Children's judgments of event upsettingness and personal experiencing of stressful events

Five-hundred and three urban and suburban 4th- to 6th-grade schoolchildren judged event upsettingness and reported the occurrence of 22 life events. Judgments of event upsettingness ranged considerably, some corresponding to, others differing from, adult judgments. Children reported experiencing an average of seven events during their lifetimes. Girls judged events to be more upsetting than boys, and fourth and fifth graders judged events to be more upsetting than sixth graders. Urban children reported having experienced more stressful events than suburban children, and sixth graders experienced more events than fourth graders.     

Effects of event structure on retrospective duration judgments

Two experiments examined whether varying degrees of event coherence influence the remembering of an event’s actual duration. Relying on musical compositions (Experiment 1) or filmed narratives (Experiment 2) as experimental stimuli, the underlying hierarchy of information within events (i.e., melodic intervals or story elements) was either attentionally highlighted or obscured by placing a varying number of accents (i.e., prolonged notes or commercial breaks) at locations that either coincided or conflicted with grammatical phrase boundaries. When subjects were unexpectedly asked to judge the actual duration of events, through a reproduction (Experiment 1) or verbal estimation (Experiment 2) task, duration estimates became more accurate and less variable when the pattern of accentuation increasingly outlined the events’ nested relationships. Conversely, when the events’ organization was increasingly obscured through accentuation, time judgments not only became less accurate and more variable, but were consistently overestimated. These findings support a theoretical framework emphasizing the effects of event structure on attending and remembering activities.     

Effects of real vs pretend shock on semantic differential judgments and the GSR in some classical conditioning paradigms

In two experiments subjects were shown different color 1-sec lights, one just before the end of a 4-sec UCS and the other coming 10 sec after UCS termination and 25 sec before the next UCS. For some groups the UCS was strong electric shock; for others it was a tone which subjects were instructed to imagine was a strong shock. The primary data were changes in semantic differential ratings of the lights before and after 12 “conditioning” trials. There were no differences among the groups. In a third experiment a 6-sec delay CS was used for GSR conditioning, some subjects receiving actual shock and others pretend shock. Only the former showed conditioning. The results are discussed in terms of a model of experimental demand.     

Neutral vs ego-orienting instructions: Effects on judgments of magnitude estimation

Three experiments were performed to examine the relative constancy of the exponent in the psychophysical power law under varying motivating conditions. The method of magnitude estimation was used to obtain judgments of apparent tactual roughness or of apparent area size of squares. Patterns of the qualitative observations of the three Es and of the various exponents for the six groups of Ss indicated that neutral instructions and “ego-orienting” instructions, which were perceived as unbelievable coming from an equal fellow student, both yielded exponents identical to those reported in the literature. Believable ego-orienting instructions given by an E of clearly perceived higher social status produced a statistically significantly lower exponent than neutral. Intermediate conditions, wherein Ss apparently disbelieved both types of instructions, but assumed that the superior-status E was “analyzing” them, yielded exponents of intermediate size. Results and supplementary trend analyses are discussed as possible, highly sensitive indicators of motivational impacts on sensory judgments.     

The effect of imagining an event on expectations for the event: An interpretation in terms of the availability heuristic

Previous studies have indicated that explaining a hypothetical event makes the event seem more likely through the creation of causal connections. However, such effects could arise through the use of the availability heuristic; that is, subjective likelihood is increased by an event becoming easier to imagine. Two experiments were designed to demonstrate this principle. In Experiment 1, subjects asked to imagine Jimmy Carter winning the presidential election (prior to the election) predicted that he was more likely to win than subjects asked to imagine Gerald Ford winning. In Experiment 2, subjects asked to imagine a good college football season for the previous championship team were more likely to predict a major bowl bid than subjects asked to imagine a bad season, although the effect did not appear in predictions of the season record. In both studies, subjects who were also asked to explain the imaginary event were no different from subjects who only imagined. Several other attributional distortions are interpreted in terms of the availability heuristic.     

On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability

In standard treatments of probability, is defined as the ratio of to , provided that . This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of arise in the mind via implicit calculation of . We tested this hypothesis (Experiment 1) by presenting brief visual scenes composed of forms, and collecting estimates of relevant probabilities. Direct estimates of conditional probability were not well predicted by . Direct estimates were also closer to the objective probabilities defined by the stimuli, compared to estimates computed from the foregoing ratio. The hypothesis that arises from the ratio fared better (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the same hypotheses were evaluated in the context of subjective estimates of the chance of future events.     

