Aristotle,the Intellect,and Cognition

It is argued in this paper that the famous ＂Active Intellect＂ of De Anima 3.5 is not God, as Alexander of Aphrodisias held, but rather an unchanging, eternally cognizing Intellect which serves as the indispensable condition for the operation of human intellect. It is ＂at the door＂ for each individual, ready to flow in as a stream of light--a light which renders potential objects of cognition knowable, just as visible light makes potentially visible objects visible--from outside that door （thyrathen） any time it is opened. Its existence cannot serve, however, as a proof of the immortality of human intellect, since, being unchanging, it can never possess a feature of human intellect which is characterized by nothing if not change, and that is memory.     

The Birth of Being and Time: Heidegger's Pivotal 1921 Reading of Aristotle's On the Soul

During the 1920s Heidegger gave no less than twelve seminars and lecture courses devoted either exclusively or in large part to the reading of Aristotle's texts. Seven of these, especially the smaller seminars for advanced students, have not been published and apparently will never be included in the Gesamtausgabe . My focus here is on the very first of these. Billed as a reading of Aristotle's De Anima , much of it was devoted to Aristotle's Metaphysics . This decision not to separate Aristotle's “psychology” from his “ontology” is a key move of the seminar that anticipates the project of Being and Time . This and many other ways in which Heidegger's early reading of De Anima anticipates the key moves of the later book constitute one of the reasons for its importance. Another is that the seminar allows us to see what gets suppressed in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, most significantly, the phenomenon of life itself in favor of an eventual focus on the being of human life or Dasein. This early seminar thus enables us not only to better understand Heidegger's project, but also to raise some fundamental questions concerning it.     

Why the view of intellect in De Anima I 4 is not Aristotle’s own

In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The passage’s argument for the indestructibility of intellect via an analogy to perception does not fit with Aristotle’s own views. Aristotle thinks that perception operates via bodily organs, but denies this of understanding. He also requires separability from the body for indestructibility, something this analogy rules out. However, Aristotle’s Platonist interlocutors may well endorse such an argument. My dialectical interpretation best resolves the interpretative difficulties and explains its place in the larger context, Aristotle’s discussion of Platonist views on the soul. Aristotle presents a challenge to his insistence that the soul is subject to change, dialectically resolves that challenge, and then ends by reserving the right to give a different account of the intellect.     

Truth as transcendental in Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas presents his most complete exposition of the transcendentals inDe veritate 1, 1, that deals with the question “What is truth?”. The thesis of this paper is that the question of truth is essential for the understanding of his doctrine of the transcendentals. The first part of the paper (sections 1–4) analyzes Thomas's conception of truth. Two approaches to truth can be found in his work. The first approach, based on Aristotle's claim that “truth is not in things but in the mind”, leads to the idea that the proper place of truth is in the intellect. The second approach is ontological: Thomas also acknowledges that there is truth in every being. The famous definition of truth as “adequation of thing and intellect” enables him to integrate the two approaches. Truth is a relation between two terms, both of which can be called “true” because both are essential for the conformity between thing and intellect. The second part of the paper (sections 5–7) deals with the manner in which Thomas gives truth a place in the doctrine of the transcendentals, and shows that his conception of truth leads to important innovations in this doctrine: the introduction of relational transcendentals and the correlation between spirit and being. If “truth” is transcendental, it must be convertible with “being”. Sect. 6 discusses objections that Thomas advances himself to this convertibility. Sect. 7 deals with a difficulty in his account of truth as a relational transcendental. Ontological truth expresses a relation to an intellect but the relation to the human intellect is accidental for the truth of things. Essential for their truth can only be a practical intellect that causes things. In this way, Thomas argues, the divine intellect relates to all things.     

Organic imagination as intuitive intellect: Self‐knowledge and self‐constitution in Hegel's early critique of Kant

This paper concerns Hegel's early treatment of the productive imagination in his 1803–1804 Faith and Knowledge. I show how he articulates that activity in terms of a pair of speculative unities, which solve lingering problems of self‐knowledge and self‐constitution from Kant's B‐deduction. On the one hand, I argue that the familiar unity of spontaneity and receptivity makes possible knowledge of the moment of self‐positing. On the other hand, I contend that Hegel's talk of imagination as both an “organic idea” and an “intuitive intellect” refers to a self‐constituting capacity that intellects like ours possess. I show that self‐constitution is possible, for Hegel, only in so far as intellects like ours possess a capacity to unify possibility and actuality in thought, or to think themselves into being.     

