Spilling thoughts: configuring attentional resources in infants’ goal-directed actions

The focus and organization of attention in perception-action coupling is systematically examined in two studies involving 9 and 10 -month-old infants engaged in learning goal-directed behaviors. Experiment 1 (discrimination study) observed the influence of an attentionally demanding motor task on learning and cognition, while Experiment 2 (means-ends study) observed the influence of an attentionally demanding goal on motor planning and reaching performance. Taken together the results of these two experiments revealed that when mental processing resources were directed to thinking about movement, discrimination performance became compromised; conversely, when processing resources were directed to thinking about the goal-state, the motor planning and execution became compromised. These results suggest a “spilling forward” of thoughts onto actions and goal-states and thus an attention-driven cognition/action trade-off for infants’ goal-directed actions. Findings highlight the ultimate importance of emerging motor skills on cognition and are contextualized within the on-going dialogues and developmental debates surrounding perceptual-motor skill development and problem-solving strategies during the first year.     

Animal foraging and the evolution of goal-directed cognition

Foraging- and feeding-related behaviors across eumetazoans share similar molecular mechanisms, suggesting the early evolution of an optimal foraging behavior called area-restricted search (ARS), involving mechanisms of dopamine and glutamate in the modulation of behavioral focus. Similar mechanisms in the vertebrate basal ganglia control motor behavior and cognition and reveal an evolutionary progression toward increasing internal connections between prefrontal cortex and striatum in moving from amphibian to primate. The basal ganglia in higher vertebrates show the ability to transfer dopaminergic activity from unconditioned stimuli to conditioned stimuli. The evolutionary role of dopamine in the modulation of goal-directed behavior and cognition is further supported by pathologies of human goal-directed cognition, which have motor and cognitive dysfunction and organize themselves, with respect to dopaminergic activity, along the gradient described by ARS, from perseverative to unfocused. The evidence strongly supports the evolution of goal-directed cognition out of mechanisms initially in control of spatial foraging but, through increasing cortical connections, eventually used to forage for information.     

镜像神经元的发现及其对身心二元论的超越

镜像神经元是意大利帕尔玛大学Rizzolatti等人在恒河猴大脑腹侧运动前皮层F5区发现的一种神经元。这种神经元在猴子操作和观察同一个指向某种目标的动作时(如伸手抓食物)皆被激活,似乎这种神经元映射了其它个体的动作,因此被命名为“镜像神经元”。镜像神经元通过具身的模拟把动作的执行和动作的知觉结合在一起,把观察过程与身体运动过程相融合,克服了二元论在身心之间所设置的障碍,为人们正确认识身心关系开辟了新的视角。     

Adaptive motor behavior of cerebellar patients during exposure to unfamiliar external forces

The authors investigated adaptation of goal-directed forearm movements to an unknown external viscous force assisting forearm flexion in 6 patients with cerebellar dysfunction and in 6 control participants. Motor performance was generally degraded in cerebellar patients and was markedly reduced under the force condition in both groups. However, patients and controls were able to adapt to the novel force within 8 trials. Only the healthy controls were able to improve motor performance when readapting to a null-force condition. The results indicate that cerebellar patients' motor control system has imprecise estimations of actual limb dynamics at its disposal. Force adaptation may have been preserved because single-joint movements were performed, whereas the negative viscous force alone and no interaction forces had to be compensated.     

Do future thoughts reflect personal goals? Current concerns and mental time travel into the past and future

Our overriding hypothesis was that future thinking would be linked with goals to a greater extent than memories; conceptualizing goals as current concerns (i.e., uncompleted personal goals). We also hypothesized that current-concern-related events would differ from non-current-concern-related events on a set of phenomenological characteristics. We report novel data from a study examining involuntary and voluntary mental time travel using an adapted laboratory paradigm. Specifically, after autobiographical memories or future thoughts were elicited (between participants) in an involuntary and voluntary retrieval mode (within participants), participants self-generated five current concerns and decided whether each event was relevant or not to their current concerns. Consistent with our hypothesis, compared with memories, a larger percentage of involuntary and voluntary future thoughts reflected current concerns. Furthermore, events related to current concerns differed from non-concern-related events on a range of cognitive, representational, and affective phenomenological measures. These effects were consistent across temporal direction. In general, our results agree with the proposition that involuntary and voluntary future thinking is important for goal-directed cognition and behaviour.     

