Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs

Abstract: The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach to the semantics of belief reports. But this approach must confront a puzzle of its own: it turns out that every case is a Paderewski case, at least potentially.     

关系推理中信念偏差效应的研究

采用结论评估范式,考察时向和空间关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式,以及心理模型理论对关系推理中信念偏差效应的解释力。研究结果表明,关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式与三段论有所不同,不论是时间推理还是空间推理中都存在信念主效应,但没有发现信念与逻辑的交互作用;心理模型理论不能对关系推理中信念偏差效应作出合理解释。     

The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning

A novel explanation of belief bias in relational reasoning is presented based on the role of working memory and retrieval in deductive reasoning, and the influence of prior knowledge on this process. It is proposed that belief bias is caused by the believability of a conclusion in working memory which influences its activation level, determining its likelihood of retrieval and therefore its effect on the reasoning process. This theory explores two main influences of belief on the activation levels of these conclusions. First, believable conclusions have higher activation levels and so are more likely to be recalled during the evaluation of reasoning problems than unbelievable conclusions, and therefore, they have a greater influence on the reasoning process. Secondly, prior beliefs about the conclusion have a base level of activation and may be retrieved when logically irrelevant, influencing the evaluation of the problem. The theory of activation and memory is derived from the Atomic Components of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture and so this account is formalized in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Two experiments were conducted to test predictions of this model. Experiment 1 tested strength of belief and Experiment 2 tested the impact of a concurrent working memory load. Both of these manipulations increased the main effect of belief overall and in particular raised belief‐based responding in indeterminately invalid problems. These effects support the idea that the activation level of conclusions formed during reasoning influences belief bias. This theory adds to current explanations of belief bias by providing a detailed specification of the role of working memory and how it is influenced by prior knowledge.     

A Study of Belief in the Accuracy of Newspaper Reports

An examination of the relationship of scores on Siegel's Manifest Hostility Scale (MHS) to Verbal Hostility, Fantasy Hostility, and Hostile Feeling responses to cartoon situations was undertaken, while controlling for sex of subject, sex of experimenter, and the social desirability (So-R) and ego strength/defensiveness (K) scales of the MMPI. MHS scores were significantly related to the three modes of hostility response, while sex of subject and sex of experimenter were not. Adjustment of the dependent variable means for So-R did not cancel MHS effects on Verbal or Fantasy Hostility, but adjustment for K cancelled the significant relationship between MHS scores and Fantasy Hostility and Hostile Feeling responses. Covariation of both K and So-R out of Verbal Hostility cancelled its relationship to MHS scores. Ego strength/defensiveness thus may be more significantly related to hostile responding than social desirability.     

Attempting to Analyze Perspective-Taking with a False Belief Vignette Using the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure

The Psychological Record - Cognitive perspective-taking research has primarily been conducted under the rubric of theory of mind (ToM), with the core skill believed to involve the correct...     

Factors Related to Mentor Reports of Mentoring Functions Provided: Gender and Relational Characteristics

In this study we examined the relationship between mentor gender, protégé gender, mentorship characteristics (e.g., mentorship type, mentorship duration, mentor experience), and mentoring functions provided as reported by mentors. Drawing on research regarding diversified mentorships and interpersonal relationships, we proposed that mentoring effectiveness would vary as a function of the gender of the mentorship participants and the characteristics of the relationship. As hypothesized, several interesting gender differences emerged from the data. Male mentors reported providing more career mentoring to their protégés, whereas female mentors reported providing more psychosocial mentoring. Contrary to expectations, mentors in informal mentorships did not report providing more mentoring than did mentors in formal mentorships. The findings demonstrate the importance of examining mentoring from the perspective of the mentor.     

Justified Belief from Unjustified Belief

Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification (JFJ): a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially justified belief that is more permissive and more complex than JFJ.     

Commanding Belief

This essay shows three things: first, that we cannot comply with a command from God to believe in God; second, that God cannot command us to believe in God; and, third, that the divine command theory is false. The third conclusion follows from the second, and the second follows from the first. The essay focuses on an argument from the medieval Jewish philosopher, Hasdai Crescas. It also draws from, and is something of a sequel to, an argument from Brown and Nagasawa published previously in this journal. 1     

Requesting Belief

Requests belong to a family of forms of social influence on action that appear problematic when employed in the attempt to directly influence belief. Explaining why this is so is more difficult than it might at first appear. The fact that belief is not directly subject to the will can only be part of the explanation. It must also be the case that requests are incapable of providing epistemic reasons in a way that parallels that in which they provide practical reasons. I propose an account of the nature of requests that is in a position to explain why requests are incapable of doing this.     

Relational Services

Recent research projects have looked for social innovations, i.e., people creating solutions outside the mainstream patterns of production and consumption. An analysis of these innovations indicates the emergence of a particular kind of service configuration—defined here as relational services—which requires intensive interpersonal relations to operate. Based on a comparative analysis between standard and relational services, we propose to the Service Design discipline an interpretative framework able to reinforce its ability to deal with the interpersonal relational qualities in services, indicating how these qualities can be understood and favored by design activities, as well as the limits of this design intervention. Martin Buber’s conceptual framework is presented as the main interpretative basis. Buber describes two ways of interacting (“I-Thou” and “I-It”). Relational services are those most favoring “I-Thou” interpersonal encounters.

Relational Complexes

A theory of relations is presented that provides a detailed account of the logical structure of relational complexes. The theory draws a sharp distinction between relational complexes and relational states. A salient difference is that relational complexes belong to exactly one relation, whereas relational states may be shared by different relations. Relational complexes are conceived as structured perspectives on states ‘out there’ in reality. It is argued that only relational complexes have occurrences of objects, and that different complexes of the same relation may correspond to the same state.     

Relational Primitivism

What kind of property is represented by the moral ought? I defend a relational answer: the moral ought represents a primitive relational property of actions required by the original claims of persons. I argue that the relational answer offers a distinctive and compelling account in its own right that also avoids standard difficulties of familiar theories.     

信念的组合性与信念的形而上学

20世纪以来,关于信念的形而上学研究,主要有表征主义和倾向论两条基本路径。基于对信念的组合性特征的阐明,一方面,组合性是信念的构成性条件;另一方面,组合性不是信念的构成性条件,因为典型的物理倾向和心理倾向都不具有组合性,而且,一个组合性的倾向谓词不必然谓述一个组合的倾向。因此,在形而上学上,信念不是倾向。进而,考虑到表征主义能够为信念的组合性提供最佳解释,论文主张,信念的组合性特征是支持信念表征主义的有力理由。     

Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess

I consider the evolution of our relational ideal—its implications for our therapeutic goals, our patients, and for ourselves. Who do we aim to be in the consulting room? How do we view our patient—her potential and her limitations? What are the clinical goals of a relational analysis? What might those goals occlude? In this context I address the historical excesses of our ideal and the ways we may have gone too far.