Aging and conditional probability judgments: a global matching approach

Age differences in bias in conditional probability judgments were investigated based on predictions derived from the Minerva-Decision Making model (M. R. P. Dougherty, C. F. Gettys, & E. E. Ogden, 1999), a global matching model of likelihood judgment. In this study, 248 younger and older adults completed frequency judgment and conditional probability judgment tasks. Age differences in the frequency judgment task are interpreted as an age-related deficit in memory encoding. Older adults' stronger biases in the probability judgment task point to age differences in criterion setting. Age-related biases were eliminated when age groups were equated on memory encoding by means of study time manipulation. The authors conclude that older adults' stronger judgment biases are a function of memory impairment.     

Understanding conjunction effects in probability judgments: the role of implicit mental models

Subjective probability judgments often violate a normative principle in that the conjunction of two events is judged to be more likely than the probability of either of the two events occurring separately. Most previous explanations of these conjunction effects have assumed that probability judgments depend on some psychological relation (e.g. representativeness) between the constituents mentioned explicitly in the stimulus information. In contrast, the present approach highlights the fundamental role of implicitly inferred information. Participants are assumed to transform the explicit stimulus information into implicit mental models in their attempt to make sense of the experimental task. Probability judgments should then reflect the degree of activation of such a mental model in memory given a set of propositions, rather than the quantitative fit or likelihood of the propositions themselves. Two studies are reported which provide converging evidence for the proposed mental model approach. In the first study, using graded conjunctions of one to five propositions, probability judgments are shown to vary as a function of the activation of a mental model rather than the likelihood of the component events. In a second study, a priming procedure is employed to activate mental models that either fit an event conjunction or do not, leading to an increase or decrease of conjunction effects in probability judgment. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross- vs. within-racial judgments of attractiveness

Subjects from two pairs of ethnic groups (Chinese and White in Experiment 1, Black and White in Experiment 2) judged the attractiveness of faces in yearbook pictures of persons that belonged to their own or to the other ethnic group. This was to see whether: (1) a given group would perceive more variation in the attractiveness of faces belonging to its own vs. the other ethnic group, as suggested by the cross-racial literature, for example, Malpass and Kravitz (1969), and (2) the two groups would use the same or different rules to define attractiveness. There were essentially no differences in perceived variation for cross- vs. within-racial judgments, but there were differences in the criteria used to define attractiveness. As expected, Black and White aesthetic criteria were more like one another than were Chinese and White criteria. Discussion centered around reconciling these findings with the recognition literature.     

Conditional probability and pragmatic conditionals: Dissociating truth and effectiveness

Recent research (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004 Over, D. E., Manktelow, K. I. and Hadjichristidis, C. 2004. Conditions for the acceptance of deontic conditionals. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58: 111–120.  [Google Scholar]) has provided support for the hypothesis that people evaluate the probability of conditional statements of the form if p then q as the conditional probability of q given p, P(q/p). The present paper extends this approach to pragmatic conditionals in the form of inducements (i.e., promises and threats) and advice (i.e., tips and warnings). In so doing, we demonstrate a distinction between the truth status of these conditionals and their effectiveness as speech acts. Specifically, while probability judgements of the truth of conditional inducements and advice are highly correlated with estimates of P(q/p), their perceived effectiveness in changing behaviour instead varies as a function of the conditional probability of q given not-p, P(q/～p). Finally, we show that the conditional probability approach can be extended to predicting inference rates on a conditional reasoning task.     

Confidence judgments in event recall: developmental progression in the impact of question format

Two studies were conducted to examine developmental progression in children's and adults' ability to adequately monitor their own attempts to recall event details as well as the dependence of such metamemorial competencies on question formats. Eight and 10-year-old children as well as adults (Study 1, N=116; Study 2, N=60) rated their confidence when responding to specific questions about an observed event. Confirming most recent results, children and adults gave higher confidence ratings after correct than after incorrect answers. This ability, however, was limited to an unbiased question format. When being asked misleading questions, children's ability to differentiate was undermined, as reflected in equally high confidence judgments after correct and incorrect answers, even when the interview contained a mix of misleading and unbiased questions. When the interviewer "bombarded" the children with an uninterrupted series of misleading questions, children's difficulties appeared to be even more pronounced. These findings highlight the importance of the way in which questions are asked, and point to age-related progression in the relative impact of questioning style.     

Memory accessibility and probability judgments: an experimental evaluation of the availability heuristic.

