Regularity of symmetry verticality guides perceptual judgments of objects

Previous research indicated that most salient, real-world objects possess natural regularities that observers commonly assume in perceptual judgments of figural orientation and interpretation. Regularities include 3-dimensionality, bilateral symmetry, and the tendency for object tops to possess more salient information than bottoms. Thus, when observers interpret randomly shaped figures, they reliably impose volume, bilateral symmetry, and top and front orientation directions, even when figures are 2-dimensional and asymmetric. We confirmed generalizability for observers to assume these regularities with stimuli that vary in complexity, and we found evidence supporting another regularity, that of symmetry verticality (symmetry about a vertical axis). Findings support use of a family of perceptual heuristics corresponding to natural regularities that constrain stimulus indeterminacy and help guide judgment of object orientation and interpretation.     

Simple mechanisms for gathering social information

Social contexts are notoriously complex, yet decisions are nevertheless made by using simple strategies. We argue that the concept of fast and frugal heuristics provides a promising framework for understanding how we gather social information to make decisions in social environments. That is, we assume that under limitations of time, energy, and computational resources people use cognitively based shortcuts that rely on information from social environments to solve different types of real problems. We review three successful applications of heuristics to the social arena. We first introduce some commonly faced social inference problems (e.g., selecting a mate or deciding whether to cooperate with someone) and then discuss how individuals can use simple strategies to solve such problems. For each problem, we consider how social environments are structured, and how we take advantage of this structure when using heuristics to make inferences and decisions.     

研究人类使用启发式之五原则(英文)

快速节俭启发式框架假定人们使用一套简捷的决策策略——启发式——进行推理、选择、评价及其他决策。这些启发式策略能顺应任务情境结构中的规律, 利用人类的基本认知能力。正基于此, 启发式成就了适应性行为。本文拟对启发式框架进行回顾, 并简要陈述引导研究者研究人类适应性工具箱的五条原则。我们强调, 启发式模型应(ⅰ)精确界定(ⅱ)对照检验(ⅲ)与策略选择理论相符(ⅳ)能评估其对新资料的预测力(ⅴ)能既在实验室又在现实世界中得以检验。     

Heuristic and linear models of judgment: matching rules and environments

Much research has highlighted incoherent implications of judgmental heuristics, yet other findings have demonstrated high correspondence between predictions and outcomes. At the same time, judgment has been well modeled in the form of as if linear models. Accepting the probabilistic nature of the environment, the authors use statistical tools to model how the performance of heuristic rules varies as a function of environmental characteristics. They further characterize the human use of linear models by exploring effects of different levels of cognitive ability. They illustrate with both theoretical analyses and simulations. Results are linked to the empirical literature by a meta-analysis of lens model studies. Using the same tasks, the authors estimate the performance of both heuristics and humans where the latter are assumed to use linear models. Their results emphasize that judgmental accuracy depends on matching characteristics of rules and environments and highlight the trade-off between using linear models and heuristics. Whereas the former can be cognitively demanding, the latter are simple to implement. However, heuristics require knowledge to indicate when they should be used.     

Précis of Simple heuristics that make us smart

How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we explore fast and frugal heuristics--simple rules in the mind's adaptive toolbox for making decisions with realistic mental resources. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices quickly and with a minimum of information by exploiting the way that information is structured in particular environments. In this précis, we show how simple building blocks that control information search, stop search, and make decisions can be put together to form classes of heuristics, including: ignorance-based and one-reason decision making for choice, elimination models for categorization, and satisficing heuristics for sequential search. These simple heuristics perform comparably to more complex algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data--that is, simplicity leads to robustness. We present evidence regarding when people use simple heuristics and describe the challenges to be addressed by this research program.     

Re-visions of rationality?

The appeal of simple algorithms that take account of both the constraints of human cognitive capacity and the structure of environments has been an enduring theme in cognitive science. A novel version of such a boundedly rational perspective views the mind as containing an 'adaptive toolbox' of specialized cognitive heuristics suited to different problems. Although intuitively appealing, when this version was proposed, empirical evidence for the use of such heuristics was scant. I argue that in the light of empirical studies carried out since then, it is time this 'vision of rationality' was revised. An alternative view based on integrative models rather than collections of heuristics is proposed.     

