Why can't I get hives: brief strategic therapy with an obsessional child

A case study is presented of a 10-year-old boy who obsessively feared he would vomit. The material is formulated within a psychodynamic as well as a strategic model, and treatment approaches are suggested for each. The treatment consisted of a five-session, strategic, problem-focused approach over three months with a two-year follow-up. The rationale and effective ingredients of the intervention are discussed.     

Why concepts can't be theories

In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the ‘theory-theory’ of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the ‘theory-theory’ is supposed to replace, and to rectify the problems of, the earlier ‘classical’ and ‘probabilistic’ theories, its failure confirms Fodor's original observation. Since my critique does not rest on controversial philosophical assumptions and is readily available from within the cognitive sciences, it is a stronger argument than Fodor's.     

Why we Believe

The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

集体自恋：群际冲突的催化剂

集体自恋是将自恋延伸到群体水平的一个经典构念, 目前被界定为对于“自身所属群体是卓越的并值得优待, 却未充分被他者承认”的信念。现有研究发现它对群际敌对性有较强解释力, 因为集体自恋者对内群体形象、地位或身份所受威胁高度敏感, 容易高估威胁和怀疑外群体, 而缺乏自我价值感及控制感是集体自恋的重要根源。鉴于现有研究一般都预设了集体自恋的脆弱性和消极性, 而集体自恋的属性不必然如此, 未来研究应在充分厘清集体自恋内涵及结构的基础上探索其消极与积极后效, 揭示其多元成因及干预方法, 并推进跨文化研究。     

Why wouldn't we cry? Love and loss along a river in decline

Along the upper reaches of the Ganga in the Indian Himalayas, devotees of the river and its Hindu Goddess decry the changes that are effecting the sanctity and continuity of its flow. Concerns include the impacts of development projects such as hydroelectric dams and the implications of climate shifts such as altered precipitation, warming temperatures, and melting glaciers. These forces of change are frequent subjects of commentary for those that fear the river's potential demise. This article draws from ethnographic research from 2008 to 2009 to highlight two of the main emotions cited by river devotees when they speak of its condition: love and loss. The feelings of intimacy are sometimes expressed through talk of identity (pehchaan) and in demands to ensure the river's uninterrupted flow. Expressions of loss are also shared verbally, through discourse, and they are evident in moments when people respond to significant changes in the river's appearance. After addressing discourses of concern for the Ganga, the article closes with the Government of India's decision to cancel the contested dams on the river's upper regions and to declare it an “eco-sensitive zone”. Such measures are important recognitions of emotive linkages with and dependencies on nature.     

Why Narcissists are Unwilling to Apologize: The Role of Empathy and Guilt

We hypothesized that narcissists would be unwilling to apologize for their interpersonal transgressions, and that reduced levels of self‐reported empathy and guilt would serially mediate this effect. Narcissism is characterized by little empathy for the victim, which reduces guilt about one's transgressions. Low guilt, in turn, is associated with unwillingness to apologize. In Study 1, we assessed dispositional narcissism, empathy, guilt, and willingness to apologize. In Study 2, we assessed dispositional narcissism and obtained state measures of empathy, guilt, and willingness to apologize. In Study 3, we manipulated narcissism and collected state measures of empathy, guilt, and willingness to apologize. Narcissism was negatively associated with (Studies 1–2) and decreased (Study 3) willingness to apologize, with this link being explained (i.e., serially mediated) by low empathy and guilt. Finally, in Study 4, we showed that antagonistic narcissism (i.e., narcissistic rivalry), but not agentic narcissism (i.e., narcissistic admiration), was negatively associated with willingness to apologize and apologizing behaviour. In all, narcissists are unwilling to apologize for their transgressions, as they experience little empathy for their victims and lower guilt. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Why we are fairer than others

Subjects wrote lists of either fair or unfair things that they or others did. A pervasive tendency was found for subjects to associate themselves with fair behaviors and others with unfair behaviors. When different subjects rated samples of the written behaviors for fairness and frequency we found that fair behaviors were rated as more frequent than unfair behaviors and self-ascribed behaviors were rated as fairer than behaviors ascribed to others. These findings and others are shown to result from a tendency for subjects to perceive a stronger link between the fairness and frequency of their own behavior than between the fairness and frequency of the behavior of other people. A final analysis showed that the subcategories of unfair behavior that subjects associated with others were different from those associated with themselves.     

