Intransitivity and Vague Preferences

This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none of them provide a justification for the transitivity axiom. For helpful comments on earlier drafts and discussions of this material, I am very grateful to John Broome, Rosanna Keefe, Matthew Kramer, Stuart Rachels, Jochen Runde and Adrian Walsh. I owe a large debt to John O’Neill, who suggested an earlier version of the “Tragedy of the Disappearing Commons” example.     

A Generic Framework for Adaptive Vague Logics

In this paper, we present a generic format for adaptive vague logics. Logics based on this format are able to (1) identify sentences as vague or non-vague in light of a given set of premises, and to (2) dynamically adjust the possible set of inferences in accordance with these identifications, i.e. sentences that are identified as vague allow only for the application of vague inference rules and sentences that are identified as non-vague also allow for the application of some extra set of classical logic rules. The generic format consists of a set of minimal criteria that must be satisfied by the vague logic in casu in order to be usable as a basis for an adaptive vague logic. The criteria focus on the way in which the logic deals with a special ⊡-operator. Depending on the kind of logic for vagueness that is used as a basis for the adaptive vague logic, this operator can be interpreted as completely true, definitely true, clearly true, etc. It is proven that a wide range of famous logics for vagueness satisfies these criteria when extended with a specific ⊡-operator, e.g. fuzzy basic logic and its well known extensions, cf. [7], super- and subvaluationist logics, cf. [6], [9], and clarity logic, cf. [13]. Also a fuzzy logic is presented that can be used for an adaptive vague logic that can deal with higher-order vagueness. To illustrate the theory, some toy-examples of adaptive vague proofs are provided.     

On Evans's Vague Object from Set Theoretic Viewpoint

Gareth Evans proved that if two objects are indeterminately equal then they are different in reality. He insisted that this contradicts the assumption that there can be vague objects. However we show the consistency between Evans's proof and the existence of vague objects within classical logic. We formalize Evans's proof in a set theory without the axiom of extensionality, and we define a set to be vague if it violates extensionality with respect to some other set. There exist models of set theory where the axiom of extensionality does not hold, so this shows that there can be vague objects.     

Forms, uses and functions of children's favourite objects

In this study, the notion of a favourite object is used as a heuristic concept for things that children are occupied with and absorbed by. According to earlier studies, favourite objects can be grouped into four categories: forerunners of transitional objects, primary and secondary transitional objects, and favourite toys. This initial classification was compared to results of cluster analyses of characteristics of favourite objects among 32 preschool and 30 primary school children, corroborating the initial classification and specifying the typology. The distribution of types of objects was different for the two groups of children, but was not dependent on age within groups or, for the preschool children, on mental development. These results indicate that changes of favourite objects with mental maturation are slow.
The softness of the material of primary and secondary transitional objects and the preference for objects that could be kept close to the body suggest that the comforting character of these favourite objects has its root in the child's self-soothing actions with the object.     

The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects

The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.

The role of three-dimensional depth cues in infants' perception of partly occluded objects

Newborn infants were familiarized to a three dimensional display consisting of a rod which moved behind a central occluder, so that only the top and bottom of the rod were visible. The infants' eyes were 38 cm from the rod and the occluder was 15 cm in front of the rod, a separation intended to ensure that the gap between the two was detected by the infants. On subsequent test trials the infants looked longer at a complete rod than at two rod pieces, suggesting that the hidden unity, or completeness of the rod had not been perceived. In a study by Johnson and Náñez (in press), using computer. generated stimuli, 4 month olds perceived the hidden unity of a similar display presented on a VDU in the complete absence of three. dimensional depth cues. Taken together, these findings suggest that, for these displays, perception of three. dimensional depth cues is not necessary for the detection of the unity of partially hidden objects. It is suggested that age changes in early infancy in the perception of occluded objects may result either from the emergence of abilities to perceive objects from kinematic information or from the emergence of sensitivity to that information itself.     

Appearance matters: Attentional orienting by new objects in the precueing paradigm

Five experiments examined whether the appearance of a new object is able to orient attention in the absence of an accompanying sensory transient. A variant of the precueing paradigm (Posner & Cohen, 1984 Posner, M. I. and Cohen, Y. 1984. “Components of attention”. In Attention and performance X, Edited by: Bouma, H. and Bouwhuis, D. G. 55–66. Hove, , UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd.  [Google Scholar]) was employed in which the cue was the onset of a new object. Crucially, the new object's appearance was not associated with any unique sensory transient. This was achieved by using the variant “annulus” procedure recently developed by Franconeri, Hollingworth, and Simons (2005). Results showed that unless observers had an attentional set explicitly biased against onset, a validity effect was observed such that response times were shorter for targets occurring at the location of the new object relative to when targets occurred at the location of the “old” object. We conclude that new onsets do not need to be associated with a unique sensory transient in order to orient attention.     

