When What You Want is What You Get: Pay Dispersion and Communal Sharing Preference

The question of whether pay structures should be compressed or dispersed remains unanswered. We argue that pay dispersion can yield uncertainty regarding others' intentions and behaviors; as a result, individuals take a greater risk trusting their group members as pay spreads widen. Accordingly, we explore the conditions under which individuals are more willing to take this risk by viewing their group members as trustworthy even when pay is dispersed. Specifically, preferences for how relationships and resources should be structured in groups should help to determine when pay dispersion relates to trustworthiness perceptions. We hypothesise that the cross‐level interaction between preferences for communal sharing (Level 1)—that is, the extent to which individuals prefer communal, egalitarian structures in their groups—and pay dispersion (Level 2) is associated with trust perceptions. Data drawn from a sample of university professors support our hypothesised cross‐level interaction, and show that when pay dispersion is greater, individuals perceive their group members as more trustworthy only when they have weak preferences for communal sharing. Our results signify the importance of individual attributes to understanding pay dispersion's effects, and show that trust is fostered when preferences and pay conditions are aligned.     

What You Don't Know Can Help You: The Ethics of Placebo Treatment

Is it permissible for a doctor or nurse to knowingly administer a placebo in a clinical setting? There is certainly something suspicious about it: placebos are typically said to be ‘sham’ treatments, with no ‘active’ properties and so giving a placebo is usually thought to involve tricking or deceiving the patient who expects a genuine treatment. Nonetheless, some physicians have recently suggested that placebo treatments are sometimes the best way to help their patients and can be administered in an honest way. These physicians conclude that placebo treatments are a perfectly acceptable, and ethically unproblematic, mode of treatment. While I grant the common idea that placebos are deceptive is correct, I argue that widespread misunderstandings concerning why this is so has led proponents of placebo treatments to respond to the charge of deception in a way that misses the mark entirely. My goal in this paper, then, is to develop a precise conception of what makes something a placebo, which in turn will clarify the central charge concerning the ethics of placebo treatment, viz. that it is deceptive.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

What You Know When You Know an Answer to a Question

A significant argument for the claim that knowing‐wh is knowing‐that, implicit in much of the literature, including Stanley and Williamson (2001), is spelt out and challenged. The argument includes the assumption that a subject's state of knowing‐wh is constituted by their involvement in a relation with an answer to a question. And it involves the assumption that answers to questions are propositions or facts. One of Lawrence Powers’ counterexamples to the conjunction of these two assumptions is developed, responses to it are rebutted, and the possibility of rejecting the second rather than the first of these assumptions is explored briefly.     

You Can't Always Get What You Want: Infants Understand Failed Goal-Directed Actions

ABSTRACT— At what age do infants understand that goals exist independently of the actions that result from them? Exploring infants' understanding of failed intentional actions—when the goal of the action is unfulfilled and thus not apparent in the actor's movements—is a critical step in answering this question. Using a visual habituation paradigm, we assessed when infants understand that a failed intentional action is goal directed and whether an understanding of successful intentional actions (actions that do overtly attain their goals) precedes an understanding of failed intentional actions. Results demonstrated that 10- and 12-month-olds recognized the goal directedness of both successful and failed reaching actions. Eight-month-olds also recognized the goal directedness of successful actions, but not of unsuccessful attempts. Thus, by the end of the 1st year of life, infants possess an impressive understanding of intentional action, and an understanding of failed intentional actions follows an earlier understanding of successful ones.     

What You Expect Is What You Believe (But Not Necessarily What You Get): A Test of the Effectiveness of Subliminal Self-Help Audiotapes

Seventy-eight subjects, ranging in age from 18 to 60 years, participated in an experiment on the effectiveness of commercially produced subliminal self-help audiotapes. Upon completing pretest memory and self-esteem tests, subjects randomly received either a subliminal self-help tape designed to improve memory or increase self-esteem and were told that they had received either a memory or a self-esteem tape. After listening to the tape for 5 weeks in a home environment, subjects returned to the laboratory for memory and self-esteem tests. The results showed that the subliminal self-help tapes did not affect any of the performance measures in a manner consistent with manufacturer claims. However, subjects' perceptions of personal improvement were consistent with their expectations. Specifically, subjects who thought they had listened to a self-esteem tape were more likely to indicate that their self-esteem had improved and subjects who thought they had listened to a memory tape were more likely to indicate their memory had improved regardless of the actual subliminal content.     

What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You1

This boy is Ignorance. This girl is Want. Beware them both, and all of their degree, but most of all beware this boy, for on his brow I see that written which is Doom... —Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol     

Tell Me What You Believe and I'll Tell You What You Want: Empirical Evidence for Discriminating Value Patterns of Five Types of Religiosity

On the basis of Wulff's (1997) theoretical model of religious attitudes and of Schwartz's (1992; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) value theory, a refined theoretical framework has been constructed and empirically tested concerning the relation between 5 types of religiosity and personal value orientation. Two theoretical value patterns associated with religiosity were identified: A theological one focused on transcendence and mutual care, and a sociopsychological one focused on acceptance of social order and avoidance of uncertainty. Religious commitment and Hutsebaut's (1996) types of religious attitudes, which are based on Wulff's theoretical model, were, in a theoretically predicted and meaningful way, empirically related to a different value pattern. Moreover, each observed pattern could be explained as a specific combination of the 2 theoretically derived value patterns.