Reference in human and non-human primate communication: What does it take to refer?

The concept of functional reference has been used to isolate potentially referential vocal signals in animal communication. However, its relatedness to the phenomenon of reference in human language has recently been brought into question. While some researchers have suggested abandoning the concept of functional reference altogether, others advocate a revision of its definition to include contextual cues that play a role in signal production and perception. Empirical and theoretical work on functional reference has also put much emphasis on how the receiver understands the referential signal. However, reference, as defined in the linguistic literature, is an action of the producer, and therefore, any definition describing reference in non-human animals must also focus on the producer. To successfully determine whether a signal is used to refer, we suggest an approach from the field of pragmatics, taking a closer look at specific situations of signal production, specifically at the factors that influence the production of a signal by an individual. We define the concept of signaller’s reference to identify intentional acts of reference produced by a signaller independently of the communicative modality, and illustrate it with a case study of the hoo vocalizations produced by wild chimpanzees during travel. This novel framework introduces an intentional approach to referentiality. It may therefore permit a closer comparison of human and non-human animal referential behaviour and underlying cognitive processes, allowing us to identify what may have emerged solely in the human lineage.     

What does it take to implicitly prime low-frequency category exemplars?

Prominent views of implicit priming agree that repetition of category exemplars should increase the probability of the exemplar coming to mind on a category production test. This prediction has been borne out in the data of numerous experiments that have used relatively high-frequency exemplars, but experiments that have used lower frequency exemplars have reported reduced or no priming on category production tests. Frameworks of memory disagree on why frequency would affect priming. The authors report 3 experiments, the first of which shows no priming of low-frequency exemplars under circumstances that yield priming of higher frequency instances. The second 2 experiments show that low-frequency instances can be primed, but the prior experience must bias the comprehension of the category label, not the exemplar.     

What does it take for context to support action memory?

Previous research on the relation between context and action memory has given ambiguous results. Some experiments have found positive context effects, whereas other experiments have failed to demonstrate a context effect in action memory. Under nonmotor encoding conditions orderly action-locus pairings have been found to yield better recall than random pairings, this not being the case with motor encoding (Helstrup, 1989 a ). Three new experiments explored whether memory for loci could be linked with memory for action–using modified replications. The first experiment provided item-specific reasons for the action-locus connections, whereas the second experiment used a whole-list relational context task. Both experiments indicated that contexts can influence action memory also under enactment conditions, with strongest effect for whole-list contexts. The third experiment demonstrated how a positive context effect can be removed when the functional value of whole-list relational support cues is reduced.     

Defending victims: What does it take to intervene in bullying and how is it rewarded by peers?

Defending is considered important in reducing bullying and victimization in schools. Yet, the prevalence of defending is quite low and there is little insight into aspects that explain why students intervene in bullying situations. The current study used a longitudinal design to simultaneously examine the antecedents and status outcomes of defending behavior. It was expected that affective and social-cognitive factors explain involvement in defending. Moreover, it was proposed that defending would be rewarded with popularity among peers, but only for defenders who were not victimized themselves. Unconflated multilevel path models were used and data came from students in grades 4–6 of Finnish elementary schools (N = 4209 students from 210 classrooms and 38 schools; M_age 11.25; 50% boys). Affective empathy and students' self-efficacy beliefs were predictive of defending behavior over time, whereas cognitive empathy was not. Additionally, defenders increased their popularity among their peers. No substantial differences between victims and non-victims were found. This pattern of results suggests that, irrespective of victim status, specific children are more likely to defend in bullying situations and are rewarded with increased popularity.     

What does it take to have a positive impact on minority students' college retention?

This paper describes the Young Scholars Program (YSP), which seeks to expand the pool of African American and other underrepresented minority youth who aspire to attend college, and to help them meet entrance requirements and successfully obtain a college degree. Quarter-by-quarter data for the first two groups of YSP students entering The Ohio State University were promising. Their retention rates approximated university averages, while comparison groups showed lower levels of retention. It was concluded that the many facets of the Young Scholars Program, as well as the students' positive reputation among family members, peers, and teachers, produced strong motivation, ability, and determination to succeed.     

What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist?

In a recent paper, 'On the Persistence of Phenomenology' (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience , Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the core thought shared by many of the friends of qualia, namely, that our conceptual resources are inadequate for capturing the richness of experience. Experience is ineffably determinate. Moreover, Raffman's argument in support of this thought seems especially embarrassing to scientific-minded materialists, since the argument relies largely on well established empirical facts. We show, however, that Raffman's argument fails. So, if we are correct that her argument highlights what is tempting about qualia, then we have also shown that it is not tempting.     

What is it Like to be a Group Agent?

