Rationales in children’s causal learning from others’ actions

Shown commensurate actions and information by an adult, preschoolers’ causal learning was influenced by the pedagogical context in which these actions occurred. Four-year-olds who were provided with a reason for an experimenter’s action relevant to learning causal structure showed more accurate causal learning than children exposed to the same action and data accompanied by an inappropriate rationale or accompanied by no explanatory information. These results suggest that children’s accurate causal learning is influenced by contextual factors that specify the instructional value of others’ actions.     

Two‐year‐old children preferentially transmit simple actions but not pedagogically demonstrated actions

Children are sensitive to both social and non‐social aspects of the learning environment. Among social cues, pedagogical communication has been shown to not only play a role in children's learning, but also in their own active transmission of knowledge. Vredenburgh, Kushnir and Casasola, Developmental Science, 2015, 18, 645 showed that 2‐year‐olds are more likely to demonstrate an action to a naive adult after learning it in a pedagogical than in a non‐pedagogical context. This finding was interpreted as evidence that pedagogically transmitted information has a special status as culturally relevant. Here we test the limits of this claim by setting it in contrast with an explanation in which the relevance of information is the outcome of multiple interacting social (e.g., pedagogical demonstration) and non‐social properties (e.g., action complexity). To test these competing hypotheses, we varied both pedagogical cues and action complexity in an information transmission paradigm with 2‐year‐old children. In Experiment 1, children preferentially transmitted simple non‐pedagogically demonstrated actions over pedagogically demonstrated more complex actions. In Experiment 2, when both actions were matched for complexity, we found no evidence of preferential transmission of pedagogically demonstrated actions. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy between our results and previous literature showing an effect of pedagogical cues on cultural transmission, and conclude that our results are compatible with the view that pedagogical and other cues interact, but incompatible with the theory of a privileged role for pedagogical cues.     

The double-edged sword of pedagogy: Instruction limits spontaneous exploration and discovery

Motivated by computational analyses, we look at how teaching affects exploration and discovery. In Experiment 1, we investigated children’s exploratory play after an adult pedagogically demonstrated a function of a toy, after an interrupted pedagogical demonstration, after a naïve adult demonstrated the function, and at baseline. Preschoolers in the pedagogical condition focused almost exclusively on the target function; by contrast, children in the other conditions explored broadly. In Experiment 2, we show that children restrict their exploration both after direct instruction to themselves and after overhearing direct instruction given to another child; they do not show this constraint after observing direct instruction given to an adult or after observing a non-pedagogical intentional action. We discuss these findings as the result of rational inductive biases. In pedagogical contexts, a teacher’s failure to provide evidence for additional functions provides evidence for their absence; such contexts generalize from child to child (because children are likely to have comparable states of knowledge) but not from adult to child. Thus, pedagogy promotes efficient learning but at a cost: children are less likely to perform potentially irrelevant actions but also less likely to discover novel information.     

Relations between 18-month-olds’ gaze pattern and target action performance: A deferred imitation study with eye tracking

Deferred imitation studies are used to assess infants’ declarative memory performance. These studies have found that deferred imitation performance improves with age, which is usually attributed to advancing memory capabilities. Imitation studies, however, are also used to assess infants’ action understanding. In this second research program it has been observed that infants around the age of one year imitate selectively, i.e., they imitate certain kinds of target actions and omit others. In contrast to this, two-year-olds usually imitate the model's exact actions. 18-month-olds imitate more exactly than one-year-olds, but more selectively than two-year-olds, a fact which makes this age group especially interesting, since the processes underlying selective vs. exact imitation are largely debated. The question, for example, if selective attention to certain kinds of target actions accounts for preferential imitation of these actions in young infants is still open. Additionally, relations between memory capabilities and selective imitation processes, as well as their role in shaping 18-month-olds’ neither completely selective, nor completely exact imitation have not been thoroughly investigated yet. The present study, therefore, assessed 18-month-olds’ gaze toward two types of actions (functional vs. arbitrary target actions) and the model's face during target action demonstration, as well as infants’ deferred imitation performance. Although infants’ fixation times to functional target actions were not longer than to arbitrary target actions, they imitated the functional target actions more frequently than the arbitrary ones. This suggests that selective imitation does not rely on selective gaze toward functional target actions during the demonstration phase. In addition, a post hoc analysis of interindividual differences suggested that infants’ attention to the model's social-communicative cues might play an important role in exact imitation, meaning the imitation of both functional and arbitrary target actions.     

