The imaginaiy questionnaire

The experiment was designed to throw some light on the statistical problems in the analysis of questionnaire data. Previous work (unpublished) suggested that a simple choice response was partially determined by previous responses; and also that the nature of the determination was changed with changing length of series. A “null” experiment was devised in the form of a questionnaire without any questions, and the distribution of responses was studied with respect to the problems formulated.

The observations are discussed in three sections.

In the statistical discussion an alternative meaning to overall association or dissociation is advanced. This: relates association or dissociation to human behaviour in the serial response situation, rather than to qualities of the questionnaire. It is further suggested that association between specific, questions should be tested against the association in the whole questionnaire, and an appropriate treatment is indicated.

The observations depart from statistical randomness in certain ways. Answers made up almost entirely of one form of response are given less often than would be expected. Long sequences of the same type of response are relatively infrequent, and sequences of alternation of response are also rare. As the material is “null” it implies that the human concept of randomness differs from the statistical concept.

An attempt is made to define the human concept of randomness. It appears that a series of responses which has a pattern, or for which the subject can postulate a simple “cause” will not be accepted as random by the human subject. This raises problems of a perceptual and cognitive nature. It also has a bearing on the design of questionnaires. or experiments involving serial responses.     

Response selection errors in spatial choice reaction tasks

In a “Consistent” spatial choice reaction task, the same spatial relationship obtains between each stimulus and its appropriate response. In an “Inconsistent” task this is not so. The present experiment concerns errors in Inconsistent tasks. Duncan (in press) has suggested that, when two spatial S-R relationships are involved in a task, the dominant type of error is a response bearing to the stimulus the wrong one of the two relationships. Duncan's results, however, may be described by a different generalization. Rabbitt and Vyas (1973) have suggested that confusions occur between responses which, when made correctly, bear similar spatial relationships to their stimuli. In the present experiment, a new Inconsistent task is studied. The results support the account of Duncan (in press) but provide no support for that of Rabbitt and Vyas (1973). Partly on the basis of error results, Duncan (in press) proposed a model of response selection in the spatial choice reaction task. Unlike previous accounts, this model is not based on a set of individual “S--R” associations; operations generating sets of S--R pairs are involved.     

Division of attention between non-verbal signals: All-or-none or shared processing?

Criteria proposed by Broadbent (1971) for deciding between “all-or-none” and “shared” models of divided attention are reviewed and modified. Of the modified criteria, the amount of the reduction in efficiency and the shape of the normalized ROC curve are identified as being diagnostic for deciding between the two models. When applied to the results of two experiments involving the recognition of difficult nonverbal signals, which showed performance on the signals presented together to be significantly worse than performance on the signals when presented alone, both the criteria favour the shared model rather than the all-or-none model. The results of a third experiment with easy signals indicated that artefacts unrelated to attention were unable to account for the reduction in efficiency with difficult signals. It is concluded that the shared model, which assumes some limit to processing capacity, has the widest application to these results and similar findings reported elsewhere. The role of the all-or-none model would appear to be restricted to conditions of extreme informational overload. Further, the movement of noncentral decision criteria and the unequal contribution of the individual dimensions to overall multi-dimension performance demonstrated in the first two experiments, suggest that a reduction in the quality of decision-making may accompany the division of attention, as well as the reduction of information derived from the signals.     

School Psychologist and Teacher Perceptions of Social Power in Consultation

Social power has been recognized as central to understanding aspects of school consultation. This study examined school psychologist and teacher perceptions of the effectiveness of 11 bases of social power that psychologists might use with initially resistant teachers. Results suggested that psychologists and teachers held similar views about power within consultation: Both groups rated expert and informational power as the most effective bases, ranked the 11 power bases in a similar way, and indicated that psychologists would be more effective using “soft” (i.e., subtle, positive, noncoercive) bases rather than “hard” bases. Findings also suggested that the groups held different views of social power: Psychologists rated impersonal and personal reward power as more effective than did teachers, and teachers rated psychologists' use of legitimate position, informational, and legitimate dependence power as more effective than did psychologists.     

Shorter articles and notes the interpretation of the passive voice

It was hypothesized that sentences in the passive voice emphasize the importance of the things referred to by their grammatical subjects to a greater extent than sentences in the active voice. Each subject had to produce simple diagrams to represent two sentences, one active and one passive, and it was assumed that the size of areas in these diagrams could be taken as an index of importance. In Group EQ, the sentences specified an equivalent arrangement of colours, e.g. “Red follows Blue,” “Blue is followed by Red”; in Group CO, they specified converse arrangements, e.g. “Red follows Blue,” “Red is followed by Blue.” The predictions, that (i) the subjects of all sentences would tend to be represented as larger than the objects, and that (ii) the subjects of passives would be represented as larger than those of actives, were confirmed.     

