Believing in one’s equal rights: Self-respect as a predictor of assertiveness

In the present research self-respect is defined as a person’s ability to see the self as someone who has the same basic rights and dignity as others. Self-respect fills a gap in previous theorizing on the self because unlike other self-concepts it can be linked to assertiveness and claim making. Self-respect was empirically distinguished from self-competence and self-confidence (Study 1) as well as from psychological entitlement, self-esteem and self-acceptance (Study 2). Self-respect predicted assertive responses above and beyond these other self-scales in two correlational studies (Studies 1 and 3) and one experiment (Study 2). As predicted, self-respect was not related to aggressive responses, but psychological entitlement was (Studies 2 and 3). Implications for future research are discussed.     

Seeking one’s heading through eye movements

A study of eye movements during simulated travel toward a grove of four stationary trees revealed that observers looked most at pairs of trees that converged or decelerated apart. Such pairs specify that one’s direction of travel, calledheading, is to the outside of the near member of the pair. Observers looked at these trees more than those that accelerated apart; such pairs do not offer trustworthy heading information. Observers also looked at gaps between trees less often when they converged or diverged apart, and heading can never be between such pairs. Heading responses were in accord with eye movements. In general, if observers responded accurately, they had looked at trees that converged or decelerated apart; if they were inaccurate, they had not. Results support the notion that observers seek out their heading through eye movements, saccading to and fixating on the most informative locations in the field of view.     

How to know one’s experiences transparently

Philosophical Studies - I would like to propose a demonstrative transparency model of our immediate, introspective self-knowledge of experiences. It is a model entirely in line with transparency....     

Motives behind the veil: Women’s affective experiences wearing a veil depend on their reasons for wearing one

Strong assumptions about Muslim women wearing a veil abound, yet few studies examine women’s felt experiences of wearing one. The current study applied self-determination theory to examine how individual differences in motives for wearing a veil relate to women’s experiences in the Muslim-majority countries of Iran and Saudi Arabia (N = 791). Confirmatory results showed autonomous motivation for wearing a veil (e.g., for self-expression) related robustly to more positive and fewer negative affective experiences, and exploratory analyses suggested autonomous motivation for the veil predicted women’s life satisfaction across these two countries. However, results for controlled motives (e.g., perceiving no choice) were mixed. Findings suggested the experience of wearing a veil depend heavily on women’s individual differences in motives.     

Predicting one’s own and others’ 16 PF scores

This study examined the relationship between subjects’ actual test derived scores and their estimates of what those scores would be. Sixty subjects completed the 16 PF (form D) and then estimated the scores on each dimension for themselves and another person they knew well. The results showed significant positive correlations on 9 of the 16 dimensions for themselves. The dimensions they were best at estimating were Desurgency-Surgency, Untroubled adequacy-guilt proneness and Threctia-Parmia. Only two correlations (both negative) reached significance concerning their ability to predict another known person’s scores. Whereas subjects believed they were like the other person they nominated (13 of the 16 correlations were significantly positive), in actual fact their test derived scores showed only two significant findings, one positive and the other negative. Results are discussed in terms of lay theories of personality and their relationship to personality assessment.     

Investigating how ostracizing others affects one’s self-concept

Abstract

Social relationships are connected with an individual’s self-concept, so events that influence one’s relationships subsequently influence one’s self-concept. Ostracism, being excluded and ignored, is an aversive experience involving both a target (the one being ostracized) and source (the one ostracizing). We will discuss previous limitations of source paradigms and how we addressed them when developing our paradigms. We will also highlight current source research, from a co-edited special issue, and how this research is relevant to an individuals’ self-concept. Lastly, we will suggest how cognitive dissonance work can ground source research within a larger theoretical framework and inspire future research. We consider how one’s self-concept influences cognitive dissonance related to knowingly harming others through ostracism.     

Kant’s coherent theory of the highest good

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - In the second Critique, Kant argues that for the highest good to be possible we need to postulate the existence of God and the...     

Theorizing about truth outside of one’s own language

A theory of truth is language-transcendent if it ascribes truth conditions to truth-bearers that are not expressible in (or translatable to) our natural language; a theory is language-immanent if it is not language-transcendent. In this paper, I argue for the following theses. (1) Whether the correct theory of truth is language-transcendent or language-immanent will have significant consequences for general philosophy. Prima facie, a language-transcendent theory is preferable. However, (2) language-transcendent theories tend to require substantive metaphysical commitments concerning truth. Deflationist theories are particularly interesting in this context. I argue that, if deflationism is to remain consistent with its motivations, then it must opt for a language-immanent conception of truth.

