A Proposal for the Demarcation of Theory and Knowledge

Research communication in interdisciplinary research projects requires a way of demarcation of theory and knowledge that is easy to communicate, is inconsequential for the framework of concepts, results, and procedures within existing scientific disciplines, and abstains from trying to resolve the dispute between (neo)positivists and constructivists. A simple way of demarcation starts from the notion of language-independent and language-dependent reality. Currently, what passes for knowledge (“news”) and myth (“fake news”) depends, besides on sheer volume and frequency of the messages, increasingly on the internal consistency of (computer) language-dependent reality and decreasingly on language-independent reality. All language is instruction, and knowledge is to know which instructions (that is, theory) are predictive of a result, state, or situation in language-independent reality. Any theory that doesn’t reduce outcome space, or contains one or more empirically/physically impossible instructions, or produces wrong predictions, or falls short of demonstration is not knowledge.     

Epistemological development in adolescence and adulthood: a multidimensional framework

Theories of epistemological development are reviewed. A framework describing variations in adolescents' and adults' intuitive conceptions of knowledge is proposed. Within the proposed framework, naive epistemologies are conceptualized in terms of their assumptions concerning (a) the nature of the knowledge acquisition process, (b) the degree of correspondence between knowledge and reality, (c) the certainty of knowledge, (d) the commensurability of knowledge across individuals, (e) the degree to which knowledge forms or inheres in a coherent system of thought, (f) the nature of meaning, (g) the appropriate procedures for evaluating competing beliefs, (h) the nature and role of authorities as sources of knowledge and justification, and (i) the nature of reality. This framework is used to describe possible developmental changes in adolescents' and adults' concepts of knowledge and to suggest how future researchers might address core issues concerning epistemological development.     

Realism and Objectivism in Quantum Mechanics

The present study attempts to provide a consistent and coherent account of what the world could be like, given the conceptual framework and results of contemporary quantum theory. It is suggested that standard quantum mechanics can, and indeed should, be understood as a realist theory within its domain of application. It is pointed out, however, that a viable realist interpretation of quantum theory requires the abandonment or radical revision of the classical conception of physical reality and its traditional philosophical presuppositions. It is argued, in this direction, that the conceptualization of the nature of reality, as arising out of our most basic physical theory, calls for a kind of contextual realism. Within the domain of quantum mechanics, knowledge of ??reality in itself??, ??the real such as it truly is?? independent of the way it is contextualized, is impossible in principle. In this connection, the meaning of objectivity in quantum mechanics is analyzed, whilst the important question concerning the nature of quantum objects is explored.     

The competition-among-relations-in-nominals theory of conceptual combination: implications for stimulus class formation and class expansion

One way in which new concepts are added to the conceptual system is through conceptual combination. The competition-among-relations-in-nominals (CARIN) theory (Gagné & Shoben, 1997) proposes that conceptual combination involves specifying a thematic relation (e.g., noun MADE OF modifier) to link the constituent concepts (e.g., chocolate and bee). This theory claims that relations have different strengths for various concepts that correspond to how often a modifier and relation have been paired in previous encounters with combined concepts and that this relational knowledge strongly affects the ease with which combined concepts can be formed. A mathematical model that incorporates key claims of the theory is presented, and empirical findings that are relevant to evaluating the CARIN theory are reviewed. The parallels between the CARIN theory and approaches to stimulus class formation are also discussed.     

Knowledge About Genetics Among African Americans

Although knowledge about genetic concepts is important for individuals to be active participants in medical technologies that use genetic science, limited information is available on knowledge about basic genetic concepts and terminology in African Americans. The purpose of this study was to evaluate knowledge about general genetic concepts and medical genetics terminology among African Americans and to identify factors having independent associations with knowledge. Participants were 109 adult African Americans enrolled in a study on attitudes about race, genetics, and smoking. The majority of respondents were knowledgeable about general genetic concepts, but were less knowledgeable about medical genetics terminology. Education was the only factor independently associated with knowledge about sporadic disorders in multivariate logistic regression analysis. Respondents with at least some college education were most likely to be knowledgeable about sporadic disorders (OR=2.70, 95% CI=1.10, 6.67, p=.03). The results of this study suggest that genetics education targeted to African Americans may need to focus on increasing understanding about technical concepts related to genetics.     