A study of position habits induced by reward and “frustration”

Predictions from Maier's theory of “frustration”-instigated behaviour have been tested in an experimental situation differing significantly from that in which the theory was propounded yet containing the central element of “frustration”—the insoluble problem.

A water discrimination unit was employed in which the performance of rats would be observed during attacks on insoluble problems, position problems or symbol problems.

Two groups, each containing ten Wistar albino rats, served as subjects. The research design consisted of the following phases: preliminary training, development of position responses, exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 50 per cent, punishment and exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 100 per cent, punishment. The design differed for the two groups only at the phase in which the position responses were established. During this phase one group was exposed to a position-reward problem and the other to an insoluble problem.

Position responses were established as frequently under position-“frustration” (position stereotypes) as under position-reward (position habits) conditions. Position stereotypes were more rigid—more resistant to extinction—than position habits under conditions of 50 per cent, punishment. Position stereotypes were as readily extinguished under 100 per cent, punishment as were position habits under 30 per cent, punishment.

The first two observations conform to predictions made from Maier's theory. The third does not. That is to say, not all situations containing the basic elements of “frustration” give rise to stereotyped behaviour patterns which are as rigid or “fixated” as Maier's theory would predict. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the characteristics of stereotyped responses established in certain “frustration” situations may be described adequately in terms of conventional learning principles without the necessity of resorting to a distinction between “goal-motivated” and “frustration-instigated” behaviour.     

Visual pattern recognition: Size preprocessing re-examined

Template theories of visual pattern recognition assume the operation of preprocessing routines to deal with irrelevancies such as discrepancies in stimulus size. In three experiments where size was an irrelevant dimension, observers classified pairs of forms as either “same” or “different”. In Experiment I, the classification “different” was required when the stimuli shared the same form but a different orientation, and “same” when the stimuli shared the same form and orientation. Under these conditions RT was an increasing function of the magnitude of the size disparity between stimuli with equal slopes for “same” and “different” judgements. In Experiment II, “different” classifications were made to stimuli that had different forms, and “same” to figures with the same form. This stimulus set produced a size disparity function that interacted with response type; “different” responses had a shallower slope. Experiment III consisted of a mixed stimulus set drawn from both Experiment I and II. Stimuli that produced additive effects of size disparity and response type in Experiment I now produced an interaction between these two factors similar to the one observed in Experiment II. The results of these experiments are interpreted as evidence that previous contradictory results reported in the literature stem from differences in the way the stimulus set is constructed, and that size transformations can not be a necessary operation, at least when “different” judgements are made. The results are problematic for the view that size disparity effects in matching tasks are easily interpretable in terms of a primitive size normalization stage that precedes any comparison operations.     

Contiguity, reinforcement rate and the law of effect

There is an ambiguity in formulations of the Law of Effect which stress the importance of the correlation of rate of responding with frequency of reinforcement. The main problem is that such theories have not specified precisely how the correlation of response and reinforcement rates should be determined, with the result that the theories can become irrefutable. Two experiments were carried out which expose some of the problems created by this ambiguity. “Free” food reinforcers were delivered to rats in the absence of responding. Lever responses intermittently provided immediate (contiguous) reinforcement, but cancelled some of the following “free” reinforcements. Responding was established and maintained even when the overall rate of responding was negatively correlated with the overall frequency of reinforcement. Several ways in which correlational theories could attempt to accommodate these results are discussed but rejected as unsatisfactory, either because they severely limit the scope of the theories or because they lose their most important feature: that of treating behaviour at a molar rather than a molecular level.     

Information relevance, working memory, and the consideration of alternatives

People routinely focus on one hypothesis and avoid consideration of alternative hypotheses on problems requiring decisions between possible states of the world--for example, on the “pseudodiagnosticity” task (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979). In order to account for behaviour on such “inference” problems, it is proposed that people can hold in working memory, and operate upon, but one alternative at a time, and that they have a bias to test the hypothesis they think true. In addition to being an ex post facto explanation of data selection in inference tasks, this conceptualization predicts that there are situations in which people will consider alternatives. These are:

1. “action” problems, where the alternatives are possible courses of action;

2. “inference” problems, in which evidence favours an alternative hypothesis.

