Engaging with Buddhism

In his new book, Jay Garfield invites philosophers of all persuasions to engage with Buddhist philosophy. In part I of this paper, I raise some questions on behalf of the philosopher working in the analytic tradition about the way in which Buddhist philosophy understands itself. I then turn, in part II, to look at what Orthodox Buddhism has to say about the self. I examine the debate between the Buddhist position discussed and endorsed by Garfield and that of a lesser-known school that he mentions only briefly, the Pudgalavāda (“Personalists”). I suggest that the views of the Pudgalavādins are strikingly similar to a position held, in the twentieth century analytic philosophy, by Peter Strawson.     

Buddha,being and the black forest 1

Abstract

While Martin Heidegger is commonly acknowledged as having a significant influence on contemporary philosophy and psychology, there have been comments made about his being a ‘closet Buddhist,’ and many of his later ideas are perceived as mystical. It is argued in this paper that this is because Heidegger is usually understood through a Western framework, whereas many of his later ideas move closer to Eastern thinking.

This paper revisits Heidegger via Buddhism. It examines important parallels and differences between Heideggerian and Buddhist ideas, such as “openness” and “non‐self,” “letting be” and “letting go,” “fourfold” and “inter‐relatedness. This comparison is undertaken against the backdrop of Medard Boss's psychotherapy, daseinsanalysis (Existential Analysis), which Heidegger engaged with extensively. Overall, the analysis illuminates the pragmatics and psychological underpinnings of Heideggerian and Buddhist philosophy, and elucidates the contributions that this understanding can make to contemporary psychology.     

BUDDHISM,FREE WILL,AND PUNISHMENT: TAKING BUDDHIST ETHICS SERIOUSLY

In recent decades, there has been growing interest among philosophers in what the various Buddhist traditions have said, can say, and should say, in response to the traditional problem of free will. This article investigates the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the historical problem of free will. It begins by critically examining Rick Repetti's Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will (2019), in which he argues for a conception of “agentless agency” and defends a view he calls “Buddhist soft compatibilism.” It then turns to a more wide-ranging discussion of Buddhism and free will—one that foregrounds Buddhist ethics and takes seriously what the various Buddhist traditions have said about desert, punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and moral anger. The article aims to show that, not only is Buddhism best conceived as endorsing a kind of free will skepticism, Buddhist ethics can provide a helpful guide to living without basic desert moral responsibility and free will.     

The Buddhist Roots of Watsuji Tetsurô's Ethics of Emptiness

Watsuji Tetsurô (1889–1960) is famous for having constructed a systematic socio‐political ethics on the basis of the idea of emptiness. This essay examines his 1938 essay “The Concept of ‘Dharma’ and the Dialectics of Emptiness in Buddhist Philosophy” and the posthumously published The History of Buddhist Ethical Thought (based on lectures given in the 1920s), in order to clarify the Buddhist roots of his ethics. It aims to answer two main questions which are fundamentally linked: “Which way does Watsuji's legacy turn: toward totalitarianism or toward a balanced theory of selflessness?” and “Is Watsuji's systematic ethics Buddhist?” In order to answer these questions, this essay discusses Watsuji's view of dharma, dependent arising, and morality in Hīnayāna Buddhism. It then proceeds to Watsuji's fine‐tuning of the concept of emptiness in Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism. Finally, this essay shows how Watsuji's modernist Buddhist theory connects to his own systematic ethical theory. These two theories share a focus on non‐duality, negation, and emptiness. But they differ in their accounts of the relations between the individual and the community, between the “is” and the “ought,” and between hermeneutics and transcendence. These findings give us hints as to Watsuji's origins, pitfalls, and possibilities.     

Countercurrents from the West: “blue-eyed” Zen masters, Vipassanā meditation, and Buddhist psychotherapy in contemporary Korea

One surprising and yet relatively unknown aspect of contemporary Korean Buddhism is the significant influence of American and European Buddhism. Between 1989 and 2009, South Koreans witnessed well-educated “blue-eyed” monastic residents via the Korean media, and the emergence of new bestsellers by authors like Thich Nhat Hahn and Jack Kornfield, written initially for Western audiences but since translated into Korean. The new teachings from the West have inspired a sudden growth of interest in vipassanā meditation as an “alternative” to Kanhwa S?n practice, and the emergence of a new academic field: Buddhist psychotherapy. This new wave of transnational influence from the West has changed not only the way Koreans practice Buddhism but also how they perceive Buddhist history and their own identities. In addition, the perceived “prestige” of Buddhism in the West has provided a new rhetorical strategy to defend Buddhism against other religions, particularly Korean evangelical Christianity.     