Why Tyrants Go Too Far: Malignant Narcissism and Absolute Power

This article explores the puzzling behavior of tyrants who undermine themselves once in power. The realpolitik perspective and a variety of psychological frameworks are used to try to resolve this puzzle in the cases of several ancient and three contemporary tyrants. Although all the frameworks used have explanatory power, the one that most closely fits the tyrants studied here is that of the narcissist with severe superego deficiencies. An individual with such psychological characteristics may have some advantages in rising to power, and his behavior may be an effective response to some real-life factors, but once he has consolidated his position his reality-testing capacities diminish. Fantasies held in check when his power is limited are apt to become his guides to action. As a consequence, his behavior becomes more erratic, he runs into difficulties in meeting his goals, and his paranoid defenses become more exaggerated. The finale of a tyrant's career depends on the particulars of his political and social situation.     

Why we need cognitive explanations of autism

In the 70 years since autism was described and named there have been huge changes in the conceptualization of this enigmatic condition. This review takes a personal perspective on the history of autism research. The origins of the first cognitive theories of autism, theory of mind and weak central coherence, are discussed and updated to inform future developments. Selected experimental findings are interpreted in the historical context of changes that have been brought about by advances in methodology. A three-level framework graphically illustrates a causal chain between brain, mind, and behaviour to facilitate the identification of phenotypes in neurodevelopmental disorders. Cognition is placed at the centre of the diagram to reveal that it can link together brain and behaviour, when there are complex multiple mappings between the different levels.     

Why we can still believe the error theory

The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer’s arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer’s argument for why we can’t believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer’s positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can’t believe the error theory.     

Why we view the brain as a computer

The view that the brain is a sort of computer has functioned as a theoretical guideline both in cognitive science and, more recently, in neuroscience. But since we can view every physical system as a computer, it has been less than clear what this view amounts to. By considering in some detail a seminal study in computational neuroscience, I first suggest that neuroscientists invoke the computational outlook to explain regularities that are formulated in terms of the information content of electrical signals. I then indicate why computational theories have explanatory force with respect to these regularities:in a nutshell, they underscore correspondence relations between formal/mathematical properties of the electrical signals and formal/mathematical properties of the represented objects. I finally link my proposal to the philosophical thesis that content plays an essential role in computational taxonomy.     

Why we simulate negated information: A dynamic pragmatic account

A well-established finding in the simulation literature is that participants simulate the positive argument of negation soon after reading a negative sentence, prior to simulating a scene consistent with the negated sentence (Kaup, Lüdtke, & Zwaan, 2006 Kaup, B., Lüdtke, J. and Zwaan, R. A. 2006. Processing negated sentences with contradictory predicates: Is a door that is not open mentally closed?. Journal of Pragmatics, 38: 1033–1050. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2007 Kaup, B., Yaxley, R. H., Madden, C. J., Zwaan, R. A. and Lüdtke, J. 2007. Experiential simulations of negated text information. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60: 976–990. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). One interpretation of this finding is that negation requires two steps to process: first represent what is being negated then “reject” that in favour of a representation of a negation-consistent state of affairs (Kaup et al., 2007 Kaup, B., Yaxley, R. H., Madden, C. J., Zwaan, R. A. and Lüdtke, J. 2007. Experiential simulations of negated text information. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60: 976–990. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). In this paper we argue that this finding with negative sentences could be a by-product of the dynamic way that language is interpreted relative to a common ground and not the way that negation is represented. We present a study based on Kaup et al. (2007) Kaup, B., Yaxley, R. H., Madden, C. J., Zwaan, R. A. and Lüdtke, J. 2007. Experiential simulations of negated text information. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60: 976–990. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] that tests the competing accounts. Our results suggest that some negative sentences are not processed in two steps, but provide support for the alternative, dynamic account.     

