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David Cummiskey 《The Journal of Ethics》2014,18(3):265-278
In From Rationality to Equality, James Sterba (From rationality to equality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) argues that the non-moral, and non-controversial, principle of logic, the principle that good arguments do not beg-the-question, provides a rationally conclusive response to egoism. He calls this “the principle of non-question-beggingness” and it is supposed to justify a conception of “Morality as Compromise.” Sterba’s basic idea is that principles of morality provide a non-question-begging compromise between self-interested reasons and other-regarding reasons. I will focus, first, on Sterba’s rejection of the alternative Kantian rationalist justification of morality, and second, I discuss the logical principle of non-question-beggingness and I argue that Sterba is wrong to assume that there is a formal, logical requirement that a rational egoist must provide a non-question-begging defense of egoism. I argue that, like the Kantian, Sterba needs a more substantial conception of practical reason to derive his conclusion. My third focus is the problem of reasonable pluralism and public reason (Rawls in Political liberalism. Columbia University Press, New York, 1996; The law of peoples with the idea of public reason revisited. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999). The Rawlsian principle of public reason is analogous to Sterba’s principle of non-question-beggingness. Sterba recognizes that public policies should respect competing perspectives and that a public conception of justice must be justifiable to all reasonable people. The problem is that that reasonable people disagree about fundamental moral questions. Rawls calls this the fact of reasonable pluralism. I argue that an intercultural conception of justice is necessary to provide a response to reasonable pluralism and a shared basis for public reason. 相似文献
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Bill E. Lawson 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(3):281-290
Professor Sterba argues for two interesting and provocative positions regarding affirmative action. First, affirmative action
programs are still needed to ensure diversity in educational institutions of higher learning. Secondly, the proponents and
opponents of affirmative action are not as far apart as they seem to think. To this end, he proposes a position that would
give weight to race as a category for affirmative action that can withstand the challenges of affirmative action opponents
while giving the needed support for affirmative action proponents. It is his contention that both sides can support arguments
for diversity affirmative action. This paper raises concerns about the ability of arguments for racial diversity to resolve
or bring together opponents and proponents of affirmative action. It is argued that the negative social climate, regarding
the social and intellectual merits of black Americans, works against the acceptance of affirmative action programs. In sum,
it is argued that Professor Sterba’s position continues to put the social onus of changing racial attitudes on blacks with
little or no effort on the part of whites other than allowing blacks admittance to formerly segregated educational institutions
to interact with white students. 相似文献
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Nico Vorster 《South African Journal of Philosophy》2013,32(2):433-446
AbstractThis article examines the libertarian arguments of Jan Narveson and James P. Sterba regarding the compatibility of liberty and equality. It then posits that their arguments fail in solving tensions between liberty and equality, because all fundamental rights cannot be derived from liberty. A coherent scheme of human rights is only possible if human dignity is used to balance the conflicting interests of liberty and equality. It then proceeds to make some suggestions on how human dignity as core value might help to solve tensions between equality and liberty. 相似文献
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Hans Lucht 《The Journal of religious ethics》2010,38(3):468-477
When African migrants disappear on the Mediterranean going to Europe they often leave no trace—except for the occasional bodies that wash ashore on the beaches of southern Europe. In this essay, the urgent social and existential ramifications of migrant fatalities on the sea are explored. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in a small Ghanaian fishing village on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, it is discussed how the bereaved struggle to make sense of these deaths to high‐risk migration—how they struggle to deal with devastating loss while retaining a sense of moral order. 相似文献
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长期以来 ,学界多以基本欲求与非基本欲求来界定天理、人欲。这种界定 ,与不平等的封建等级制的基本精神不符合 ,也与儒家所向往的理想社会的蓝图以及儒家对生活的态度不符合。本文认为 ,理学家们所讲的天理 ,系指符合封建道德准则和自己等级地位的欲求 ,而与天理对立的人欲 ,则是指违背封建道德准则、超过自己等级地位的非分欲求。 相似文献
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对复归与走近马克思的考辨--一种现代解释学意义上的新破解 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
本文针对当今“复归”、“走近”马克思的观点,运用当代解释学进行了新破解。本文依据马克思哲学的根本原则,运用当代解释学的积极合理成果,立足于现代思维范式的新视域,对建国以来理解马克思哲学的三个不同阶段、不同结果进行了新破解,肯定了三个不同阶段及结果的合理性及存在的价值,明确指出破解对马克思哲学理解的理解,必须摒弃形而上学的“非此即彼”、以及追求那种所谓“马克思哲学本真精神”的绝对思维方式。运用独特的新视角,指出对马克思哲学的理解是一个开放的过程,这一过程的不同阶段及结果,只要实现了实践、理解主体、理解对象三者的具体、历史统一,就都具有真理性,就都是马克思哲学本真精神的显现;与此同时,还通过这一问题的探索揭示出了该过程的内在逻辑。 相似文献
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E Krüger M Nitzsche J Kühn L P Sasse G Nitzsche 《Psychiatrie, Neurologie, und medizinische Psychologie》1988,40(9):523-531
The problems of so-called "therapy resistant or chronic" depression has been investigated on own patients of the year 1986, but simply one chronic example could be noticed. Configurations-frequence-analytic research didn't essentially result in significant statements. It is referred to that the frequent occurrence of the so-called "therapy resistant" depressions described by some authors, could be in connection with limited diagnosis inventories and insufficient to the personality orientated therapy regime. 相似文献
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Joep Dohmen 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2003,4(4):351-371
Art-of-living is a classical notion in philosophy that is currently receiving renewed interest. Art-of-living refers to a
kind of self-direction with a view to the good life. This paper surveys modern philosophical thought on this subject.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献