Cut Elimination inside a Deep Inference System for Classical Predicate Logic

Deep inference is a natural generalisation of the one-sided sequent calculus where rules are allowed to apply deeply inside formulas, much like rewrite rules in term rewriting. This freedom in applying inference rules allows to express logical systems that are difficult or impossible to express in the cut-free sequent calculus and it also allows for a more fine-grained analysis of derivations than the sequent calculus. However, the same freedom also makes it harder to carry out this analysis, in particular it is harder to design cut elimination procedures. In this paper we see a cut elimination procedure for a deep inference system for classical predicate logic. As a consequence we derive Herbrand's Theorem, which we express as a factorisation of derivations.     

The emergence of inferential rules: The use of pragmatic reasoning schemas by preschoolers

This study contrasts the pragmatic view with the natural logic view regarding the origin of inferential rules in conditional reasoning. The pragmatic view proposes that pragmatic rules emerge first, and the generalizations of these produce formal rules. In contrast, the natural logic view proposes that the formal rules emerge first and serve as a core that is then supplemented by pragmatic rules. In an experiment, scenarios involving conditional rules in different contexts, permission and arbitrary, were administered to independent groups of preschool children. To rule out the matching bias [Evans, J. St. B. T., & Lynch, J. S. (1973). Matching bias in the selection task. Br J Psychol 64, 391–397] as a possible explanation of reasoning performance, children were given conditional rules with a negated consequent. The results show that in the arbitrary context modus tollens (MT) was unavailable, and the use of modus ponens (MP) was unstable. In contrast, children in the permission context reliably used both MP and MT. In addition, they realized that a conditional rule does not imply a definite answer when the consequent holds. These findings suggest that, in their explicit forms, pragmatic rules emerge earlier than formal rules and in particular, even as basic a rule as MP is generalized from a context-specific form to a context-general one in preschool children.     

Stability and Paradox in Algorithmic Logic

There is significant interest in type-free systems that allow flexible self-application. Such systems are of interest in property theory, natural language semantics, the theory of truth, theoretical computer science, the theory of classes, and category theory. While there are a variety of proposed type-free systems, there is a particularly natural type-free system that we believe is prototypical: the logic of recursive algorithms. Algorithmic logic is the study of basic statements concerning algorithms and the algorithmic rules of inference between such statements. As shown in [1], the threat of paradoxes, such as the Curry paradox, requires care in implementing rules of inference in this context. As in any type-free logic, some traditional rules will fail. The first part of the paper develops a rich collection of inference rules that do not lead to paradox. The second part identifies traditional rules of logic that are paradoxical in algorithmic logic, and so should be viewed with suspicion in type-free logic generally.     

A Method of Generating Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski’s Discussive Logic D<Subscript>2</Subscript>

Ja?kowski’s discussive logic D₂ was formulated with the help of the modal logic S5 as follows (see [7, 8]): \({A \in {D_{2}}}\) iff \({\ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\rm S}5}\), where (–)^? is a translation of discussive formulae from For^d into the modal language. We say that a modal logic L defines D₂ iff \({{\rm D}_{2} = \{A \in {\rm For^{\rm d}} : \ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\it L}\}}\). In [14] and [10] were respectively presented the weakest normal and the weakest regular logic which (?): have the same theses beginning with ‘\({\diamond}\)’ as S5. Of course, all logics fulfilling the above condition, define D₂. In [10] it was prowed that in the cases of logics closed under congruence the following holds: defining D₂ is equivalent to having the property (?). In this paper we show that this equivalence holds also for all modal logics which are closed under replacement of tautological equivalents (rte-logics).We give a general method which, for any class of modal logics determined by a set of joint axioms and rules, generates in the given class the weakest logic having the property (?). Thus, for the class of all modal logics we obtain the weakest modal logic which owns this property. On the other hand, applying the method to various classes of modal logics: rte-logics, congruential, monotonic, regular and normal, we obtain the weakest in a given class logic defining D₂.     

