How you lie affects what you remember

We investigated how telling different types of lies may impact memory. Participants studied pictures of objects, and later lied and told the truth about these and new objects once or multiple times by describing them or by denying they had seen them. Forty-eight hours later, participants were tested on their source memory. Results revealed that participants had good memory for having falsely described a never-seen object, but relatively poor memory for having falsely denied seeing a studied object. These results suggest that telling certain types of lies may make a person more likely to forget having lied. In addition, repeated truthful denials of having seen a picture paradoxically increased false memories for having seen it. Thus, telling the truth does not always prevent the possibility of memory distortion.     

Getting what you want

Philosophical Studies - It is commonly accepted that if an agent wants p, then she has a desire that is satisfied in exactly the worlds where p is true. Call this the ‘Satisfaction-is-Truth...     

Psychological distance and emotional experience: what you see is what you get

Recent research suggests that perceiving negative emotion-eliciting scenes approaching intensifies the associated felt emotion, while perceiving emotion-eliciting scenes receding weakens the associated felt emotion (Muhlberger, Neumann, Wieser, & Pauli, 2008). In the present studies, we sought to extend these findings by examining the effects of imagining rather than perceiving such changes to negative emotion-eliciting scenes. Across three studies, we found that negative scenes generally elicited less negative responses and lower levels of arousal when imagined moving away from participants and shrinking, and more negative responses and higher levels of arousal when imagined moving toward participants and growing, as compared to the responses elicited by negative scenes when imagined unchanged. Patterns in responses to neutral scenes undergoing the same imagined transformations were similar on ratings of emotional arousal, but differed on valence-generally eliciting greater positivity when imagined moving toward participants and growing, and less positivity when imagined moving away from participants and shrinking. Moreover, for these effects to emerge, participants reported it necessary to explicitly imagine scenes moving closer or farther. These findings have implications for emotion regulation, and suggest that imagined spatial distance plays a role in mental representations of emotionally salient events.     

You are not what you feel you are

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences -     

Saying what you mean, meaning what you say: language, interaction and interpretation

As analysts, we strive to say what we mean, which involves understanding the other person's communication, finding the appropriate form of words to articulate what we have understood, and expressing them in the tone of voice which can be heard. Meaning what we say refers to the authenticity of our response, that what we say is sincere. My theme touches on different ways of saying what we mean and how this can affect the meaning of what we say. Some of the issues are aesthetic, some grammatical. How some sentence structures lead to closing off communication while others open it.     

Spatial reasoning with external visualizations: what matters is what you see, not whether you interact

Three experiments examined the effects of interactive visualizations and spatial abilities on a task requiring participants to infer and draw cross sections of a three-dimensional (3D) object. The experiments manipulated whether participants could interactively control a virtual 3D visualization of the object while performing the task, and compared participants who were allowed interactive control of the visualization to those who were not allowed control. In Experiment 1, interactivity produced better performance than passive viewing, but the advantage of interactivity disappeared in Experiment 2 when visual input for the two conditions in a yoked design was equalized. In Experiments 2 and 3, differences in how interactive participants manipulated the visualization were large and related to performance. In Experiment 3, non-interactive participants who watched optimal movements of the display performed as well as interactive participants who manipulated the visualization effectively and better than interactive participants who manipulated the visualization ineffectively. Spatial ability made an independent contribution to performance on the spatial reasoning task, but did not predict patterns of interactive behavior. These experiments indicate that providing participants with active control of a computer visualization does not necessarily enhance task performance, whereas seeing the most task-relevant information does, and this is true regardless of whether the task-relevant information is obtained actively or passively.     

On not having what you are given

The statement, that these or those philosophers do not accept the distinction between what is, and what is not, ‘given’ in perception, has very little content; and should receive only a corresponding degree of emphasis.     

The benefits of knowing what you know (and what you don’t): How calibration affects credibility

People tend to believe, and take advice from, informants who are highly confident. However, people use more than a mere “confidence heuristic.” We believe that confidence is influential because—in the absence of other information—people assume it is a valid cue to an informant’s likelihood of being correct. However, when people get evidence about an informant’s calibration (i.e., her confidence-accuracy relationship) they override reliance on confidence or accuracy alone. Two experiments in which participants choose between two opposing witnesses to a car accident show that neither confidence nor accuracy alone explains judgments of credibility; rather, whether a person is seen as credible ultimately depends on whether the person demonstrates good calibration. Credibility depends on whether sources were justified in believing what they believed.     

