Finite Agents,Sublime Feelings: Response to Hanauer

Tom Hanauer's thoughtful discussion of my article “The Pleasures of Contra‐purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human” (2014) puts pressure on two important issues concerning the affective phenomenology of the sublime. My aim in that article was to present an analysis of the sublime that does not suffer from the problems identified by Jane Forsey in “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?” (2007). I argued that Kant's notion of reflective judgment can help with this task, because it allows us to capture the experience of failure that characterizes the sublime without committing us to ontologically transcendent items. In a significant departure from Kant, however, my account does not require references to our moral vocation to explain the pleasure we take in the sublime; the pleasure comes from getting the right measure of our agency. For Hanauer, trouble for my analysis comes both from the discursive presentation of the sublime, its focus on judgment, and from the removal of references to our moral vocation.     

Sublimity and the Ends of Reason: Questions for Deligiorgi

The sublime has come under severe criticism in recent years. Jane Forsey, for instance, has argued that all theories of the sublime “rest on a mistake” (2007, 381). In her article, “The Pleasures of Contra‐purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human,” Katerina Deligiorgi ( 2014 ) provides a rejoinder to Forsey. Deligiorgi argues—with the help of Kant—that a coherent theory of the sublime is possible, and she provides a sketch for such a theory. Deligiorgi makes good progress in the debate over the sublime. But here I raise two questions in relation to her account. The aim of these questions is to help clarify and augment her theory and thus extend the discussion about the tenability and relevance of the sublime. The first question is about the pleasure of the sublime. The pleasure, she claims, comes from our catching a glimpse of ourselves as agents in the world. But, I argue, Deligiorgi's conception of agency is insufficient for explaining the pleasure of sublimity, and this is because she does not take into account what I call (echoing Kant) the “ends of reason,” those ends that matter most to us as agents. The second question pertains to the phenomenology of the sublime. The worry here is that Deligiorgi overcomplicates the subject's experience and, in doing so, greatly restricts the scope of the sublime.     

Merleau‐Ponty on painting and the problem of reflection

The challenge of “catching experience in the act” is commonly recognized as a problem for phenomenological reflection. After tracing this “problem of reflection” to its origin in Natorp's Allgemeine Psychologie and discussing Husserl's critical response, I argue that Merleau‐Ponty recognizes that a version of it poses a genuine problem for phenomenology in the form of what he calls “objective thought.” Seen in light of his concern for the distortion of objective thought, his attention to indeterminacy and distortion in the portraits and still lifes of Cézanne takes on philosophical significance. I analyze how Merleau‐Ponty sees phenomenological concepts such as style, horizons, and coherent deformation at work in a number of paintings and suggest how such features remedy objective thought by resisting the tendency for reflection on ordinary perception to mistake objective properties of objects for properties of the experience in which they are given.     

Schopenhauer on the Values of Aesthetic Experience

In this essay, I argue that Schopenhauer's view of the aesthetic feelings of the beautiful and the sublime shows how a “dialectical” interpretation that homogenizes both aesthetic concepts and reduces the discrepancy between both to merely quantitative differences is flawed. My critical analysis reveals a number of important tensions in both Schopenhauer's own aesthetic theory—which does not ultimately succeed in “merging” Plato's and Kant's approaches—and the interpretation that unjustly reduces the value of aesthetic experience to a merely preliminary stage of ethical will‐less salvation.     

Levinasian Reflections on Somaticity and the Ethical Self

In this article, I attempt to bring some conceptual clarity to several key terms and foundational claims that make up Levinas's body‐based conception of ethics. Additionally, I explore ways that Levinas's arguments about the somatic basis of subjectivity and ethical relatedness receive support from recent empirical research. The paper proceeds in this way: First, I clarify Levinas's use of the terms “sensibility”, “subjectivity”, and “proximity” in Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence. Next, I argue for an interpretation of Levinas's thought that I suggest is buttressed by recent experimental work in both developmental psychology and neuroscience. I provide examples of research that I suggest opens up Levinas's phenomenological analysis in new and interesting ways. I also urge the importance of Levinas's phenomenological analysis in contextualizing the ethical significance of these empirical findings.     

Empathy as dialectic imagination

Abstract

The importance of relationship processes for humanistic and psychodynamic therapists makes empathy a critical concept in psychotherapy. Experimental work suggests that learning occurs only when the subject is actively and cooperatively engaged in the learning process. Similarly, psychotherapy is only effective when the client is willingly active in the therapeutic process. A crucial aspect of the therapist's activity is empathic imagination, defined here as the use of “dialectic” thinking capacities‐the recognition of conceptual alternatives in a given situation. These processes are at the heart of a humanistic view of agency. The therapist's use of this capacity allows imaginative projection into aspects of the client's experience, helping the client to feel understood in the relationship and emboldened to consider new possibilities in life.     

Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy

This paper proposes that adopting a “phenomenological stance” enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other people's experiences against the backdrop of a shared world. Hence our attempts to appreciate interpersonal differences do not call into question a deeper level of commonality. A phenomenological stance involves suspending our habitual acceptance of that world. It thus allows us to contemplate the possibility of structurally different ways of “finding oneself in the world”. Such a stance, I suggest, can be incorporated into an empathetic appreciation of others' experiences, amounting to what we might call “radical empathy”.     

Figuring the Porous Self: St. Augustine and the Phenomenology of Temporality

This article examines the phenomenological structures of the homo temporalis filtered through Augustine's illuminating, if unsystematic, insights on temporality and the imago Dei. It situates such a phenomenological interpretation of the Augustinian self in view of current interpretations that polarize or split the Augustinian self into an either/or scheme—either an “interior” self or an “exterior” self. Given this imbalance, the article suggests that a phenomenological evaluation of Augustine brings to light how interior and exterior spheres are deeply integrated. The article elaborates this position by contending that the self's temporal streaming within the exterior world‐horizon is inescapable because it reflects basic constituents of a self created by God which is nevertheless capable of contemplating a God who transcends time. This seeming paradox is resolved by recourse to what is described as the “double entry” of the self. The temporal streaming of the self in the world‐horizon (entry one) is porous to the eternal inwardly (entry two); the eternal entry is thus interior and analyzable in terms of a non‐reflective self‐awareness on display in Augustine's De Trinitate; and finally Augustine's understanding of the temporality of faith indicates how the self of faith can be lived in light of Heidegger's emphasis on the future and Husserl's emphasis on the past.     

The Sublime and the Other

What is the philosophical significance of the “sublime”, and does this concept still have any relevance to contemporary life? In this essay, I argue that the experience of the sublime is exceptionally important, insofar as it presents us with a general model for the experience of otherness, the encounter with transcendence itself, which might reasonably be viewed as impossible. As Rudolf Otto suggested, the experience of the sublime is closely related to the experience of the sacred; and even in Burke and Kant, the sublime is to be grasped as both an aesthetic and a religious experience which finally opens the individual to that which is greater than herself. Thus, the sublime has become a major theme in postmodern theory, precisely because it gives us access to the sacred and that which is wholly “other.”     

Personal Construct Theory and Cognitive Science

Abstract

Warren (1990) claims to have formulated an argument “that personal construct psychology is not a cognitive psychology” (p. 379). Nonetheless, he presents very little in the way of logical demonstration or empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Moreover, the theoretical significance of the question posed in the title of his essay (“Is Personal Construct Psychology a Cognitive Psychology?”) is far from obvious. He asserts that “what is at dispute here is the proper characterization of a position” however, his listing several textbooks that refer to Kelly's theory as a “cognitive” approach to the study of personality does nothing at all to either clarify the specific implications of this question or explain its importance. Interestingly, in a recent introductory personality text by one of Kelly's former students (Phares, 1988), this theory is designated as a “phenomenological approach,” which is consistent with Warren's own notion that “he [Kelly] was more phenomenological than he himself believed” Kelly vigorously resisted all such attempts to classify his model in terms of the usual textbook categories (cf. Adams-Webber & Mancuso, 1983).     

GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE SACRED

Abstract. Genetic engineering of life forms could well have a profound effect upon our sense of the sacred. Integrating the experience of the sacred as George Bataille does, we can characterize it as a phenomenological encounter with prelinguistic, noncategoreal experience. This view of the sacred is similar to Friedrich Nietzsche's Dionysian experience or Rudolf Otto's mysterium tremendum and diminishes one's sense of self. It seems similar to the eighteenth‐century aesthetic categorization of “the sublime.” Despite the dominant rational approach to religiosity in the United States, intimations of this experience persist in popular culture. What possible relationship does genetic engineering have to this allegedly inevitable and profound experience? If certain modifications of life occur, they are likely to create such an experience of the sacred in us. In principle, we can now resurrect the mammoth or even create beings designed to directly potentiate our experience of the numinous such as satyrs or centaurs. The creation of such beings could become an art form associated with awaking the sacred, in turn appropriated by religion, as art has always been. Such experimentation, though morally questionable, is probably inevitable.     

