Sabotaging the deal: The way relational concerns undermine negotiators

We addressed the questions of how and to what end negotiators sacrifice their economic outcomes in exchange for hoped-for relationship gains with the other party. We predicted that negotiators' chronic belongingness needs–fundamental to human beings–would undercut the economic value of their deals. Moreover, we tested two mechanisms by which this occurs. Belongingness needs encouraged negotiators to reduce their economic ambitions ahead of time, and they interfered with negotiators' attention to the substantive issues on the table. Rather than finding that partners were able to exploit negotiators' belongingness needs for their own economic gains, we found that their partners were left worse off. If negotiators were making a calculation initially to trade economic gains for relationship gains, we did not find evidence that this paid off with a partner who especially wanted to work with the focal negotiator in the future. We conclude that belongingness needs lead negotiators to sabotage their economic outcomes without any clear benefits to the relationships these negotiators are keen to build.     

It's a bet! A problem-solving approach promotes the construction of contingent agreements

Negotiators often have different expectations about the future. A contingent agreement, or a bet that makes the ultimate outcome dependent on some future event, builds on negotiators' differences. The authors argue that a problem-solving approach, in which negotiators thoroughly explore options to build on their differences, is most likely to construct contingent agreements. The authors explore two factors expected to influence this problem-solving approach, namely, negotiators' relational and accountability concerns. The authors argue when these considerations are imbalanced, negotiators are less likely to adopt a problem-solving style and construct a contingent agreement. To test this hypothesis, negotiators' relationships and accountability pressures were manipulated in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants engaged in an integrative negotiation, allowing the authors to examine whether a contingent agreement was constructed and joint gain. Experiment 2 sought to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1 using a scenario study. Results across the two experiments support the authors' hypotheses.     

回报谨慎对谈判过程和谈判结果的影响

回报谨慎是人们害怕在人际关系中被他人利用的一种信念。研究考察了回报谨慎对谈判者的动机倾向、谈判行为及谈判结果的影响。184人组成92个两人小组参加了一项模拟商业谈判,谈判前研究者成功地进行了回报谨慎的操纵,谈判结束后,参加谈判的人完成谈判协议和谈判后问卷。研究者假设,低回报谨慎的谈判者比高回报谨慎的谈判者在谈判中更可能持有合作倾向、更多地与谈判对手分享信息,研究者还预测回报谨慎与谈判双方的联合收益以及谈判后对谈判对手的看法都有关系。研究结果支持了上述假设。研究对从事商业谈判的人具有实际意义。     

Shaping data collection congruent with experimental hypotheses

The influence of instructions and feedback from an experimenter on observational recordings of disruptive behavior was evaluated. Four subject-observers recorded four categories of disruptive behavior from videotapes of children in a classroom setting. Two sets of videotapes, labelled "baseline" and "treatment", were matched for rates of disruptive behavior in each category. The observers were told that two target behaviors were expected to decrease and the other two control behaviors were not expected to change during the treatment condition. During observational recording of treatment videotapes, the observers were given positive feedback when they reported decreases in the two target behaviors, and negative feedback when they reported either to change or increases in the two control behaviors. The target behaviors were recorded less frequently by observers, while recordings of control behaviors were unaffected during the treatment phase. These results suggest that contingent feedback to observers should be avoided as a possible source of bias in behavioral recordings.     

How Negotiator Self-Efficacy Drives Decisions to Pursue Mediation

We examined the role of self-efficacy in negotiators' choice of dispute-resolution procedures and responsiveness to third-party recommendations after an impasse. Results show that high self-efficacy negotiators were more likely to choose continued negotiation over mediation than were their low self-efficacy counterparts. In addition, we found that these negotiators were more likely to reject a mediator's recommendation for settlement, even when this recommendation was evenhanded and met their interests. As predicted, however, the influence of self-efficacy on the acceptance of recommendations was moderated by mediator credibility. When disputants perceived that the mediator had low credibility, the pattern of effects remained unchanged. However, when disputants viewed the mediator as being highly credible, self-efficacy had no influence on the acceptance/rejection of mediator recommendations.     