The Force of Truth1

The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.” Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded his argument on this implication rather than on what we call the force of truth.     

Aristotle,Plato and Bhagvad Gita on the “Soul”

This paper broadly aims at examining the idea of the “soul” or “atma” in ancient Greece and in India during the Axial Age. Against the backdrop of this general understanding, an attempt is made at comprehending the idea of the soul in Plato’s Phaedo in the light, on the one hand of Aristotle’s De Anima and on the other of Bhagavad Gita (or Gita in short). It is opined that Socrates’s views, in Phaedo, are closer in spirit to the Hindu ideas of “atma” in the Upanishads and the Gita than to the Greek ideas of the “soul”. An attempt has been made to provide a background for this paradoxical event.

     

Aristotle's De Anima: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities

Although it is common for interpreters of Aristotle's De Anima to treat the soul as a specially related set of powers of capacities, I argue against this view on the grounds that the plausible options for reconciling the claim that the soul is a set of powers with Aristotle's repeated claim that the soul is an actuality cannot be unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of attributing to Aristotle the view that the soul is a set of powers because this claim conflicts with several of his metaphysical commitments, most importantly his claims about form and substance. I argue that although there are passages in the De Anima in which Aristotle discusses the soul in terms of its powers or capacities, these discussions do not establish that the soul is a set of capacities.     

Aristotle’s dilemma

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appears to use an elegant short argument to attack Plato’s doctrine of the good, which argument equally appears to attack Aristotle’s own doctrine of the good. I consider these two questions: First: Why does Aristotle reverse the judgment of Socrates/Plato on the issue: Which is better – things that are (only) good in themselves, or things that are both good in themselves and good for their consequences? Second: Why does Aristotle attack Plato’s doctrine that the Form of the Good is the chief good, with an argument that appears to threaten his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good? I think the answers to these two questions are related. The elegant short argument in question I call “Aristotle’s Fast Argument.”After apologizing for criticizing views held by friends of his, Aristotle deploys the Fast Argument as a clincher to cap off his refutation of Plato’s view that the Form of the Good is the chief good: “And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by ‘a thing itself’, if in man himself and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are men, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will there be a difference in so far as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day.” (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1096 a34–b4). I explore this sketchily presented Fast Argument. I consider why Aristotle may think it is valid and why he does not seem to realize that, on readings that make it effective against Plato’s view, his Fast Argument also seems to apply to his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good. This is what I will call “Aristotle’s Dilemma.” If the Fast Argument is interpreted too narrowly, its point about the whiteness of a white thing being independent of its duration will not apply to the goodness of the Form of the Good. If it is interpreted broadly enough to undermine the claim of the Form of the Good to be the chief good, it will equally undermine that claim for eudaimonia. Finally, I discuss some of the things Plato and Aristotle say about the chief good, and comparable things Immanuel Kant says about the good will. I draw some speculative conclusions that focus on the importance for Aristotle of the goodness of the chief good not being at risk.     

Aristotle on the Unity of Composite Substance

Aristotle claims that a sensible substance is composed of form and matter, while he insists that it is a unity in a strict sense. So there is the question—in what sense can a composite thing be a unity? Aristotle’s key solution lies in his account of matter as potentiality and form as actuality. Many scholars are bewildered by his laconic solutions, and there are mainly two approaches undertaken in interpretations. One is called “projective”; the other is called “explanatory.” But neither interpretation is satisfying. The main tasks of this paper are to reexamine the problem and the two interpretations, then to argue that the composition of a sensible substance should be understood in light of its coming-to-be; that its unity refers to its being a functional unity.     

The Search for Adam Revisited: Evolution,Biblical Literalism,and the Question of Human Uniqueness

Abstract

This article questions the adequacy of the philosophical category of realism in characterizing Rheticus' endorsement of Copernicus' astronomy. Rheticus and Osiander agree that the human intellect is restricted in its aspirations to truth, resulting in a condition of “causal ignorance” regarding the celestial phenomena on Rheticus' part. Copernicus' pupil advances trust in the most true hypothesis of the motion of the earth without postulating its absolute truth. Causal knowledge waits after Resurrection. In line with Luther's comment on Genesis 1:14, Rheticus ascribes a theological meaningfulness to the pursuit of mathematics, alerting the astronomer to his immortal soul and divine creation.     

