The construction of risk in relationships: The role of framing in decisions about intimate relationships

Two studies examined the applicability of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) notion of “framing” to decision making in romantic relationships. Using scenarios about hypothetical relationships, the results of Study 1 demonstrated that framing objectively identical alternatives in terms of losses versus gains affected participants' preferences for risky versus cautious actions. Furthermore, adult attachment style was found to moderate the impact of this framing effect. Study 2 examined individual differences in people's spontaneous tendencies to frame their feelings about their actual relationships in terms of losses or gains. Consistent with the findings of Study 1, attachment style was reliably associated with spontaneous framing. Secure individuals were most likely to represent their feelings in terms of a “gains frame” whereas fearful individuals were most likely to represent their feelings in terms of a “loss frame.”     

Who Takes the Lead in Risky Decision Making? Effects of Group Members' Risk Preferences and Prototypicality

In two experiments, we studied the effects of (a) the extent to which group members are risk seeking in comparison with others in the group and (b) group member prototypicality (the extent to which individuals hold group-typical risk preferences) on the likelihood that group members will take the lead in risky decision making. Participants were led to believe that they engaged in a four-person group discussion and received bogus feedback about their own risk preferences, the risk preferences of the other group members, and the risk preferences of their group as a whole. In Experiment 2, we also manipulated the framing of the decision problem (gain vs. loss frame). Results supported the hypotheses that (a) more risk seeking members are more likely to take the lead and (b) prototypical members are more likely to take the lead when the problem facing the group is ambiguous (i.e., when group risk preferences and decision framing are incongruent), whereas nonprototypical members are more likely to take the lead when the problem facing the group is relatively clear-cut (i.e., when group risk preferences and decision framing are congruent).     

Finding the Right Value: Framing Effects on Domain Experts

By defining the essence of a policy problem, an issue frame shapes how individuals think about a political issue. In this research, we investigate framing effects among domain experts, an understudied yet increasingly important set of individuals in the policymaking process. Because domain experts have extensive and highly structured knowledge on a particular topic, they are likely to actively process issue frames to which they are exposed. Consequently, we hypothesize that frames consistent with experts' values will be particularly influential, whereas frames inconsistent with their values will lead to contrast effects. We test our hypotheses on a unique set of domain experts by examining professional farmers' attitudes toward no‐till agriculture. Using an experimental design, we find evidence that environmental values interact with frames to influence farmers' interest in no‐till, especially when farmers are exposed to a novel frame.     

Reflections of the self: how self‐esteem determines decision framing and increases risk taking

Historically, research examining the influence of individual personality factors on decision processing has been sparse. In this paper we investigate how one important individual aspect, self‐esteem, influences imposition and subsequent processing of ambiguously, negatively or positively framed decision tasks. We hypothesized that low self‐esteem individuals would impose a negative frame onto ambiguous decision problems and would be especially sensitive to negatively framed decision tasks. In Study 1 we utilized a self‐framing procedure and demonstrated that HSE participants were evenly divided in the hedonic valence they self‐imposed whereas LSE participants were more likely to self‐impose a negative frame. When these differences were accounted for, HSE and LSE participants were equivalent in risk seeking/avoiding choices. Study 2 used a risky‐choice framing task and found that LSE individuals were especially sensitive to the negative frame. Study 3, provided converging evidence and generalization of these findings to a reflection tasks involving money. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Die‐by Framing both Lengthens and Shortens Life: Further Evidence on Constructed Beliefs in Life Expectancy

