JUST WHAT IS VAGUENESS?

We argue that standard definitions of ‘vagueness’ prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of ‘vagueness’ in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth‐value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of ‘vagueness’ should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over how to best deal with the sorites paradox. Moreover, a definition of ‘vagueness’ must be able to accommodate the variety of forms sorites arguments can take. These include numerical, total‐ordered sorites arguments, discrete versions, continuous versions, as well as others without any obvious metric structure at all. After considering the shortcomings of various definitions of ‘vagueness’, we propose a very general non‐question‐begging definition.     

WAS THE GULF WAR A JUST WAR?

In the early months of 1991, the United States—in alliance with a number of other nations—fought a large scale air and ground war to evict Iraq's occupying army from the emirate of Kuwait. In this paper, I will consider the question of whether this U.S. military campaign was a just war according to the criteria of traditional just war theory—the only developed moral theory of warfare that we have. My aim, however, is not so much to reach a verdict about the morality of the Gulf War, as it is to identify relevant moral issues, and to reveal certain serious problems of application that are inherent in just war theory itself. Just war theory divides into two parts concerning, respectively, the question of whether or not to fight a particular war (justice of war), and the question of how the war is conducted (justice in war). I begin by considering whether it was just, according to the justice of war criteria, for the U.S. to fight the Gulf War at all. I then turn to the question of whether the way the war was conducted satisfied the criteria of justice in war.     

WHY DO PEOPLE USE FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE?

Abstract— In this article, we examine the discourse goals that are accomplished by the use of eight forms of figurative language: hyperbole, idiom, indirect request, irony, understatement, metaphor, rhetorical question, and simile. Subjects were asked to provide reasons why they would use a particular figure of speech. Based on their responses, a discourse goal taxonomy that includes each of the eight figures was developed. The goal taxonomy indicates that each figure of speech is used to accomplish a unique constellation of communicative goals. The degree of goal overlap between the eight forms was also calculated, and the results provide support for theoretical claims about the relatedness of certain figures. Taken together, the goal taxonomy and overlap scores broaden our understanding of functional and theoretical differences between the various kinds of figurative language.     

DO PEOPLE REALLY ADAPT TO MARRIAGE?

Although cross-sectional studies have shown a reliable association between marital status and subjective well-being, a recent longitudinal study [Lucas et al. 2003, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 84(3), pp.␣527–539] found no support for the idea that happiness increases after marriage. Instead, participants who got married reported short-term increases followed by complete adaptation back to baseline levels of well-being. However, researchers have criticized this study on two grounds. First, these results contradict cohort-based analyses from a nationally representative sample. Second, these analyses do not control for pre-marriage cohabitation, which could potentially inflate baseline levels of well-being. The original data (plus four additional waves) are reanalyzed to address these concerns. Results confirm that individuals do not get a lasting boost in life satisfaction following marriage.The data used in this paper were made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). This research was supported by a grant from the Anthony Marchionne Foundation.     

JUST WHAT ARE SEX AND GENDER, ANYWAY?

Abstract— The terms sex and gender have come to be used as synonyms in the social sciences literature. However, nothing has been gained by the use of the term gender except confusion. This article identifies five meanings for which social scientists often use the terms sex or gender and proposes a distinct term for each of those five meanings. The terms proposed are (1) sex: to refer to the biological function; (2) biologically sex-linked: to refer to traits or conditions that are causally biologically related to being male or female; (3) gender-linked: to refer to traits or conditions that are causally linked with maleness or femaleness but are culturally based as opposed to biologically based; (4) sex- and gender-linked: to refer to traits or conditions that are causally related to both a biological component and a cultural component; and (5) sex-correlated: to refer to traits or conditions that are related to being male or female without asserting a causal relation to either biology or culture (because we do not wish to make such an assertion or cannot do so confidently). It is hoped that adopting a terminological standard will reduce the confusion resulting from nonspecific language use.     

IS “JUST WAR” THEORY JUSTIFIABLE?

