Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate

In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification. The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way; since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified iff a relevant possible instance of conscious deliberation would endorse the belief. The importance of conscious deliberation stems from its role in guiding us in acquiring true beliefs: whereas the externalist holds that if we wish to acquire true beliefs, we have to begin by assuming that some of our usual methods of belief formation generally provide us with true beliefs, the internalist holds that if we form beliefs by conscious deliberation, we can be conscious of reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true. Conscious deliberation can make us conscious of reasons because it proceeds via rational intuitions. I argue that despite the fallibility of rational intuition, rational intuitions do enable us to become conscious of reasons for belief.

An informational analysis of actors' and observers' belief attributions in a role-playing situation

An actor's belief in a proposition was inferred by both the actor himself and an observer on the basis of information concerning (a) the actor's preparation and delivery of a speech on the proposition to an unseen audience, and (b) the audience's belief in the proposition. The availability of this information to judges was systematically varied. The position advocated by the actor in his speech and the audience's opinion affected both the actor's belief in the test proposition and the belief attributed to the actor by a disinterested observer. However, neither effect depended upon whether or not other belief-relevant information was also available. These results were interpreted as more consistent with a summative model of information integration than with an averaging model. Actors' behavior had similar effects upon both actors' estimates of how the audience would judge their beliefs and observers' actual estimates of these beliefs. However, these effects were both greater than the effect of their behavior on their own estimates of their beliefs. The apparent strength of the audience's belief in the target proposition had a positive influence upon both actors' beliefs in the proposition and observers' estimates of actors' beliefs, but had a negative, or contrast effect upon actors' expectancies for how the audience would judge their beliefs. Results were more consistent with the differential perspective hypothesis of actor-observer differences proposed by Jones and Nisbett than with the hypothesis that actors and observers differentially weight the implications of their past experience in formulating their judgments. Results had additional implications for the assumptions that persons make when using their behaviors as indications of their beliefs.     

THE MORAL BELIEF PROBLEM

The moral belief problem is that of reconciling expressivism in ethics with both minimalism in the philosophy of language and the syntactic discipline of moral sentences. It is argued that the problem can be solved by distinguishing minimal and robust senses of belief, where a minimal belief is any state of mind expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R. Two attempts to specify R are discussed, both based on the thought that beliefs are states that aim at truth. According to the first, robust beliefs are criticisable to the extent that their content fails to match the state of the world. This sense fails to distinguish robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. According to the second, robust beliefs function to have their content match the state of the world. This sense succeeds in distinguishing robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. The conclusion is that the debate concerning the cognitive status of moral convictions needs to address the issue of the function of moral convictions. Evolutionary theorising may be relevant, but will not be decisive, in answering this question.     

Expectancy-value models of attitudes: A note on the relationship between theory and methodology

Concern has been expressed in the literature regarding the method of scoring ‘beliefs’ within expectancy-value models of attitudes. This paper reviews the major issues and focuses upon some hitherto largely neglected problems with scoring methods. Empirical findings from a series of studies concerned with ‘the theory of reasoned action’ are examined: with a multiplicative Combination of beliefs and evaluations, it is found that bipolar scoring of belief items leads to higher correlations of the summed products of beliefs and evaluations with attitudes than are achieved with unipolar scoring. These findings contrast markedly with recently reported research and indicate the important role played by contextual factors (such as belief content and the response scales presented to subjects). It is concluded that more attention needs to be paid to the relationship between conceptual and methodological issues.     