TURNING POINTS IN DEVELOPING ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

The 80 partners from 40 romantic relationships were independently interviewed using the RIT procedure with regard to the turning points of their respective relationships; 26 types of turning points were found, which reduced to 14 supra-types. These supra-types differed in their association with relational commitment, with some events strongly positive, some strongly negative, and others relatively modest in reported change in commitment. About half of the turning points involved explicit metacommunication between the relationship parties, but the likelihood of relationship talk varied by turning point type. About half of the 759 identified turning points were agreed upon by relationship partners, but agreement differed depending on turning point type. Neither partner agreement nor the presence of explicit metacommunication was related to the respondent's current satisfaction with the relationship. However, the proportion of total turning points that were negative correlated negatively with current satisfaction. Two turning point events, Exclusivity and Disengagement, individually differentiated more from less satisfied relationship parties.     

From self-prediction to self-defeat: behavioral forecasting, self-fulfilling prophecies, and the effect of competitive expectations

Four studies explored behavioral forecasting and the effect of competitive expectations in the context of negotiations. Study 1 examined negotiators' forecasts of how they would behave when faced with a very competitive versus a less competitive opponent and found that negotiators believed they would become more competitive. Studies 2 and 3 examined actual behaviors during a negotiation and found that negotiators who expected a very competitive opponent actually became less competitive, as evidenced by setting lower, less aggressive reservation prices, making less demanding counteroffers, and ultimately agreeing to lower negotiated outcomes. Finally, Study 4 provided a direct test of the disconnection between negotiators' forecasts for their behavior and their actual behaviors within the same sample and found systematic errors in behavioral forecasting as well as evidence for the self-fulfilling effects of possessing a competitive expectation.     

Context matters: the benefits and costs of expressing positive emotion among survivors of childhood sexual abuse

Positive emotions promote adjustment to aversive life events. However, evolutionary theory and empirical research on trauma disclosure suggest that in the context of stigmatized events, expressing positive emotions might incur social costs. To test this thesis, the authors coded genuine (Duchenne) smiling and laughter and also non-Duchenne smiling from videotapes of late-adolescent and young adult women, approximately half with documented histories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), as they described the most distressing event of their lives. Consistent with previous studies, genuine positive emotional expression was generally associated with better social adjustment two years later. However, as anticipated, CSA survivors who expressed positive emotion in the context of describing a past CSA experience had poorer long-term social adjustment, whereas CSA survivors who expressed positive emotion while describing a nonabuse experience had improved social adjustment. These findings suggest that the benefits of positive emotional expression may often be context specific.     

Paying a price: culture, trust, and negotiation consequences

Three studies contrasting Indian and American negotiators tested hypotheses derived from theory proposing why there are cultural differences in trust and how cultural differences in trust influence negotiation strategy. Study 1 (a survey) documented that Indian negotiators trust their counterparts less than American negotiators. Study 2 (a negotiation simulation) linked American and Indian negotiators' self-reported trust and strategy to their insight and joint gains. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 2 using independently coded negotiation strategy data, allowing for stronger causal inference. Overall, the strategy associated with Indian negotiators' reluctance to extend interpersonal (as opposed to institutional) trust produced relatively poor outcomes. Our data support an expanded theoretical model of negotiation, linking culture to trust, strategies, and outcomes.     