Decisions regarding consumption over the lifespan require some estimate of how long that lifespan is likely to be. Payne et al. (2013) found that respondents' estimates of their own life expectancy are on average 8.6 years shorter when elicited using a die‐by frame than when elicited by a live‐to frame. If decision makers act on these life expectancies, then an arbitrary detail of framing will lead to drastically different choices. We propose that the framing effect is sensitive to the iterative probabilistic elicitation procedure employed by the previous literature. Study 1 compares the framing effect across the iterative probabilistic procedure and a point estimate procedure that simply asks respondents the age they will live to/die by. The iterative probabilistic procedure implies a life expectancy six years shorter in the die‐by frame than in the live‐to frame, replicating the results of Payne et al. (2013). With the point estimate procedure, however, the framing effect reverses: the die‐by frame increases life expectancy by three years. In Study 2, we test for the framing effect using a point estimate procedure on a representative sample of 2000 Britons. Again, and in contrast with the previous literature, we find that the die‐by frame implies longer life. Our results reinforce the previous literature that beliefs around life expectancy are constructed. We recommend caution when attempting to debias life expectancy estimates or using life expectancies in choice architecture. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Humpty Dumpty blues: Disaggregation bias in the evaluation of tax systems

Three experiments carried out on the World Wide Web assessed the consistency of attitudes toward various tax regimes that differed in their overall levels and degrees of tax rate graduation in the presence of framing manipulations. The regimes had two components: an income and a payroll tax. One frame involved aggregation. Subjects were asked either to design a single, global tax system or to vary one component of a tax system (payroll or income tax) with the other component held constant. The idea was to replicate the effects of income tax reform given a constant payroll tax system. Consistent with the experimental hypothesis—though not with “rational” decision making—subjects focused on the component they were asked to manipulate and did not respond fully to changes in the other component, across conditions, reflecting an under-adjustment bias as well as a framing effect. The results are akin to Thaler’s “mental account” model for personal financial behavior. A second manipulation involved a “metric” frame: whether putative tax burdens were given in dollars or percent terms. Once again consistent with the experimental hypothesis, subjects preferred higher rates of graduation when matters were stated in percent terms. The results point to the lability of public opinion about important questions of public finance, and they illustrate a specific category of biases concerning disaggregation.     

右侧颞顶联合区及道德加工脑网络的功能连接预测社会性框架效应：来自静息态功能磁共振的证据

社会性框架效应指个体进行社会性决策时, 描述方式(即框架)对其选择倾向的影响。采用“伤害/帮助框架”范式, 本研究在行为上发现了显著的框架效应：被试在伤害框架下比帮助框架下, 更倾向于选择利他选项, 这可能是由于伤害框架凸显了伤害他人的后果及有意性, 从而提高了道德冲突水平。在神经活动上发现(1)静息态下, 右侧颞顶联合区(TPJ)的低频振荡振幅(ALFF)与框架效应强度存在显著正相关; (2)道德加工相关脑区构成的局部脑网络内部的功能连接强度(FC)能够有效预测框架效应强度。本研究首次利用静息态功能连接探讨个体的社会性决策受到语言表述方式影响的神经机制, 为进一步揭示社会决策中的个体差异提供了神经学证据。     

The Role of Inference in Attribute Framing Effects

Previous research has shown that a speaker's choice between logically equivalent frames is influenced by reference point information, and that listeners draw accurate inferences based on the frame. Less clear, however, is whether these inferences play a causal role in generating attribute framing effects. Two experiments are reported, which suggest that frame‐dependent inferences are sufficient to generate attribute framing effects, and that blocking such inferences may block framing effects. Experiment 1 decomposed the typical framing design into two parts: One group of participants saw a target described in one of two attribute frames and reported their estimates (inferences) of the typical attribute value. These estimates were then given to a second group of yoked participants, who evaluated the target. Although this latter group was not exposed to different attribute frames, they nevertheless exhibited a “framing effect” as a result of receiving systematically different inferences. In contrast, Experiment 2 shows that experts—who are familiar with an attribute's distribution and are therefore less likely to draw strong frame‐based inferences—exhibit a diminished framing effect. Together, these findings underscore the role of inferences in the generation and attenuation of attribute framing effects. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do the right thing: but only if others do so

Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响

两个实验考察了情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果表明:(1)获益框架下,悲伤情绪比愉悦情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,自我决策比预期他人决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(2)损失框架下,愉悦情绪比悲伤情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,预期他人决策比自我决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(3)在自我决策时,愉悦情绪在损失框架下比在获益框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好,悲伤情绪在获益框架下比在损失框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好;在预期他人决策时,无论是愉悦情绪还是悲伤情绪,损失框架均比获益框架诱发了更强的风险偏好。     

Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains

The author examines the mechanisms and dynamics of framing effects in risky choices across three distinct task domains (i.e., life–death, public property, and personal money). The choice outcomes of the problems presented in each of the three task domains had a binary structure of a sure thing vs a gamble of equal expected value; the outcomes differed in their framing conditions and the expected values, raging from 6000, 600, 60, to 6, numerically. It was hypothesized that subjects would become more risk seeking, if the sure outcome was below their aspiration level (the minimum requirement). As predicted, more subjects preferred the gamble when facing the life–death choice problems than facing the counterpart problems presented in the other two task domains. Subjects’ risk preference varied categorically along the group size dimension in the life–death domain but changed more linearly over the expected value dimension in the monetary domain. Framing effects were observed in 7 of 13 pairs of problems, showing a positive frame–risk aversion and negative frame–risk seeking relationship. In addition, two types of framing effects were theoretically defined and empirically identified. Abidirectional framing effectinvolves a reversal in risk preference, and occurs when a decision maker's risk preference is ambiguous or weak. Four bidirectional effects were observed; in each case a majority of subjects preferred the sure outcome under a positive frame but the gamble under a negative frame. In contrast, aunidirectional framing effectrefers to a preference shift due to the framing of choice outcomes: A majority of subjects preferred one choice outcome (either the sure thing or the gamble) under both framing conditions, with positive frame augmented the preference for the sure thing and negative frame augmented the preference for the gamble. These findings revealed some dynamic regularities of framing effects and posed implications for developing predictive and testable models of human decision making.     

Ratio Bias and Policy Preferences: How Equivalency Framing of Numbers Can Affect Attitudes

Numbers permeate modern political communication. While current scholarship on framing effects has focused on the persuasive effects of words and arguments, this article shows that framing of numbers can also substantially affect policy preferences. Such effects are caused by ratio bias, which is a general tendency to focus on numerators and pay insufficient attention to denominators in ratios. Using a population‐based survey experiment, I demonstrate how differently framed but logically equivalent representations of the exact same numerical value can have large effects on citizens' preferences regarding salient political issues such as education and taxes. Furthermore, the effects of numerical framing are found across most groups of the population, largely regardless of their political predisposition and their general ability to understand and use numerical information. These findings have significant implications for our understanding of framing effects and the role played by numbers in public opinion formation.     

Myopic loss aversion: Demystifying the key factors influencing decision problem framing

Advancement of myopic loss aversion theory has been hamstrung by conflicting results, methodological inconsistencies, and a piecemeal approach toward understanding the key factors influencing decision problem framing. A series of controlled experiments provides a more holistic view of the variables promoting myopia. Extending the information horizon promotes broad framing, which propels risk. Evaluation frequency and decision frequency interact regardless of information horizon, supporting the notion that restricting either mechanism alleviates myopia. When conducting evaluations infrequently, neither segregating nor aggregating retrospective returns significantly alters risk preferences. Moreover, students and real retirement plan participants exhibit comparable appetites for risk, implying that both groups frame decision problems similarly. Explanations for these findings and avenues for future research are discussed.     

Need for Cognition and Choice Framing Effects

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.     

