The anatomy of object processing: The role of anteromedial temporal cortex

How objects are represented and processed in the brain remains a key issue in cognitive neuroscience. We have developed a conceptual structure account in which category-specific semantic deficits emerge due to differences in the structure and content of concepts rather than from explicit divisions of conceptual knowledge in separate stores. The primary claim is that concepts associated with particular categories (e.g., animals, tools) differ in the number and type of properties and the extent to which these properties are correlated with each other. In this review, we describe recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies in which we have extended our theoretical account by incorporating recent claims about the neuroanatomical basis of feature integration and differentiation that arise from research into hierarchical object processing streams in nonhuman primates and humans. A clear picture has emerged in which the human perirhinal cortex and neighbouring anteromedial temporal structures appear to provide the neural infrastructure for making fine-grained discriminations among objects, suggesting that damage within the perirhinal cortex may underlie the emergence of category-specific semantic deficits in brain-damaged patients.     

The anatomy of object processing: the role of anteromedial temporal cortex.

How objects are represented and processed in the brain remains a key issue in cognitive neuroscience. We have developed a conceptual structure account in which category-specific semantic deficits emerge due to differences in the structure and content of concepts rather than from explicit divisions of conceptual knowledge in separate stores. The primary claim is that concepts associated with particular categories (e.g., animals, tools) differ in the number and type of properties and the extent to which these properties are correlated with each other. In this review, we describe recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies in which we have extended our theoretical account by incorporating recent claims about the neuroanatomical basis of feature integration and differentiation that arise from research into hierarchical object processing streams in nonhuman primates and humans. A clear picture has emerged in which the human perirhinal cortex and neighbouring anteromedial temporal structures appear to provide the neural infrastructure for making fine-grained discriminations among objects, suggesting that damage within the perirhinal cortex may underlie the emergence of category-specific semantic deficits in brain-damaged patients.     

Relationship between object-related gestures and the fractionated object knowledge system

The praxic semantic system comprises a conceptual knowledge system, which stores functional information about objects, and an action knowledge system, which stores information about the correct manipulation of objects. Moreover, mechanical problem solving abilities permit to take advantages from objects structure to use unfamiliar tools or discover alternative ways of using familiar tools. This study aims at investigating whether conceptual knowledge, action knowledge and mechanical problem solving abilities intervene in the production of gestures with objects (i.e. pantomimes and object use) by testing a group of brain damaged patients. Results showed that the mechanical problem solving abilities are not sufficient to produce pantomimes and that only severe deficits in the praxic semantic system would affect the production of these gestures. Furthermore, a double dissociation was observed between mechanical problem solving abilities and the capacity to use multiple objects. Overall, the results indicate that the praxic semantic system can be disrupted at different levels, suggesting that the semantic system for object has to be conceived as fractionated in different entities.     

Is a picture worth a thousand words? Evidence from concept definitions by patients with semantic dementia

Nine patients with semantic dementia (the temporal lobe variant of frontotemporal dementia) were asked to define concrete concepts either from presentation of a picture of the object or from its spoken name. As expected, the patients with the most severe semantic impairment produced the least detailed definitions, and the quality of the definitions overall was significantly related to concept familiarity. Further analyses of the definitions were designed to assess two key theoretical aspects of semantic organization. (i) Do objects and their corresponding names activate conceptual information in two neuroanatomically separable (modality-specific) semantic systems? If so, then-apart from any expected commonality in performance attributable to factors such as concept familiarity-one would not predict striking item-specific similarities in a patient's picture- and word-elicited definitions. (ii) Do sensory/perceptual features and more associative/functional attributes of conceptual knowledge form two neuroanatomically separable subsystems? If so, then one would predict significant dissociations in the prominence of these two types of information in the patients' definitions. The results lead us to favor a model of the semantic system that is divided by attribute type but not by modality.     

语义表征具身理论:情绪在概念表征中的作用

概念如何被表征是认知科学的热点问题,其中抽象概念如何表征是当前具身认知最具争议性的话题之一。与前期概念隐喻理论(强调意象图式)和知觉符号理论(强调情境内省信息)的观点不同,语义表征具身理论强调情绪经验信息在抽象概念表征和加工中的作用。具体而言,具体概念的表征主要来自感觉运动信息,而抽象概念的表征主要来自情绪经验信息和语言信息。研究证明,抽象概念的高情绪经验信息能够促进词汇的加工,且这一促进作用受词汇情绪效价的调节。未来研究应进一步考虑影响情绪经验信息发挥作用的因素,比如语言信息的丰富性、情绪唤醒或个体的情绪状态等。     