Negotiators' profit predicted by cognitive reappraisal, suppression of emotions, misrepresentation of information, and tolerance of ambiguity

This study examined the relationship between negative emotions and variables that affect negotiators' profit. Based on a simulated negotiation, this study induced emotions by providing negative feedback on how negotiating partners perceived and evaluated each other's behavior. Then relationships were examined between negative emotions and emotional regulation strategies, misrepresentation of information, tolerance of ambiguity, and negotiators' profit. A total of 228 undergraduate students enrolled in an economics course in the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Management at a university in Ankara participated. There were 130 students in the experimental group and 98 students in the control group; 102 were men and 126 were women, ages 17 to 35 years (M =22.6 yr., SD = 2.3). A simulated negotiation process was used. Regression coefficients suggested positive relation between Emotional Reaction and the use of a Suppression strategy and Misrepresentation of Information. Negative coefficients were obtained from scores between Emotional Reaction and Cognitive Reappraisal and Tolerance of Ambiguity. The regression also suggested there were negative regression coefficients linking Misrepresentation of Information and Suppression strategies to Negotiators' Profit. Positive regression coefficients linked Tolerance of Ambiguity to Negotiators' Profit. Mediating variables explained 55% of variance in Negotiators' Profit; the majority (43%) was explained by Cognitive Reappraisal.     

Too much information: the perils of nondiagnostic information in negotiations

Two studies showed that possessing information about a negotiation counterpart that is irrelevant to the negotiation task can impair negotiators' effectiveness because such knowledge impedes effective information exchange. In Study 1, negotiators who possessed diagnostic and nondiagnostic forms of information were each less likely to exchange information about their preferences within the negotiation. However, only those negotiators who possessed nondiagnostic information achieved inferior negotiation outcomes as a result. In Study 2, negotiators possessing nondiagnostic information about their counterparts in electronically mediated negotiations were more likely to terminate the search for mutually beneficial outcomes prematurely and declare impasses. They were also less able to use diagnostic forms of information to make mutually beneficial trade-offs. As a result, negotiators in these dyads achieved inferior outcomes.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

谈判者第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响：角色的调节作用

谈判者在大多数情况下都希望能顺利达成协议,但很多时候多种因素使得谈判进入僵局或者破裂。本研究利用模拟谈判的手段,综合考察了第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响。很多谈判者出于害怕吃亏或者希望获得更多收益,向对手提出较高的第一次开价。研究一证明第一次出价越高,谈判越容易失败。有趣的是,第一次开价的高低与谈判破裂之间的关系会受到谈判角色的影响,谈判者的权力不同会使得他们的第一次开价具有不同的作用。研究二证实,当谈判双方权力不对等时,第一次出价对谈判破裂的负面作用受到了权力的影响。弱者的第一次出价越高,谈判越容易破裂。中介分析表明,当弱者出价较高时,容易让对方感到竞争性过强,因此不愿意达成协议。本研究不仅丰富了谈判破裂和第一次出价的理论研究,而且对于谈判者具有实践意义     

The three faces of Eve: Strategic displays of positive,negative, and neutral emotions in negotiations

In a series of laboratory experiments, we tested the influence of strategically displaying positive, negative, and neutral emotions on negotiation outcomes. In Experiment 1, a face-to-face dispute simulation, negotiators who displayed positive emotion, in contrast to negative or neutral emotions, were more likely to incorporate a future business relationship in the negotiated contract. In Experiment 2, an ultimatum setting, managers strategically displaying positive emotion were more likely to close a deal. This effect was mediated by negotiators’ willingness to pay more to a negotiator strategically displaying positive versus negative emotions. In Experiment 3, display of positive emotion was a more effective strategy for gaining concessions from the other party in a distributive setting. Negotiators made more extreme demands when facing a negotiator strategically displaying negative, rather than positive or neutral, emotions. Implications for strategic display of emotion in negotiations are discussed.     

Third Party Power: Some Negative Effects of Positive Incentives

The present study simulated an organizational dispute to examine the effects of reward and coercive third party power on negotiator concessions and negotiator perceptions of the third party. The results indicated that the possibility of third party rewards inhibited negotiator concessions, and the possibility of third party punishments facilitated concessions. This effect was enhanced by negotiator limit. When negotiators had high limits, they made the fewest concessions if the third party could compensate; when negotiators had low limits, they made the greatest concessions if the third party could press. Taken together, the results suggest that negotiators sometimes use concession making as a strategy to affect third party behavior. When negotiators want third parties to provide compensation, as when they have high limits, they reduce their concession making as a way of eliciting the compensation; when they want to avoid third party behavior that is punitive, and they have low limits and room to make concessions, they hasten their concessions to reach agreement quickly and thereby stem the third party's involvement.     