Some Comments on Ian Rumfitt’s Bilateralism

Ian Rumfitt has proposed systems of bilateral logic for primitive speech acts of assertion and denial, with the purpose of ‘exploring the possibility of specifying the classically intended senses for the connectives in terms of their deductive use’ (Rumfitt Mind109, 781–823 (4): 810f). Rumfitt formalises two systems of bilateral logic and gives two arguments for their classical nature. I assess both arguments and conclude that only one system satisfies the meaning-theoretical requirements Rumfitt imposes in his arguments. I then formalise an intuitionist system of bilateral logic which also meets those requirements. Thus Rumfitt cannot claim that only classical bilateral rules of inference succeed in imparting a coherent sense onto the connectives. My system can be extended to classical logic by adding the intuitionistically unacceptable half of a structural rule Rumfitt uses to codify the relation between assertion and denial. Thus there is a clear sense in which, in the bilateral framework, the difference between classicism and intuitionism is not one of the rules of inference governing negation, but rather one of the relation between assertion and denial.     

A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic

We defend a set of acceptance rules that avoids the lottery paradox, that is closed under classical entailment, and that accepts uncertain propositions without ad hoc restrictions. We show that the rules we recommend provide a semantics that validates exactly Adams?? conditional logic and are exactly the rules that preserve a natural, logical structure over probabilistic credal states that we call probalogic. To motivate probalogic, we first expand classical logic to geo-logic, which fills the entire unit cube, and then we project the upper surfaces of the geo-logical cube onto the plane of probabilistic credal states by means of standard, linear perspective, which may be interpreted as an extension of the classical principle of indifference. Finally, we apply the geometrical/logical methods developed in the paper to prove a series of trivialization theorems against question-invariance as a constraint on acceptance rules and against rational monotonicity as an axiom of conditional logic in situations of uncertainty.     

Improved statistics for contrasting means of two samples under non‐normality

This paper presents the asymptotic expansions of the distributions of the two‐sample t‐statistic and the Welch statistic, for testing the equality of the means of two independent populations under non‐normality. Unlike other approaches, we obtain the null distributions in terms of the distribution and density functions of the standard normal variable up to n^?1, where n is the pooled sample size. Based on these expansions, monotone transformations are employed to remove the higher‐order cumulant effect. We show that the new statistics can improve the precision of statistical inference to the level of o (n^?1). Numerical studies are carried out to demonstrate the performance of the improved statistics. Some general rules for practitioners are also recommended.     

Pragmatic concepts of valid inference and of implication

Summary The paper gives a tentative reconstruction of the classical theory of so called fallacious arguments. Its title refers to the following observations. One of the fallacies listed in traditional logic ispetitio principii. It seem natural to add to the list another, similar fallacy. An argumentationArg ⁺ considered as a part of a theoretical contextC commits this fallacy relatively toC, if it contains an inference such that the principle of this inference has not been proved inC. By principle of a given inference the conditional is meant whose antecedent and consequent are the conjuction of all the premisses and the conclusion of the inference respectively. If the principle of a given inference has been proved in a given contextC, the inference is valid relatively toC and the premisses are implying the conclusion relatively toC. Both these concepts, of valid inference and of implication do involve the concept of an effectively performed proof; hence they are pragmatic concepts.     

Deduction theorems for weak implicational logics

The standard deduction theorem or introduction rule for implication, for classical logic is also valid for intuitionistic logic, but just as with predicate logic, other rules of inference have to be restricted if the theorem is to hold for weaker implicational logics.In this paper we look in detail at special cases of the Gentzen rule for and show that various subsets of these in effect constitute deduction theorems determining all the theorems of many well known as well as not well known implicational logics. In particular systems of rules are given which are equivalent to the relevance logics E,R, T, P-W and P-W-I.     

Current Trends in Substructural Logics

This paper briefly overviews some of the results and research directions. In the area of substructural logics from the last couple of decades. Substructural logics are understood here to include relevance logics, linear logic, variants of Lambek calculi and some other logics that are motivated by the idea of omitting some structural rules or making other structural changes in LK, the original sequent calculus for classical logic.     

