Kant's account of moral weakness

On the one hand, Kant seems to suggest that moral weakness is merely expressed at the level of following maxims. On the other hand, he addresses moral weakness as the first grade of our propensity to evil, which implies that moral weakness is also expressed at the level of adopting maxims. There is still a lack of clarity in the literature concerning how the relationship between these two aspects is to be understood, and a proper account of the nature of the maxims of the morally weak has yet to be offered. Drawing on my earlier interpretation of moral strength, I shall propose a reading of Kant's account of moral weakness that consistently unifies both aspects. On my interpretation, the morally weak agent lacks the moral strength that he ought to acquire through the continuous exercise of his power of self‐control; he therefore fails both to set himself particular moral ends in adopting his maxims and to follow his maxims by realizing such ends. His intention to do what the moral law demands is overly general: It does not set a particular moral end, which is what virtue requires.     

Positive morality and the realization of freedom in Kant's moral philosophy

This paper argues that recent accounts of Kantian virtue as “strengthened” inner freedom apply much more clearly to the avoidance of violations of perfect duties than to the fulfillment of imperfect duties, leaving us with the question of how inadequate commitment to morally required ends impacts the exercise of inner freedom. The question is answered through the development of a model of inner freedom that emphasizes the relationship between moral self‐governance and participation in an ethical community.     

Kant's Pragmatism

This article offers a definition of the term ‘pragmatic’, as it is used in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The definition offered does not make any reference to the affinities between Kant's pragmatism and the philosophies of the American or other pragmatists but draws its definiens entirely from the Kantian conceptual framework. It states that the term ‘pragmatic’ denotes imperatives, laws and beliefs of a specific type: an imperative is pragmatic if and only if it is concerned with the choice of means to individual or universal happiness; a law is pragmatic if and only if our willingness to presuppose it results from our obedience to a pragmatic imperative; and a belief is pragmatic if and only if it relates to the objective validity of pragmatic laws. This article also discusses two rival definitions of the term ‘pragmatic’ (as used by Kant) that have been brought forward by Sidney Axinn and Nicholas Rescher.     

From car use reduction to ride-sharing: The relevance of moral and environmental identity

Car use contributes significantly to environmental pollution, leading people to rethink their transport habits. Previous studies on car use reduction relied on established theories related to values and self-regulation to examine this decision. In this paper, we offer an alternative approach and examine the intention to reduce car use through the prism of identity theory, and propose environmental and moral identities, together with environmental concern, as the main antecedents to the importance of car use reduction and intention to reduce car use. Further, we consider ride-sharing intention as an outcome of the decision to reduce car use. The proposed conceptual model is tested on a sample of consumers from the United Kingdom using an online consumer panel. The results offer partial support for the influence of moral identity, environmental identity, and environmental concern on the importance to reduce car use and intention. The links among the importance of and intention to reduce car use, along with ride-sharing intentions, are supported. Finally, managerial implications are discussed, and future research directions are suggested.