Contributions of invariants, heuristics, and exemplars to the visual perception of relative mass

Some potential contributions of invariants, heuristics, and exemplars to the perception of dynamic properties in the colliding balls task were explored. On each trial, an observer is asked to determine the heavier of 2 colliding balls. The invariant approach assumes that people can learn to detect complex visual patterns that reliably specify which ball is heavier. The heuristic approach assumes that observers only have access to simple motion cues. The exemplar-based approach assumes that people store particular exemplars of collisions in memory, which are later retrieved to perform the task. Mathematical models of these theories are contrasted in 2 experiments. Observers may use more than 1 strategy to determine relative mass. Although observers can learn to detect and use invariants, they may rely on either heuristics before the invariant has been learned or exemplars when memory demands and similarity relations allow.     

Mood and heuristics: the influence of happy and sad states on sensitivity and bias in stereotyping

The influence of mood states on the propensity to use heuristics as expressed in stereotypes was examined using signal detection statistics. Participants experienced happy, neutral, or sad moods and "remembered" whether names connoting race (African American, European American) belonged to social categories (criminal, politician, basketball player). Positive mood increased reliance on heuristics, indexed by higher false identification of members of stereotyped groups. Positive mood lowered sensitivity (d'), even among relative experts, and shifted bias (beta) or criterion to be more lenient for stereotypical names. In contrast, sad mood did not disrupt sensitivity and, in fact, revealed the use of a stricter criterion compared with baseline mood. Results support theories that characterize happy mood as a mental state that predisposes reliance on heuristics and sad mood as dampening such reliance.     

Heuristics made easy: an effort-reduction framework

In this article, the authors propose a new framework for understanding and studying heuristics. The authors posit that heuristics primarily serve the purpose of reducing the effort associated with a task. As such, the authors propose that heuristics can be classified according to a small set of effort-reduction principles. The authors use this framework to build upon current models of heuristics, examine existing heuristics in terms of effort-reduction, and outline how current research methods can be used to extend this effort-reduction framework. This framework reduces the redundancy in the field and helps to explicate the domain-general principles underlying heuristics.     

Environments That Make Us Smart: Ecological Rationality

ABSTRACT— Traditional views of rationality posit general-purpose decision mechanisms based on logic or optimization. The study of ecological rationality focuses on uncovering the "adaptive toolbox" of domain-specific simple heuristics that real, computationally bounded minds employ, and explaining how these heuristics produce accurate decisions by exploiting the structures of information in the environments in which they are applied. Knowing when and how people use particular heuristics can facilitate the shaping of environments to engender better decisions.     

Working memory and syllogistic reasoning

The purpose of this study was to examine the relation between working memory span and syllogistic reasoning performance. In addition, performance for the reasoning task was compared to predictions made by mental model theory and the probability heuristics model. According to mental model theory, syllogisms that require the use of more mental models are more difficult. According to the probability heuristics model difficulty is related to the number of probabilistic heuristics that must be applied, or (for invalid syllogisms) inconsistencies between the derived and correct conclusion. The predictions of these theories were examined across two experiments. In general, people with larger working memory capacities reasoned better. Also, the responses made by people with larger capacities were more likely to correspond to the predictions made by both mental model theory and the probability heuristics model. Relations between working memory span and performance were also consistent with both theories.     

How (far) can rationality be naturalized?