Escalation of Commitment and the Framing Effect: An Empirical Investigation

Research and theory are reviewed which consider two decision biases: escalation of commitment and decision framing. Some authors (Bazerman, 1986; Whyte, 1986) have suggested that escalation of commitment may be explained by the decision framing used in the research paradigms. A study was conducted which simultaneously manipulated both responsibility for a prior decision and decision frame. Results show a main effect on resource allocation for responsibility and no effect for decision frame. A follow-up study found that amount of information provided systematically affected the framing bias, and that when responsibility was added to a large amount of contextual information, the framing effect became nonsignificant. These results suggest a need to further examine the boundary conditions of framing.     

封面故事、选项框架和损益概率对风险偏好的影响

以股市投资为背景设计决策问题,考查了问题的封面故事类型、备择选项框架和风险项的概率水平对327名股民被试和465名大学生被试的风险偏好的影响。结果表明,股民被试的风险偏好不同于大学生被试,前者在所有实验处理上呈现出稳定的风险回避倾向。大学生被试在不同类型的封面故事下呈现出不同的风险偏好。在传统的坏封面故事下,风险偏好只受到备择选项框架的影响,不受损益概率的影响,即出现经典的框架效应现象。在好封面故事下,风险偏好受到备择选项框架、损益概率及两者交互作用的影响,即在高概率水平上出现框架效应现象,在低概率水平上出现框架效应反转现象     

Attribute Framing and Goal Framing Effects in Health Decisions

Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (LSG, 1998) have distinguished among three types of framing—risky choice, attribute, and goal framing—to reconcile conflicting findings in the literature. In the research reported here, we focus on attribute and goal framing. LSG propose that positive frames should be more effective than negative frames in the context of attribute framing, and negative frames should be more effective than positive frames in the context of goal framing. We test this framework by manipulating frame valence (positive vs negative) and frame type (attribute vs goal) in a unified context with common procedures. We also argue that the nature of effects in a goal-framing context may depend on the extent to which the research topic has “intrinsic self-relevance” to the population. In the context of medical decision making, we operationalize low intrinsic self-relevance by using student subjects and high intrinsic self-relevance by using patients. As expected, we find complete support for the LSG framework under low intrinsic self-relevance and modified support for the LSG framework under high intrinsic self-relevance. Overall, our research appears to confirm and extend the LSG framework.     

不同建议来源和关系亲疏下突发事件决策中的框架效应

从建议来源和关系亲疏两个方面对突发事件下的决策框架效应进行探讨。采用2（建议来源：来自普通群众／消防人员）×2（关系亲疏：关系亲密／关系疏远）×2（任务框架：正面框架／负面框架）完全被试间实验设计。实验材料以突发事件为背景,根据Kahneman（1981）研究的经典“亚洲疾病问题”改编。采用集体施测的方法,240名来自济南和重庆的大学生参加了实验。结果发现：①建议来源影响被试的决策反应,尤其是当建议来自专业人士（如消防人员）时,决策者表现出偏好于风险的单向框架效应;②关系亲疏导致不同的框架效应,在拯救包括亲属在内的受灾人群（关系亲密）时,框架效应非常明显;但当拯救陌生人（关系疏远）时,决策者表现出偏好于风险的单向框架效应;③当建议来源和关系亲疏共同作用于被试决策时,凡涉及关系亲密条件时决策者不管建议来源都表现出明显的框架效应;而当关系疏远时不同的建议来源导致决策者的决策框架不同。这说明,不同的建议来源和关系亲疏对突发事件下的决策框架效应产生了影响。     

Preferences,expectations, and behaviours in interpersonal interaction

This study is concerned with the relationship between expectations and preferences prior to an interaction, and their effects on behaviours enacted during the interaction. Expectations and preferences of therapists regarding several specific therapist's and client's behaviours were assessed prior to a therapy meeting. After that meeting, the therapists described the behaviours that had occurred during the meeting. It was found that the correspondence between expectations and preferences is affected by the amount of control one has over the behaviours. There seems also to be a clear indication that expectations predict the behaviours better than preferences. Still, it should be noted that preferences do predict behaviours, and this relationship, although weak, holds even after the effect of expectations is removed.