Crossmodal object-based attention: auditory objects affect visual processing

According to the object-based view, visual attention can be deployed to "objects" or perceptual units, regardless of spatial locations. Recently, however, the notion of object has also been extended to the auditory domain, with some authors suggesting possible interactions between visual and auditory objects. Here we show that task-irrelevant auditory objects may affect the deployment of visual attention, providing evidence that crossmodal links can also occur at an object-based level. Hence, in addition to the well documented control of visual objects over what we hear, our findings demonstrate that, in some cases, auditory objects can affect visual processing.     

Visually guided grasping of common objects: Effects of priming

Priming effects were tested on the planning of the grasping of common objects under full vision during action performance. Healthy participants took part in four experiments which manipulated the nature of the prime (objects, circular block, rectangular bar) and priming context (blocked vs. mixed). Each experiment relied on four priming conditions: (1) congruent orientation, (2) incongruent orientation, (3) neutral prime, and (4) no prime. Priming was observed to have a facilitating effect on visually guided grasping when the object to be grasped was primed by a congruently oriented identical object. This effect was rather independent of the priming context (experimental set-up). Our data suggest an object's functional identity may contribute to the priming effect, as well as its intrinsic (e.g., shape, size) and extrinsic (orientation) visual characteristics. We showed that the planning of visually guided grasping is influenced by prior visual experience, and thus that grasping is not based exclusively on real-time processing of visual information.     

Oculomotion mediates attentional guidance toward temporarily close objects

Previous research has identified multiple features of individual objects that are capable of guiding visual attention. However, in dynamic multi-element displays not only individual object features but also changing spatial relations between two or more objects might signal relevance. Here we report a series of experiments that investigated the hypothesis that reduced inter-object spacing guides visual attention toward the corresponding objects. Our participants discriminated between different probes that appeared on moving objects while we manipulated spatial proximity between the objects at the moment of probe onset. Indeed, our results confirm that there is a bias toward temporarily close objects, which persists even when such a bias is harmful for the actual task (Experiments 1a and 1b). Remarkably, this bias is mediated by oculomotor processes. Controlling for eye-movements reverses the pattern of results (Experiment 2a), whereas the location of the gaze tends toward the temporarily close objects under free viewing conditions (Experiment 2b). Taken together, our results provide insights into the interplay of attentional and oculomotor processes during dynamic scene processing. Thereby, they also add to the growing body of evidence showing that within dynamic perception, attentional and oculomotor processes act conjointly and are hardly separable.     

Talking emotions: vowel selection in fictional names depends on the emotional valence of the to-be-named faces and objects

One prestudy based on a corpus analysis and four experiments in which participants had to invent novel names for persons or objects (N?=?336 participants in total) investigated how the valence of a face or an object affects the phonological characteristics of the respective novel name. Based on the articulatory feedback hypothesis, we predicted that /i:/ is included more frequently in fictional names for faces or objects with a positive valence than for those with a negative valence. For /o:/, the pattern should reverse. An analysis of the Berlin Affective Word List – Reloaded (BAWL-R) yielded a higher number of occurrences of /o:/ in German words with negative valence than in words with positive valence; with /i:/ the situation is less clear. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants named persons showing a positive or a negative facial expression. Names for smiling persons included more /i:/s and fewer /o:/s than names for persons with a negative facial expression. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants heard a Swahili narration and invented pseudo-Swahili names for objects with positive, neutral, or negative valence. Names for positive objects included more /i:/s than names for neutral or negative objects, and names for negative objects included more /o:/s than names for neutral or positive objects. These finding indicate a stable vowel-emotion link.     

Drives and objects - notes on the change of drive theory

Freud’s drive theory has been questioned since the 1940s when Fairbairn created a metaphor of the mind that is not based on the tripartite model and drive theory. His work inspired others to elaborate on the significance of internal object relationships. According to the object relation theory, internal object relations are dynamic structures capable of generating meanings and action. Consequently, two distinct metapsychologies were created.The aim of this article is to show how the interaction of theories has initiated revisions of classic drive theory. Freud’s concept of drive and three synthesizing viewpoints between the two perspectives are discussed. Otto Kernberg addresses affects as a primary motivational system; the mother–infant relationship organizes affects to drives. Joseph Sandler adheres to classic drive theory but proposes that the ego’s attempt to protect the mind against psychic pain is as important as drive derivatives in motivating the mind. Laplanche proposes that the unconscious of the care-giving adult is the crucial factor for the constitution of an infant’s unconscious and drives. For Freud and Klein, drive is inherent. Contemporary writers, like Loewald and Laplanche, conceive drive as a function of the mind that is born out of the same matrix of interaction with the other elements of the mind.     

