Temporal Distance and Moral Concerns: Future Morally Questionable Behavior is Perceived as More Wrong and Evokes Stronger Prosocial Intentions

Prior research on temporal construal has shown that core values become more salient when people think about distant- as compared to near-future events. The present research shows that greater temporal distance of an event also results in greater moral concern. More specifically, it was found that people make harsher moral judgments of others' distant-future morally questionable behavior than near-future morally questionable behavior. Moreover, it was shown that people increasingly attribute distant vs. near future behavior to abstract dispositional relative to concrete situational causes, and that this attribution bias is partially responsible for the temporal distance effect on moral judgments.     

Proximal Intentions,Non-executed Proximal Intentions and Change of Intentions

This paper investigates the conceptual and empirical possibility of non-executed, non-conscious proximal intentions, i.e., non-conscious proximal intentions to act that do not turn into a final act, but perhaps are vetoed or overcome by an alternative action. It constructs a conceptual framework in which such cases are justifiably considered ‘proximal intentions’. This is achieved by combining Alfred Mele’s notion of non-conscious proximal intentions together with the notion of trying or striving taken from Brian O’Shaughnessy’s model of action. With this framework in hand we analyze empirical electroencephalography (EEG) findings regarding ‘change of intention’ scenarios. Prior to EEG development (and other brain imaging techniques), one would never consider non-executed, non-conscious proximal intentions a case of intention at all. However, with technological and interpretable development of EEG, a whole group of so called ‘intentions’ appears, and the main aim of the paper is to justify this expanded usage.     

目标性意图与执行性意图调节情绪反应的效果比较

目标性意图和执行性意图作为目标的不同形式,对情绪调节的影响有待探讨。本研究试图考察目标性意图和执行性意图与表达抑制相结合之后,在调节情绪反应方面的作用。实验采用主观报告和生物反馈的方法对58名大学生进行测试。结果发现：（1）执行性意图组被试在观看负性和中性图片时对自身情绪唤醒度的评价均显著低于目标性意图组,在观看负性图片时其情绪唤醒度也显著低于控制组。（2）执行性意图组被试在各项生理反应指标上均显著低于目标性意图组和控制组,主要表现为形成执行性意图的个体在皮肤电导增加量、皮温降低量和指脉增加量上均显著低于形成目标性意图或不形成任何意图的个体。上述结果表明,相较于仅仅给出情绪体验下调目标的目标性意图,与表达抑制结合在一起的执行性意图能有效下调个体的负性情绪反应。     

Reconsidering Intentions

This paper argues that the principles of instrumental rationality apply primarily to extended action through time. Most philosophers assume that rational requirements and principles govern in the first instance momentary mental states, as opposed to governing extended intentional actions directly. In the case of instrumental rationality, the relevant mental states or attitudes would typically be preferences, decisions, or intentions. In fact, even those who recognize the extended nature of our agency still assume that rational requirements apply primarily to mental states at a moment in time. Such views try to do justice to the extended nature of our agency by postulating rational requirements that apply in the first instance to plans, policies, and intentions more generally. The paper focuses on the central case of requirements and reasons governing the reconsideration of intentions and argues that these requirements or reasons are either superfluous or invalid. I argue that a proper conception of instrumental reasoning that applies directly to actions turn out to have surprising consequences. In fact, this conception allows us to see that policies, projects and the like are best understood as instances of extended actions, and that the instrumental requirements that apply to projects and policies are exactly the same as the instrumental requirements that apply to ordinary extended actions. Finally, I argue that the resulting theory of instrumental rationality is a significant improvement over theories that rely on principles governing intentions.     

Justice,Care, and Questionable Dichotomies

Throughout the development of an “ethic of care” different from an “ethic of justice,” the relationship between the two has been problematic. Are they theories between which one must choose? Are they complementary? Are they domain-specific? In support of my view that neither is adequate by itself, I here examine the private domain of care of the dying by intimates, and find there important issues both of care and of justice.     

The Self-referentiality of Intentions

Philosophical Studies -     

关于意向的两个难题

意向有三种:永恒的意向,持续一段时间的意向,意向之事完成后就不复存在的意向.人们常说的是最后一种意向,本文讨论的是第二种意向,即打算做的事完成后,意向不消失,当相似情况出现时,还会引起同样行为的意向.     

Intentions are mental states

Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the ‘mental state’ theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.     

The Origin of Intentions

In contemporary discussions of the concept of intention, the assumption is made that an intention results from a person's decision, or resolution, or plan, or the like. And the intention persists, generally, until the appropriate action is carried out. However, intentions cannot be said to have temporal duration, or beginnings, or endings. And it is not necessary for a person who is intending to do something to have made a decision to do it, or a resolution, or anything else. It may be that a person acquires an intention because of the circumstances that he finds himself in. If one sees that a tricycle is in front of his car, he will move it. No decision is necessary, obviously, because running over it would be contrary to common sense. Or one may gradually come to realise that he is obliged to do something and thereupon acquires the intention to do it. By focusing on one kind of intention, the “desire‐belief” theories have failed to realise that intentions originate in various ways, and for various reasons.