快速节俭启发式--基于有限理性和生态理性的简单决策规则

本文阐述了德国“马克斯．普朗克人类发展研究所”以Gerd Gigerenzer教授为代表的“适应行为与认知中心”简称“ABC研究中心(组)”关于判断、推理和决策制定简单启发式研究的理论背景、研究思路和技术路线,着重介绍了该研究中心在有限理性和生态理性假设基础上提出的一系列极富创意的快速节俭启发式规则,并对围绕这些简单决策规则开展的研究活动作了简要介绍。     

有限理性的“占优启发式”和“齐当别”决策模型的作为 ——当Allais悖论杠杆撬动了期望效用理论

人们在做决策时常常要受到时间或知识的限制,有时还要受到其双重限制。关于人们是如何进行风险决策,早期有期望效用理论对其加以解释,但Allais悖论对其标准化地位提出了挑战。Simon的“有限理性”观点提出后,一些研究者开始致力于开发决策的“有限理性”模型。文章讨论并比较了无限理性的期望效用理论被Allais悖论杠杆撬动之后,有限理性的“占优启发式”和“齐当别”决策模型所能做的和所不能做的。两种模型的决策标准、计算策略以及未来研究的展望也一并作了讨论     

有限理性的"占优启发式"和"齐当别"决策模型的作为——当Allais悖论杠杆撬动了期望效用理论

人们在做决策时常常要受到时间或知识的限制,有时还要受到其双重限制。关于人们是如何进行风险决策,早期有期望效用理论对其加以解释,但Allais悖论对其标准化地位提出了挑战。Simon的“有限理性”观点提出后,一些研究者开始致力于开发决策的“有限理性”模型。文章讨论并比较了无限理性的期望效用理论被Allais悖论杠杆撬动之后,有限理性的“占优启发式”和“齐当别”决策模型所能做的和所不能做的。两种模型的决策标准、计算策略以及未来研究的展望也一并作了讨论。     

Integrating Fast and Frugal Heuristics with a Model of Memory‐based Cue Generation

Although the fast and frugal heuristics have been studied extensively, relatively little attention has been paid to how cues are generated to be used within the heuristics. The goal of this paper is to propose and test a memory‐based model of how cues are generated and used in cue‐based inferences. The current study advances theory by integrating the fast and frugal heuristics with HyGene, a memory‐based model of how decision makers generate and evaluate hypotheses. Using archival data in which memory retrieval variables were not directly manipulated, we demonstrate that participants' cue selection behavior is consistent with memory‐based retrieval. Further, by directly manipulating memory retrieval within a cue‐based stock‐forecasting task, we demonstrate that memory processes underlie cue use. Participants' cue use varied depending on the relationship between cue validity and the frequency with which the cues were seen during learning. The HyGene model provided the best account of the empirical data, providing further evidence for the critical role of memory in judgment and decision making. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the binary quality of recognition and the inconsequentiality of further knowledge: two critical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic is claimed to be distinguished from notions of availability and fluency through its categorical or “binary” treatment of information and the “inconsequentiality” of further knowledge to inferences based on recognition. Using the city‐size task of Goldstein and Gigerenzer ( 2002 ) we demonstrate that: (1) increasing the validity of other information in the environment decreases the reliance on recognition; (2) cities that are both recognized and have other information known about them (e.g. they have a soccer team) are chosen more often than those which are simply recognized; and (3) there is a negative correlation between the time taken to identify a city and the proportion of times it is selected as the larger of a pair. None of these results is predicted by the process model of the recognition heuristic. The implication of the results for the distinction between the recognition, availability and fluency heuristics is discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coherence shifts in probabilistic inference tasks

The fast‐and‐frugal heuristics approach to probabilistic inference assumes that individuals often employ simple heuristics to integrate cue information that commonly function in a non‐reciprocal fashion. Specifically, the subjective validity of a certain cue remains stable during the application of a heuristic and is not changed by the presence or absence of another cue. The parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model, in contrast, predicts that information is processed in a reciprocal fashion. Specifically, it assumes that subjective cue validities interactively affect each other and are modified to coherently support the favored choice. Corresponding to the model's simulation, we predicted the direction and the size of such coherence shifts. Cue validities were measured before, after (Experiment 1), and during judgment (Experiments 2 and 3). Coherence shifts were found in environments involving real‐world cue knowledge (weather forecasts) and in a domain for which the application of fast‐and‐frugal heuristics has been demonstrated (city‐size tasks). The results indicate that subjective cue validities are not fixed parameters, but that they are interactively changed to form coherent representations of the task. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

对相容和不相容析取关系下析取句与条件句之间推理的比较

研究析取句和条件句之间的推理能检验推理心理学中的主要理论解释。一个实验考察了析取句和条件句中两个基本成分之间的关系(相容析取与不相容析取)和推理方向(由析取句推条件句与由条件句推析取句)对析取句与其等值的条件句之间推理的影响。结果发现,推理方向的影响取决于条件句和析取句中基本成分间的关系,在不相容析取关系下的推理成绩好于在相容析取关系下的推理成绩。现有的推理理论不能解释被试的整体反应模式,作者提出的特殊知识启发式与一般的句法意义对比启发式的竞争能统一解释被试的主导反应模式。     

Heuristics in learning classifiers: The acquisition of the classifier system and its implications for the nature of lexical acquisition

Classifiers are like nouns in that they classify entities in the world into lexical categories. However, the lexical nature of the classifier system is very different from that of nouns. We discuss how Japanese and Chinese children learn the meanings of classifiers. We focus on two specific questions: How classifier acquisition is different from noun acquisition; and what the prerequisites are for spontaneously extracting the meanings of classifiers. It is shown that children are very conservative in assigning meaning to classifiers. The pace of learning largely depends on semantic complexity, across languages and within each language. Furthermore, we suspect that learning the meanings of classifiers requires a certain cognitive ability – an ability to synthesize pieces of partial knowledge and form them into a cohesive whole. It may be only when children have developed such an ability that they are able to extract the complex semantic rules of classifiers on their own. We conclude that children take very different routes in learning nouns and classifiers: Unlike noun acquisition, classifier acquisition is guided by a slow, bottom-up process.