Groups and Solos in Context: The Effects of Accountability on Team Negotiation

This study examines whether and how accountability to constituents affects the cognitions, performance, and outcomes of team and solo negotiators. Previous findings for solos were replicated here: solo negotiators respond competitively when they are accountable to constituents. For teams, however, accountability pressures were distributed across the members resulting in each team member experiencing little responsibility for outcomes. As a consequence, teams did not respond to accountability pressures by behaving contentiously as solos did. Analysis of negotiators' perceptions of advantage reveals that solos who negotiate under conditions of high accountability consider themselves to be at a disadvantage in the negotiation even before the negotiation begins. These perceptions may underlie the accountability/competitive relation that characterizes solo negotiation. Implications for negotiation research as well as the study of groups in organizations are discussed.     

Mere physical distance and integrative agreements: When more space improves negotiation outcomes

We examined the effects of negotiating non-face-to-face with someone that is physically nearby versus faraway on integrative (mutually beneficial) agreements. Across Studies 1 and 2, we found that individuals who negotiated with another person that they believed was physically faraway (several thousand feet away) rather than nearby (a few feet away) attained more integrative agreements (higher joint outcome, more Pareto efficient agreements). In Study 3, we found that the effect of different magnitudes of physical distance between negotiators on integrative agreements depended on negotiators' construal level: individuals who negotiated with another person who was purportedly farther away achieved more integrative agreements when their level of construal was not constrained, but had no effect when they adopted a high-level of construal. The implications for non-face-to-face communication are discussed.     

Effective behaviors to de-escalate organizational conflicts in the process of escalation

The goal of the present study was to determine what behaviors negotiators can use to help to quell an escalating conflict. In doing so, we formed a sample of professionals who took on the role of negotiator when we provoked an organizational conflict between a superior and subordinate that escalates due to the intervention of research confederates. Trained judges analyzed the negotiators' behaviors that most effectively mitigated the intensity of the conflict in which they were involved. The results demonstrate that the behaviors most effective at de-escalating an escalating conflict are problem-solving and accommodation, especially when said conflict has escalated considerably. Similarly, jointly employing problem-solving and direct fighting behaviors also seems to help de-escalate conflict. The results do not, however, consistently support using a forceful behavioral strategy to de-escalate a conflict in the early stages of escalation.     

Negotiator cognitions: A descriptive approach to negotiators' understanding of their opponents

Substantial evidence exists that negotiators frequently fail to attain readily available and mutually beneficial outcomes. This paper provides a preliminary model of why these failures occur. We assume that negotiators are decision makers, and that their errors derive from cognitive processes ignored by utility-maximization theories. We focus on one part of the model: the systematic tendency to ignore the cognitions of opponent negotiators. Empirical evidence clarifying negotiators' cognitive processes is generated using verbal protocol techniques in a controlled negotiation task. The results show that subjects simplify the negotiation task, in part by ignoring contingencies introduced by the knowledge possessed by their opponents. The discussion focuses on how subjects simplify the task and how the decision-making perspective helps redirect the negotiation literature.     

Expectancy Disconfirmation and Negotiator Reactions Across Negotiation Episodes

In the negotiation literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the impact of negotiator goals and expectancy disconfirmations on negotiator behaviors and affective outcomes. We found that negotiators with larger negative expectancy disconfirmations were less satisfied; set lower targets for a subsequent negotiation; and were more likely to settle with the other party in the second negotiation, rather than requiring third-party imposition of a settlement. Those negotiators who settled had more positive feelings and perceptions about the negotiation and set higher targets for a third negotiation. Further, negotiators who experienced repeated high levels of negative expectancy disconfirmation also experienced the greatest decrements in their feelings and perceptions across negotiation episodes. Implications of study findings for future research are discussed.