“Doing justice” in psychological methodology: From science and experiments to anecdotes

Methodology is intrinsically related to “object” and its quality is based on the degree to which a method is doing justice to the object, demonstrating the entanglement of ontic, epistemic, and ethical considerations. The intent of “doing justice” is at the core of methodology and is the de facto guiding principle for conducting research and for producing knowledge. Objects in psychology can range from subjectivity to science and conflicts emerge because of giving primacy to particular objects. Using this perspective, various meanings of doing justice, critics’ challenges, deviations from doing justice to an object, ethical-political dimensions and the dialectics of doing justice in relation to objects are discussed. If doing justice is at the core of methodology, then the issue becomes under what circumstances a particular method is doing justice in relation to a particular object. Contrasting the experiment with anecdotes, it is shown dialectically that the former has no privileged status in psychology, and that experiments that are not replicated only do justice as anecdotal evidence.     

aPRIDIT Unsupervised Classification with Asymmetric Valuation of Variable Discriminatory Worth

Abstract

Sometimes one needs to classify individuals into groups, but there is no available grouping information due to social desirability bias in reporting behavior like unethical or dishonest intentions or unlawful actions. Assessing hard-to-detect behaviors is useful; however it is methodologically difficult because people are unlikely to self-disclose bad actions. This paper presents an unsupervised classification methodology utilizing ordinal categorical predictor variables. It allows for classification, individual respondent ranking, and grouping without access to a dependent group indicator variable. The methodology also measures predictor variable worth (for determining target behavior group membership) at a predictor variable category-by-category level, so different variable response categories can contain different amounts of information about classification. It is asymmetric in that a “0” on a binary predictor does not have a similar impact toward signaling “membership in the target group” as a “1” has for signaling “membership in the non-target group.” The methodology is illustrated by identifying Spanish consumers filing fraudulent insurance claims. A second illustration classifies Portuguese high school student’s propensity to alcohol abuse. Results show the methodology is useful when it is difficult to get dependent variable information, and is useful for deciding which predictor variables and categorical response options are most important.     

On modeling the creativity and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre

The problem of modeling the creativity is shown to be entirely connected with another mysterious challenge — the “Explanatory Gap” between the concepts of “Brain” and “Mind”. We use the Natural Constructive Cognitive Architecture, with its important feature being the combination of two subsystems, for generation of new information and for its conservation. “Brain” is considered as records of the raw images of real objects (individual objective information), while “Mind” refers to individual subjective information created inside the cognitive system (symbols). We argued that creativity can be treated as “an effort to bring a piece of personal “Brain” into the “Mind” and World”. Specific thinking mode (intellectual panic or throes of creativity) is shown to enhance the creative work resulting in over-mobilization and even enriching personal deep inside (“Brain”) experience. It is simulated by chaotic jumps of the noise amplitude around abnormally high value. The nature of Aesthetic Emotions and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre are analyzed. It is shown that they are caused by the “recognition paradox”: an object seems both, familiar but unusual. This occurs if the “Brain” does see its subtle features, while the “Mind” does not realize. Bright aesthetic emotions (goosebumps) are caused by irregular excitation of implicit associations provided by weak (“gray”) connections of the halo neurons (simulating the subconsciousness). General formula for Chef-D’oeuvre in science and art could be expressed as “condensed capacity to see the invisible, to combine the incompatible”.     

The idea of will and organic evolution in Bergson’s philosophy of life

The idea of the élan vital is crucial for an understanding of Bergson’s metaphysical method, underpinning the way in which philosophy stands with other forms of creative activity as an endeavour of “self-overcoming,” the self or subject no longer being at the centre of thought, but understood rather as a product of the process of thinking. In placing a special emphasis on Bergson’s 1907 work, Creative Evolution, the present essay is both an acknowledgement and challenge to the shift from early interpretations of Bergson in which comparisons were made with thinkers such as Schelling and Schopenhauer, to more recent engagements centred on the theories of perception and memory. The aim of this essay is to formulate a response to the marginalized status of Creative Evolution in the “perception-based” strands of Bergson scholarship, by emphasising how Bergson’s theories of memory and consciousness are a means for understanding his definition of evolutionary “creativity.” Bergson suggests that the analysis of consciousness or “will” can provide us with a way of thinking about this creative movement of life, which is not a concept of a “cause” or “origin” in the sense of a “state of nature” (substance, essence, or “being”), but rather the operation of pure tendency.     