Best Unifiers in Transitive Modal Logics

This paper offers a brief analysis of the unification problem in modal transitive logics related to the logic S4: S4 itself, K4, Grz and Gödel-Löb provability logic GL. As a result, new, but not the first, algorithms for the construction of ??best?? unifiers in these logics are being proposed. The proposed algorithms are based on our earlier approach to solve in an algorithmic way the admissibility problem of inference rules for S4 and Grz. The first algorithms for the construction of ??best?? unifiers in the above mentioned logics have been given by S. Ghilardi in [16]. Both the algorithms in [16] and ours are not much computationally efficient. They have, however, an obvious significant theoretical value a portion of which seems to be the fact that they stem from two different methodological approaches.     

Computationally intensive methods warrant reconsideration of pedagogy in statistics

Computationally intensive methods of statistical inference do not fit the current canon of pedagogy in statistics. To accommodate these methods and the logic underlying them, I propose seven pedagogical principles: (1) Define inferential statistics as techniques for reckoning with chance. (2) Distinguish three types of research: sample surveys, in which statistics affords generalization from the cases studied; experiments, in which statistics detects systematic differences among the batches of data obtained in the several conditions; and correlational studies, in which statistics detects systematic associations between variables. (3) Teach random-sampling theory in the context of sample surveys, augmenting the conventional treatment with bootstrapping. Regarding experimentation, (4) note that random assignment fosters internal but not external validity, (5) explain the general logic for testing a null model, and (6) teach randomization tests as well ast,F, and χ². (7) Regarding correlational studies, acknowledge the problems of applying inferential statistics in the absence of deliberately introduced randomness.     

Aspects of analytic deduction

Let ? be the ordinary deduction relation of classical first-order logic. We provide an “analytic” subrelation ?³ of ? which for propositional logic is defined by the usual “containment” criterion $$\Gamma \vdash ^a \varphi iff \Gamma \vdash \varphi and Atom(\varphi ) \subseteq Atom(\Gamma ),$$ whereas for predicate logic, ?^a is defined by the extended criterion $$\Gamma \vdash ^a \varphi iff \Gamma \vdash \varphi and Atom(\varphi ) \subseteq ' Atom(\Gamma ),$$ where Atom(?) $ \subseteq '$ Atom(Γ) means that every atomic formula occurring in ? “essentially occurs” also in Γ. If Γ, ? are quantifier-free, then the notions “occurs” and “essentially occurs” for atoms between Γ and ? coincide. If ? is formalized by Gentzen's calculus of sequents, then we show that ?^a is axiomatizable by a proper fragment of analytic inference rules. This is mainly due to cut elimination. By “analytic inference rule” we understand here a rule r such that, if the sequent over the line is analytic, then so is the sequent under the line. We also discuss the notion of semantic relevance as contrasted to the previous syntactic one. We show that when introducing semantic sequents as axioms, i.e. when extending the pure logical axioms and rules by mathematical ones, the property of syntactic relevance is lost, since cut elimination no longer holds. We conclude that no purely syntactic notion of analytic deduction can ever replace successfully the complex semantico-syntactic deduction we already possess.     

The logic of how-questions

Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the logic of questions, Van Fraassen has managed to apply their approach in constructing an account of the logic of why-questions. Comparatively little, by contrast, has been written on the logic of how-questions despite the apparent centrality of questions such as How is it possible for us to be both free and determined? to philosophical enterprise.¹ In what follows I develop a logic for how-questions of various sorts including how-questions of cognitive resolution, how-questions of manner, how-questions of method, of means, and of mechanism.     

Local pragmatics: reply to Mandy Simons

In response to Mandy Simons’ defence of a classical Gricean approach to pragmatic enrichment in terms of conversational implicature, I emphasize the following contrast. Conversational implicatures are generated by a global inference which uses as a premise the fact that the speaker has said that p, but only the triggering inference is global in cases of pragmatic enrichment. What generates the correct interpretation is a process of reconstrual, which locally maps the literal meaning of a constituent to a modulated meaning and composes that meaning with that of the other constituents. That process is constrained by Gricean considerations (in the broad sense) but that is true of all pragmatic aspects of interpretation, whether pre-propositional or post-propositional. Just as indexical resolution, though pragmatic and constrained by Gricean considerations, does not fit the two-stage model through which Grice accounts for conversational implicatures, so pragmatic modulation can’t be accounted for in terms of that model despite the fact that, like conversational implicatures and unlike indexical resolution, modulation is pragmatically rather than semantically triggered.     

