God,guilt, and logic: The psychological basis of the ontological argument

The most eminent exponents of the ontological argument for the existence of God have been characterized as well by a common emotional ingredient — a concern with individual guilt. Anselm, Josiah Royce, Karl Barth, and Norman Malcolm in their respective ways have made the experience of guilt a central one in their metaphysical standpoints. The hypothesis is therefore advanced that the validity which such thinkers have found in the ontological argument is the expression of a frame of mind which we can call ‘logical masochism'; under the influence of such emotions, the ontologian bows his logical powers submissively before an entity the existence of which he cannot question because of the guilt that such questioning would arouse. Under such social circumstances, on the other hand, as during the eighteenth century, when the psychology of individual guilt subsided, the appeal of the ontological argument likewise declines.     

The psychological treatment of tinnitus: An experimental evaluation

Disabling tinnitus in 27 patients was treated in an experimental setting with two different types of therapy aiming at the development of coping behaviour. One was focused on behavioural control procedures, while the other aimed at more cognitive control methods such as distraction. The results of the two forms of therapy were compared with each other and with observations of the untreated control subjects. Assessments of subjective loudness, discomfort from tinnitus and controllability were made on analogue scales and at a questionnaire follow-up. Psychoacoustic measures such as personal loudness units (PLU) were used in connection with these self-recordings and for evaluation of treatment effects. The results confirmed favourable reports on behavioural methods in tinnitus. However, no differences were found between therapies. The results are discussed in the light of the coping and adaptation theory.     

The acceptability and preference for the psychological treatment of PTSD

The acceptability and preference of psychological treatments is important in understanding patient treatment seeking, choice, engagement and attrition and possibly treatment response in health care. The acceptability of, and preference for, 14 different types of psychological treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were investigated in a student population through invitation to participate in a web-based survey. Respondents were asked to rate each treatment on 10 scales and to rank the treatments in order of preference. Respondents were also asked whether they would seek treatment themselves, recommend treatment to friends and family, feel stigmatised by suffering from PTSD, had any prior knowledge of the treatments and if this had been positive or negative and whether they had a history of psychological problems or treatment. A total of 330 respondents completed the survey. A past or current history of psychological problems and treatment was surprisingly high. Almost all respondents indicated that they would seek or recommend treatment in spite of high levels of stigmatisation. Factor analysis of the 10 scales indicated two factors: Endorsement and Discomfort. Rank ordering on preference and Endorsement scores was highly consistent. The highly preferred and endorsed treatments involved cognitive therapy, exposure or psycho-education in spite of high levels of discomfort anticipated with exposure. Treatments involving new technologies, EMDR and psychodynamic psychotherapy received the lowest Endorsement and preference. There was a modest influence of prior knowledge of a treatment.     

The logic of delusion

Piagetian concepts explaining normal mental development are applied to delusion, a major psychiatric disorder of thought which can result in bizarre conduct. Piaget constructed problems in which the errors of six to eight year old children fit the standard textbook definition of delusion surprisingly well. When we examined cases of delusional individuals, we concluded that their apparent irrational and bizarre conduct could be explained as problem-solving errors like those of Piaget's young children. In contradistinction to existing theories, we define delusion as a regression under stress to the logic of children of a particular age range, and that what appears bizarre and irrational is the result of an adult attempting to filter experience through a child's logic.Under a different title this paper was presented at the Biennial Congress of the World Federation for Mental Health in Mexico City in August, 1991.     

The logic of how-questions

Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the logic of questions, Van Fraassen has managed to apply their approach in constructing an account of the logic of why-questions. Comparatively little, by contrast, has been written on the logic of how-questions despite the apparent centrality of questions such as How is it possible for us to be both free and determined? to philosophical enterprise.¹ In what follows I develop a logic for how-questions of various sorts including how-questions of cognitive resolution, how-questions of manner, how-questions of method, of means, and of mechanism.     

The logic of implication

The principles that AN INSTANCE OF A CLASS IS THE CLASS and A CLASS IS AN INSTANCE OF ITSELF allow for the so called LAWS OF THOUGHT

The logic of ground

Journal of Philosophical Logic - I explore the logic of ground. I first develop a logic of weak ground. This logic strengthens the logic of weak ground presented by Fine in his ‘Guide to...