Conceptual Hierarchies in a Flat Attractor Network: Dynamics of Learning and Computations

The structure of people's conceptual knowledge of concrete nouns has traditionally been viewed as hierarchical ( Collins & Quillian, 1969 ). For example, superordinate concepts ( vegetable ) are assumed to reside at a higher level than basic-level concepts ( carrot ). A feature-based attractor network with a single layer of semantic features developed representations of both basic-level and superordinate concepts. No hierarchical structure was built into the network. In Experiment and Simulation 1, the graded structure of categories (typicality ratings) is accounted for by the flat attractor network. Experiment and Simulation 2 show that, as with basic-level concepts, such a network predicts feature verification latencies for superordinate concepts ( vegetable ). In Experiment and Simulation 3, counterintuitive results regarding the temporal dynamics of similarity in semantic priming are explained by the model. By treating both types of concepts the same in terms of representation, learning, and computations, the model provides new insights into semantic memory.     

When senses meet functions: an amodal stage in conceptual processing

Research has shown that concepts are associated with modality-specific features widely distributed in the brain and that semantic hubs or convergence zones may exist to mediate or integrate distributed representations. Although much neuropsychological and neuroimaging literature has provided support for the existence of hubs/convergence zones from the spatial perspective, opinions differ as to whether the representations in the hubs/convergence zones are modality-specific or amodal. The current ERP study aimed to explore whether there is an amodal stage in conceptual processing from the temporal perspective. Participants were presented with prime-target pairs and were asked to judge whether the prime (a sensory or functional feature) could be an attribute of the target (a noun in a natural or artifactual category). The results revealed that a semantic hub or convergence zone may be reached no later than 350–450?ms in conceptual processing and that the representations in the hub may be amodal.     

基于语义网络的创造性认知机制研究现状与展望

语义网络是主要的知识表征方式之一,对创造性研究具有重要意义。近年来不断发展的网络科学方法为相关研究提供了强大的方法论框架及量化工具,研究者得以分别从语义网络结构及语义相关认知操作的角度探讨语义网络与创造性的内在联系。已有证据表明语义网络中所储存的概念越丰富、概念间的连接通路越多元化或越灵活,则个体创造性水平越高;而个体创造性水平亦受制于个体对概念的检索、抑制、选择、整合及扩展等认知能力。在此方向上,未来研究工作应当更多地思考如何在一个相对整合的认知框架中深入探讨语义网络结构及相关认知过程对创造性的交互作用,并结合神经影像等技术手段,将语义网络之于创造性的认知机制嵌套于神经科学体系中进行解释。     

Low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation of the anterior temporal lobes does not dissociate social versus nonsocial semantic knowledge

Social conceptual knowledge is imperative to communicate with, interact with, and interpret human society; however, little is known about the neural basis of social concepts. Previous research has predominantly suggested that the right anterior temporal lobe (ATL) may specifically represent social conceptual knowledge, whereas the left ATL is necessary for general semantic processing. However, this view has not always been supported by empirical studies. Employing a lateralized design and two different semantic tasks and a nonsemantic control task, we aimed to clarify some of these ambiguities by potentially dissociating left from right functionality and social from nonsocial concepts, using inhibitory repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) coupled with a sham and control site stimulation (N = 56). The results showed that stimulation of the left ATL led to overall faster processing times without affecting accuracy, whilst the right ATL and control groups did not significantly change in reaction times or accuracy. No difference occurred between social and nonsocial concepts after stimulation. This study is the first to show that inhibition of the left temporal lobe may improve performance on a semantic task and provides evidence that the ATLs may be lateralized in conceptual processing. The results do not confirm that the right temporal lobe is crucial for social conceptual processing, as inhibition did not significantly affect performance for social concepts.     

The semantic organization of the animal category: evidence from semantic verbal fluency and network theory

Semantic memory is the subsystem of human memory that stores knowledge of concepts or meanings, as opposed to life-specific experiences. How humans organize semantic information remains poorly understood. In an effort to better understand this issue, we conducted a verbal fluency experiment on 200 participants with the aim of inferring and representing the conceptual storage structure of the natural category of animals as a network. This was done by formulating a statistical framework for co-occurring concepts that aims to infer significant concept-concept associations and represent them as a graph. The resulting network was analyzed and enriched by means of a missing links recovery criterion based on modularity. Both network models were compared to a thresholded co-occurrence approach. They were evaluated using a random subset of verbal fluency tests and comparing the network outcomes (linked pairs are clustering transitions and disconnected pairs are switching transitions) to the outcomes of two expert human raters. Results show that the network models proposed in this study overcome a thresholded co-occurrence approach, and their outcomes are in high agreement with human evaluations. Finally, the interplay between conceptual structure and retrieval mechanisms is discussed.     