Jung's concept of the archetype: An existential phenomenological reflection

Abstract

The concept of the archetype became the central focus of Jung's analytic psychology. This paper will present some phenomenological reflections on this concept. It will first reason that the archetype is not a phenomenologically acceptable concept by drawing upon the absolutely unconscious nature of the archetypes, their independence from the individual's intentionaliry, and their separateness from Dasein. The paper will then argue that what Jung refers to as “archetypal” images, ideas, and experiences do have phenomenological value. As data pursuant to a phenomenological analysis, they may lead to a better understanding of those psychological experiences that may be common to all of humanity.     

Body and Language: Butler,Merleau-Ponty and Lyotard on the Speaking Embodied Subject

In this article three viewpoints on the relation of body and language are discussed: the poststructuralist viewpoint of Judith Butler, the phenomenological viewpoint of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the postmodernist viewpoint of Jean-François Lyotard. The reason juxtaposing for these three accounts is twofold. First, the topic requires a combination of post-structuralist and phenomenological insights, and second, the accounts are supplementary. Butler's account raises questions that can be answered with the help of Merleau-Ponty's work. Lyotard's anthropology of the inhuman offers a perspective of finitude that is missing in the other two. The aim of the article is to outline the necessary ingredients of an adequate conception of the speaking embodied subject.     

The body maledict: Understanding the method of standpoint phenomenology through the work of Frantz Fanon

In this article, I examine the phenomenological methodology at work in Fanon's revision of the body schema. I argue that he implicitly utilizes a methodology I call standpoint phenomenology and show how this methodology emphasizes experiences that are not “universal” but specific to certain social groups in order to uncover shared ontological structures of experience. Fanon's work illustrates two key theses of standpoint phenomenology: (1) the thesis of situated phenomenology and (2) the thesis of inverted phenomenological privilege. I also draw a deep connection between classical and standpoint phenomenology by showing that it is the phenomenological analysis of breakdown experiences (e.g., corporeal malediction) that enables a standpoint approach to phenomenology. This breakdown methodology is explicitly developed by Heidegger and utilized implicitly by Merleau-Ponty. If I am right, standpoint phenomenology is both a natural development of and a considerable advance on the traditional methodology. This article, then, provides a better understanding of Fanon's place in the phenomenological tradition and, more broadly, makes explicit a new methodology for advancing phenomenological research.     

Reiteration: The ‘Imperative of the Word’ and Echoing the ‘Significative Terms’

Abstract

The act of reiteration is viewed as a therapeutic reply that is especially responsive in the face of what Lacan (1977) and Heidegger (1927/1962) respectively refer to as “empty speech” and “idle talk.” By hearing and selecting those key signifiers and phrasings that bear the client's story of distress, the act of reiteration allows us to focus and address the “subject who speaks” rather than the commonsense storyline itself. As an active and continuing punctuation of the client's direct discourse at the level of the word, the act of reiteration is only the first moment of a more complete narrative reply. But in keeping the therapist ever grounded in the client's direct expressions, it is this first moment of reiteration that leaves the therapist positioned to be responsive to the client's discourse of “rhetorical displacements,” of intimation and allusion, as these “echo” from “elsewhere.”     

Developing a Psychoanalytic Practice

Abstract

This paper examines two methods of developing a psychoanalytic practice. The first is an “internal” approach that helps a patient make the transition from therapy to analysis with the same analyst. This may be accomplished by attenuating the patient's unconscious fears of analysis as a facilitator of an anticipated regressive loss of control and as a reactivator of feared desires and impulses. Increased motivation for analysis may also result from a therapy that leads the patient to an awareness that an ongoing level of distress is internal, together with the experience of a deepened therapy and of the analyst as safe and potentially providing relief. The second method of developing an analytic practice is an “external” approach that provides others, such as analytic, mental health, medical, and academic colleagues, an experience of the analyst as person and some idea of the type of work he or she does.     

Ferenczi and Freud – From psychoanalysis as a “professional and personal home” to the creation of a “psychoanalytic home” for the patient1

Abstract

The author explores the relationship between Sándor Ferenczi and Sigmund Freud in the light of their correspondence. This allows us to see how Freud was able to offer and create for Ferenczi a “professional and personal home” that enabled the latter to find a much more meaningful and creative contact with himself. According to the author, this experience played an important role in Ferenczi’s later readiness to offer to and create with his patients a similar “psychoanalytic home.” As Freud was not able to share such clinical research work with Ferenczi, a conflict developed between them whose nature has occupied psychoanalysts ever since, and whose seeds can be found in the 1246 letters that they exchanged between January 1908 and May 1933. From this point of view, Ferenczi’s Clinical diary (written in 1932 and published only in 1985) can be seen as the continuation of the dialogue they had entertained for so many years, as well as Ferenczi’s attempt not to give up the “professional and personal home” that they had created together.