverted faces and objects. Importantly, the body inversion effect negatively correlated with the persistence scores at the Temperament and Character Inventory, which evaluates increased tendency to convert a signal of punishment into a signal of reinforcement. These results suggest that the deficits of configural processing in AN patients may be associated with their obsessive worries about body appearance and to the excessive attention to details that characterizes their general perceptual style.     

Rhythms of the body,rhythms of the brain: Respiration,neural oscillations,and embodied cognition

In spite of its importance as a life-defining rhythmic movement and its constant rhythmic contraction and relaxation of the body, respiration has not received attention in Embodied Cognition (EC) literature. Our paper aims to show that (1) respiration exerts significant and unexpected influence on cognitive processes, and (2) it does so by modulating neural synchronization that underlies specific cognitive processes. Then, (3) we suggest that the particular example of respiration may function as a model for a general mechanism through which the body influences cognitive functioning. Finally, (4) we work out the implications for EC, draw a parallel to the role of gesture, and argue that respiration sometimes plays a double, pragmatic and epistemic, role, which reduces the cognitive load. In such cases, consistent with EC, the overall cognitive activity includes a loop-like interaction between neural and non-neural elements.     

Self-esteem modulates attentional responses to rejection: Evidence from event-related brain potentials

Individuals with low self-esteem have been shown to exhibit an attentional bias for social rejection cues. The present study investigated whether individuals with low self-esteem would demonstrate greater reactivity to rejection-related stimuli during an attention shifting task than was exhibited by those with high self-esteem. Individuals with low self-esteem showed higher amplitude event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to rejection cues than was observed for those with high self-esteem. These results suggest that individuals with low self-esteem allocate more attentional resources to rejection cues than those with high self-esteem. Discussion will focus on the implications of these findings for understanding the connection between low self-esteem and social rejection.     

On the mind/body problem: The theory of essence

The classical mind/body problem can be approached empirically, using instances of the near-death experience (NDE) as experimental data. The monistic viewpoint, that the mind is the functioning of the brain, finds little support in the NDE data, while dualism, mind and body as separate entities, is consistent with NDE research to date. Comparison of the details of the NDE with predictions from theoretical cosmology shows strong similarities between the two and further strengthens the case for dualism. A theory of human nature is proposed that incorporates these similarities.J. Kenneth Arnette, Ph.D. received a doctorate in Physical Chemistry from Florida State University     

The non-specificity of theory of mind deficits: Evidence from children with communicative disabilities

The aim of the present paper was to investigate the performance on theory of mind tasks of four different clinical groups: children with deficits in attention, motor control and perception (DAMP), children with autism, children with Asperger syndrome, and non-vocal cerebral-palsied children. The children with DAMP performed on the same level as the comparison group on the first and second order theory of mind task. The children with autism and Asperger syndrome performed somewhat lower than the children with DAMP and the comparison group. However, in respect of the specifcity issue, only 6 out of 14 of the non-vocal participants successfully solved the first order theory of mind task, while 13 out of 14 children in a comparison group did. The children were matched for chronological age and IQ. The findings suggest that deficits in theory of mind are not specific to the autistic continuum, but can be found in other groups with communicative disabilities, implying that linguistic and communicative skills are important precursors in the development of theory of mind. The study also shows that severe dysfunction in attention, motor control, and perception is not associated with any theory of mind difficulties.     

Treatment of developmental stress disorder: mind,body and brain – analysis and pharmacology coupled

The schism between psychiatry, psychology and analysis, while long present, has widened even more in the past half‐century with the advances in psychopharmacology. With the advances in electronic brain imaging, particularly in developmental and post‐traumatic stress disorders, there has emerged both an understanding of brain changes resulting from severe, chronic stress and an ability to target brain chemistry in ways that can relieve clinical symptomatology. The use of alpha‐1 adrenergic brain receptor antagonists decreases many of the manifestations of PTSD. Additionally, this paper discusses the ways in which dreaming, thinking and the analytic process are facilitated with this concomitant treatment and hypervigilence and hyper‐arousal states are signficiantly decreased.     

How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis

Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, this very issue has not received much attention in the respective debates and when it has, typically the outlook has been skeptical or outright negative. In this paper, I argue that it is epistemologically possible for a group of individuals to literally share a single mental unit. In particular, I will put forward and defend what I shall call the zombie conception of group minds.     

Segmenting the body into parts: Evidence from biases in tactile perception

How do we individuate body parts? Here, we investigated the effect of body segmentation between hand and arm in tactile and visual perception. In a first experiment, we showed that two tactile stimuli felt farther away when they were applied across the wrist than when they were applied within a single body part (palm or forearm), indicating a “category boundary effect”. In the following experiments, we excluded two hypotheses, which attributed tactile segmentation to other, nontactile factors. In Experiment 2, we showed that the boundary effect does not arise from motor cues. The effect was reduced during a motor task involving flexion and extension movements of the wrist joint. Action brings body parts together into functional units, instead of pulling them apart. In Experiments 3 and 4, we showed that the effect does not arise from perceptual cues of visual discontinuities. We did not find any segmentation effect for the visual percept of the body in Experiment 3, nor for a neutral shape in Experiment 4. We suggest that the mental representation of the body is structured in categorical body parts delineated by joints, and that this categorical representation modulates tactile spatial perception.     

More than a body: mind perception and the nature of objectification

According to models of objectification, viewing someone as a body induces de-mentalization, stripping away their psychological traits. Here evidence is presented for an alternative account, where a body focus does not diminish the attribution of all mental capacities but, instead, leads perceivers to infer a different kind of mind. Drawing on the distinction in mind perception between agency and experience, it is found that focusing on someone's body reduces perceptions of agency (self-control and action) but increases perceptions of experience (emotion and sensation). These effects were found when comparing targets represented by both revealing versus nonrevealing pictures (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) or by simply directing attention toward physical characteristics (Experiment 2). The effect of a body focus on mind perception also influenced moral intuitions, with those represented as a body seen to be less morally responsible (i.e., lesser moral agents) but more sensitive to harm (i.e., greater moral patients; Experiments 5 and 6). These effects suggest that a body focus does not cause objectification per se but, instead, leads to a redistribution of perceived mind.