     

“Improving one’s touch” … and more

Gordon and Cooper (1975) have described an interesting tactile phenomenon. The orientation of undulations on the surface of an object can be detected more accurately when a person moves an intermediate paper over the surface than when the bare fingers are used. Counter to a prediction derived from Gordon and Cooper’s explanation of their results, the present studies show that the apparent roughness of a surface increases when a similar manner of touching is used. The first two experiments confirm the latter observation. To explain the alteration in perceived roughness (and more tentatively, Gordon and Cooper’s own findings), it is proposed that surface roughness (and undulations) are masked by shear forces applied to the skin. Two informal tests and a third experiment support this interpretation. Alternative explanations and a practical application for the blind are also considered.     

Perceiving one’s own movements when using a tool

The present study examined what participants perceive of their hand movements when using a tool. In the experiments different gains for either the x-axis or the y-axis perturbed the relation between hand movements on a digitizer tablet and cursor movements on a display. As a consequence of the perturbation participants drew circles on the display while their covered hand movements followed either vertical or horizontal ellipses on the digitizer tablet. When asked to evaluate their hand movements, participants were extremely uncertain about their trajectories. By varying the amount of visual feedback, findings indicated that the low awareness of one’s own movements originated mainly from an insufficient quality of the humans’ tactile and proprioceptive system or from an insufficient spatial reconstruction of this information in memory.     

Mnemic neglect: Selective amnesia of one’s faults

The mnemic neglect model predicts and accounts for selective memory for social feedback as a function of various feedback properties. At the heart of the model is the mnemic neglect effect (MNE), defined as inferior recall for self-threatening feedback compared to other kinds of feedback. The effect emerges both in mundane realism and minimal feedback settings. The effect is presumed to occur in the service of self-protection motivation. Mnemic neglect is pronounced when the feedback poses high levels of self-threat (i.e., can detect accurately one’s weakness), but is lost when self-threat is averted via a self-affirmation manipulation. Mnemic neglect is caused by self-threatening feedback being processed shallowly and in ways that separate it from stored (positive) self-knowledge. The emergence of mnemic neglect is qualified by situational moderators (extent to which one considers their self-conceptions modifiable, receives feedback from a close source, or is primed with improvement-related constructs) and individual differences moderators (anxiety, dysphoria, or defensive pessimism). Finally, the MNE is present in recall, but absent in recognition. Output interference cannot explain this disparity in results, but an inhibitory repression account (e.g., experiential avoidance) can: Repressors show enhanced mnemic neglect. The findings advance research on memory, motivation, and the self.     

Counterfactual thinking about one’s birth enhances well-being judgments

Previous research demonstrates that thinking counterfactually about life experiences facilitates meaning making about those events. Two studies extend this work into the well-being domain by examining the effects of writing factually or counterfactually about one’s birth on well-being. In Study 1, participants (N?=?252) were randomly assigned to write factually or counterfactually about their births or the election of Barack Obama and then completed measures of meaning in life and life satisfaction. Writing counterfactually about one’s birth led to higher evaluations of life relative to all other groups. In Study 2, (N?=?98) participants wrote factually or counterfactually about their births and again completed well-being measures. Fate attributions, probability estimates, and feelings of luck were explored as potential mediators. The effect on well-being from Study 1 replicated, but was not driven by any of the measured variables. Implications for existential psychology and well-being research are discussed.     

On justifying one’s acceptance of divine command theory

It has been alleged against divine command theory (DCT) that we cannot justify our acceptance of it without giving it up. For if we provide moral reasons for our acceptance of God’s commands, then those reasons, and not God’s commands, must be our ultimate moral standard. Kai Nielsen has offered the most forceful version of this objection in his book, Ethics Without God. My principal aim is to show that Nielsen’s charge does not succeed. His argument crucially relies upon the assumption that the moral judgments one employs to justify acceptance of a normative theory are more fundamental to one’s moral outlook than the theory itself. I argue that this assumption presupposes a questionable foundationalist view of theory justification, and if we instead adopt a coherentist reflective equilibrium stance, we can thoughtfully evaluate DCT without abandoning it.     

Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it

Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising.