Democracy as Uninformed Non‐Consent

Carol Gould argues that democratic institutions can serve as mechanisms of informed consent or could at least facilitate creating regulations and other structures which facilitate informed consent in bioethics, medicine, and elsewhere. I am sceptical. I argue that democracies cannot serve as vehicles of consent, let alone informed consent. Further, the problems of democratic ignorance and irrationality created significant barriers to democratic deliberation helping to produce better regulations or conditions for informed consent. Democracy is not a good surrogate for consent.     

Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation

According to a view I’ll call Epistemic Normativism (EN), knowledge is normative in the same sense in which paradigmatically normative properties like justification are normative. This paper argues against EN in two stages and defends a positive non‐normativist alternative. After clarifying the target in §1, I consider in §2 some arguments for EN from the premise that knowledge entails justification (the “Entailment Thesis”). I first raise some worries about inferring constitution from entailment. I then rehearse the reasons why some epistemologists reject the Entailment Thesis and argue that a non‐normativist picture provides the best explanation of all the intuitions surrounding this thesis, favorable and unfavorable. On this picture, human knowledge is a structured non‐normative complex that has as one of its parts a justification‐making property, analogous in role to good‐making properties like pleasurableness. After giving three arguments against EN in §3 and answering an objection in §4, I turn in §5 to further develop the positive view sketched in §2. In §6, I take stock and conclude.     

Freedom as Non‐Domination and Widespread Prejudice

This paper offers an answer to an objection to Phillip Pettit’s neo‐republican account of freedom as non‐domination raised by Sharon Krause. The objection is that widespread prejudice, such as systemic racism or sexism, generates significant obstacles to individuals’ free agency but that neo‐republicanism fails to explain why these obstacles reduce freedom. This is because neo‐republicanism defines domination in terms of the capacity for arbitrary interference, but many prejudiced actions do not involve physical coercion, threats, or any other behavior typically described as types of interference. The paper discusses three strategies to account for the impact of widespread prejudice on the domination of groups. It argues that the most plausible strategy redefines domination in terms of behavior that is prima facie wrong and lacks appropriate checks. Such behavior includes interference but also includes prejudiced actions, such as failing to select the most qualified candidate for a job.     

Towards a ‘Non‐Ideal’ Non‐Ideal Theory

This article explores the role that considerations about the feasibility of a political proposal should play at the levels of both ideal and non‐ideal theory. Drawing on recent work in the literature on political feasibility, I begin by describing a ‘constraint‐based’ view of ideal and non‐ideal theory, with feasibility considerations serving different functions depending on whether they are operating at the ideal or non‐ideal level. Taking feasibility seriously at either level presents us with at least two important challenges. Firstly, we need principles which enable us to weigh the value of a proposal's feasibility against its other normatively significant properties, and against those of alternative proposals. Secondly, we need the capacity to gauge the nature of the epistemic constraints which apply to our feasibility assessments themselves. In response to these problems, I propose a ‘narrowing‐down’ approach, focused on developing our capacities to make accurate and reliable judgements about the feasibility of political proposals.     

Non‐adjacent Dependencies Processing in Human and Non‐human Primates

Human and non‐human primates share the ability to extract adjacent dependencies and, under certain conditions, non‐adjacent dependencies (i.e., predictive relationships between elements that are separated by one or several intervening elements in a sequence). In this study, we explore the online extraction dynamics of non‐adjacent dependencies in humans and baboons using a serial reaction time task. Participants had to produce three‐target sequences containing deterministic relationships between the first and last target locations. In Experiment 1, participants from the two species could extract these non‐adjacent dependencies, but humans required less exposure than baboons. In Experiment 2, the data show for the first time in a non‐human primate species the successful generalization of sequential non‐adjacent dependencies over novel intervening items. These findings provide new evidence to further constrain current theories about the nature and the evolutionary origins of the learning mechanisms allowing the extraction of non‐adjacent dependencies.     

Non‐Classical Knowledge

The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely‐held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single‐premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker‐than‐classical K₃ logic. I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to—whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non‐classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities.     

Non‐Analytic Logic

A logic focusing on the analytic a priori and explicitly rejecting the synthetic a priori ¹ developed in the early decades of the 20th century, largely through the efforts of the Logical Empiricists. This group was very influenced by Wittgenstein's early work Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus. But Wittgenstein himself, later on, departed from the Tractatus in significant ways that the Logical Empiricists did not follow. Wittgenstein came later to accept the synthetic a priori, and out of this insight comes a non‐analytic logic that differs from standard 20th century logic in many distinct ways. This paper details these differences.     

Implicit Attitudes Reflect Associative,Non‐associative,and Non‐attitudinal Processes

It is a common assumption that responses on implicit measures are proxies for automatically activated associations stored in memory. Consequently, explanations for implicit attitude malleability, variability, and prediction have assumed differences in underlying associations. However, a growing body of evidence challenges the assumption that implicit attitude change is driven only by associative processes. This paper reviews evidence from research with the Quadruple Process model on the influence of associative and non‐associative processes on implicit task performance. We also describe recent research on non‐attitudinal processes that do not pertain directly to the attitude object of interest but that, nevertheless, influence implicit task performance. Implications for the interpretation of implicit measures and implicit attitude change are discussed.     