Ethics and Nanotechnology: Views of Nanotechnology Researchers

A study was conducted of nanotechnology (NT) researchers’ views about ethics in relation to their work. By means of a purpose-built questionnaire, made available on the Internet, the study probed NT researchers’ general attitudes toward and beliefs about ethics in relation to NT, as well as their views about specific NT-related ethical issues. The questionnaire attracted 1,037 respondents from 13 U.S. university-based NT research facilities. Responses to key questionnaire items are summarized and noteworthy findings presented. For most respondents, the ethical responsibilities of NT researchers are not limited to those related to safety and integrity in the laboratory. Most believe that NT researchers also have specific ethical responsibilities to the society in which their research is done and likely to be applied. NT appears to be one of the first areas of contemporary technoscientific activity in which a long-standing belief is being seriously challenged: the belief that society is solely responsible for what happens when a researcher’s work, viewed as neutral and merely enabling, is applied in a particular social context. Survey data reveal that most respondents strongly disagree with that paradigmatic belief. Finally, an index gauging NT researcher sensitivity to ethics and ethical issues related to NT was constructed. A substantial majority of respondents exhibited medium or high levels of sensitivity to ethics in relation to NT. Although most respondents view themselves as not particularly well informed about ethics in relation to NT, a substantial majority are aware of and receptive to ethical issues related to their work, and believe that these issues merit consideration by society and study by current and future NT practitioners.

The psychology of meta-ethics: exploring objectivism

How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.     

The Coping Mechanisms and Strategies of Hypertension Patients in Ghana: The Role of Religious Faith,Beliefs and Practices

This qualitative study explored the role of religious faith, belief and practice systems in the coping mechanisms and strategies of essential hypertension patients in Accra, Ghana. Six participants were recruited for participation, of which five were Christians and one was a Muslim. Interviews were conducted and interpretative phenomenological analysis was used to analyze the data. Results showed that participants used their religious faith, beliefs and practices as coping resources. Participants used a deferring-collaborative style of religious coping, which seemed to have provided them with an avoidance strategy that protected the participants from conscious confrontation with their illness. Religious faith and beliefs also afforded the participants a sense of coherence that enabled the participants to manage their stress, reflect on their external and internal resources to promote effective coping and adaptive functioning in a health promoting manner. Implications of a deferring-collaborative style of religious coping and religious re-appraisal are discussed.     

Choosing to believe

This article defends a regulative ethics of voluntary belief. In order to determine the occasion and the scope of such an ethics, the article begins with an examination of the concept of belief in conversation with the view of J. L. Schellenberg. Next, against the dominant position in contemporary epistemology, it argues that some beliefs can be voluntary, in the sense that they are under the immediate control of the believer, and replies to William Alston’s influential objections to doxastic voluntarism. If some beliefs are subject to the immediate control of the believer, then in these cases believers are ethically responsible not only for how they investigate those beliefs, but also for the choice of whether or not to believe them. The article concludes by formulating and defending two types of regulative ethical principles governing voluntary belief.     

Evaluating scientific research: Belief,hindsight bias,ethics, and research evaluation

Students may exhibit two forms of cognitive biases, belief and hindsight bias, in evaluating a scientific experiment. Counter to disagreement, they may only believe an outcome that agrees with their belief to be more predictable in hindsight than foresight. The focus of this research is on the relationship between these biases. Students were queried about their dichotomous beliefs (learned vs. genetic) about behavior for an animal experiment and then assigned randomly to a no‐outcome or genetic outcome condition. With agreement between students' belief and outcome, the findings revealed hindsight bias (foreseeability) supported by the outcomes for surprise, disappointment, ethics, and research evaluation. With disagreement, hindsight bias was trumped along with perceiving the experiment as being less ethical and scientifically sound. Regardless of the outcome, students seem to adhere to their beliefs. Hence, students may believe that the outcome is inconsequential because it is obvious or contrary to their beliefs.     

The Impact of Specific Psychotherapist Beliefs Regarding Managed Care on Prospective Psychotherapy Clients

The purpose of this study was to investigate the separate impact of each of thirteen therapist beliefs that, presented collectively, were previously found to have a significantly negative impact on prospective clients' attitudes toward managed care psychotherapy (Pomerantz, 2000). Participants in this study initially completed a brief questionnaire measuring their willingness to enter psychotherapy and their expectations regarding psychotherapy under managed care. Participants subsequently completed the same brief questionnaire again after being instructed to imagine seeing a hypothetical psychologist and being presented with the psychologist's supposed beliefs regarding managed care (which were actually derived from survey data by Murphy et al., 1998). Results suggest that almost every discrete therapist belief had a significantly negative impact on participants' attitudes toward managed care psychotherapy. Several specific therapist beliefs produced particularly salient negative effects. Implications regarding ethics and informed consent are discussed.     

Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement

Self‐consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self‐knowledge, norms of belief, self‐consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self‐conscious adherence to epistemic norms requires the ability to self‐consciously hold a belief without endorsing that belief as true, as well‐supported by the evidence, or as meeting some other epistemic standard, and there are cases in which no such commitment is rationally required. This ability is necessary if there is to be any such thing as a fully self‐conscious process of changing one's mind.     

Individual Differences in Commitment to Value‐Based Beliefs and the Amplification of Perceived Belief Dissimilarity Effects

The commitment to beliefs (CTB) framework (Maxwell‐Smith & Esses, 2012) proposes that there are individual differences in the extent to which people generally follow beliefs that are a reflection of their values. The current research hypothesized that CTB would amplify the effects of perceived belief dissimilarity or incompatibility, such that individuals higher in CTB would display more pronounced reactions to belief‐relevant groups, events, or individuals seen as incompatible with their value‐based beliefs. We tested our hypothesis in three studies that assessed participants' CTB and their perceptions of belief dissimilarity or incompatibility with regard to other religious groups (Study 1), political parties during a national election (Study 2), and their romantic partner (Study 3). CTB amplified the effects of perceived belief dissimilarity or incompatibility on people's biases toward other religious groups, voting intentions and behavior in a national election, and their evaluative and behavioral responses toward their romantic partner. These results collectively suggest that perceptions of belief dissimilarity or incompatibility are particularly important cues for individuals with higher levels of CTB as they encounter other people or events that are relevant to their beliefs.     

Diverse Supernatural Portfolios: Certitude,Exclusivity, and the Curvilinear Relationship Between Religiosity and Paranormal Beliefs

Studies have attempted to understand the association between more conventional supernatural (religious) beliefs and practices and less conventional “paranormal” supernatural beliefs. Some have posited that the two comprise incompatible cultural spheres and belief systems, while others have argued that supernatural religious beliefs are “small steps” toward less conventional paranormal views (such as belief in astrology and telekinesis). We build upon recent scholarship outlining a more nuanced, nonlinear relationship between religiosity and paranormal beliefs by identifying a specific niche of believers who are particularly likely to dabble in unconventional supernatural beliefs. Strong believers in the paranormal tend to be characterized by a nonexclusive spiritualist worldview, as opposed to materialist or exclusive religious outlooks. Paranormal believers tend to be characterized by moderate levels of religious belief and practice, and low levels of ideological exclusivity. In general, the relationship between more conventional religiosity and paranormal beliefs is best conceptualized as curvilinear.     

It is our destiny to die: The effects of mortality salience and culture‐priming on fatalism and karma belief

The current study explores whether Asians use culture‐specific belief systems to defend against their death anxiety. The effects of mortality salience (MS) and cultural priming on Taiwanese beliefs in fatalism and karma were investigated. Study 1 showed that people believe in fatalism and karma more following MS compared with the control condition. Study 2 found that the effect of MS on fatalism belief was stronger when Taiwanese were exposed to an Eastern cultural context than to a Western cultural context. However, a matched sample of Western participants did not show increased fatalism belief after either a West‐ or East‐prime task. The present research provides evidence that Asians may use some culture‐specific beliefs, particularly fatalism belief, to cope with their death awareness.     

The Role of Sensory Experience in Epistemic Justification: a Problem for Coherentism

The author argues that coherence views of justification, in spite of their crucial insight into the interpenetration of our beliefs, neglect a key constraint on justification: they are unable to accommodate the epistemic significance of experience. Epistemic justification is not just a function of our beliefs and their interrelations. Both, beliefs and experiences, are relevant to the justification of an empirical belief. Experience is not itself a form of belief or disposition to believe; it cannot be analyzed in doxastic terms. And, yet, nondoxastic experiences play a justificatory role, not merely a causal role. The positive epistemic status of a perceptual belief depends upon being appeared to in appropriate ways. It is important that, for an ordinary perceptual belief to be justified, one does not have to believe that one is appeared to in these ways. It is the experiences themselves, the ways of being appeared to, not our beliefs about them, that are required for justification.     

A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision

What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision.     