Bootstrapping Processes in the Development of Students' Commonsense Matter Theories: Using Analogical Mappings,Thought Experiments,and Learning to Measure to Promote Conceptual Restructuring

This study explores whether the development of students' understanding of matter as something that occupies space and has weight involves conceptual change and restructuring rather than only simple belief revision. Based on an analysis of how the concepts in students' initial matter theory (henceforth MT1) may differ from the concepts in the matter theory that is a target of middle school instruction (MT2), I propose ways that concepts in a given theory cohere with each other and identify the sources of the new ideas in MT2 and the learning processes by which those new ideas can be acquired. I test implications of these analyses by designing a curriculum unit that exploits these learning mechanisms, by using the curriculum with 4 classes of eighth-grade Earth Science students, and by assessing 42 students' thinking about matter, object size, and weight (via individual interviews and written tests) before and after the teaching unit. Consistent with the hypothesis of conceptual restructuring, the data not only show coherencies in students' thinking about matter, size, and weight before and after teaching, but also coordinated patterns of change. The implications for the design of science instruction are discussed.     

Jungian metapsychology and neurobiological theory

This paper deals with brain research and depth psychology. Because brain research is becoming significantly more sophisticated and increasingly able to assay the neurobiology of subjective (i.e. mental) events in vivo , it is suggested that any school of depth psychology will probably not survive as a mainstream treatment modality if its theory and practice is found to be in frank variance with the findings of the modern neurosciences. Jung's psychology is compared to Freud's and shown to be reasonably consonant with such findings. Historical highlights of Jung's non-reductive way of conceptualizing and working are presented and put in the context of more recent scientifically defensible concepts (emergence, supervenience, complexity theory) from the fields of both philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. These concepts postulate a hierarchical model of reality which permits an exploration of the mind/brain relationship without resorting to reductionism or dualism. A sense of the present struggle is conveyed between the proponents of these and more traditional scientific concepts. Finally, the nature of mind/brain confluence is elucidated by examples from the areas of learning, memory, and the capacity to symbolize in order to illustrate how clinical practices and observations familiar to experienced depth therapists and also in agreement with Jungian theory are compatible with neuroscientific findings. A research suggestion is offered.     

Jean piaget and george kelly: Toward a stronger constructivism

Among constructivist metatheoretical approaches, a strong version is defined as that which reveals reality to be actively and subjectively constructed rather than passively incorporated as objective environmental or innate “facts” by the subject. Given this definition, however, ambiguities arise concerning the potential and limits of construct integration over the course of development. Piaget's stronger constructivist model is offered as a means of clarifying and broadening the strong constructivist position on knowledge evolution. Piaget's genetic epistemology model places dramatic emphasis on the organizational capacity of the subject, specifying personal development as a strongly continuous and subsuming process. Discussion of commonalities between Piaget's position and Kelly's personal construct theory concludes this article.     

On the logic of psychoanalytic theory

Psychoanalytic theory shows some specific features and problems. It exists in a number of variations, according to different schools as well as cultural and subcultural conditions, with different understandings even of core concepts. Instead of producing definite knowledge, results remain uncertain. They vary in use and imply a permanent reworking of ideas and conceptions. This is the effect of the kind of theory psychoanalysis has to use. Since psychodynamics are a special kind of heterogeneous, changing, always different, emergent-in a word, autopoietic-reality, psychoanalysis cannot use the methods of a denotative theory (algorithmic reduction leading to strictly defined and formulated calculations) but has to use connotative theories. Connotative theories use open concepts which provide an active and flexible access to autopoietic reality. They are able to cope with the difference between singularities as well as with the distance between general logic and empirical reality. Problems tied to this possibility are structural fuzziness, a dependence on forms of use, multiple paradigms and difficulties in legitimation and balance of theories. This causes problems of institutionalisation. These problems are not a sign of immaturity but the normal way in which connotative theories appear and develop. They can therefore not be eliminated but only be treated in a better way.     