婴儿动作意图推理研究及其争论

人类对行为意图的推理有很重要的生存意义,这种能力使我们能够更好地处理和其他个体的社会关系。意图的推理能力早在婴儿半岁时就已经出现,研究者通过习惯化、神经科学等方法对其进行了探讨,但这种能力究竟源于先天遗传,还是后天经验,始终未能得到统一答案。此外,婴儿的意图推理能力与幼儿期心理理论之间存在一定关系,对语言习得的先后天争论也有一定的启示作用。     

Thinking as the control of imagination: a conceptual framework for goal-directed systems

This paper offers a conceptual framework which (re)integrates goal-directed control, motivational processes, and executive functions, and suggests a developmental pathway from situated action to higher level cognition. We first illustrate a basic computational (control-theoretic) model of goal-directed action that makes use of internal modeling. We then show that by adding the problem of selection among multiple action alternatives motivation enters the scene, and that the basic mechanisms of executive functions such as inhibition, the monitoring of progresses, and working memory, are required for this system to work. Further, we elaborate on the idea that the off-line re-enactment of anticipatory mechanisms used for action control gives rise to (embodied) mental simulations, and propose that thinking consists essentially in controlling mental simulations rather than directly controlling behavior and perceptions. We conclude by sketching an evolutionary perspective of this process, proposing that anticipation leveraged cognition, and by highlighting specific predictions of our model.

Apathy in frontotemporal dementia: behavioral and neuroimaging correlates

We investigated the occurrence of goal-directed motivational change in the form of apathy in patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD), particularly those with behavioral variant social and executive deficits (bvFTD). Standardized behavioral inventory was employed to survey and compare apathy ratings from patients and caregivers. In cases of bvFTD, apathy ratings were further related to measures of social cognition, executive function, and atrophy on brain MRI. Results indicated that caregivers rated bvFTD patients as having significantly elevated apathy scores though patient self-ratings were normal. Caregiver and self-ratings of FTD samples with progressive nonfluent aphasia and semantic dementia did not differ from healthy controls and their informants. In the bvFTD sample, caregiver apathy scores were not correlated with general cognitive screening or depression scores, but were significantly correlated with social cognition and executive function measures. Voxel-based morphometry revealed that apathy ratings in bvFTD were related to prominent atrophy in the right caudate (including the ventral striatum), the right temporo-parietal junction, right posterior inferior and middle temporal gyri, and left frontal operculum- anterior insula region. Findings suggest that bvFTD is associated with a significant breakdown in goal-directed motivated behavior involving disruption of cortical-basal ganglia circuits that is also related to social and executive function deficits.     

EMBODIED COGNITION AND RELIGION

It is argued that there are good scientific grounds for accepting that cognition functions in a way that reflects embodiment. This represents a more holistic, systemic way of thinking about human beings, and contributes to the coordination of scientific assumptions about mind and body with those of the faith traditions, moving us beyond sterile debates about reductionism. It has been claimed by Francisco Varela and others that there is an affinity between Buddhism and embodied cognition, though it is argued here that they are less closely aligned than is sometimes assumed. Embodied cognition also accords well with the holistic strand of thinking about human nature in Judeo‐Christian thinking. While accepting the persuasiveness of the general case for cognition being embodied it is suggested here that some forms of cognition are more embodied than others, and that it may be one of the distinctive features of humans that they have developed a capacity for relatively nonembodied forms of cognition.     

Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation induced slow wave activity modification: A possible role in disorder of consciousness differential diagnosis?

Slow wave activity (SWA) generation depends on cortico–thalamo-cortical loops that are disrupted in patients with chronic Disorders of Consciousness (DOC), including the Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS) and the Minimally Conscious State (MCS). We hypothesized that the modulation of SWA by means of a repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) could reveal residual patterns of connectivity, thus supporting the DOC clinical differential diagnosis. We enrolled 10 DOC individuals who underwent a 24 hh polysomnography followed by a real or sham 5 Hz-rTMS over left primary motor area, and a second polysomnographic recording. A preserved sleep-wake cycle, a standard temporal progression of sleep stages, and a SWA perturbation were found in all of the MCS patients and in none of the UWS individuals, only following the real-rTMS. In conclusion, our combined approach may improve the differential diagnosis between MCS patients, who show a partial preservation of cortical plasticity, and UWS individuals, who lack such properties.     