Linking somatic and symbolic representation in semantic memory: the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework

Biological plausibility is an essential constraint for any viable model of semantic memory. Yet, we have only the most rudimentary understanding of how the human brain conducts abstract symbolic transformations that underlie word and object meaning. Neuroscience has evolved a sophisticated arsenal of techniques for elucidating the architecture of conceptual representation. Nevertheless, theoretical convergence remains elusive. Here we describe several contrastive approaches to the organization of semantic knowledge, and in turn we offer our own perspective on two recurring questions in semantic memory research: (1) to what extent are conceptual representations mediated by sensorimotor knowledge (i.e., to what degree is semantic memory embodied)? (2) How might an embodied semantic system represent abstract concepts such as modularity, symbol, or proposition? To address these questions, we review the merits of sensorimotor (i.e., embodied) and amodal (i.e., disembodied) semantic theories and address the neurobiological constraints underlying each. We conclude that the shortcomings of both perspectives in their extreme forms necessitate a hybrid middle ground. We accordingly propose the Dynamic Multilevel Reactivation Framework—an integrative model predicated upon flexible interplay between sensorimotor and amodal symbolic representations mediated by multiple cortical hubs. We discuss applications of the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework to abstract and concrete concept representation and describe how a multidimensional conceptual topography based on emotion, sensation, and magnitude can successfully frame a semantic space containing meanings for both abstract and concrete words. The consideration of ‘abstract conceptual features’ does not diminish the role of logical and/or executive processing in activating, manipulating and using information stored in conceptual representations. Rather, it proposes that the materials upon which these processes operate necessarily combine pure sensorimotor information and higher-order cognitive dimensions involved in symbolic representation.     

The effect of frequency of shared features on judgments of semantic similarity

Insight into the structure of conceptual knowledge can be gleaned by examining how statistical regularities in the semantic structure of concepts affect semantic processing. Two similarity judgment experiments revealed that pairs of concepts sharing relatively rare features were judged to be more similar than concepts sharing an equal number of relatively frequent features. Simulations confirmed that these results are consistent with a recurrent connectionist network model of semantic processing in which units corresponding to rare features are activated more quickly and accurately than units corresponding to frequent features. These results support the hypothesis that rare features play a privileged role in the processing of word meanings.     

The organization and dissolution of semantic-conceptual knowledge: Is the ‘amodal hub’ the only plausible model?

In recent years, the anatomical and functional bases of conceptual activity have attracted a growing interest. In particular, Patterson and Lambon-Ralph have proposed the existence, in the anterior parts of the temporal lobes, of a mechanism (the 'amodal semantic hub') supporting the interactive activation of semantic representations in all modalities and for all semantic categories. The aim of then present paper is to discuss this model, arguing against the notion of an 'amodal' semantic hub, because we maintain, in agreement with the Damasio's construct of 'higher-order convergence zone', that a continuum exists between perceptual information and conceptual representations, whereas the 'amodal' account views perceptual informations only as a channel through which abstract semantic knowledge can be activated. According to our model, semantic organization can be better explained by two orthogonal higher-order convergence systems, concerning, on one hand, the right vs. left hemisphere and, on the other hand, the ventral vs. dorsal processing pathways. This model posits that conceptual representations may be mainly based upon perceptual activities in the right hemisphere and upon verbal mediation in the left side of the brain. It also assumes that conceptual knowledge based on the convergence of highly processed visual information with other perceptual data (and mainly concerning living categories) may be bilaterally represented in the anterior parts of the temporal lobes, whereas knowledge based on the integration of visual data with action schemata (namely knowledge of actions, body parts and artefacts) may be more represented in the left fronto-temporo-parietal areas.     

Knowledge is power: How conceptual knowledge transforms visual cognition

In this review, we synthesize the existing literature demonstrating the dynamic interplay between conceptual knowledge and visual perceptual processing. We consider two theoretical frameworks that demonstrate interactions between processes and brain areas traditionally considered perceptual or conceptual. Specifically, we discuss categorical perception, in which visual objects are represented according to category membership, and highlight studies showing that category knowledge can penetrate early stages of visual analysis. We next discuss the embodied account of conceptual knowledge, which holds that concepts are instantiated in the same neural regions required for specific types of perception and action, and discuss the limitations of this framework. We additionally consider studies showing that gaining abstract semantic knowledge about objects and faces leads to behavioral and electrophysiological changes that are indicative of more efficient stimulus processing. Finally, we consider the role that perceiver goals and motivation may play in shaping the interaction between conceptual and perceptual processing. We hope to demonstrate how pervasive such interactions between motivation, conceptual knowledge, and perceptual processing are in our understanding of the visual environment, and to demonstrate the need for future research aimed at understanding how such interactions arise in the brain.     