You can't always get what you want: The influence of unexpected task constraint on voluntary task switching

The current study assessed the effect that unexpected task constraint, following self-generated task choice, has on task switching performance. Participants performed a modified double-registration voluntary task switching procedure in which participants specified the task they wanted to perform, were presented with a cue that, on the majority of trials, confirmed the choice, and then performed the cued task. On a small portion of trials, participants were cued to perform a task that did not match their choice. Trials on which cues unexpectedly failed to match the chosen task were associated with costs. These costs were particularly large when participants chose to switch tasks but had to unexpectedly repeat the previous task. The results suggest that when participants choose to switch tasks, they prepare for that switch in anticipation of the stimulus, and the preparation is durable such that it cannot be readily undone.     

Making human research safe: Why we cannot afford to fail

This paper was given as a keynote address at the international conference on Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents held in Warsaw, Poland on April 23–24, 2004. The address was the introductory presentation to the important topic of protecting individuals who participate in research as research subjects.     

Limitations to the capacity to love

This paper is a meditation on the potential and problems of establishing and maintaining loving and passionate relationships, drawn from a lifetime of struggling with these issues in the course of doing analysis. It describes interferences with the capacity for mature sexual love as reflecting various psychopathological conditions. These limitations include a variety of psychological restrictions determined most frequently by masochistic, narcissistic and paranoid personality features. Clinical case material illustrates both mature and disturbed capability for love relations.     

Why and how we should care about the General Data Protection Regulation

Abstract

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the new European Union-wide (EU) law on data protection, which is a great step towards more comprehensive and more far-reaching protection of individuals' personal data. In this editorial, we describe why and how we – as researchers within the field of health psychology – should care about the GDPR. In the first part, we explain when the GDPR is applicable, who is accountable for data protection, and what is covered by the notions of personal data and processing. In the second part, we explain aspects of the GDPR that are relevant for researchers within the field of health psychology (e.g., obtaining informed consent, data minimisation, and open science). We focus on questions that researchers may ask themselves in their daily practice. Compliance with the GDPR requires adopting research practices (e.g., data minimisation and anonymization procedures) that are not yet commonly used, but serve the fundamental right to protection of personal data of study participants.     

Examining the life story account of the reminiscence bump: Why we remember more from young adulthood

The reminiscence bump is a robust finding demonstrated mostly with the cue-word method in Western cultures. The first aim of the study was to replicate the reminiscence bump using a life history timeline method and to extend reminiscence bump research to a Turkish sample. The second aim was to empirically examine the recently proposed life story account (Glück & Bluck, 2007) for the reminiscence bump. The sample consisted of 40 women and 32 men aged 52 to 66 years. Participants’ lives were divided into 5-year intervals and they verbally reported as many memories as possible in a standard timeframe from each interval (in random order) and provided ratings of several memory characteristics. As expected, the lifespan distribution of the resulting 6373 memories demonstrated a reminiscence bump. In support of the life story account, bump memories were found to be more novel, more important for identity development, more distinct, and more likely to involve developmental transitions than memories from other age periods. Findings are discussed in terms of the life story account, which synthesises lifespan developmental theory and life story theory.     

Competing interests: The need to control conflict of interests in biomedical research

Individual and institutional conflict of interests in biomedical research have becomes matters of increasing concern in recent years. In the United States, the growth in relationships — sponsored research agreements, consultancies, memberships on boards, licensing agreements, and equity ownership — between for-profit corporations and research universities and their scientists has made the problem of conflicts, particularly financial conflicts, more acute. Conflicts can interfere with or compromise important principles and obligations of researchers and their institutions, e.g., adherence to accepted research norms, duty of care to patients, and open exchange of information. Disclosure is a key component of a successful conflict policy. Commitments which conflict with a faculty member's primary obligations to teaching, research, administrative responsibilities, or patient care also need attention. Institutional conflict of interests present different problems, some of which are discussed in an analysis of an actual problem posed by two proposed clinical trials. This paper is adapted from a lecture presented to a Symposium on Scientific Integrity, Warsaw, Poland, 23 November 1995. Daniel Steiner was Vice-President and General Counsel of Harvard University (1972–92) and in that capacity became familiar with conflict of interest issues. He is currently Counsel to the Boston law firm. Ropes and Gray, and is Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Harvard University.