In Defense of the Responsibility to Protect

This essay responds to Esther Reed's recent critique of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle in this journal. It argues that Reed fundamentally misunderstands and misrepresents R2P. Her critique of R2P would have served well as a critique of the earlier concept of humanitarian intervention had it been penned in the late 1990s. But most of the problems and dangers that Reed identifies are in reality the very problems and dangers that R2P seeks to overcome, and I suggest that it does overcome them quite successfully. R2P does not impose Western ideals on the rest of the world, weaken the legal restrictions on the use of force, or promote abusive interventionism. Rather, it offers a bold but carefully constructed framework that holds the promise of promoting the protection of vulnerable populations from mass atrocities.     

Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention

My essay “Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention: When and Why the Churches Failed to Discern Moral Hazard” (JRE 40.2) called for more questioning engagement with R2P than the broadly uncritical welcome given by the churches to the doctrine between September 2003 and September 2008. In response to Luke Glanville's reply, this essay identifies further reasons for caution before accepting R2P and so‐called humanitarian wars alongside defensive wars as paradigmatically justified. It is structured with reference to the tests in A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, the Report by the Secretary‐General's High‐level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, as recommended to the General Assembly when considering whether to authorize or apply military force: seriousness of risk, intention, last resort, proportional means, balance of consequences.     

Perceived Patient Responsibility and Belief in a Just World Affect Helping

Three experiments reported here uniquely test the effectiveness of warm versus competent advertising strategy as a function of congruence with other elements of the advertising context. These are product involvement (Experiment 1, n = 96), consumers’ smartphone anxiety (Experiment 2, n = 60), or self-versus other-profitability (Experiment 3, n = 100). As expected, the “golden quadrant” (optimum warmth and competence for advertising effectiveness) does shift: Competence is more important for high-involving products, but warmth wins for highly anxious participants or when the highly involving service is accompanied by people-focused appeals. An expansion of the stereotype content model is discussed in the context of the congruity principle.     

Challenges in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: The Security Council Veto and the Need for a Common Ethical Approach

The Journal of Ethics - In 2005 the member states of the United Nations recognized a “responsibility to protect” (“R2P”) victims of mass atrocities such as genocide, war...     

Tarasoff and the Duty to Protect

Summary

The Tarasoff I and Tarasoff II cases were decided by the California Supreme Court in 1974 and 1976, respectively. These cases involved the murder of a young woman by her ex-boyfriend, who had been a patient at a University counseling center. The parents of the young woman sued, alleging negligence. Tarasoff I set forth a “duty to warn” on the part of psychotherapists. Upon rehearing in Tarasoff II, the decision was upheld but modified. The court ruled that when a therapist determines, or should have determined, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, the therapist has a “duty to protect” that other person. In this article, we address subsequent cases that have arisen under the “duty to protect” doctrine, and analyze some of the legal issues that these cases have raised.     

Muslim Governance and the Duty to Protect

In this response to Johnson, Oh reaffirms the scholarly vision of Kelsay and Twiss, elaborates upon Muslim perspectives on human rights, and questions the emphasis on violent humanitarian interventions as part of the Responsibility to Protect mandate. Oh suggests that, in light of the historical relationship between Muslim and non‐Muslim states and the aftermath of the second Iraq War, more consideration be given to the rebuilding of Muslim‐majority societies. Oh also highlights the concept of duty as a religiously based ideal to which governments of Muslim nations ought to be held.     

父母情感温暖对青少年感恩的影响:责任心与公正世界信念的中介作用

以748名高中生为被试,采用问卷法考察父母情感温暖、责任心以及公正世界信念对青少年感恩的影响机制。结果显示：（1）高中生的父母情感温暖可显著正向预测其感恩;（2）在控制了性别、年龄以及年级后,父母情感温暖可分别通过责任心和公正世界信念间接地影响青少年的感恩。这表明责任心和公正世界信念是父母情感温暖影响青少年感恩的重要中介变量。     

The Tarasoff Warning and the Duty to Protect

Summary

Since the case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, mental health professionals have had an explicit legal duty to warn potential adult victims of violence. Subsequent case law expanded this standard to a broader duty-to-protect. Primary health care providers are increasingly treating psychiatric patients for whom the duty to protect is applicable. However, these providers are often unaware of the legal, ethical, and clinical issues involved. Assessment of violence risk should include demographic, psychiatric, and social dimensions. Interventions include notifying law enforcement authorities, potential victims, and possible use of psychiatric hospitalization to prevent aggressive behavior. The duty-to-protect as a standard-of-care has been applied to several other clinical situations, including impaired driving capacity, high-risk HIV behavior, and child sexual abuse. The article includes a step-by-step clinical protocol for evaluation and intervention in dangerous situations.     