Latent structure in measures of associative,semantic, and thematic knowledge

There has been much debate about the relation between knowledge for meaning (semantic memory) and knowledge for words in context (associative memory). Many measures of that knowledge exist, but do they all measure the same thing? In this study, scaling, clustering, and factor-analytic techniques were used to reveal the structure underlying 13 variables. Semantic similarity determined from lexicographic measures is shown to be separable from the associative strength determined from word association norms, and these semantic and associative measures are in turn separable from abstract representations derived from computational analyses of large bodies of text. The three-factor structure is at odds with traditional views of word knowledge. The expression of long-term knowledge about words and the concepts they represent may be better viewed in terms of associative, semantic, and thematic information.     

Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition

"Force dynamics" refers to a previously neglected semantic category—how entities interact with respect to force. This category includes such concepts as: the exertion of force, resistance to such exertion and the overcoming of such resistance, blockage of a force and the removal of such blockage, and so forth. Force dynamics is a generalization over the traditional linguistic notion of "causative": it analyzes "causing" into finer primitives and sets it naturally within a framework that also includes "letting," "hindering," "helping," and still further notions. Force dynamics, moreover, appears to be the semantic category that uniquely characterizes the grammatical category of modals, in both their basic and epistemic usages. In addition, on the basis of force dynamic parameters, numerous lexical items fall into systematic semantic patterns, and there exhibit parallelisms between physical and psychosocial reference. Further, from research on the relation of semantic structure to general cognitive structure, it appears that the concepts of force interaction that are encoded within language closely parallel concepts that appear both in early science and in naive physics and psychology. Overall, force dynamics thus emerges as a fundamental notional system that structures conceptual material pertaining to force interaction in a common way across a linguistic range: the physical, psychological, social, inferential, discourse, and mental-model domains of reference and conception.     

In defense of abstract conceptual representations

An extensive program of research in the past 2 decades has focused on the role of modal sensory, motor, and affective brain systems in storing and retrieving concept knowledge. This focus has led in some circles to an underestimation of the need for more abstract, supramodal conceptual representations in semantic cognition. Evidence for supramodal processing comes from neuroimaging work documenting a large, well-defined cortical network that responds to meaningful stimuli regardless of modal content. The nodes in this network correspond to high-level “convergence zones” that receive broadly crossmodal input and presumably process crossmodal conjunctions. It is proposed that highly conjunctive representations are needed for several critical functions, including capturing conceptual similarity structure, enabling thematic associative relationships independent of conceptual similarity, and providing efficient “chunking” of concept representations for a range of higher order tasks that require concepts to be configured as situations. These hypothesized functions account for a wide range of neuroimaging results showing modulation of the supramodal convergence zone network by associative strength, lexicality, familiarity, imageability, frequency, and semantic compositionality. The evidence supports a hierarchical model of knowledge representation in which modal systems provide a mechanism for concept acquisition and serve to ground individual concepts in external reality, whereas broadly conjunctive, supramodal representations play an equally important role in concept association and situation knowledge.     

LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND GETTIER CASES

Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is that it is grounded in semantic or conceptual understanding. However, I show that this cannot be the correct account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic, because it is open to Gettier-style counter-examples.     

Modality switching costs emerge in concept creation as well as retrieval

Theories of embodied cognition hold that the conceptual system uses perceptual simulations for the purposes of representation. A strong prediction is that perceptual phenomena should emerge in conceptual processing, and, in support, previous research has shown that switching modalities from one trial to the next incurs a processing cost during conceptual tasks. However, to date, such research has been limited by its reliance on the retrieval of familiar concepts. We therefore examined concept creation by asking participants to interpret modality-specific compound phrases (i.e., conceptual combinations). Results show that modality switching costs emerge during the creation of new conceptual entities: People are slower to simulate a novel concept (e.g., auditory jingling onion) when their attention has already been engaged by a different modality in simulating a familiar concept (e.g., visual shiny penny). Furthermore, these costs cannot be accounted for by linguistic factors alone. Rather, our findings support the embodied view that concept creation, as well as retrieval, requires situated perceptual simulation.