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现象学、解释学、生命哲学——海德格尔与胡塞尔、狄尔泰及雅斯贝尔斯遭遇 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
近来,海德格尔早期的一些弗赖堡讲座稿[《全集》56/57卷,《全集》58卷,《全集》61卷,《全集》63卷和"那托普论文":《对亚里士多德的现象学解释(解释学境域的显示)》]等相关手稿,以及关于时间概念的演讲稿(《时间概念》)被发表了,于是我们现在可以更好地理解海德格尔通向《存在与时间》的哲学道路(这是一条由于在《存在与时间》之前十年的沉默而长期不为我们所知的道路),从而也能更好地理解这部杰作本身了.战后期间海德格尔的另一重要早期文献,即他未发表的关于雅斯贝尔斯的详尽评论,一段时间以来就已为世人所见了(《全集》9卷1-44页).他1925年夏季学期的讲座稿(《全集》20卷)也是如此.这个文本突出地显示了在通往《存在与时间》的道路上,海德格尔与胡塞尔现象学甚为广泛而细致的遭遇. 相似文献
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马克思哲学与康德、黑格尔、胡塞尔等的思辨现象学思想的互释表明:思辨现象学有一种自我超越和回归实践的倾向,但在现实意义上却没有实现这种指归;思辨现象学在纲领、直观、世界、实践等方面脱离了对现实问题的关注,学理式地指向哲学逻辑的根据;而马克思哲学则通过实践还原与实践直观对哲学逻辑的前提发问的根本转换而扬弃了思辨现象学的缺陷,赋予现象学以现实的存在学和历史学的纬度,确立了一种逻辑在先意义上的、具有本真“同一性”的科学实践现象学思想。 相似文献
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《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(2):239-253
I explore some interpretations of the practice of international market reliance that forms the focus of Aaron James' book, and I wonder how our actual practices help to settle what we should go on to do now. 相似文献
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Recent research suggests that religious intrinsicness should predict a failure to confront existential problems whereas an interactional orientation should promote the opposite influence. This study, however, demonstrated that intrinsicness is associated only with traditional religious resolutions of such difficulties and that the interactional approach is essentially unrelated to confrontation with existential realities. These data therefore failed to support claims that orthodox, intrinsic individuals are rigid in their approach to the basic existential questions of life; the data also illustrated the importance of differentiating thought content from thought process in analyzing religious influences on psychological functioning. 相似文献
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Andrew Jones 《Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology》2014,45(2):177-180
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该文希望通过对德里达和现象学的关系的梳理和探讨,分析德里达思想从胡塞尔现象学开始而又从一开始就与之“偏离”(或可说“延异”)的由来和发展,试图指出德里达对现象学运动是有贡献的,对于德里达从现象学出发的哲学反思和由此展开的独特的跨学科的哲学质疑的探讨和研究,有助于我们深入理解当代西方思想的诸多问题的实质和内涵,是非常有意义的事情。文章主要通过对德里达早期著作的分析,从起源问题及其解决途径入手探讨德里达与现象学的关系。现象学在德里达的著述中处处留下踪迹而又处处被“偏离”,这构成了德里达解构思想的一个重要特点,也恰恰是德里达对现象学运动本身的贡献。 相似文献
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Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat “inner” states, including both qualia and intentional states, as “theoretical posits” of either folk or scientific psychology. This article argues that phenomenology in fact plays a very different role in the most mature part of psychology, psychophysics. Methodologically, phenomenology plays a crucial role in obtaining psychophysical results. And more importantly, many psychophysical data are best interpreted as reporting relations between stimuli and phenomenological states, both qualitative and intentional. Three examples are used to argue for this thesis: the Weber–Fechner laws, the Craik-O’Brien–Cornsweet effect, and subjective contour figures. The phenomenological properties that play a role here do so in the role of data that ultimately constrain theoretical work (in this case theory of vision), and not as theoretical posits. 相似文献
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Walter Hopp 《Husserl Studies》2009,25(1):1-14
If Husserl is correct, phenomenological inquiry produces knowledge with an extremely high level of epistemic warrant or justification.
However, there are several good reasons to think that we are highly fallible at carrying out phenomenological inquiries. It
is extremely difficult to engage in phenomenological investigations, and there are very few substantive phenomenological claims
that command a widespread consensus. In what follows, I introduce a distinction between method-fallibility and agent-fallibility,
and use it to argue that the fact that we are fallible phenomenologists does not undermine Husserl’s claims concerning the
epistemic value of phenomenological inquiry. I will also defend my account against both internalist and externalist objections.
相似文献
Walter HoppEmail: |