Experiment 1 tested the first prediction. Subjects were given action or inference problems, each with two alternatives and two items of data relevant to each alternative. They received probabilistic information about the relation between one datum and one alternative and picked one value from among the other three possible pairs of such relations. Two findings emerged; (1) a strong tendency to select information about only one alternative with inferences; and (2) a strong tendency, compared to inferences, to select information about both alternatives with actions.

Experiment 2 tested the second prediction. It was predicted that data suggesting that one alternative was incorrect would lead many subjects to consider, and select information about, the other alternative. For actions, it was predicted that this manipulation would have no effect. Again the data were as predicted.     

Contextual assimilation and its effect on the division of attention between nonverbal signals

Subjects performed a recognition task in which a low or a high frequency signal was presented simultaneously with a dim or a bright intensity one. The independent variable was the degree of association between the signals on the two dimensions. Unknown to the subjects four levels were tested in separate conditions, 1.0, 0.8, 0.5 and 0.2. Increasing the positive association improved overall sensitivity as measured by d' on both dimensions, but left contingent sensitivity unchanged. Changing the association did not affect overall bias, as measured by Beta. However, holding context constant by analysis produced significant differences between individual measures of contingent bias in the direction of assimilation, for example “low” responses tended to accompany dim signals and “dim” responses. The differences were unaffected by the changes in association. The results are interpreted as favouring models of contextual assimilation which assume that biasing at some level of processing depends upon the mutually contingent interaction of discrete events rather than on memory and expectation of the relative frequency of conjoint events. Further support for this conclusion comes from previous studies which indicate that assimilation occurs with separate responses but not with unitary ones. The implications of the findings for research on the division of attention are discussed, particularly the need to control variability in measured bias to establish a true change in the allocation of attention. Two generalized models of contextual assimilation are proposed, one based on “object” and the other on “lexical” assimilation. The possible application of these models to synaesthesia is considered.     

Demands and capacities or demands and performance?

The Demands and Capacities Model of stuttering purportedly provides a framework for obtaining information concerning a child's capacities for fluency and the demands placed on the child by the environment and for integrating that information in devising individual therapy plans. The current paper analyzes the model, with specific attention to the status of the “capacities” component. It is suggested that the model is more accurately characterized as a Demands and Performance rather than a Demands and Capacity Model because capacities are not actually addressed.     

Effects of nitrous oxide on reactions to “stress”

It has been demonstrated that exposure to the stress of a situation involving conflict or frustration may interfere significantly with subsequent learning. Behaviour under stress is characterized by experiences of “anxiety” and by widespread physiological changes. Inhalation of nitrous oxide has the general effect of reducing the extent of these symptoms.

The present investigation using insoluble and soluble problems has demonstrated that both nitrous oxide and exposure to stress impair learning; but that, when subjects are exposed to stress while under the influence of the drug, the effects of the stress on subsequent learning are abolished. It is suggested that these empirical results may be accounted for either in terms of “anxiety-reduction” or in terms of transfer effects.     

Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.     

A preliminary study of distinctive features in problem solving

The abstract logical structure of family relationship problems, such as, “What relationship to a man is his mother's father?” was described in terms of a “distinctive-feature-transition count (dft)”, where the answer to the problem was characterized in terms of the distinctive features of descendancy, co-linearity, and sex. On average, it proved possible to predict the difficulty of such problems from such a count; thus tending to support the idea of a relational rather than an associative memory structure.     

Nonstutterers'' perceptions of stuttering and speech difficulty

Two versions of Woolf's (1967) Perception of Stuttering Inventory (PSI) were administered to nonstuttering college students in three experiments. In one (Woolf's published version) the word “stuttering” appeared and in another [a version developed by Daly, Oakes, Breen, and Mishler (1981)] “stuttering” was replaced by “speech difficulty.” Nonstutterers' scores on the PSI were found to be affected by knowledge of—or attention to—“stuttering” or “stutterers” as well as orientation toward speech or speech pathology. It was concluded that a total PSI score of 5 is presently a more defensible criterion of normality for stutterers than the more commonly used score of 10.     

Stimulus Intensity and Attention in Relation to Learning Theory

Three experiments are described which test the hypothesis that the more intense of two stimuli will, ceteris paribus, be more likely to receive attention. It is assumed that an objective behavioural manifestation of attention to a given stimulus is a preference for responding to it rather than to another which is present at the same time.