The paper shows why and how an empirical study of fast-and-frugal heuristics can provide norms of good reasoning, and thus how (and how far) rationality can be naturalized. We explain the heuristics that humans often rely on in solving problems, for example, choosing investment strategies or apartments, placing bets in sports, or making library searches. We then show that heuristics can lead to judgments that are as accurate as or even more accurate than strategies that use more information and computation, including optimization methods. A standard way to defend the use of heuristics is by reference to accuracy-effort trade-offs. We take a different route, emphasizing ecological rationality (the relationship between cognitive heuristics and environment), and argue that in uncertain environments, more information and computation are not always better (the ??less-can-be-more?? doctrine). The resulting naturalism about rationality is thus normative because it not only describes what heuristics people use, but also in which specific environments one should rely on a heuristic in order to make better inferences. While we desist from claiming that the scope of ecological rationality is unlimited, we think it is of wide practical use.     

The use of heuristics in intuitive mathematical judgment

Anecdotal evidence points to the use of beauty as an indication of truth in mathematical problem solving. In the two experiments of the present study, we examined the use of heuristics and tested the assumption that participants use symmetry as a cue for correctness in an arithmetic verification task. We manipulated the symmetry of sets of dot pattern addition equations. Speeded decisions about the correctness of these equations led to higher endorsements for both correct and incorrect equations when the addend and sum dot patterns were symmetrical. Therefore, this effect is not due to the fact that symmetry facilitates calculation or estimation. We found systematic evidence for the use of heuristics in solving mathematical tasks, and we discuss how these findings relate to a processing-fluency account of intuition in mathematical judgment.     

Share and Share Alike or Winner Take All?: The Influence of Social Value Orientation upon Choice and Recall of Negotiation Heuristics

Two experiments test the hypothesis that social value orientation influences choice and recall of heuristics in individuals preparing for negotiation. Consistent with predictions, Study 1 shows that in the preparation phase, negotiators with a prosocial value orientation choose more cooperative heuristics (e.g., “equal split is fair”) than competitive heuristics (e.g., “your gain is my loss”) while negotiators with a competitive social value orientation do the reverse. Negotiators with an individualistic social value orientation do not discriminate in their choice between cooperative and competitive heuristics. Study 2 shows that following preparation, prosocial negotiators recall more cooperative than competitive heuristics while individualists and competitors do the reverse. Additional measures suggest that prosocial negotiators prefer cooperative heuristics because these are seen as morally appropriate, whereas individualists and competitors prefer competitive heuristics because these are seen as effective.     

Fast and frugal heuristics are plausible models of cognition: reply to Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas (2008)

M. R. Dougherty, A. M. Franco-Watkins, and R. Thomas (2008) conjectured that fast and frugal heuristics need an automatic frequency counter for ordering cues. In fact, only a few heuristics order cues, and these orderings can arise from evolutionary, social, or individual learning, none of which requires automatic frequency counting. The idea that cue validities cannot be computed because memory does not encode missing information is misinformed; it implies that measures of co-occurrence are incomputable and would invalidate most theories of cue learning. They also questioned the recognition heuristic's psychological plausibility on the basis of their belief that it has not been implemented in a memory model, although it actually has been implemented in ACT-R (L. J. Schooler & R. Hertwig, 2005). On the positive side, M. R. Dougherty et al. discovered a new mechanism for a less-is-more effect. The authors of the present article specify minimal criteria for psychological plausibility, describe some genuine challenges in the study of heuristics, and conclude that fast and frugal heuristics are psychologically plausible: They use limited search and are tractable and robust.     

Solidarity and Social Moral Rules

The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.     

Motivation,heuristics, and the psychology of prediction

The present study was designed to test whether or not the use of representativeness and causality heuristics in decision-making results from insufficient or nonvigilant information processing rather than from an inherent deficiency in human information-processing ability. It was hypothesized that subjects who were distracted while making predictions (field-dependent subjects who were continuously aware of other subjects' performance in the experimental session) would fail to use the base rate to a greater extent than would nondistracted subjects (field-dependent subjects who were not aware of the other subjects' performance, and field-independent subjects). As predicted, when other subjects' performance was public, field-independent subjects conformed more to the base rate than did field-dependent subjects. In the private condition, however, the opposite pattern emerged. The results were discussed in terms of the drive theory of social facilitation and non-vigilant information processing.We would like to thank Matthew R. Marler for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.