"Transitional objects" as establishing operations for thumb sucking: a case study

This study examines the effects of a "transitional object" (surgical cloth) on the thumb sucking of a 3-year-old boy in two conditions: while sitting in the lap of his physical therapist and while alone in his crib. Sucking occurred when the cloth was present and did not occur when it was absent, regardless of condition. These results are discussed in terms of establishing operations, object attachment, and application.     

Association between objects and body parts mediated by function

Recent accounts of conceptual knowledge suggest that the specific gestures/actions that should be performed in order to use an object for its intended function are an integral part of its mental representation. If this is true, then the information regarding which body part needs activating to interact with the object should also be part of such representation. Starting from the assumption that not only artefacts (i.e., tools), but also natural objects (i.e., fruits and vegetables) have a function, the present study investigates the existence of a link between a specific object and the effector involved in its use. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) paradigm was adopted to test for an association between natural objects and mouth, and between artefacts and hand (Experiment 1) or foot (Experiment 2). Results showed selective links between objects and effectors, based on which body part is needed to carry out the object's function.     

The explicit learning of new names for known objects is improved by dexamphetamine

A randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled, between subjects study design (N=37) was used to investigate the effects of dexamphetamine on explicit new name learning. Participants ingested 10mg of dexamphetamine or placebo daily over 5 consecutive mornings before learning new names for 50 familiar objects plus fillers. The dexamphetamine group recognised and recalled the new names more accurately than the placebo group over the 5 days and 1 month later. Word learning success was not associated with baseline neuropsychological performance, mood, cardiovascular arousal, or sustained attention. These results may have implications for the pharmacological treatment of acquired naming difficulties.     

Function, goals and intention: children's teleological reasoning about objects

A fundamental aspect of adult thought is the 'teleological' tendency to assume that objects exist for a purpose. When seeing an unfamiliar artifact or strange anatomical part on an animal, the first question an adult will usually ask is 'what's that for?' - a query that assumes that the object can be teleologically explained in terms of its function. Current debate focuses on the origin and scope of teleological thought, and its role in children's emerging theories of the biological world. The bias to view objects as 'designed for a purpose' probably derives from children's privileged understanding of intentional behavior and artifacts. This makes children prone to a 'promiscuous teleology' in which artifacts and natural objects of all types are viewed as existing for a function. Because of this, I argue that we should be cautious about taking the existence of an early teleological bias as evidence that there is biological understanding that exists independently of a psychological construal of living things.     

Battle of the dinosaurs: The impact of internalized bad paternal and maternal objects in a three-year-old boy

Abstract

This paper begins with a summary of W. Ronald D. Fairbairn's object relations theory, with particular focus on his ideas of how paternal objects are internalized alongside maternal objects. A case is then presented of a three-year-old boy who experienced deprivation and frustration from both his mother and father, thus initiating the internalization of bad paternal and maternal objects. Assessment and implications for treatment are then discussed using Fairbairn's model as an organizing framework for developing goals and interventions, and monitoring treatment progress.     

A place within the heart: finding a home with parental objects

For adopted and Looked After children with compromised early experiences, there can be troubling phantasies and anxieties associated with parental objects. These internal object relations can seriously restrict the development of secure intimate relationships with new parental figures. Adoptive parents and foster carers bear the brunt of the associated difficulties. Clinical work with the child, parents/carers, family, or network, may help processes of containment, differentiation, working through, mourning, and integration. This paper is based on thinking derived from clinical work with children who are adopted or Looked After, and with adoptive parental couples, carers, and networks. The primary focus is on how the child needs to find a ‘psychic home’ in the minds of others for their damaged internal parental objects, and the emotional capacities required in adoptive parents to provide this. I describe some of the complexities for adoptive parents and others in providing what is needed to enable the child to experience their internal parental objects in a fuller way. This process can allow the child to introject, identify with, and re-imagine their internal parental objects, and through this develop a more realistic relationship to their adoptive parents and to their birth parents. It promotes trust, freedom, and emotional depth in the relationship with parental figures.     

Maternal responsiveness and search for hidden objects and contingency learning by infants

The relationship between maternal responsiveness and infant cognition was examined during two activities: the search for hidden objects and the learning of a contingency rule. Thirty-four mother–infant dyads were observed in a laboratory setting when the infants were 11 months old. The experimental session included three phases: a search for hidden objects (Piagetian tasks), the learning of a contingency rule on a touch screen, and a mother–infant play session using a standardised toy. The results indicated a link between performances in the search and contingency tasks. Moreover, infants who succeeded in both tasks had mothers who displayed higher responsiveness score. The findings are discussed in terms of the infant's detection of relevant stimulus information. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.