Causes of young children's confusion of same and different

Three experiments are reported that explore 3-year-olds' and adults' understanding of the words, same and different. In the first, 3-year-olds selected a bead that was “the same color as” or “a different color from” a target bead. In the second, 3-year-olds selected a bead that was “the same in some way as” or “different in some way from” a target bead. Contrary to results reported previously, the majority of consistent responders chose a bead identical with the target in response to the different instruction in both experiments. The rates of both incorrect different responding and incorrect same responding were greater in Experiment II than in Experiment I. In Experiment III, adults chose objects that were “the same as” or “different from” a target; unlike the children, they never chose a target-identical object in response to different instructions. It is argued that children and adults treat same and different differently, and that children's task performance is influenced by three factors: semantic, pragmatic, and nonlinguistic.     

Learning as Leaving Home: Fear,Empathy, and Hospitality in the Theology and Religion Classroom

The article is a response to this journal's call for papers on metaphors for teaching, and also draws from a previous publication in which Kent Eilers developed a methodology for teaching global theologies. In this methodology, the ultimate goal was the development of “hermeneutical dispositions of empathy, hospitality, and receptivity toward culturally diverse voices” (2014, 165). This article considers the goals of Eilers' methodology, and others like his, and how it is that the metaphors of “leaving home” and “communal imagination” highlight the importance of the ambient and interpersonal features of a classroom and their effect on the attainment of the above goals. In so doing, it extends the conversation beyond content and methodology in teaching theology and religion into the realms of philosophy of education, as well as the fields of moral and values education. It is contended that the metaphors informed by these areas of study facilitate the attainment of such goals, and similar ones, by demonstrating that the cultivation of an ambience of care, trust, and compassion within the classroom constitutes an essential foundation for learning in which students “leave home” and cultivate “communal imagination.” The article finishes with practical suggestions for educators in theology and religion.     

Husserl’s Way to Authentic Being

In a journal entry from 1906, Husserl complains of lacking “internal stability” and of his desire to “achieve” it. My claim in this paper is that the “phenomenological method,” which he made public in his 1907 lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie was, and is, a means to achieve the inner harmony that Husserl longed for. I do not provide an analysis of why Husserl might have felt the way he did; my aim is to show what internal stability might be and how one might achieve it. I conclude that the phenomenological method is the means, the “how,” to internal stability, which I characterize as “clarity” and “harmony” regarding our beliefs and, and ultimately, our authentic comportment.     

Can Multimodal and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy be Reconciled?

The purpose of this article is to determine whether two distinct modes of cognitive-behaviour therapy—Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) and Multimodal Therapy (MMT)—can be reconciled. This quest in the spirit of integrationism is pursued along three lines of inquiry: Do we talk about schools, approaches, or techniques? A reconciliation between MMT and REBT as systems seems not to be feasible, just because of the simple fact that MMT is not a new school with an idiosyncratic theory, whereas REBT is. However, REBT is also a congenial approach consisting of various eclectic techniques, as is MMT. It is explained how the A-B-C format and firing orders of the BASICI.D. modalities stem from an S-O-R model. Furthermore, the circular character of the various modalities (thinking, feeling, and behaving) is recognised both in MMT and in REBT. The techniques used in REBT and MMT overlap for 65–80%, according to a comparative perusal of Ellis's and Lazarus's presentations of preferred techniques. This means that MMT and REBT, as an approach with distinct techniques, “must” be very similar in practice. The conclusion is that philosophically Ellis and Lazarus see eye-to-eye and that MMT and REBT overlap a great deal. But a fusion is not yet at hand. At best the two can be described as two sides of one coin. “When you wake up in the morning, Pooh,” said Piglet at last, “what's the first thing you say to yourself?” “What's for breakfast?” said Pooh. “What do you say, Piglet?” “I say, I wonder what's going to happen exciting today?” said Piglet. Pooh nodded thoughtfully. “It's the same thing,” he said. “What's that?” the Unbeliever asked. “Wisdom from a Western Taoist,” I said. “It sounds like something from Winnie-the Pooh,” he said. “It is,” I said. From The Tao of Pooh Benjamin Hoff (1982)     