Collective and Individual Duties to Protect the Environment

ABSTRACT Many environmental harms are produced by the consequences of too many people doing acts which taken together have collective bad consequences, e.g. overuse of an underground aquifer or acid rain ‘killing’ a lake. If such acts are wrong, what should a conscientious moral agent do in such circumstances? Examples of such harms have the general feature that they are produced by individual acts, which taken by themselves may be innocent and morally permissible, but which have disastrous consequences when too many people perform them. Philosophers once thought that the generalisation argument (GA), “If the consequences of everyone's doing acts of kind a are undesirable, then no one ought to do a,” was the appropriate principle to guide a conscientious moral agent in such circumstances. However, there has been considerable literature discussing the shortcomings of this principle. Nevertheless, a proper understanding of the GA suggests that whole groups of people have collective duties to prevent such harms, which duties then provide clues to individual duties to protect the environment. In this paper I consider some major deficiencies of the generalisation argument, the collective duty which follows from the salvageable part of the argument, and the distribution of individual duties a conscientious moral agent has with regard to such environmental harms as a consequence. These duties turn out to be peculiarly political in nature with the result that conscientious moral agents may have a number of political duties to protect the environment heretofore unrealised.     

Implicit Bias and Policing

In a time when racial prejudice is generally taboo and decision makers, including law enforcement officials, strenuously disavow the use of group‐based stereotypes to make judgments that affect others, one might expect discriminatory outcomes to be unusual. However, research repeatedly indicates that discrimination is pervasive across many domains, and specifically in policing. A major cause of biased policing is likely the implicit biases that operate outside of conscious awareness and control but nevertheless influence our behaviors. Implicit biases (e.g., stereotypes linking Blacks with crime or with related traits like violence or hostility) influence judgments through processes of misattribution and disambiguation. Although psychological science gives us good insight into the causes of racially biased policing, there are as yet no known, straightforward, effective intervention programs. Nevertheless, there are several strands of research that represent promising avenues for further exploration, including intergroup contact, exposure to counter‐stereotypic exemplars, and stereotype negation. Meanwhile, many police departments are adjusting their policies, trainings, and procedures to try to address biased policing and community complaints. Several common themes among those changes include banning racial profiling, collecting data, training officers, reducing discretion, and adopting new technologies. These adjustments are more likely to be successful if they incorporate the understanding that biased policing occurs in the absence of explicitly “racist” thoughts because of well‐documented, pernicious stereotypes that operate largely outside of conscious awareness and control.     

Reforming England's Blasphemy Law to Protect the Individual

Using a framework of legal analysis proposed by Robert Post, this article examines the novel possibility of a reform in England's current criminal law of blasphemy. As previous attempts to include faiths other than Christianity faltered politically and theoretically, the article proposes a reform of the law to protect individual citizens and not religious groups. Different from incitement to racial or religious hatred legislation, this new offense would rest on what Joel Feinberg calls 'vicarious harm', the harm done directly to a person by deliberately wounding her sense of the sacred. The essay takes as given the propositions that equality before the law is desirable, a clear and ordered criminal offense is better than a vague criminal offense, and, as given specifically by the circumstances in England, a reverence for the transcendent sacred is privileged above other forms of reverence.     

The Duty to Protect: Privacy and the Public University

This article addresses the tensions between the sense of responsibility that university administrators feel to protect student privacy with the requirement to be accountable and transparent to the public. This discussion is placed in the context of the history and purpose of post-secondary education.     

Just the beginning for ubuntu: reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi

In an article titled ‘The end of ubuntu’ recently published in this journal, Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi argue that contemporary conditions in (South) Africa are such that there is no justification for appealing to an ethic associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’. They argue that political elites who invoke ubuntu do so in ways that serve nefarious functions, such as unreasonably narrowing discourse about how best to live, while the moral ideals of ubuntu are appropriate only for a bygone, pre-modern age. Since there is nothing ethically promising about ubuntu for today's society, and since elite appeals to it serve undesirable purposes there, the authors conclude that ubuntu in academic and political circles ‘has reached its end’. In this article, I respond to Matolino and Kwindingwi, contending that, in fact, we should view scholarly enquiry into, and the political application of, ubuntu as projects that are only now properly getting started.     

职业压力对护患互动行为的影响

自编护士职业压力调查问卷及自编护患互动行为观察表,发放护士职业压力问卷159份,将被试着分为高,中,低三个压力组,对不同压力组护士护患互动行为进行观察,76.7％的护士认为护理工作是一种“较大”压力的职业,64.5％的护士认为自己承受“较大”或“极大”的职业压力.中等压力护士的护患互动行为最多,且为正性五动行为,因此证实了压力水平与工作绩效的倒U型关系,护士工作压力已影响到了其护患互动行为.由此可见,护理管理者要有针对性地缓解护士压力,才能提高优质护理服务质量.     

Impure Agency and the Just War

Feminist critiques of intention challenge some aspects of traditional just war reasoning, including the criteria of right intention and discrimination (particularly as interpreted using the doctrine of double effect). I take note of these challenges and propose some directions just war reasoners might take in response. First, right intention can be evaluated more accurately by judging what actors in war actually do than by attempting to uncover inward dispositions. Assessing whether agents in war have taken due care to minimize foreseeable collateral damage, avoided intentional targeting of noncombatants, corrected previous mistakes in their later actions, and taken responsibility to repair unintended damage they cause are examples of ways in which just war reasoners can evaluate intention by looking at actions.