公民资格论——政府公共性视界中的公民公共感能力探究

政府公共性意义上的公民,分享着两项公共权利,承担着两项公共义务。他们不仅能够感知和理解公共权利和公共义务,而且具有把它们化为现实的公共感能力。用公共感能力确定公民的资格,为公民的概念提供了规范的标准,从而与国籍描述的公民资格区分开来,把公民定义为与市民不同的公共角色。公民作为公共的角色,应该积极地从正反两面培养自己的公共感能力,不断创造自己作为公民的价值。     

Equal Citizenship and Convergence

I argue against Lori Watson and Christie Hartley's recent criticisms of convergence approaches to public justification. In particular, I argue that convergence approaches can capture what is distinctive about democratic decision-making and provide an attractive account of stability for the right reasons.     

公民身份的研究范式——理论把握与本土化解释

公民身份日益成为我国学术界的重要研究课题.如何将西方公民身份的研究范式与本国公民身份的发展特点有机地结合起来,是我国学者在研究本国公民身份时必须考虑的问题.针对这一问题.本文归纳了T.H.马歇尔、迈克尔‘曼和布赖恩·特纳提出的三种研究范式,分析了这些范式在研究中国公民身份问题时的局限和不足,并且在借鉴西方研究范式的基础上,结合本国公民身份的发展特点,从发展动力、发展轨迹、层级结构和发展取向的角度提出了研究中国公民身份的四种思路.     

论公民身份的二重性

公民的概念和公民身份理论是当代政治、社会和法律理论领域中的核心概念,近些年逐渐成为了中国学界关注的理论焦点之一,而对公民身份的基本内涵和属性却缺乏相应深入的研究和了解.本文从内在逻辑和演进脉络两个方面入手,讨论了公民身份本身固有的三对矛盾统一体即二重性,即民族性与世界性,权利性与责任性,私人性与公共性.相信通过对公民身份二重性的充分认识,对于培养"好公民"、构建社会主义和谐社会有着重要的参照和借鉴作用.     

Mental Handicap and Citizenship

ABSTRACT Mentally handicapped people have been taken in philosophical work as an obvious exception to the canons which are applied to other, 'rational'individuals. This paper argues that mentally handicapped people should be accorded the same rights as others. If there are human rights, then mentally handicapped people are entitled to them as humans; and if there are rights which apply in general to citizens, the same rights apply equally to mentally handicapped people. The argument for the inclusion of mentally handicapped people as citizens is first, that there is a presumption of inclusion: if citizenship is accorded to all other individuals, there is no reason why citizenship should not be accorded to mentally handicapped people on the same basis as others. Second, mentally handicapped people cannot successfully be excluded without effectively challenging the presumption of inclusion applied to other groups. Third, and perhaps most important, there are positive reasons why mentally handicapped people, as a particularly vulnerable group, need to have rights to protect them against particular abuses.     

Gratitude,Citizenship and Education

Citizenship education is a complex matter, and not least the place of civic virtues in it. This is illustrated by a consideration of the civic virtue of gratitude. Two conceptions of gratitude are explored. Gratitude seen as a debt is examined and Kants exposition of it, including his objections to a persons getting himself into the position where he has to show gratitude as a beneficiary, is explored. An alternative conception of gratitude as recognition is developed. This, it is claimed, has more relevance to the kind of gratitude it would be appropriate for citizens of a democratic state to feel. The educational implications of these views are indicated.     

Civic Friendship and Thin Citizenship

Contemporary appeals for a deepening of civic friendship in liberal democracies often draw on Aristotle. This paper warns against a certain kind of attempt to use Aristotle in our own theorising, namely accounts of civic friendship that characterise it as similar in some way to Aristotelian virtue friendship. The most prominent of these attempts have focused on disinterested mutual regard as a basic ingredient in all Aristotelian forms of friendship. The argument against this is that it inadequately accounts for the idea of a virtue friend as another self, which we find in Aristotle’s thought. When we attend closely to that, we see that civic friendship is different in a fundamental way from virtue friendship because virtue friends are keenly committed to the moral improvement of one another. It is argued that Aristotle does not see civic friendship in the same way. However, if this argument about the differences between the forms of friendship cannot be accepted, the paper argues that we should not draw on Aristotle for an understanding of civic friendship because any similarity it might have to virtue friendship would license illiberal interventions in the lives of citizens in service of some idea of moral improvement. A seeming connection between Aristotelian civic friendship and thick conceptions of citizenship is replaced with a connection between it and thinner conceptions.     