Human nature,corruption, and the African social order

Transparency International has consistently maintained two prominent assertions: that corruption remains a global threat because no human society in the world has a clean record, and that Africa is the most corrupt region in the world. These assertions raise some fundamental philosophical concerns. The former assertion re-opens the need to ascertain whether corruption is an essence of humans, or an acquired disposition. Howsoever this is resolved forms the fulcrum of concerns on the second assertion. This paper engages these philosophical concerns. The paper takes two paths to achieve this goal. The first draws from Aristotle’s essentialism and Thomas Hobbes’ accounts on human nature to engage the debate on the relationship between human nature and corruption. The second derives and discusses the plausibility and fundamental implications of the claim that Africa is the most corrupt region in the world. It was found that neither on the basis of Aristotle’s nor Thomas Hobbes’, nor even a possible African cosmology as discussed, can it be said that official corruption is essential to humans. The paper concludes that what is at issue concerning corruption as measured by Transparency International pertains to different African expectations of recompense in a protective communalism from which relatives in public offices must have drawn care, now termed “corruption” by Transparency International, which is not so regarded in the African social order.     

Orthodoxy,Orthopraxis, and Orthopathy: Evaluating the Feminist Kenosis Debate

This study examines the feminist kenosis debate, tracing its development through Daphne Hampson, Sarah Coakley, Aristotle Papanikolaou, Carolyn Chau, Jennifer Newsome Martin and Anna Mercedes. Given the diversity of theologies put forth in this debate, it is necessary to have a method of evaluation. In order to do this, I will introduce the theology of Jon Sobrino to the feminist kenosis conversation. Sobrino's notions of orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy are essential tools for assessing different interpretations of kenosis and advancing an adequate theology of “self‐emptying.” This analysis leads to a proposal for a comprehensive feminist theological view of kenosis.     

Christer Sjödin interviews Jan Stensson

Abstract

The author examines different definitions and applications of the terms “psychic energy” and “libido.” With regard to the “psychic energy” terminology, he shows that its application and usage relate in particular to the perspective of Brenner and not to Freud's definition. He argues that Freud uses the term “psychic energy” as a synonym for “libido,” and not “libido” as a synonym for “psychic energy.” It is demonstrated that in Freud's view, up until 1914, “libido” relates to manifestations of bodily sexual tensions, and subsequently this term applies to the manifestations of sexual energy in the psychic field. The author rejects this change in terminology and also challenges Freud's attempt to use dynamic-economic considerations as an explanatory device for epistemological reasons. Freud's concept of energy is inconsistent with the meaning of energy as defined in the physical sciences, and whereas the metapsychological topographical, dynamic, and structural viewpoints have a solid foundation in the representational world to which the psychoanalytic process affords unique access, this is not true of the economic viewpoint. It is claimed that bodily tensions only exist in the representational world in the form of affects, so that, in the author's opinion, the economic viewpoint should be abandoned in favour of an affective one. In the context of the endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure adduced by Freud, this viewpoint focuses on the relationships between affects and the different elements of the representational world, thereby serving as the subject of metapsychological investigation.     

Hylomorphic virtue: cosmology,embryology, and moral development in Aristotle

Aristotle is traditionally read as dividing animal souls into three parts (nutritive, perceptive, and thinking), while dividing human souls into four parts (a rational part, with theoretical and practical subparts, and non-rational part, with nutritive and desiderative subparts). But careful reading of Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 suggests that he divides the human soul into three parts – the nutritive, the theoretical, and the “practical” – but allows that the “practical” part is sometimes divided, as in akratic and other non-virtuous agents. In a fully virtuous agent, practical reason is the proper form of – and so in the hylomorphic sense one with – the desiring part of soul. It is thus contingent how many parts a given soul has, three being the norm, but four being common. Reading Aristotle this way is supported by appeal to his cosmology, where the superlunary world provides the unitary norm, and his embryology, where male offspring are the norm (in which menstrual fluid is fully mastered by the male principle) but female offspring commonly occur when the menstrual fluid (analogous to desire) is only partially mastered by the male principle (analogous to practical reason).     