The Liberating Awareness

The purpose of this article is to reflect on the search for racial justice as a call from God, using biblical readings and documents produced by the World Council of Churches (WCC). It is anchored in the increasingly intense challenges that emerge in this respect in Brazil, a country whose Indigenous peoples were annihilated in its colonization process, and which up until the 19th century received the largest flow of enslaved Africans in the world. The article combines the Latin American methodology “See, Judge, Act” with the theological methodology of the WCC's Pilgrimage of Justice and Peace and its three steps: “Celebrating Gifts,” “Visiting the Wounds,” and “Transforming Injustice.” The first part of the paper reflects the “See” and exposes the expressions of everyday racism in Brazil. The second part presents the “Judge,” seeking references to the challenge of racial justice in the Bible and in ecumenical reflection. The third and final section, “Act,” reflects on the possibility for transforming racial injustices, sharing experiences from Brazil as well as one of the Pilgrim Team Visits organized by the WCC in 2019.     

On the Conditions of Possibility for Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy

In this essay, we present a theory of intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy, drawing on both hermeneutics and analytic philosophy. We advocate the approach of “de-essentialization” across the board. It is true that similarities and differences are always to be observed across languages and traditions, but there exist no immutable cores or essences. “De-essentialization” applies to all “levels” of concepts: everyday notions such as green and qing 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion(s) and qing 情, and philosophical categories such as forms of life and dao 道. We argue that interpretation is a holistic multi-directional process constrained by the principle of mutual attunement. It is necessary to assume that “the other” is a human being, who, in most cases, is consistent and stating that which is true or right. This is the condition of possibility for intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy. No more necessary conditions are needed. There is no need to presuppose concepts or categories that are universal for all humans and their languages (such as emotion(s) and qing 情).     

A successive-conditionalization approach to disjunctive and syllogistic reasoning

With p and q each standing for a familiar event, a disjunctive statement, “either p or q”, seems quite different from its material conditional, “if not p then q”. The notions of sufficiency and necessity seem specific to conditional statements. It is surprising, however, to find that perceived sufficiency and necessity affect disjunctive reasoning in the way they affect conditional reasoning. With B and C each standing for a category name, a universal statement, “all B are C”, seems stronger than its logically equivalent conditional statement, “if B then C”. However, the effects of perceived sufficiency or necessity were found to be as pronounced in conditional reasoning as in syllogistic reasoning. Furthermore, two experiments also showed that (a) MP (modus ponens)-comparable disjunctive reasoning was as difficult as MT (modus tollens)-comparable disjunctive reasoning, and that (b) MT-comparable syllogisms were easier to solve than MT problems in conditional reasoning.     

Prolegomena to any future mereology of the body

Many bioethical arguments rely implicitly on the assumption that the concept of “human part” is one on which everyone must agree, because it is unambiguous. But various parties interpret this “unambiguous” term in incompatible ways, leading to contention. This article is an informal presentation of a topomereological system on whose preferred interpretation several distinct but related meanings of “human part” can be isolated: part of a human body, part of the completion of a human body, and part of a human being. A case is analyzed (the first total artificial heart (TAH) implantation), demonstrating in the process much of the apparatus of the system. By means of a casuistic methodology, the analysis is translated into recommendations for the ethical conduct of future TAH research. The more general conclusion, however, is that formal methods may provide useful tools for clarifying thought processes and organizing arguments in debates over bioethical issues.     

Sur la tête de Gorgias. Le “parler beau” et le “dire vrai” dans Le Banquet de Platon