The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness (pace Schwitzgebel 2015 ). In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much‐discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.     

What is it to be healthy?

According to Christopher Boorse's Bio-Statistical Theory (BST), 'health' is statistically normal function in a reference class, and 'health' and 'disease' are empirical, objective and value-free concepts. I demonstrate that the success of the BST depends on its choice of reference classes; different reference classes result in different accounts of health. I argue that nothing in nature empirically or objectively dictates the use of reference classes Boorse proposes. Reference classes in the BST, and the concept of health, are therefore not value-free. Nor is there a reason to favour the BST over accounts of health that use different reference classes.     

What does it take to be a virtual team player? The knowledge,skills, abilities,and other characteristics required in virtual teams

Competency models are available for many aspects of work that cut across various occupations (such as leadership, teamwork, etc.). Although virtual teamwork has developed to a highly prevalent aspect of work, very little is known about the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics (KSAOs) required. In the current study, KSAO requirements of virtual and traditional business teams (n = 175 and 205, respectively) were compared and aligned to the Great Eight competency model. Results showed that KSAOs pertaining to Leading and Deciding and to Analyzing and Interpreting were more important in virtual teams. Conversely, virtual and traditional teams did not differ in terms of broad personality (Big Five) requirements. Together, these findings contribute to deeper knowledge on selection and training in virtual teams.     

What Does it Mean to be a Man Today?: Bloke Culture and the Media

Psychologists have paid scant attention to the positive relationships and community contributions of working class men who are not in trouble, and have focused instead on men who are ‘in trouble.’ In addressing this oversight, we draw on insights from ethnographic observations, life narrative interviews, photographic techniques and media items, which have been compiled by 12 working class men from a shared community of practice in New Zealand. We illustrate how these men often appropriate aspects from contemporary media deliberations regarding what it means to be a man today in order to make sense of their own lives. The implications of participants’ emphasis on friendship, support, familial obligations, and community participation are discussed in relation to the place of working class men in society.     

What is it like to be Oscar?

Oscar is going to be the first artificial person — at any rate, he is going to be the first artificial person to be built in Tucson's Philosophy Department. Oscar's creator, John Pollock, maintains that once Oscar is complete he will experience qualia, will be self-conscious, will have desires, fears, intentions, and a full range of mental states (Pollock 1989, pp. ix–x). In this paper I focus on what seems to me to be the most problematical of these claims, viz., that Oscar will experience qualia. I argue that we have not been given sufficient reasons to believe this bold claim. I doubt that Oscar will enjoy qualitative conscious phenomena and I maintain that it will be like nothing to be Oscar.     

What does it mean to be human? How salience of the human category affects responses to intergroup harm

Two studies explore how salience of the human category influences responses to intergroup harm and how different images of humanity modify these effects. In Study 1, British participants (n = 86) contemplated acts of terrorism against their group. When the human category (versus intergroup distinctions) was salient and when the prevailing image of humanity was malevolent (versus benevolent), participants were not only more understanding of terrorism, blamed this less on religious group memberships, but also more strongly endorsed the use of extreme force by countries to defend their boarders, preserve the peace and prevent future attacks. In Study 2, British participants (n = 83) contemplated the torture of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers. When the human category was salient and the prevailing image of humanity was malevolent, participants experienced less guilt and justified torture more. We conclude that the effects of human category salience on interpretations of intergroup harm depend on what it means to be human. When human nature is perceived negatively, thinking in terms of the human category can normalise intergroup harm regardless of whether the outgroup or the ingroup is the perpetrator. Implications for re‐categorisation approaches to conflict reduction are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What does it mean to trust blockchain technology?

This paper argues that the widespread belief that interactions between blockchains and their users are trust-free is inaccurate and misleading, since this belief not only overlooks the vital role played by trust in the lack of knowledge and control but also conceals the moral and normative relevance of relying on blockchain applications. The paper reaches this argument by providing a close philosophical examination of the concept referred to as trust in blockchain technology, clarifying the trustor group, the structure, and the normatively loaded nature of this trust relation. The paper ends by critically reflecting on two of the most promising values (decentralization and transparency) that can invite users’ trust in blockchain technology, arguing that there is a tension between the pressing values that are intended to be achieved by developers and the predicament situations caused by current blockchain implementations.     

Tigers and teapots: what does it mean to be alive?

The Symposium entitled 'Conceptual Knowledge: Developmental, Biological, Functional and Computational Accounts' was held at the British Academy, London, UK on 24-26 June 2002. It was funded by the British Academy with support from the Novartis Foundation, and organized by Lorraine Tyler (University of Cambridge, UK) and Tim Shallice (University College London, UK).