Differentiated Citizenship and Contextualized Morality

Political theorists, increasingly, are realizing the virtues of contextuality to conceptual analysis. Just as theory may provide useful standards for the assessment of political practices, so may application of theoretical constructs within particular contexts provide a critical corrective to theory. This essay relates work undertaken within sociolegal studies applying a constitutive methodology to such efforts to contextualize political theorizing. The essay describes how the emphasis placed by constitutive theory on locality and meaning entails a contextual analysis. The essay then demonstrates how a constitutive and contextual approach can enhance our understanding of the moral issues surrounding differentiated citizenship policy. While the most obvious cost associated with differentiated citizenship policy is a loss in formal equality, a contextual assessment demonstrates the prospect of an even deeper, though ultimately contingent, moral loss in self-invention.     

Selling Citizenship: A Defence

Many people think that citizenship should not be for sale. On their view, it is morally wrong for states to sell citizenship to foreigners. In this article, I challenge this view. I argue that it is in principle permissible for states to sell citizenship. I contend that, if states can permissibly deny foreigners access to citizenship in some cases, then states can permissibly give foreigners the option of buying citizenship in these cases. Furthermore, I defend the permissibility of selling citizenship against the objections that selling citizenship values citizenship in the wrong way, corrupts civic norms, and unfairly discriminates against poor foreigners. I conclude by noting that, although selling citizenship is not intrinsically wrong, it could still be wrong for states to sell citizenship in practice. If existent immigration restrictions are unjust, then it may be impermissible for states to sell citizenship in the real world.     

Boundaries of Citizenship Behavior: Curvilinearity and Context in the Citizenship and Task Performance Relationship

Resource allocation, attentional capacity, and role theories all suggest that the well‐documented linear relationship between citizenship behavior and task performance may be more complex than previously believed. In a study of 352 incumbents, we develop hypotheses that propose a curvilinear effect of employee citizenship on task performance. We further argue that this nonmonotonic relationship is different across the targets of citizenship performance and is moderated by several factors from the task context. Results support the curvilinear assertion, indicating that the relationship with task performance inflects when citizenship is more frequently performed. These diminishing returns are amplified when the target of citizenship is the organization compared to the individual. Findings further reveal that the task context elements of accountability and autonomy moderate the curvilinear relationship, whereas ambiguity does not. Implications for a reappraisal of the citizenship–task performance relationship are discussed.     

The Case for Markets in Citizenship

A number of countries sell citizenship rights to foreign buyers. Gary Becker makes an economic case for the state's sale of citizenship; more recently, Javier Hidalgo has offered a moral defence. However, the private sale of citizenship on a market remains largely unexplored and undefended. This article argues that under certain conditions states ought to permit their citizens to swap citizenship rights with foreigners in exchange for payment. I begin by offering two defeasible reasons to legalize citizenship markets: they would enable mutually beneficial exchange and increase the labour market opportunities of the global poor. I consider a number of counterarguments and conclude that none are dispositive, leaving the case for citizenship markets undefeated.     

Citizenship and Community Mental Health Care

Citizenship is an approach to supporting the social inclusion and participation in society of people with mental illnesses. It is receiving greater attention in community mental health discourse and literature in parallel with increased awareness of social determinants of health and concern over the continued marginalization of persons with mental illness in the United States. In this article, we review the definition and principles of our citizenship framework with attention to social participation and access to resources as well as rights and responsibilities that society confers on its members. We then discuss our citizenship research at both individual and social‐environmental levels, including previous, current, and planned efforts. We also discuss the role of community psychology and psychologists in advancing citizenship and other themes relevant to a citizenship perspective on mental health care and persons with mental illness.     

Substantive Equality and Equal Citizenship1

In Part 1, I argue that Watson and Hartley’s relational feminist political liberal approach – grounded in the idea of equal citizenship – produces a rather elusive liberal feminist agenda (because of its reliance on intuitions) and that it may lose track of the importance of goods whose value stems from the role they play in an individual woman’s or girl’s life rather than from the role they play in securing equal citizenship. I suggest that a distributive principle approach – like that of Susan Okin – might do better on both scores. In Part 2, I argue that Watson and Hartley may have overpromised what the state can and may do. Discussion includes focus on policy questions concerning, for example, prostitution and the gendered division of labor.