镜像神经元系统的研究回顾及展望

镜像神经元系统的发现使得研究者从一个较为统一的神经机制层面了解人类多个层次的社会认知活动。在猕猴大脑F5区发现的镜像神经元可以在抽象的层面上帮助猕猴理解他人行为的意图。利用脑成像技术,研究发现人类的镜像神经元系统能够匹配外界的知觉表征和内在的动作表征从而通过“居身模仿”这一过程来进行模仿、语言理解、理解他人的意图及情绪这些重要的社会认知活动。另外,镜像神经元系统在社会交往中也起着重要作用,最后,就镜像神经元系统在心理理论中的作用、了解自我-他人问题和镜像神经元系统的关系、动机、经验等因素对镜像神经元系统活动的调控等问题对未来的研究方向进行了展望     

Looking for ideas: Eye behavior during goal-directed internally focused cognition

Humans have a highly developed visual system, yet we spend a high proportion of our time awake ignoring the visual world and attending to our own thoughts. The present study examined eye movement characteristics of goal-directed internally focused cognition. Deliberate internally focused cognition was induced by an idea generation task. A letter-by-letter reading task served as external task. Idea generation (vs. reading) was associated with more and longer blinks and fewer microsaccades indicating an attenuation of visual input. Idea generation was further associated with more and shorter fixations, more saccades and saccades with higher amplitudes as well as heightened stimulus-independent variation of eye vergence. The latter results suggest a coupling of eye behavior to internally generated information and associated cognitive processes, i.e. searching for ideas. Our results support eye behavior patterns as indicators of goal-directed internally focused cognition through mechanisms of attenuation of visual input and coupling of eye behavior to internally generated information.     

Intentional action processing results from automatic bottom-up attention: An EEG-investigation into the Social Relevance Hypothesis using hypnosis

Social stimuli grab our attention. However, it has rarely been investigated how variations in attention affect the processing of social stimuli, although the answer could help us uncover details of social cognition processes such as action understanding. In the present study, we examined how changes to bottom-up attention affects neural EEG-responses associated with intentional action processing. We induced an increase in bottom-up attention by using hypnosis. We recorded the electroencephalographic μ-wave suppression of hypnotized participants when presented with intentional actions in first and third person perspective in a video-clip paradigm. Previous studies have shown that the μ-rhythm is selectively suppressed both when executing and observing goal-directed motor actions; hence it can be used as a neural signal for intentional action processing. Our results show that neutral hypnotic trance increases μ-suppression in highly suggestible participants when they observe intentional actions. This suggests that social action processing is enhanced when bottom-up attentional processes are predominant. Our findings support the Social Relevance Hypothesis, according to which social action processing is a bottom-up driven attentional process, and can thus be altered as a function of bottom-up processing devoted to a social stimulus.     

Motor imagery and higher-level cognition: four hurdles before research can sprint forward

Traditionally, higher-level cognition has been described as including processes such as attention, memory, language, and decision-making. However, motor processing and motor imagery are important aspects of cognition that have typically been considered outside of the traditional view. Recent research has demonstrated that there may be a critical functional relationship between motor imagery and other higher-level cognitive processes. Here we present a review of the extant literature on motor imagery and cognition, as well as outline four hurdles that must be addressed before the field investigating the influence of motor-based processes on higher-level cognition can be moved forward. These hurdles include problems distinguishing between visual and motor processes, addressing the differences in tasks and stimuli used to evoke motor imagery, accounting for individual differences in motor imagery ability, and identifying the appropriate neural correlates. It is important that these hurdles are addressed in future research so we can sprint forward and further our knowledge about this interesting relationship.     