War is only the sad recourse in the state of nature (where there is no tribunal which could judge with the force of law) by which each state asserts its right by violence and in which neither party can be adjudged unjust (for that would presuppose a juridical decision); in lieu of such a decision, the issue of the conflict (as if given by a so-called "judgment of God") decides on which side justice lies. We may well be astonished that the word "law" has not yet been banished from war politics as pedantic, and that no state has yet been bold enough to advocate [this banishment]. Up to the present, Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and many other irritating comforters have been cited in justification of war, though their code, philosophically or diplomatically formulated, has not and cannot have the least legal force, because states as such do not stand under a common external power.
—Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace ¹     

DO PEOPLE MAKE THE PLACE? AN EXAMINATION OF THE ATTRACTION-SELECTION-ATTRITION HYPOTHESIS

This study tests the hypotheses that (1) congruence between internal need states and external environments drives the organizational-choice process and (2) those attracted to particular organizations are more homogeneous than the applicant pool in general. Subjects were evaluated on 14 needs using the Jackson Personality Research Form. They then viewed two video-taped segments of simulated campus interviews to gain information about two distinct types of organizational reward systems. The interview segments entered the discussion in progress to avoid any reference to a particular job that might introduce an occupational confound. Subjects received job offers from both organizations and were asked to indicate which of the two organizations they found more attractive by accepting one of the offers. Analysis of variance results indicated only weak support for the congruency hypothesis. Differences were observed in nAch between the groups of subjects attracted to each organization. No differences were found for any of the other need strength measures. This suggests that the subjects attracted to the different organizations were substantially similar. Hierarchial factor analysis of the PRF has suggested a six-factor structure that appears consistent with the second-order factors from other respectable personality measures. This suggests that the second-order solution may be a parsimonious mapping of the personality domain and may therefore be more relevant in testing these hypotheses. The analysis was repeated using these dimensions. The results suggest that work force homogeneity may be more complex than originally considered. Implications for the homogeneity hypothesis are discussed, and suggestions for further study of this concept are offered.     

LANGUAGE,MIND, AND WORLD: CAN'T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG?

Abstract: This article addresses recent claims made by Richard Rorty about antirepresentationalist theories of meaning. Rorty asserts that a faithful rendering of the core antirepresentationalist assumptions precludes even revised pieces of representationalist semantics like “refers” or “true” and epistemological correlates like “answering to the facts.” Rorty even asserts that such notions invite reactionary authoritarian elements that would impede the development of a democratic humanism. I reject this claim and assert that such notions (suitably constructed) pose no greater threat to democratic humanism than the alternatives and in fact are crucial to its maintenance and continuing success. These notions (suitably constructed) reflect a metatheoretical stance that I call “openness,” which I believe lies at the heart of both democratic humanism and the pragmatism from which Rorty claims to take his inspiration.     

WHAT DO PROACTIVE PEOPLE DO? A LONGITUDINAL MODEL LINKING PROACTIVE PERSONALITY AND CAREER SUCCESS

We developed and tested a model linking proactive personality and career success through a set of four behavioral and cognitive mediators. A 2-year longitudinal design with data from a sample of 180 full-time employees and their supervisors was used. Results from structural equation modeling showed that proactive personality measured at Time 1 was positively related to innovation, political knowledge, and career initiative, but not voice; all measured at Time 2. Innovation, political knowledge, and career initiative in turn had positive relationships with career progression (salary growth and the number of promotions during the previous 2 years) and career satisfaction. Interestingly, voice had a negative relationship with career progression. We discuss practical implications and future research directions for proactive personality, extra-role behavior, and careers.     

HOMELESSNESS AND CONTAINMENT – A PSYCHOTHERAPY PROJECT WITH HOMELESS PEOPLE AND WORKERS IN THE HOMELESS FIELD

A high percentage of homeless people suffer from a severe degree of personality disorder that causes them to fall through the net of psychiatric and caring services. Their persistent inability to maintain an actual dwelling‐place as a location of stability and meaning, is also reflected in an inner state of fragility, and in relationship difficulties that lead to destructive behaviours that inevitably alienate others. In this paper, the relationship between homelessness, the maternal body, buildings and containment is explored, using clinical material which illustrates how the claustro‐agoraphobic dilemma (Henri Rey 1994 Rey, H. 1994. Universals of Psychoanalysis in the Treatment of Psychotic and Borderline States, Edited by: Magagna, J. London: Free Association Books.  [Google Scholar]), intrinsic to the state of homelessness and to borderline conditions, impacts on vulnerable individuals and on care workers in this field. Examples drawn from staff consultations demonstrate how psychodynamic thinking can help to provide containment within systems of care.