Consistent with Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, 1974) availability heuristic hypothesis, the current study found a negative correlation between recall latency for past events and the perceived future probability of similar events. Furthermore, when the relative accessibility of memories of positive and negative events was experimentally manipulated using the Velten mood-induction procedure, the perceived future probabilities of similar events also changed in a manner consistent with the availability heuristic account. Reductions in recall latencies resulting from the mood manipulations were, as predicted, related to increases in perceived probability, and vice versa. Partial correlations indicated that this association between the observed patterns of changes in recall latencies and probability judgments could not be accounted for by the existence of independent associations between each of these effects and the magnitude of mood change.     

Conditional probability and components of rt in the variable foreperiod experiment

If the passage of time during the foreperiod in a variable foreperiod experiment is marked by a series of tones, RT decreases with the conditional probability of stimulus occurrence. RTs at short foreperiods, however, are rather slower than would be expected on the basis of a simple conditional probability effect. It is suggested that this is attributable to an independent “initial slow reaction” effect, and it is shown that the degree of this effect is influenced by the duration of the prior foreperiod. The results are related to those of variable foreperiod a-reactions in which no conditional probability effect has been found, and it is argued that in a marked reaction of the kind described above, the initial slow reaction effect behaves like an a-reaction component of RT. It is suggested that the absence of a conditional probability effect in the a-reaction and its presence in the marked reaction are related to the fact that a different type of sensory process is used to identify the signal in each case.     

Last word: imagining the future

H.G. Wells warned, in 1895, not to allow economic injustices to become so acute that they ultimately transform human biology. Wells's warning is all the more pertinent today as society contemplates the use of biotechnologies to manipulate or "enhance" the human genome.     

The relationship between the probability assessor and the outcomes of an event as a determiner of subjective probability

Two experiments were conducted in which 58 subjects assessed the probability of occurrence of positive and negative events. Two types of probabilities were assessed. The first was the probability that an event would occur, influencing the assessor him/herself (SPE). The second was the probability that the same event would occur to someone else, not influencing the assessor (SNPE). Six patterns of assessments were observed. Most of the subjects assessed SPE to be higher than SNPE for positive events and SNPE to be higher than SPE for negative events. In the first experiment SNPE was assessed in regard to someone very close and similar to the assessor while in the second experiment SNPE was assessed in regard to a less-defined “else”. In the latter case the differences between SPE and SNPE were more prominent than in the first. The explanation was given in terms of motivational factors and the availability heuristic.     

Remembering and imagining: the role of the self

This study investigated whether temporal clustering of autobiographical memories (AMs) around periods of self-development ( [Rathbone et al., 2008] and [Rathbone et al., 2009] ) would also occur when imagining future events associated with the self. Participants completed an AM task and future thinking task. In both tasks, memories and future events were cued using participant-generated identity statements (e.g., I am a student; I will be a mother). Participants then dated their memories and future events, and finally gave an age at which each identity statement was judged to emerge. Dates of memories and future events were recoded as temporal distance from the identity statement used to cue them. AMs and future events both clustered robustly around periods of self-development, indicating the powerful organisational effect of the self. We suggest that life narrative structures are used to organise future events as well as memories.     

Reporting observer agreement on stuttering event judgments: A survey and evaluation of current practice

A survey of articles appearing in three national journals over a five-year period was conducted in order to examine current practice in reporting observer agreement on stuttering event judgments. Of 55 articles in which observer agreement was deemed critical, 47 reported at least one observer agreement procedure. A total of eleven agreement procedures were reported and current practice is characterized by five procedures which account for 92% of the articles in which procedures are reported. Problems with using these five indices to represent observer agreement are detailed and several alternatives are discussed.     

An evaluation of the reliability of probability judgments across response modes and over time

Despite the importance of probability assessment methods in behavioral decision theory and decision analysis, little attention has been directed at evaluating their reliability and validity. In fact, no comprehensive study of reliability has been undertaken. Since reliability is a necessary condition for validity, this oversight is significant. The present study was motivated by that oversight. We investigated the reliability of probability measures derived from three response modes: numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. Unlike previous studies, the experiment was designed to distinguish systematic deviations in probability judgments, such as those due to experience or practice, from random deviations. It was found that subjects assessed probabilities reliably for all three assessment methods regardless of the reliability measures employed. However, a small but statistically significant decrease over time in the magnitudes of assessed probabilities was observed. This effect was linked to a decrease in subjects overconfidence during the course of the experiment.