In all three experiments, successions of pairs of visual stimuli interspersed with single stimuli were presented to the subject, and he was instructed to respond to either (by pressing its corresponding morsekey), but not both, in the case of the pairs. The first two experiments reveal significant tendencies to respond to the larger and the brighter stimulus respectively. In the third experiment, there was a tendency, but a statistically insignificant one, to respond to a constant rather than to a flickering stimulus.

It is shown that the attraction of attention by a more intense stimulus follows from Hull's system with the addition of his new variable, “stimulus-intensity dynamism (V),” and it is suggested that it may thus be possible to add attention to the phenomena that can be integrated with an objective behaviour theory.     

The perception of short phrases presented simultaneously for visual & auditory reception

Subjects were provided with outline maps that were incomplete in several details. Brief, simultaneous, visual and auditory instructions were given for completing some of the missing details. Certain items could be completed on the basis of direct information contained in one or other of the sensory modalities. Others, however, could be completed only because of their relation to details capable of location by direct instruction. Information important for the completion of map details was distributed randomly among short passages of unconnected words. All relevant visual and aural clues were presented simultaneously in every case. Opportunities for alternations of attention were curtailed.

Thirty-six subjects were randomly assigned to three experimental conditions, and to two groups that were given different instructions. One group was told that relevant information would always appear simultaneously, while the other group was not allowed this information.

The number of successfully located simultaneous pairs of items presented for direct location was found to be no greater than could be expected by chance. The total number of correctly located items was less than 50 per cent of the possible items. There was no difference in the number of correctly located simultaneous pairs of items between the “instructed” and the “uninstructed” groups. The “uninstructed” group did not learn in the course of the experiment that all relevant material was presented simultaneously. Significantly more correct completions were made with the visual material than with the auditory. It is concluded that successful division of attention did not occur.     

Response selection in spatial choice reaction: Further evidence against associative models

In a “consistent” spatial choice reaction task the same spatial relationship obtains between each stimulus and its correct response. In an “inconsistent” task this is not so. While Duncan (1977a) found both easy (spatially corresponding) and difficult (spatially opposite) responses to be slowed in inconsistent tasks, Smith (1977) found this only for the corresponding responses, the reverse holding for opposites. Reasons for this discrepancy are examined. The result of Smith (1977) depends on the use of different numbers of alternative responses in consistent and inconsistent tasks, a situation allowing no useful comparison between the two. Effects of consistency are related to others in the literature. The general conclusion is that, in these tasks, response selection is based not on a list of associations between individual stimuli and responses, but on operations or rules each of which will generate a set of stimulus-response pairs.     

The twelfth Bartlett memorial lecture: The role of single neurons in the psychology of perception

I feel deeply honoured by your invitation to give the Bartlett lecture, and am especially glad to do so in Holland, the home of so many distinguished psychologists of sensation and perception. And there is a third reason why it has given me much pleasure, for Sir Frederick Bartlett was one of those who had an important influence on the direction of my career some 40 years ago. I had to decide whether to spend my last year at Cambridge reading psychology or physiology, so I attended a short course of introductory lectures he gave in July. About half a dozen of us sat on upright wooden chairs circled around him as he sat in an armchair, smiling benignly. The first thing he did was to tell us to close our notebooks, for he was not going to say anything that would help us to pass any exams. And I believe the very last words of his last lecture were, “So you see it is all very difficult”. I was very glad he said that, for I had in fact found it all very heavy going: my brain seemed always to be lost in clouds of uncertainty when “remembering”, “thinking”, or “perceiving” were mentioned, because there was no conceptual framework for these processes except the words themselves and others spun around them. What I was looking for were the definable quantities of physics, chemistry and even physiology, these I could handle conceptually in their geometric and functional interactions, whereas I always find a purely verbal argument about abstractions difficult to follow and impossible to believe. So this lack of any nonverbal conceptual framework was very painful.

There was one phrase I think I recall him using that particularly aroused my interest-“the effort after meaning”; intuitively this seemed to be very important, but however much effort I made the meaning never quite emerged. I had almost decided that my mistrust of words made me unsuited to a career in psychology, but all the same I put my problem about “physiology or psychology” directly to Bartlett. After finding out that I was mainly interested in problems of sensation and perception, he said he thought that E. D. Adrian's research over the last 20 years had made more difference to that subject than any results obtained from within psychology itself.