The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis

Abstract

Certain philosophers maintain that there is a ‘constitutive threshold for belief’: to believe that p just is to have a degree of confidence that p above a certain threshold. On the basis of this view, these philosophers defend what is known as ‘the Lockean Thesis’, according to which it is rational to believe that p just in case it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p above the constitutive threshold for belief. While not directly speaking to the controversy over the Lockean Thesis, this paper defends the general idea behind it—namely, the thesis that there is some threshold such that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence greater than that threshold. This paper identifies the threshold in question—not with the alleged constitutive threshold for belief—but with what I call ‘the practical threshold for rational belief’. Roughly, the thesis defended here is that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p that rationalizes engaging in certain types of practical reasoning.     

Lockean Empathy

This paper offers an epistemic defense of empathy, drawing on John Locke's theory of ideas. Locke held that ideas of shape, unlike ideas of color, had a distinctive value: resembling qualities in their objects. I argue that the same is true of empathy, as when someone is pained by someone's pain. This means that empathy has the same epistemic value or objectivity that Locke and other early modern philosophers assigned to veridical perceptions of shape. For this to hold, pain and pleasure must be a primary quality of the mind, just as shape is a primary quality of bodies. Though Locke did not make that claim, I argue that pain and pleasure satisfy his criteria for primary qualities. I consider several objections to the analogy between empathy and shape‐perception and show how Locke's theory has resources for answering them. In addition, the claim that empathetic ideas are object‐matching sidesteps Berkeley's influential objection to Locke's theory of resemblance. I conclude by briefly considering the prospects for a similar defense of empathy in contemporary terms.     

Cognitive psychology and modern physics: Some analogies

Abstract

Patterns in physics and psychology are often related. This paper examines such relations on two levels. First, a survey is made of the various possible relations between physics and psychology and, secondly, a series of analogies between patterns in modern physics and cognition is presented. The analogies pertain both to the theory of relativity (both special and general) and to quantum mechanics. While the different analogies noted are argued for independently from one another, together they do present some unified patterns. It is argued that the analogies may be useful in opening up avenues for new conceptual bameworks in psychology. In particular, they are linked to a possible critique of the representational view of mind.     

A Lockean Argument for Black Reparations

This is a defense of blackreparations using the theory of reparations setout in John Locke's The Second Treatise ofGovernment. I develop two mainarguments, what I call the ``inheritanceargument' and the ``counterfactual argument,'both of which have been thought to fail. In nocase do I appeal to the false ideas that presentday United States citizens are guilty ofslavery or must pay reparation simply becausethe U.S. Government was once complicit in thecrime.     

Between the modern and the postmodern. The possibility of self and progressive understanding in psychology

Psychology assumes defensible notions of human subjectivity and understanding. Yet, some versions of postmodernism, including some of those currently influential within psychology, eschew the possibility of the kind of understanding-capable personhood on which modern psychology has depended. The authors argue for a skeptical, middle-ground position that might allow psychologists to resist a forced choice between modernism and postmodernism in their subject matter and understanding. The authors set up their argument with 2 stories of human development and change. These stories assume no fixed, essentialist foundations of the sort favored in classically modern psychologies, yet they maintain the possibility of both self and understanding within a real but contingent physical, biological, and sociocultural world. The authors then articulate a middle-ground position as one that avoids the fixed foundationalism, essentialism, and absolute certitude of modernity, without endorsing the radical arbitrariness, antisubjectivism, and anarchistic relativism of some versions of postmodernity.     

Spoilage and Squatting: A Lockean Argument

Res Publica - John Locke is generally seen as an unequivocal defender of private property. However, taken normatively, certain aspects of his argument leave room for interesting loopholes with...     

尊礼的义务:洛克式爱国主义的构成与展现

洛克的爱国主义思想主要是通过"尊礼的义务"体现出来的。从尊礼家长到尊礼君王、再到尊礼国家,构成洛克式爱国主义的脉络。在洛克的语境中,尊礼家长的义务不是一项政治义务,但它具有与同意、自愿、职责、共同福祉相关的政治特质,这是洛克式爱国主义的根源。在政治社会中,不可取消的、永恒的、尊礼家长的非政治义务转变为可取消的、有条件的、尊礼君王的政治义务,以平衡尊礼政治权威与规训君王权力之间的张力。而当人民反抗君王的权利与人民尊礼君王的义务之间的矛盾需要调解时,尊礼的对象则落定为君王所代表的政治共同体——国家,以便与可反抗的君王自然之身区别开来,由此呈现出洛克式爱国主义的主旨——捍卫共同福祉。英国光荣革命后,有效协调个体与集体、人民与君王、人民及其代表之间的有限君主制,不仅成为洛克尊礼的对象,也成为洛克式爱国主义的具体范例。     

Lockean Essentialism and the Possibility of Miracles

If the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then it appears that miracles are metaphysically impossible. Yet Locke accepts both essentialism, which takes the laws to be metaphysically necessary, and the possibility of miracles. I argue that the apparent conflict here can be resolved if the laws are by themselves insufficient for guaranteeing the outcome of a particular event. This suggests that, on Locke's view, the laws of nature entail how an object would behave absent divine intervention . While other views of laws also make miracles counterfactually dependent on God's will, I show how this view is consistent with the essentialist commitment to the view that the laws are metaphysically necessary. Further, I argue that Locke's view is a relatively attractive version of essentialism, in part, because it allows for the possibility of miracles.