Sensitivity to communicative relevance tells young children what to imitate

How do children decide which elements of an action demonstration are important to reproduce in the context of an imitation game? We tested whether selective imitation of a demonstrator’s actions may be based on the same search for relevance that drives adult interpretation of ostensive communication. Three groups of 18‐month‐old infants were shown a toy animal either hopping or sliding (action style) into a toy house (action outcome), but the communicative relevance of the action style differed depending on the group. For the no prior information group, all the information in the demonstration was new and so equally relevant. However, for infants in the ostensive prior information group, the potential action outcome was already communicated to the infant prior to the main demonstration, rendering the action style more relevant. Infants in the ostensive prior information group imitated the action style significantly more than infants in the no prior information group, suggesting that the relevance manipulation modulated their interpretation of the action demonstration. A further condition (non‐ostensive prior information) confirmed that this sensitivity to new information is only present when the ‘old’ information had been communicated, and not when infants discovered this information for themselves. These results indicate that, like adults, human infants expect communication to contain relevant content, and imitate action elements that, relative to their current knowledge state or to the common ground with the demonstrator, is identified as most relevant.     

The influence of negligence, intention, and outcome on children’s moral judgments

Piaget (1932) and subsequent researchers have reported that young children’s moral judgments are based more on the outcomes of actions than on the agents’ intentions. The current study investigated whether negligence might also influence these judgments and explain children’s apparent focus on outcome. Children (3–8 years of age) and adults (N = 139) rated accidental actions in which the valences of intention, negligence, and outcome were varied systematically. Participants of all ages were influenced primarily by intention, and well-intentioned actions were also evaluated according to negligence and outcome. Only two young children based their judgments solely on outcome. It is suggested that previous studies have underestimated children’s use of intention because outcome and negligence have been confounded. Negative consequences are considered to be important because children assume that they are caused by negligence. The findings indicate that young children can show sophisticated understanding of the roles of intention and negligence in moral judgments.     

Delayed imitation of complex behavioural sequences by 14- to 16-month olds

The present study was conducted to determine if children under the age of 18 months can exhibit delayed imitation of three-event sequences when they have no opportunity to practice. Twenty-three 14- to 16-month-old children underwent two different imitation conditions. In the practice condition the children could imitate the sequence immediately after modelling; then they were tested 1 or 7 days later. In the no practice condition the children had the chance to imitate only on the test day. Children were able to imitate the sequences under both conditions irrespective of the delay period. They produced significantly more target actions, and more target actions in the correct order, in the test phase and cued recall phase, compared with the baseline. There were no differences between the two conditions with a 1-day delay period, but after a 7-day delay, the number of target actions produced during the practice condition was significantly higher than those in the no practice condition. The results are discussed in terms of nonverbal mimetic representations. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

The Influence of Visually Dangerous Information on Imitation in Children

Abstract

Previous studies have demonstrated that when perceiving the actions of another agent, individuals will automatically imitate those observed actions. This study investigated how children’s imitation of physical actions was influenced by either visually neutral or visually dangerous information. Participants were presented with a series of pictures in which an agent was reaching towards either a neutral object or a dangerous object. Results showed that the imitation effect occurred when the agent was observed reaching and grasping a neutral object. However, this effect was not present when the agent’s hand was observed reaching towards or grasping, the non-handle side of a dangerous object. These results suggest children can predict potential behavioral consequences and adjust their imitative action depending on the perceived danger of the action.     

Preschoolers use pedagogical cues to guide radical reorganization of category knowledge

In constructing a conceptual understanding of the world, children must actively evaluate what information is idiosyncratic or superficial, and what represents essential, defining information about kinds and categories. Preschoolers observed identical evidence about a novel object’s function (magnetism) produced in subtly different manners: accidentally, intentionally, or demonstrated communicatively and pedagogically. Only when evidence was explicitly demonstrated for their benefit did children reliably go beyond salient perceptual features (color or shape), to infer function to be a defining property on which to base judgments about category membership. Children did not show this pattern when reasoning about a novel perceptual property, suggesting that a pedagogical communicative context may be especially important for children’s learning about artifact functions. Observing functional evidence in a pedagogical context helps children construct fundamentally different conceptions of novel categories as defined not by superficial appearances but by deeper, functional properties.     

Inference and coherence in causal-based artifact categorization

In four experiments, we tested conditions under which artifact concepts support inference and coherence in causal categorization. In all four experiments, participants categorized scenarios in which we systematically varied information about artifacts’ associated design history, physical structure, user intention, user action and functional outcome, and where each property could be specified as intact, compromised or not observed. Consistently across experiments, when participants received complete information (i.e., when all properties were observed), they categorized based on individual properties and did not show evidence of using coherence to categorize. In contrast, when the state of some property was not observed, participants gave evidence of using available information to infer the state of the unobserved property, which increased the value of the available information for categorization. Our data offers answers to longstanding questions regarding artifact categorization, such as whether there are underlying causal models for artifacts, which properties are part of them, whether design history is an artifact’s causal essence, and whether physical appearance or functional outcome is the most central artifact property.     

进化还是倒退:儿童过度模仿的文化共性与差异

过度模仿指模仿与完成目标无关的动作。本文通过比较不同文化下儿童过度模仿行为的共性和差异,探究了儿童过度模仿可能的产生机制。不同文化下的儿童均存在过度模仿行为,说明它很可能是人类累积文明发展的重要产物;而不同文化下儿童过度模仿的倾向又存在差异,生存环境、教导式学习和对社会规范的强调等因素均可能产生影响。未来研究可考虑进一步探究不同文化因素的具体作用,并比较不同文化下个体过度模仿行为的发展进程,帮助我们更好地理解过度模仿在人类文明发展中的意义。     

进化还是倒退:儿童过度模仿的文化共性与差异

过度模仿指模仿与完成目标无关的动作。本文通过比较不同文化下儿童过度模仿行为的共性和差异,探究了儿童过度模仿可能的产生机制。不同文化下的儿童均存在过度模仿行为,说明它很可能是人类累积文明发展的重要产物;而不同文化下儿童过度模仿的倾向又存在差异,生存环境、教导式学习和对社会规范的强调等因素均可能产生影响。未来研究可考虑进一步探究不同文化因素的具体作用,并比较不同文化下个体过度模仿行为的发展进程,帮助我们更好地理解过度模仿在人类文明发展中的意义。     

Preschool children's learning proclivities: When the ritual stance trumps the instrumental stance

Previous research has demonstrated an efficiency bias in social learning whereby young children preferentially imitate the functional actions of a successful individual over an unsuccessful group member. Our aim in the current research was to examine whether this bias remains when actions are presented as conventional rather than instrumental. Preschool children watched videos of an individual and a group member. The individual always demonstrated a successful instrumental action and the group member an unsuccessful action that was either causally transparent or opaque. Highlighting the selective nature of social learning, children copied the group at higher rates when the demonstrated actions were causally opaque than when they were causally transparent. This research draws attention to the influence of conventional/ritual‐like actions on young children's learning choices and emphasizes the role of this orientation in the development of human‐specific cumulative culture.     

Action preferences and the anticipation of action outcomes

Skilled performers of time-constrained motor actions acquire information about the action preferences of their opponents in an effort to better anticipate the outcome of that opponent's actions. However, there is reason to doubt that knowledge of an opponent's action preferences would unequivocally influence anticipatory responses in a positive way. It is possible that overt information about an opponent's actions could distract skilled performers from using the advance kinematic information they would usually rely on to anticipate actions, particularly when the opponent performs an ‘unexpected’ action that is not in accordance with his or her previous behaviour. The aim of this study was to examine how the ability to anticipate the outcome of an opponent's actions can be influenced by exposure to the action preferences of that opponent. Two groups of skilled handball goalkeepers anticipated the direction of penalty throws performed by opponents before and after a training intervention that provided situational probability information in the form of action preferences (AP). During the training phase participants in an AP-training group anticipated the action outcomes of two throwers who had a strong preference to throw in one particular direction, whilst participants in a NP-training group viewed players who threw equally to all directions. Exposure to opponents who did have an action preference during the training phase resulted in improved anticipatory performance if the opponent continued to bias their throws towards their preferred direction, but decreased performance if the opponent did not. These findings highlight that skilled observers use information about action preferences to enhance their anticipatory ability, but that doing so can be disadvantageous when the outcomes are no longer consistent with their generated expectations.     

The mirror reflects both ways: Action influences perception of others

Substantial evidence links perception of others’ bodies and mental representation of the observer’s own body; however, the overwhelming majority of this evidence is unidirectional, showing influence from perception to action. It has been proposed that the influence also runs from action to perception, but to date the evidence is scant. Here we report that ordinary motor actions performed by the subject affect concurrent psychophysical judgments of human-body stimuli. Subjects remained unaware of the connection between the action and the main task. The results show that perception can change as a result of the observer’s ongoing actions.     

Inferring action structure and causal relationships in continuous sequences of human action

In the real world, causal variables do not come pre-identified or occur in isolation, but instead are embedded within a continuous temporal stream of events. A challenge faced by both human learners and machine learning algorithms is identifying subsequences that correspond to the appropriate variables for causal inference. A specific instance of this problem is action segmentation: dividing a sequence of observed behavior into meaningful actions, and determining which of those actions lead to effects in the world. Here we present a Bayesian analysis of how statistical and causal cues to segmentation should optimally be combined, as well as four experiments investigating human action segmentation and causal inference. We find that both people and our model are sensitive to statistical regularities and causal structure in continuous action, and are able to combine these sources of information in order to correctly infer both causal relationships and segmentation boundaries.     

Paradoxical decrease of imitation performance with age in children

Imitation development was studied in a cross-sectional design involving 174 primary-school children (aged 6–10), focusing on the effect of actions' complexity and error analysis to infer the underlying cognitive processes. Participants had to imitate the model's actions as if they were in front of a mirror (‘specularly’). Complexity varied across three levels: movements of a single limb; arm and leg of the same body side; or arm and leg of opposite body sides. While the overall error rate decreased with age, this was not true of all error categories. The rate of ‘side’ errors (using a limb of the wrong body side) paradoxically increased with age (from 9 years). However, with increasing age, the error rate also became less sensitive to the complexity of the action. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that older children have the working memory (WM) resources and the body knowledge necessary to imitate ‘anatomically’, which leads to additional side errors. Younger children might be paradoxically free from such interference because their WM and/or body knowledge are insufficient for anatomical imitation. Yet, their limited WM resources would prevent them from successfully managing the conflict between spatial codes involved in complex actions (e.g. moving the left arm and the right leg). We also found evidence that action side and content might be stored in separate short-term memory (STM) systems: increasing the number of sides to be encoded only affected side retrieval, but not content retrieval; symmetrically, increasing the content (number of movements) of the action only affected content retrieval, but not side retrieval. In conclusion, results suggest that anatomical imitation might interfere with specular imitation at age 9 and that STM storages for side and content of actions are separate.     

Fourteen-month-old infants copy an action style accompanied by social-emotional cues

Human adults exaggerate their actions and facial expressions when interacting with infants. These infant-directed modifications highlight certain aspects of action sequences and attract infants’ attention. This study investigated whether social-emotional aspects of infant-directed modifications, such as smiling, eye contact, and onomatopoeic vocalization, influence infants’ copying of another's action, especially action style, during the process of achieving an outcome. In Study 1, 14-month-old infants (n = 22) saw an experimenter demonstrate goal-directed actions in an exaggerated manner. Either the style or the end state of the actions was accompanied by social-emotional cues from the experimenter. Infants copied the style of the action more often when social-emotional cues accompanied the style than when they accompanied the end state. In Study 2, a different group of 14-month-old infants (n = 22) watched the same exaggerated actions as in Study 1, except that either the style or the end state was accompanied by a physical sound instead of social-emotional cues. The infants copied the end state consistently more often than the style. Taken together, these two studies showed that accompanying social-emotional cues provided by a demonstrator, but not accompanying physical sound, increased infants’ copying of action style. These findings suggest that social-emotional cues facilitate efficient social learning through the adult–infant interaction.     

Male more than female infants imitate propulsive motion

Few experimental studies investigate the mechanisms by which young children develop sex-typed activity preferences. Gender self-labeling followed by selective imitation of same-sex models currently is considered a primary socialization mechanism. Research with prenatally androgenized girls and non-human primates also suggests an innate male preference for activities that involve propulsive movement. Here we show that before children can label themselves by gender, 6- to 9-month-old male infants are more likely than female infants to imitate propulsive movements. Further, male infants’ increase in propulsive movement was linearly related to proportion of time viewing a male model’s propulsive movements. We propose that male sex-typed behavior develops from socialization mechanisms that build on a male predisposition to imitate propulsive motion.