Normativity in Comparative Religious Ethics

This essay seeks to clarify the meaning and nature of normativity in metaethics and offers reasons why comparative religious ethics (CRE) must properly address questions about normativity. Though many comparative religious ethicists take CRE to be a normative discipline, what they say about normativity is often unclear and confusing. I argue that the third‐wave scholars face serious questions with respect to not only the justification of moral belief but also the rationality of moral belief and action. These scholars tend to view the justification of moral belief to be a matter of process (that is, discursive social practice) rather than evidence‐possession, thus overlooking crucial differences between the two. They also run the risk of confusing motivating and explanatory reasons with normative reasons for moral belief and action. Consequently, their account of normativity would be insufficient for determining the rationality of moral beliefs and actions as well as for justifying moral beliefs.     

The virtues of belief: toward a non-evidentialist ethics of belief-formation

William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an epistemological claim (that entitlement is always a function of evidential support). Although I reject the (universality of the) epistemological claim, I argue that something deserving of the name ethics of belief can nevertheless be preserved. However, in the second half of the paper I argue that Clifford’s response to the problem of unethical belief is insufficiently attentive to the role played by self-deception in the formation of unethical beliefs. By contrasting the first-person perspective of a doxastic agent with the third-person perspective of an outside observer, I argue that unethical belief is a symptom of deficiencies of character: fix these, and belief will fix itself. I suggest that the moral intuitions implicit in our response to examples of unethical belief (like Clifford’s famous example of the ship owner) can better be accounted for in terms of a non-evidentialist virtue ethics of belief-formation, and that such an account can survive the rejection of strong versions of doxastic voluntarism.

Joseph Butler, “Upon Self-Deceit” (1726)

     

冲突情境下幼儿的选择性信任和信念修正

幼儿如何选择性地采信他人提供的信息、获取知识, 是幼儿社会认知发展研究的重要问题。除客观的信息内容外, 信息传递者的特征也影响幼儿的选择性信任。另外, 在不确定情境下, 他人证言与幼儿已有信念可能存在冲突, 在二者冲突的情境下, 幼儿是否可以采信他人的证言, 并最终改变幼儿的已有判断是以往研究忽略的问题。本研究考察了当母亲证言与幼儿已有信念冲突时, 不同程度的冲突情境(面对不同比例的合成动物时)对幼儿选择性信任和信念修正的影响。研究采用冲突信息源范式, 向74名4~6岁幼儿呈现对不同比例合成动物(50%-50%任务 vs 75%-25%任务)命名的证言, 考察幼儿对信息提供者的询问意愿、对证言的信任情况和在证言前后对合成动物的判断(信念修正)。信息提供的一方为母亲(提供相似度低的动物名称), 另一方为陌生人(提供相似度高的动物名称)。结果发现, 幼儿的选择性信任和信念修正受到母亲证言与已有信念冲突程度的影响。在低冲突情境下, 幼儿对母亲证言的询问意愿和外显信任均高于高冲突情境。幼儿的信念修正存在年龄差异, 在低冲突情境下, 年长幼儿比年幼幼儿更倾向于改变已有信念, 在高冲突情境下, 年长的幼儿比年幼幼儿更不愿意改变已有信念。本研究结果表明, 当母亲的证言与幼儿已有信念冲突时, 中国幼儿可以区分不同程度的冲突情境, 并且可以根据冲突的程度进行选择性信任和信念修正。     

Selective exposure in decided and undecided individuals: differential relations to automatic associations and conscious beliefs

People often show a preference for information that confirms their attitudes and beliefs, and this tendency is reduced for opinions that are not held with conviction. The present study shows that both decided and undecided individuals show a tendency to selectively expose themselves to confirmatory information, albeit with different antecedents and consequences. Whereas selective exposure in decided participants was predicted by conscious beliefs and not by automatic associations, selective exposure in undecided participants was predicted by automatic associations and not by conscious beliefs. Moreover, selective exposure led undecided participants to adopt conscious beliefs that were in line with their preexisting automatic associations. Conversely, for decided participants, selective exposure shifted automatic associations in a direction that was in line with their preexisting conscious beliefs. Implications for decision making and mutual influences of automatic associations and conscious beliefs in attitude change are discussed.