Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.     

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.     

The ‘healthy’ family*

The importance of concepts and hypotheses about ‘healthy’ families for family therapists is stressed. A number of different approaches to defining ‘health’ is described. Concepts and hypotheses of family therapists from different schools are integrated into a more encompassing theory, thereby focusing on statements with respect to personality, cognition, behaviour, communication, relationship, role, family system and network. It is noted that family therapy literature lacks information about ‘healthy’ families. Moreover, nearly all statements are non-scientific and normative as they are not founded on empirical research.     

Love and anarchy in Romania : A critical review of Mircea Eliade's Autobiography, volume one, 1907–1937

Eliade is a problem: to at least half of today's historians of religion he embodies the discipline; to the other half he is anathema. I do not intend to review this debate here, nor to rehearse the themes of Eliade's massive oeuvre. I will, however, point over my shoulder to the mixed legacy of theoretical debts and doubts Eliade's work has inspired and try to bring them into relationship with the life story Eliade tells in the Autobiography. This review then attempts to show how Eliade's ‘life’ and ‘letters’ cohere and thus how in illuminating one we shed light on the other.     

The typicality of therapeutic ‘surprises’

One reason why exposure to a feared stimulus does not result in a reduction in anxiety involves patients' cognitions as to the typicality of the encounter. This possibility was tested by relating the discrepancy between the discomfort dental patients expect to feel and their actual experience to their views of the typicality of the appointment and any change in dental anxiety reported 3 months later. As predicted, a large discrepancy between expected and experienced pain was associated with a change in anxiety only when the patients were confident that the discrepancy was a typical one. Implications for the design of therapeutic programmes are discussed.     

‘Unwilling’ versus ‘unable’: capuchin monkeys’ (Cebus apella) understanding of human intentional action

A sensitivity to the intentions behind human action is a crucial developmental achievement in infants. Is this intention reading ability a unique and relatively recent product of human evolution and culture, or does this capacity instead have roots in our non‐human primate ancestors? Recent work by Call and colleagues (2004) lends credence to the latter hypothesis, providing evidence that chimpanzees are also sensitive to human intentions. Specifically, chimpanzees remained in a testing area longer and exhibited fewer frustration behaviors when an experimenter behaved as if he intended to give food but was unable to do so, than when the experimenter behaved as if he had no intention of giving food. The present research builds on and extends this paradigm, providing some of the first evidence of intention reading in a more distant primate relative, the capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). Like chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys distinguish between different goal‐directed acts, vacating an enclosure sooner when an experimenter acts unwilling to give food than when she acts unable to give food. Additionally, we found that this pattern is specific to animate action, and does not obtain when the same actions are performed by inanimate rods instead of human hands (for a similar logic, see Woodward, 1998 ). Taken together with the previous evidence, the present research suggests that our own intention reading is not a wholly unique aspect of the human species, but rather is shared broadly across the primate order.     

Rereading Mircea Eliade's Youth Without Youth, a story of suspicion and camouflage

The article argues that Mircea Eliade's 1976 novella Youth Without Youth (which has been recently turned into a film by Francis Ford Coppola) offers an intriguing literary illustration of the concept of ‘camouflage’ so prominent in Eliade's scholarly writings. Youth Without Youth, revolving around the paradoxes of aging and of (biological) time, develops as a fantastic reverie, a mysterious gnostic parable under the appearances of a work of science fiction, and ultimately becomes a sort of rebus, made up of a large number of suggested enigmas within enigmas. It is, at the same time, an opportunity for the author to revisit phantasmatically a dramatic period of his life – the year 1938. Historical reality becomes fantastic, charged with symbols and riddles. The Eliadean dialectic between the sacred and the profane is interestingly doubled in this story by a dialectic between spying and hiding, surveillance and escape, suspicion and camouflage.