What you think is what you get: comparative evaluations of close relationships

Three studies tested the hypothesis that focus of comparison moderates the influence of comparison standards on relationship satisfaction. Participants were asked to evaluate either their current relationships or their alternative relationships relative to an external comparison standard: a romantic stereotype (Study 1) or others' relationships (Studies 2 and 3). Consistent with the focusing hypothesis, the results show that people are more satisfied when they assimilate their relationship outcomes to a high standard or when they contrast them away from a low standard. Satisfaction, however, also increases when alternative relationships are contrasted away from a high standard or when they are assimilated to a low standard of comparison. Perceived quality of alternatives partially mediated the impact of focus of comparison on satisfaction. This finding is consistent with interdependence theory's distinction between a comparison level and a comparison level for alternative relationships, which are not completely independent from each other.     

Local optima in K-means clustering: what you don't know may hurt you

The popular K-means clustering method, as implemented in 3 commercial software packages (SPSS, SYSTAT, and SAS), generally provides solutions that are only locally optimal for a given set of data. Because none of these commercial implementations offer a reasonable mechanism to begin the K-means method at alternative starting points, separate routines were written within the MATLAB (Math-Works, 1999) environment that can be initialized randomly (these routines are provided at the end of the online version of this article in the PsycARTICLES database). Through the analysis of 2 empirical data sets and 810 simulated data sets, it is shown that the results provided by commercial packages are most likely locally optimal. These results suggest the need for some strategy to study the local optima problem for a specific data set or to identify methods for finding "good" starting values that might lead to the best solutions possible.     

Why you do what you do: The power in knowing and naming pedagogies

This article is for those educators who want to become more intentional in their craft of teaching. The authors introduce eight different pedagogies through their historical lineage, intending for readers to gain an appreciation for, and understanding of, the broader trajectory of educational philosophies, and illustrate how common teaching techniques can be shaped by the pedagogies. By familiarizing themselves with a specific educational philosophy or philosophies, educators begin to identify and name the ways they teach, how students best learn, what counts as knowledge, and the desired outcomes. In doing so, educators increase their opportunities to provide more meaningful and impactful education. This article also includes quick‐reference guides to the pedagogies for readers to return to frequently.     

You get what you give: children's karmic bargaining

Do children believe in karma – the notion that life events occur to punish or reward our moral behavior? In three experiments, we investigate 4–6‐year‐old children's willingness to endorse and engage in the practice of performing good acts in order to secure an unrelated future desired outcome, so‐called ‘karmic bargaining’. Most children agreed that performing a morally good social behavior, but not a morally negative or morally neutral non‐social behavior, would increase the chances that future desired outcomes would occur, in both first‐party and third‐party contexts. About half of children also engaged in karmic bargaining behavior themselves. We conclude that a belief in karma may therefore reflect a broad, early‐emerging teleological bias to interpret life events in terms of agency, purpose, and design.     

Conflict adaptation: It is not what you expect

In two studies, a vocal Stroop task with eight different colours was employed in order to put two core assumptions of the original interpretation of the Gratton effect to the test. We verified whether top-down control processes can elicit conflict adaptation when episodic memory effects are controlled for and to what extent proactive adjustments driven by the subjects' expectancy for congruency level repetition contribute to this effect. Therefore, we presented Stroop stimuli without feature repetitions and investigated whether the induced expectancy manipulation of raising the amount of either congruency level repetitions or alternations in a training phase transferred to an unmanipulated test phase. Over the two experiments, a sequential modulation of the Stroop effect was found in the absence of stimulus feature repetitions, strongly confirming a share for top-down control processes in bringing about the Gratton effect. In the condition where congruency level repetitions were raised, a strong Gratton effect was found. When congruency level alternations outnumbered repetitions, the Gratton effect disappeared completely. However, this difference seemed mainly due to cumulative effects of local, dynamic, trial-to-trial control adjustments rather than expectancy-induced attentional shifting. Once the transition probability changed back to 50% in the test phase of each experiment, a similar Gratton effect was found in both conditions. Taken together, these results are best explained in terms of dynamic reactive control.