The Logic of “Most” and “Mostly”

The paper suggests a modal predicate logic that deals with classical quantification and modalities as well as intermediate operators, like “most” and “mostly”. Following up the theory of generalized quantifiers, we will understand them as two-placed operators and call them determiners. Quantifiers as well as modal operators will be constructed from them. Besides the classical deduction, we discuss a weaker probabilistic inference “therefore, probably” defined by symmetrical probability measures in Carnap’s style. The given probabilistic inference relates intermediate quantification to singular statements: “Most S are P” does not logically entail that a particular individual S is also P, but it follows that this is probably the case, where the probability is not ascribed to the propositions but to the inference. We show how this system deals with single case expectations while predictions of statistical statements remain generally problematic.     

Balance,positivity, and agreement in the Jordan Paradigm: A defense of balance theory

It was argued that Heider's p?o?x triad can best be conceptualized according to a three- factor analysis of variance model in which the p?o, p?x, and o?x bands are all factors. From this perspective the balance effect is the triple interaction, the positivity effect a main effect for the p?o factor, and the agreement effect a p?x by o?x interaction. Although the existence of the latter two effects has previously been regarded as damaging to balance theory, it was shown that these effects could be interpreted from a balance perspective and that balance theory could be used to generate supportable propositions regarding these effects. Thus in agreement with a unit-relation interpretation it was shown, in accordance with balance theory, that positivity effects are obtained when the subject, or p, assumes future contact with o, that reverse positivity effects are obtained when the subject anticipates breaking off contact with o, and that no positivity effect is obtained when there is absolutely no contact, past or future. It was also demonstrated in an experiment involving the p?o?q triad that, in accordance with balance theory, positivity effects may be produced by the assumption or inference of same-sign reciprocation in sentiment. Evidence for two balance processes underlying agreement effects was also found. One of these processes was based on the assumption that the subject would have or reveal psycho-logical reasons for the disagreement and thus produce imbalance. Consistent with this interpretation it was found that the agreement effect was significantly larger when future contact with discussion of x was assumed than when future contact without discussion of x was assumed. The other, or unit-relation interpretation was supported by evidence indicating that the breaking off of contact resulted in a reversed agreement effect. In general, it was argued that balance theory did quite well in such phenomenological investigations when attention was not narrowly restricted to the three-sign pattern but considered other potential cognitive bands.     

Refutations,Proofs, and Models in the Modal Logic K4

In this paper we study the method of refutation rules in the modal logic K4. We introduce refutation rules with certain normal forms that provide a new syntactic decision procedure for this logic. As corollaries we obtain such results for the following important extensions: S4, the provability logic G, and Grzegorczyk's logic. We also show that tree-type models can be constructed from syntactic refutations of this kind.     

Information-seeking dialogues: Some of their logical properties

The dialogical games introduced in Jaakko Hintikka, Information-Seeking Dialogues: A Model, (Erkenntnis, vol. 14, 1979) are studied here to answer the question as to what the natural logic or the logic of natural language is. In a natural language certain epistemic elements are not explicitly indicated, but they determine which inference rules are valid. By means of dialogical games, the question is answered: all classical first-order rules have to be modified in the same way in which some of them are modified in the transition to intuitionistic logic. (Furthermore, in some cases quantificational rules have to be modified further.) The rules that are left unmodified by intuitionists are applicable only to the output of certain game rules, but not to others. In. this sense, neither classical nor yet intuitionistic logic is the logic of natural language. We need a new type of nonclassical logic, justified by our information-seeking dialogues.     

Wittgenstein and logical necessity

An attempt is made to show that Wittgenstein's later philosophy of logic is not the kind of conventionalism which is often ascribed to him. On the contrary, Wittgenstein gives expression to a “mixed” theory which is not only interesting but tends to resolve the perplexities usually associated with the question of the a priori character of logical truth. I try to show that Wittgenstein is better understood not as denying that there are such things as “logical rules” nor as denying that the results of applying such rules are “logically necessary,” but as trying to understand what it is to appeal to a logical rule and what it means to say that the results of applying such a rule are “necessary.” He is not so much overthrowing standard accounts of logical necessity as discovering the limits of the concept.