Rhetoric is at present the object of a rehabilitation on a grand scale, all the more as it overlaps the fields of literature, linguistics, and philosophy. Actually, if philosophy rejects and removes rhetoric, it is nevertheless, as a method of word, wholly impregnated with it. To investigate the complex relationship of mutual implication in which rhetoric and philosophy are involved is part and parcel of this plan of re-evaluation of rhetoric as “discourse art” with a view to a re-definition of its field and functions. In this perspective, rhetoric articulates itself within, in relation to, and with Plato's dialogues in a much more subtle and complex manner than warranted by the process of “anti-rhetoricalness” initiated by philosophy against rhetoric after Plato. Going back to the origins of this conflict and recalling the system of oppositions supporting the official Platonic vulgate, this study begins to pave the way for a micr-reading of the Platonic text regarded as a paradigm of philosophic textuality. It is certainly true that the Phaedrus, the Gorgias, and the Symposium set up a system of oppositions between between rhetoric and dialectrics which are in contrast with each other in the word practices, in the rules and methods of discourse, and which are antinomic in their ends. This system of oppositions always seems to be referable to the opposition between “speaking fair” and “speaking the truth”. But the strategies and procedures set going in the Symposium, in particular in “Agathon's speech” and in “Diotima and Socrates' speech” betray a much closer connection between the supposed “bad rhetoric” revealed by Phaedrus and the “good rhetoric” which is dialectrics. The search for this connection is conducted through two types of reading of the Symposium. In actual fact, between the paronomasia on the agathoi and that on “Gorgias' head” (this Gorgon of rhetoric) there takes place a speech, Agathon's, whose parodied, exacerbated, and counterfeit rhetoric allows us to gauge Plato's own rhetoric in this artefact which distances itself, more or less openly, from Gorgian rhetoric. This “hyper-rhetoricalness” and “over-grammaticalness” cannot be there with the sole aim of serving as evidence against rhetoric. It is in fact possible to perceive through the web of the text the ends, quite rhetorical themselves, which preside over the structure of Agathon's speech, seen from the viewpoint of the figure of the antithesis. Thus, it is in the play of a “neo-rhetoricalness” where we must, in the last analysis, look for the spring allowing the philosophical discourse to overturn the rhetorical one. And while in Giorgias what clothes the discourse is actually the truth, in Plato it is the antinomy between “speaking fair” and “speaking the truth”, conveniently set up, which forms the basis of the function of diversion by which Socrates points out — in the complex network of the continuity and discontinuity existing between rhetoric and philosophy — the structures of reversal and the original upheavals which Plato imposes on the relation between rhetorical and dialectric discourse. Actually, dialectrics is found in “Socrates and Diotima's speech”, not as “anti-rhetoric”, but rather as a “transposition” of the rhetorical discourse, thus acquiring the traits of a “neo-rhetoric”. The analysis of this discourse, which constitutes the second reading exercise of the Symposium, allows us to pick out the aversion and inversion strategies that turn dialectrics in an overtuned rhetoric. The founding deed of this “inversion” (rather than “separation”) is recognizable in the alteration it introduces in the first plase in the type of discourse, which from a rhetorical, explicitly addressed, macrological, monological, and continuous discourse turns into a dialectical, brachylogous, dialogic discourse with partners and interlocutors, i.e. into a dialogue; in the second place, the subject of the discourse shifts from the locuteur, author and signer of the discourse to ever-present interlocutors who end up by making room for a talking and knowing speaker in a regime of anonymous subjectivity: this is an extreme alteration of the anthropological and epistemic subject, culminating in the scientific discourse of Euclidean geometry. Finally, the inversion is recognizable in the object of the discourse, whose prâgma slips from being the predicate of a qualified grammatical subject into a process of objectivation and substantivation, thereby moving from the rhetorical question “What is beautiful?” to the philosophical question “What is the beautiful?”. The hypothesis of a “neo-rhetoricalness” of dialectics, underlying this research, is therefore more Platonic than it appears, insofar as between rhetoric and dialectics there has been a tradition which has tried to wipe out the traces of its transmission, but where the neo-rhetoricalness of dialectics shows through quite clearly, taking advantage, without admitting it, from a more ancient rhetoric than it is itself. (A.T.)     

Interrogating Integration, Dissenting Dis-integration: Multiplicity as a Positive Metaphor in Therapy and Theology

The term “integration” has long been used as a metaphor for psychological health and wholeness, and a therapeutic goal. It is counterposed to related conceptions of pathology, such as “disintegration,” “fragmentation” and “splitting.” Christian theology has similarly framed salvation as “at-onement” vs. sin as alienation. Contemporary psychologies have begun to contest the hegemony of the “One,” leading to a number of paradigms of health that do not privilege “integration” as the primary model (e.g., feminist, postmodern, and relational-psychoanalytic). The seeds of a positive view of multiplicity already exist in earlier psychoanalytic models. This paper will argue for valuing multiplicity in psychotherapy as a way of conceptualizing both health and a goal of treatment. Re: pastoral psychotherapy in particular, multiplicity will be shown to have fruitful parallels in a constructive Trinitarian theology of multiplicity of God as a framework for interrogating “integration,” and claiming “dis-integration” as psycho-spiritual dissent and creativity.     