正念是什么——从正念内涵研究发展角度的思考

"正念是什么"是正念研究中的基本问题,也是长期困扰研究者的难题,造成此困境的重要原因是正念跨越了佛学与心理学两种语境。在正念内涵研究历程中,研究者们先后试图以"去神秘化"、"去语境化"及"整合化"来解决跨语境所造成的问题。本研究认为:正念为多维概念,其内涵的复杂性决定了研究者对正念的认识并非静态的判断,而是逐步成熟的过程;应深入整合佛学与心理学语境,以发展的视角看待正念。     

How the Swans Came to Lake Michigan: The Social Organization of Buddhist Chicago

An analysis of the social organization of Buddhist groups and networks in metropolitan Chicago sheds light on the social organization of Buddhism and other new religions in American cities generally. Following an overview of the history and geography of Buddhist Chicago, this essay examines the dynamics underlying the emergence of local Buddhist groups and networks under two main headings: religious identities and sociological factors. First, Buddhism's various branches, traditions, and lineages are discussed; sociological factors discussed include organizational types, ethnic/racial distinctions, sociological functions played by Buddhism for “culture Buddhists” and “convert Buddhists,”and the role of local social dynamics in the emergence, proliferation, and interaction of Buddhist groups. As the field of American Buddhist studies enters a period of renewed productivity, this essay offers a conceptual framework for understanding major issues that can benefit both researchers within the field and interested social scientists outside of it.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">W</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Bold">ang</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Bold">Fuzhi’s Criticism of Buddhism and Its Limitations</Emphasis>

Wang Fuzhi’s 王夫之 remarks on Buddhism have not been given sufficient attention despite increasing research on him. The few works on this topic either focus on just one aspect of his view of Buddhism or fail to disclose the purpose and uniqueness of his attack of it. This essay analyzes his view of Buddhism comprehensively, in particular his insight into the paradox of Buddhist universal love and his rejection of Buddhist retribution and reincarnation from Confucian righteousness and qi 氣-monism. In addition, it also explores the reason, context, and limitations of his criticism, that is, his reaction to the popular approach of “understanding Confucian classics through learning Buddhism” in the late Ming 明, his response to Zongmi’s 宗密 criticism of Confucian cosmology and human nature, and his misunderstanding of some Buddhist concepts. Yet his criticism is still illuminating to our understanding of the interaction of Confucianism with Buddhism and other religions.     

EXAMINING THE BODHISATTVA'S BRAIN

Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain aims to introduce secular‐minded thinkers to Buddhist thought and motivate its acceptance by analytic philosophers. I argue that Flanagan provides a compelling caution against the hasty generalizations of recent “science of happiness” literature, which correlates happiness with Buddhism on the basis of certain neurological studies. I contend, however, that his positive account of Buddhist ethics is less persuasive. I question the level of engagement with Buddhist philosophical literature and challenge Flanagan's central claim, that a Buddhist version of eudaimonia is a common core conception shared by all Buddhists. I argue that this view is not only a rational reconstruction in need of argumentation but is in tension with competing Buddhist metaphysical theories of self, including the one Flanagan himself endorses.     

Buddhism in America

This paper analyzes Buddhism in America from a social, rather than individual, perspective. In particular, an effort is made to move from informative but limited case studies of Buddhism to a national empirical study of the religion. Using the location of Buddhist organizations within the United States as the dependent variable, difference of means testing and logistic regressions are employed to determine what areas are the most receptive to Buddhism. Applying concepts from a variety of ethnographic and indirect approaches to Buddhism, as well as studies of the general success of new religions, I find that both individual and social factors influence the development of Buddhism in the United States. Specifically, significant Asian populations, more college graduates, the presence of schools of higher education and lower levels of conventional religious affiliation are all conducive to the success of Buddhist religious groups.     