Non‐factualism Versus Nominalism

The platonism/nominalism debate in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the question whether numbers and other mathematical objects exist. Platonists believe the answer to be in the positive, nominalists in the negative. According to non‐factualists (about mathematical objects), the question is ‘moot’, in the sense that it lacks a correct answer. Elaborating on ideas from Stephen Yablo, this article articulates a non‐factualist position in the philosophy of mathematics and shows how the case for non‐factualism entails that standard arguments for rival positions fail. In particular, showing how and why non‐factualists reject nominalism illuminates the originality and interest of their position.     

Non‐instrumental voice and extra‐role behaviour

The instrumental power associated with voicing opinions to an authority was manipulated to observe the effects upon subsequent discretionary, extra‐role behaviours. In two experiments, the provision of non‐instrumental voice increased extra‐role behaviours above a no voice condition. Experiment 2 also showed that this relationship was mediated by procedural‐justice perceptions, but not respect from, or social identification with, the group. The implications of these data for current theory, as well as the possible moderating role of social identification, are discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non‐Triviality

This paper outlines a non‐reductive counterfactual account of grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non‐trivial truth‐conditions to a range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from scepticism about non‐trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.     

Personality in Non‐human Animals

Over the past decade, research on animal personality has flourished in numerous disciplines ranging from Behavioral Ecology and Developmental Psychobiology to Genetics and Comparative Psychology. The broad appeal of animal studies is that, in comparison with human studies, they afford greater experimental control, more options for measuring physiological and genetic parameters, greater opportunities for naturalistic observation, and an accelerated life course. Past research has established that personality (a) exists and can be measured in animals; (b) can be identified in a broad array of species, ranging from squid, crickets, and lizards, to trout, geese, and orangutans; and (c) shows considerable cross‐species generality for some dimensions. The wave of new studies is shedding fresh light on traditional issues in personality research (How do early experiences affect adult personality?), raising novel questions (What are the evolutionary origins of personality traits?) and addressing practical problems (Which dogs are best suited to detecting explosives?).     

Mathematical symbols as epistemic actions

Recent experimental evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience indicates that humans are equipped with unlearned elementary mathematical skills. However, formal mathematics has properties that cannot be reduced to these elementary cognitive capacities. The question then arises how human beings cognitively deal with more advanced mathematical ideas. This paper draws on the extended mind thesis to suggest that mathematical symbols enable us to delegate some mathematical operations to the external environment. In this view, mathematical symbols are not only used to express mathematical concepts??they are constitutive of the mathematical concepts themselves. Mathematical symbols are epistemic actions, because they enable us to represent concepts that are literally unthinkable with our bare brains. Using case-studies from the history of mathematics and from educational psychology, we argue for an intimate relationship between mathematical symbols and mathematical cognition.     

Motivation as an epistemic ground

In several papers, Mark Wrathall argued that French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, identifies a sui generis type of grounding, one not reducible to reason or natural causality. Following the Phenomenological tradition, Merleau-Ponty called this form of grounding “motivation,” and described it as the way in which one phenomenon spontaneously gives rise to another through its sense. While Wrathall’s suggestion has been taken up in the practical domain, its epistemic import has still not been fully explored. I would like to take up the epistemic dimension of Wrathall’s thought in this paper. Following Wrathall, I explain how motivation can help us understand the manner in which perceptions ground singular, experiential judgments. But I extend this work in two ways. First, I suggest some additional considerations that support Wrathall’s view. Second, I argue that motivation can also help account for the way perceptions ground general judgments. My aim here will not be so much to rule out other answers to these longstanding epistemological questions, as to show that motivation carves out an attractive epistemological space.

     

Luck as an epistemic notion

Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation. According to the proposed account, an event is lucky for an agent only if the agent was not in a position to know that the event would occur. It is also explored whether this new account threatens the anti-luck program in epistemology. It is argued that although not detrimental to the anti-luck program, the epistemic account of luck sets certain important limits to its scope and feasibility.     

Learning to Teach Islam as a Non‐Muslim in the Twin Cities

Abstract. In this essay I reflect on my experience thus far of teaching Islam as a non‐Muslim at Metropolitan State University and at the University of St. Thomas in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota. I begin by narrating a conversation about conversion that I had with one of my Muslim students. Then I introduce the theme of multiplicity as a way of being, teaching, and learning. The third section illustrates the theme of multiplicity pedagogically with reference to institutional identity, choice of textbooks, topical organization of the course, the “mosque visit” assignment, and class composition and student roles in the classroom. I conclude in the fourth section with personal reflections on multiplicity in relation to credibility and identity, politics and transformation. The essay was inspired by my realization that I embody multiple religious identities, and that one of my purposes is to build community inside and outside the classroom in an effort not only to transcend the tendency of our culture to adopt an essentialist view of Islam as suspect and alien, but also to recover Islam as a universal religion and to consider its agenda for world transformation alongside those of other religions.