The eco-cognitive model of abduction: Ἀπαγωγή now: Naturalizing the logic of abduction

Abduction (ἀπαγωγή, in ancient Greek, often translated as “leading away” or “reduction”) is a procedure in which something that lacks classical explanatory epistemic virtue can be accepted because it has virtue of another kind: Gabbay and Woods [15] contend (GW-schema) that abduction presents an ignorance-preserving or (ignorance-mitigating) character. From this perspective abductive reasoning is a response to an ignorance-problem; through abduction the basic ignorance – that does not have to be considered a total “ignorance” – is neither solved nor left intact. Abductive reasoning is an ignorance-preserving accommodation of the problem at hand. Is abduction really ignorance-preserving? To better answer this question I will introduce (and take advantage of) an eco-cognitive model (EC-Model) of abduction. It will be illustrated that through abduction, knowledge can be enhanced, even when abduction is not considered an inference to the best explanation in the classical sense of the expression, that is an inference necessarily characterized by an empirical evaluation phase, or an inductive phase, as Peirce called it. To further deepen the eco-cognitive character of abduction a simple genealogy of logic is provided: Aristotle clearly states that in syllogistic theory local/environmental cognitive factors – external to that peculiar inferential process, for example regarding users/reasoners, are given up. Indeed, to define syllogism Aristotle first of all insists that all syllogisms are valid and contends that the necessity of this kind of reasoning is related to the circumstance that “no further term from outside (ἔξωθɛν) is needed”, in sum syllogism is the fruit of a kind of eco-cognitive immunization. At the same time Aristotle presents a seminal perspective on abduction: the second part of the article considers the famous passage in Chapter B25 of Prior Analytics concerning ἀπαγωγή (“leading away”), also studied by Peirce. I contend that some of the current well-known distinctive characters of abductive cognition are already expressed, which are in tune with the EC-Model. By providing an illustration of the role of the method of analysis and of the middle terms in Plato's dialectic argumentation, considered as related to the diorismic/poristic process in ancient geometry – also, later on, emphasized by Proclus – I maintain that it is just this intellectual heritage which informs Aristotle' Chapter B25 on ἀπαγωγή. Even if, in general, Aristotle seems to sterilize, thanks to the invention of syllogistic theory, every “dialectic” background of reasoning, nevertheless in Chapter B25 he is still pointing to the fundamental inferential role in reasoning of those externalities that substantiate the process of “leading away” (ἀπαγωγή). Hence, we can gain a new positive perspective about the “constitutive” eco-cognitive character of abduction, just thanks to Aristotle himself. Finally, the paper presents an excursus on Aristotle's enthymemes from signs, disregarded by Peirce, but extremely important to stress the Aristotelian treatment of what I have called selective abduction. A forthcoming companion paper [35] will further deepen the EC-Model of abduction stressing stricter logical aspects: the first result will be that, contrarily to the classical logical view, relevance and plausibility in abductive reasoning have to be relativized and so the epistemologically embarrassing concepts of irrelevance and implausibility exculpated: they are not always offensive to reason.     

Buddha,being and the black forest 1

Abstract

While Martin Heidegger is commonly acknowledged as having a significant influence on contemporary philosophy and psychology, there have been comments made about his being a ‘closet Buddhist,’ and many of his later ideas are perceived as mystical. It is argued in this paper that this is because Heidegger is usually understood through a Western framework, whereas many of his later ideas move closer to Eastern thinking.

This paper revisits Heidegger via Buddhism. It examines important parallels and differences between Heideggerian and Buddhist ideas, such as “openness” and “non‐self,” “letting be” and “letting go,” “fourfold” and “inter‐relatedness. This comparison is undertaken against the backdrop of Medard Boss's psychotherapy, daseinsanalysis (Existential Analysis), which Heidegger engaged with extensively. Overall, the analysis illuminates the pragmatics and psychological underpinnings of Heideggerian and Buddhist philosophy, and elucidates the contributions that this understanding can make to contemporary psychology.     

A note on final causes and their role in contextualism

According to the contextualist world view, it is not possible to specify before-hand the formal characteristics of the outcomes of development. Some authors have claimed that this constitutes a rejection of final causes. This note distinguishes between the two kinds of final cause, “end stages” and “functions,” both of which can be found in the literature and traced back to Aristotle. It is argued that only one kind of final cause (end stages) is rejected in contextualism and that the other kind (functions) may even be useful to contextualism.