MASS COMMUNICATION AND BELIEF CHANGE: A TEST OF THREE MATHEMATICAL MODELS

Three mathematical models of communication and belief change were proposed and tested: a proportional change model, a belief certainty model, and an accumulated information model. A quick correlational check of the three models suggested that the accumulated information model was the superior with the belief certainty model being the most inferior of the three. Stronger support for the accumulated information model obtained using a more stringent test: a nonlinear bivariate regression which produced visual “plots” of empirical data that nearly duplicated the visual “plots” produced by the theoretical model. The accumulated information model states that belief change is proportional to the discrepancy between the original belief and the belief communicated in the message, and inversely proportional to the amount of information which the receiver has about the topic at the time the message is received. The belief certainty model was the most inferior of the three indicating that the degree to which a receiver is certain in conviction is unrelated to the communication-belief change relationship.     

Memory belief is weak

Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds.     

Absolutizing the Relative and Relativizing the Absolute: Metaphysical Implications of the Christian and Buddhist Soteriological Perspectives,Part I

This essay is an attempt at opening parallel but contrastive avenues into the respective Christian and Buddhist outlooks with respect to the metaphysical notion of relativity in contradistinction with the concept of the Absolute. The main thesis is that Christianity and Buddhism present us, in their respective normative intellectual economies, with analogous, yet profoundly different ways of envisioning metaphysics from the vantage point of their sui generis soteriology. In other terms, our argument is that Christian and Buddhist metaphysics are essentially informed by the tenets of their spiritual way, whether redemptive or emancipative. Furthermore, these forms of “soteriological metaphysics” could be encapsulated in the twin nutshells of an “absolutization of the relative” on the one hand, and a “relativization of the absolute” on the other hand. The first formula refers, more specifically, to Christian Trinitarian theology, and the second to the Buddhist ontology of emptiness. These two formulas provide a theoretical framework that suggests both the internal coherence of each tradition and the ways in which this coherence is variously understood within the tradition itself. In the soteriological emphasis of these two traditions lies a possible—but not exclusive—way to open a wider space for a hermeneutics of aspects and vantage points, as well as for warding off any overly rigid conceptual crystallizations through a deeper recognition of the interplay between principled intellectual unity and the manifold of human existence. This essay is the first section of the submission, which is focusing on the Christian tradition.

     

The Compassionate Treatment of Animals

The compassionate treatment of animals has been the focal point of speeches and writings by one of the most influential Buddhist cleric‐scholars on the Tibetan plateau today, Khenpo Tsultrim Lodrö of Larung Buddhist Academy. This essay surveys the Khenpo's broad‐based advocacy for animal welfare and details his discrete appeals to nomads in eastern Tibet to forgo selling livestock for slaughter, to eat a vegetarian diet on religious holidays, to relinquish wearing animal fur, to protect wildlife habitat, and to liberate the lives of animals. I focus on the modernist “this worldly” dimension of his advocacy, calling attention to how Tsultrim Lodrö goes beyond traditional scare tactics that emphasize the karmic effects of negative deeds in future lives and instead invokes compassion by attending to the lived experience and suffering of animals. In doing so, the Khenpo positions Buddhism as a civilizing force in order to reform certain Tibetan customs and mitigate the influence of Chinese modernity and state marketization policies. I argue that his strategy of “reverse orientalism” appropriates state civilizational discourse and reverses its terms.     

Michel Foucault and the “care of the self” approach to the Buddhist dharma

In line with a particular form of analysis as developed by Michel Foucault, this article proposes to elucidate a particular way of understanding Buddhist monastic culture as detailed in the rules concerning behaviour (the Vinaya), which may be called the “care of the self approach”. To develop this argument, the article first describes the nature of the Vinaya as a “training scheme” rather than a system of prohibitions or rules. Second, it examines the nature of confession or what is called “truth telling”. Third, it examines the nature of transgression of the Vinaya rules. Fourth, I examine the Vinaya and the role of ethics. Lastly, it is shown how these approaches to monastic Buddhism deal with the nature of the transformation of desire to construct what may be seen as a form of “ethical technology” or alternatively as a “transgressive technology”.     