The motor way: Clinical implications of understanding and shaping actions with the motor system in autism and drug addiction

To understand others’ minds is crucial for survival; however, it is quite puzzling how access to others’ minds can be—to some extent—direct and not necessarily mediated by conceptual reasoning. Recent advances in neuroscience have led to hypothesize a role for motor circuits not only in controlling the elementary physical features of movement (e.g., force, direction, and amplitude), but also in understanding and shaping human behavior. The concept of “motor cognition” refers to these aspects, and neurophysiological, neuroimaging, and behavioral studies in human and nonhuman primates support this view. From a clinical perspective, motor cognition represents a challenge in several domains. A thorough investigation of the neural mechanisms mediating motor action/intention understanding and automatized/compulsive behaviors seems to be a promising way to tackle a range of neurodevelopmental and drug-related disorders. On the one hand, anomalies in motor cognition may have cascade effects on social functioning in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD); on the other, motor cognition may help explain the pathophysiology of drug-seeking and drug-taking behaviors in the most severe phase of drug addiction (i.e., see drug dependence, motor low-order cue reactivity). This may represent a promising approach that could improve the efficacy of rehabilitative interventions. The only way to shed light on multifactorial disorders such as ASD and drug addiction is through the investigation of their multiple factors. This motor way can promote new theoretical and experimental perspectives that would help bridge the gap between the basic neuroscience approach and clinical practice.     

Sentence comprehension affects the dynamics of bimanual coordination: Implications for embodied cognition

Recent work in embodied cognition has demonstrated that language comprehension involves the motor system (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). Such findings are often attributed to mechanisms involving simulations of linguistically described events (Barsalou, 1999; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). We propose that research paradigms in which simulation is the central focus need to be augmented with paradigms that probe the organization of the motor system during language comprehension. The use of well-studied motor tasks may be appropriate to this endeavour. To this end, we present a study in which participants perform a bimanual rhythmic task (Kugler & Turvey, 1987) while judging the plausibility of sentences. We show that the dynamics of the bimanual task differ when participants judge sentences describing performable actions as opposed to sentences describing events that are not performable. We discuss the general implications of our results for accounts of embodied cognition.     

The Effects of Elevated Arousal and Mood on Maximal Strength Performance in Athletes

Optimal arousal models contend that high arousal contributes to inhibited athletic performance, whereas there is reversal theory research which indicates that high positive arousal may enhance performance. To test these claims, 22 male and 6 female elite athletes were induced into high arousal telic (goal-directed) and high arousal paratelic (non goal-directed, process focussed) motivational states and tested on a standard hand strength task. Personalized guided imagery techniques and paced breathing were used to change psychological and physiological arousal. Significant increases in strength performance occurred when arousal was high and experienced as pleasant excitement in the paratelic condition (i.e., high positive arousal). Heart rate and other indicators of parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous system activity were not found to mediate between psychological arousal and performance. Where athletic performance requires maximal motor strength over a short period, performance benefits of high arousal may be maximized by restructuring motivational state.     

Voluntariness, intention, and the defence of mental disorder: toward a rational approach

This article addresses how mental disorder may be used in common law countries to negate the requirements of voluntariness and intention in serious criminal offences as well as to provide the basis for current versions of the insanity defence. The notion that mental disorder can cause conduct to become completely involuntary or unintentional is questionable, given current thinking in the behavioral sciences. This article argues that different forms of mental disorder should be subsumed within a separate defence of mental disorder. Providing that a range of dispositional options is available, the law in this complex area would be simplified and brought into line with current psychological notions of goal-directed behavior.     

Effects of physical activity on children’s executive function: Contributions of experimental research on aerobic exercise

Executive function refers to the cognitive processes necessary for goal-directed cognition and behavior, which develop across childhood and adolescence. Recent experimental research indicates that both acute and chronic aerobic exercise promote children’s executive function. Furthermore, there is tentative evidence that not all forms of aerobic exercise benefit executive function equally: Cognitively-engaging exercise appears to have a stronger effect than non-engaging exercise on children’s executive function. This review discusses this evidence as well as the mechanisms that may underlie the association between exercise and executive function. Research from a variety of disciplines is covered, including developmental psychology, kinesiology, cognitive neuroscience, and biopsychology. Finally, these experimental findings are placed within the larger context of known links between action and cognition in infancy and early childhood, and the clinical and practical implications of this research are discussed.