„Peak Oil“

Scientific prognoses augur the advent of “Peak Oil”, or maximum possible global oil production, in our time. After this maximum, production rates will begin to drop due to increasing capillary pressure in rock deposits, and new discoveries will be unable to compensate for the additive drop in production rates. At the same time, a global increase in energy consumption is also predicted. It is to be expected that the discrepancy between production and demand (heat, mobility, oil-based chemicals) will lead to political destabilisation not only between the “industrial” and “developing” nations, but also in democratic systems. Like the biblical “mene tekel”, “Peak Oil” may be interpreted psychoanalytically as another ecological omen which should arouse civilization to ward off coming disaster. Up to now, psychoanalysts have dealt only sparingly with this perspective. The wake-up call of scientists and publicists in the media has prompted little reaction among consumers and decision-makers. Instead, utopian and/or apocalyptic visions of the future are the order of the day. In correspondence with the Airbus motto: “We must use the air to preserve the earth”, a project of the Max Planck Society is working on “flying automobiles”. In view of these phenomena, our paper presents for discussion the hypothesis of a collective manic denial with splitting of the ego. We try here to limit psychoanalytic speculations with a clinical vignette. It may be asked to what extent the psychoanalytic method – in matters of ecological reality – runs the risk today of entering into collusion with the above-mentioned collective denial, instead of working through it lege artis on the basis of the reality principle.     

“I can Almost Remember it Now”: Between Personal and Collective Memories of Massive Social Trauma

This article explores the psycho-social space between autobiographical and collective memory concerning massive social traumas. It is conceptualized that there is a third type of memory image, termed “my-their.” Individuals appear to “remember” autobiographical memories of elder family members, even though they could not, either because they were born after the trauma happened or because the autobiographers were extremely young at the time of the experience. These emotional “memories” furthermore connect to collective memories of social traumas of ethnic/national groups. Examples from memories of the Holocaust and al Naqba are examined. Furthermore, the roles that “my-their” memory images can play in peace building and reconciliation are discussed.     

Plural self-awareness

It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (1) it is neither the case that the sense in question has the community (or “us”) in its content or as its object nor does the attitude in question presuppose a preexistent community (or “us”) as its subject. (2) The “sense of ‘us’” is plural pre-reflective self-awareness. (3) Plural pre-reflective self-awareness plays the same role in the constitution of a common mind that singular pre-reflective self-awareness plays in the individual mind. (4) The most important conceptions of plural subjects, collective persons, or group agents in the current literature fail to recognize the nature and role of plural self-awareness, and therefore fall short in important respects. (5) In spite of the striking similarities between the plural and the singular mind, there are important differences to consider. The authority of the singular first person point of view has no equivalent in the plural case.     

Theology,Anti-Theology and Atheology: From Christian Passions to Secular Emotions

The nineteenth-century transition from talk of passions and affections of the soul to talk of “emotions” in English-language psychological thought is taken as a case-study in the secularisation of psychology. This transition is used as an occasion to re-evaluate the methodologies of John Milbank and Richard Webster, who interpret certain secular scientific accounts as forms of theology or anti-theology “in disguise”. It is suggested, in the light of the study of the emergence of the secular concept of ‘emotions’, that the category of “atheology” be used to supplement their methodology. “Atheological” texts are not merely theology or anti-theology in disguise but are a novel form of discourse, which is alienated from the assumptions and metaphors of traditional theologies (and which replaces them with physiological evolutionary narratives) but which is not necessarily atheistic or anti-theological.     

On the Interpreter’s Choices: Making Hermeneutic Relativity Explicit

In this essay, we explore the various aspects of hermeneutic relativity that have rarely been explicitly discussed. Our notion of “hermeneutic relativity” can be seen as an extension, with significant revisions, of Gadamer’s notion of Vorurteil. It refers to various choices and constraints of the interpreter, including beliefs concerning the best way of doing philosophy, what criteria are to be used to evaluate competing interpretations, and so on. The interpreter cannot completely eliminate the guidance and constraint originating from his/her “background.” However, in principle the interpreter can “choose” to be guided by other constraints. Hence, we speak of “choices” or “commitments.” Hermeneutic relativity is the major cause for the variation of competing interpretations.