Building more solid bridges between Buddhism and Western psychology

Introducing the ways of cultivating mental balance, B. A. Wallace and S. L. Shapiro attempted to build bridges between Buddhism and psychology. Their systematic categorization of Buddhist teachings and extensive review of empirical support from Western psychology are valuable for future study. However, it remains a matter of concern that some more profound parts of Buddhist philosophy can be disregarded by focusing only on practical aspects of Buddhism within the context of mental health. In this comment, the authors briefly address four substantial themes to be considered: reality, identity, causality, and logicality. They suggest that the way to interpret Buddhism as techniques for well-being would certainly be viable in encouraging the study of Buddhist teachings in psychology. Yet, such attempts should not result in superficial imports and applications of Buddhist practices but give due weight to the deeper philosophical issues to build more solid bridges between Buddhism and psychology.     

THE TREES,MY LUNGS: SELF PSYCHOLOGY AND THE NATURAL WORLD AT AN AMERICAN BUDDHIST CENTER

This study employs ethnographic field data to trace a dialogue between the self‐psychological concept of the self object and experiences regarding the concept of “interbeing” at a Vietnamese Buddhist monastery in the United States. The dialogue develops an understanding of human experiences with the nonhuman natural world which are tensive, liminal, and nondual. From the dialogue I find that the self object concept, when applied to this form of Buddhism, must be inclusive enough to embrace relationships with animals, stones, and other natural forms. The dialogue further delineates a self‐psychological methodology for examining religions in their interactions with natural forms.     

Teaching Buddhism in the Postmodern University: Understanding,Critique, Evaluation

A contemporary liberal education in the humanities and social sciences should introduce students to the serious exploration of various kinds of worlds that human beings articulate and within which they live. Teachers in Buddhist studies can make a significant contribution by offering courses that focus attention on distinctively Buddhist worlds that are directly relevant to postmodern interests and concerns. These courses should also be designed to empower students with the kind of interpretive skills that are needed in a postmodern environment to generate viable modes of sympathetic understanding, convincing forms of critical analysis, and the capacity to formulate and defend responsible personal and social judgments. This article is a revised version of the keynote lecture given at a McGill University conference on “Teaching Buddhism: The State of the Art,” October 8–10, 1999.     

Faith and belief in The Anti-Christ: A re-evaluation of Nietzsche’s relation to Jesus

This paper re-evaluates the significance of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at The Anti-Christ. Specifically we will ask whether a re-evaluation of this relation can shed new light on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity. And we will do this first by surveying the standard interpretations of this issue, as well as the existing literature on The Anti-Christ. Arguing that the latter picks out nothing new regarding a critique of Christianity, we nonetheless suggest that a new criticism can be developed via the discussion of Jesus there. Further, this can be done by looking at the account given of faith and belief in that text. That is, we will explore the status of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at the origins and development of “faith” as a mode of belief. In particular, we trace the former’s development as a type from a basic mode of faith. As such, we begin by looking at the psychological origins of this kind of belief in “decadence”, and why Nietzsche is critical of this. However, we will then discuss the emergence of a more positive faith in the form of Buddhism, and see how this represents an analogue for Jesus’s faith. Continuing, we will see how Jesus signifies a similar problematic development, but also “overcoming”, of initial decadence faith. And we will argue, also, that this overcoming is rooted in his emphasis on the immediacy of lived experience. Finally though, we will look at how Christianity returns Jesus’s more productive relation to the world again to a primitive mode of faith. In other words, we will see how Christianity converts the fluid, lived, “faith” of Jesus into something again based on transcendent belief. And lastly, we will ask what new light this point sheds on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, and his affinity with Jesus the man.     

“THE NEW SCIENCE OF HEALTH AND HAPPINESS”: INVESTIGATING BUDDHIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF MEDITATION

Clinical and neuroscientific studies of Buddhist meditation practices are frequent topics in the news media, and have helped certain practices (such as mindfulness) achieve mainstream cultural status. Buddhists have reacted by using these studies in a number of ways. Some deploy the studies to show the compatibility of science and Buddhism, often using the authority of science to lend credence to Buddhism. Other Buddhists use meditation studies to demonstrate the superiority of Buddhism over science. Within inter‐Buddhist debates, meditation studies are used to argue for changes in practice or belief, but also sometimes to reinforce certain traditional practices. Benjamin Zeller's threefold categorization of religious groups’ attitudes toward science (guide, replace, absorb) and José Ignacio Cabezón's three ideal types of relationships between Buddhism and science (conflict/ambivalence, compatibility/identity, complementarity) contribute to analysis of Buddhist uses of scientific studies of meditation.