Grounding Concepts: The Problem of Composition

In a recent book C.S. Jenkins proposes a theory of arithmetical knowledge which reconciles realism about arithmetic with the a priori character of our knowledge of it. Her basic idea is that arithmetical concepts are grounded in experience and it is through experience that they are connected to reality. I argue that the account fails because Jenkins’s central concept, the concept for grounding, is inadequate. Grounding as she defines it does not suffice for realism, and by revising the definition we would abandon the idea that grounding is experiential. Her account falls prey to a problem of which Locke, whom she regards as a source of inspiration was aware and which he avoided by choosing anti-realism about mathematics.     

Ideal objects as models in science

Three main concepts of model in science are distinguished: (1) semantical model of a theory; (2) real model of another real thing; (3) mathematical model of a real thing. The last concept is the most important for the empirical sciences. The mathematical model is not identical with a theory: it is an ideal object which is directly described by the theory. We have here an intermediate level between reality and theory.     

The Process of Constructing Main Ideas From Text

A discourse-analytical approach to children's knowledge is offered, focusing on extracts of classroom talk between a teacher and a kindergarten class. After rejecting the possibility of defining concepts and memories as cognitive states prior to or underlying discourse, the talk is examined for how participants define and deal with such notions as a feature of the sequential and rhetorical organization of discourse. An argument is advanced for the analysis of knowledge, reality, and education as public, interactionally managed participants' concerns that can be studied as discursive practices. It is argued that the study of discourse does not ignore nondiscursive realms of mind and reality but permits analysis of how those things are defined, so that any explanatory appeal to what is beyond or behind the talk is unwarranted.     

Acquiring new word meaning: What does it tell us about development

R. J. Sternberg (1984, Developmental Review, 4, 113–138) offers a thoughtful and provocative essay on how individuals acquire meanings for novel or unfamiliar nouns. The Sternberg essay, however, is incomplete on a number of grounds. By stressing general processes and specific knowledge as critical components in the acquisition of verbal concepts, for example, it overlooks two logically complementary categories—specific processes and general knowledge—and the role these play in the acquisitions in question. A second concern is that the paper blurs distinctions among development, short-term learning, and the origin/acquisition of individual differences. Finally, Sternberg is encouraged to frame the specific phenomenon described here within the context of a larger theory of intellectual development and to indicate what else this specific model can be used to explain.     

Feminist Perspectives on Erikson 's Theory: Their Relevance for Contemporary Identity Development Research

In view of recent controversies about theory and self, identity development researchers need to examine the utility of their own theory. In an effort to begin this enterprise, we define what we see as the central concerns of Erikson 's theory a life-span, psychosocial emphasis, and the notion of agentic identity development and use a feminist standpoint analysis to examine the usefulness of these aspects of his theory in a rapidly changing, multicultural context. We critique the theory 's emphasis on biology as a significant component of psychosocial development, including the emphasis on the biological distinctiveness of women and men as an explanatory construct. We also address the issue of an androcentric bias that many have argued is interwoven with the theory 's core concepts. Finally, we offer conclusions regarding the aspects of the theory we find most useful and most in need of clarification or revision.     

INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE AND THE CHANCES OF A CONSTRUCTIVE MASTERING

In spite of incomplete knowledge we are permanently forced to act in complex real-life situations. First, a modern concept of information, the non-trivial transition from information to knowledge, patterns of missing knowledge, and the concept of perspective notions are studied. The main sections review some guidelines for action under incomplete information. A modern view of the concepts of holism and wholeness reveals that (in contrast to some critics) general system theory does not require any metaphysical assumption or previously accepted worldview. The concepts of holism and wholeness, as well as general system theory, are well-founded, even under strict criteria.