常识问题任务中理解他人的加工机制

理解他人是指推断他人的心理状态,以及解释和预测他人行为的心理加工。本研究采用常识问题任务,通过三个实验来考察成人理解他人的加工机制,提出并验证双加工模型。研究发现:第一,个体在理解他人的过程中综合考虑了自我信息和他人信息,提出并验证了双加工模型。第二,反馈作用会改变个体自我模拟所获得的自我信息,从而影响理解他人。第三,他人信息将影响自我对他人的推断预测,片面的他人信息会导致理解他人出现偏差。     

自我面孔识别的脑机制

自我面孔识别是自我参照加工的一种研究范式, 反映了人们通过自我与他人的区分识别出自我面孔的过程。自我面孔识别的脑区定位涉及前额叶、脑岛、扣带回、颞叶和顶叶等脑区的协同作用, 其认知加工有三个阶段：低水平的感觉处理阶段, 对自我参照的面孔信息的处理阶段和身份辨别阶段。在今后的研究中, 应该在时程上区分自我面孔识别的各个加工过程, 并且结合脑区定位结果, 明确自我面孔识别的各加工阶段及认知成分。     

先“自我中心”再“调整”:成人推理他人心理状态的加工过程

成人在某些情况下推理他人心理状态时也会像较小的儿童一样出现自我中心化。本研究通过控制完成心理理论任务的反应时间,比较成人被试在有/无时间压力情况下推理他人心理状态时行为表现上的差异。其中,实验1选取24名大学生被试进行指示交流任务(考察视觉观点采择),实验2选取76名大学生被试进行成人版意外地点任务(考察错误信念理解)。结果发现,在限制反应时间的条件下,被试会更加自我中心化。两个实验的结果支持了成人推理他人心理状态可能是一个两阶段的加工过程的假设,即先自我中心再调整:首先以自我心理状态进行自我中心锚定,然后(若自我和他人心理状态存在差异)克服自我中心,理解他人的心理状态。     

自我控制失败的理论模型与神经基础

自我控制指那些帮助人们克服思想和情绪, 进而依据实际情况调整自我行为的心理加工。虽然良好的自我控制对个体的成功与幸福非常重要, 但自我控制失败仍然是整个人类社会的核心问题。借助于序列任务范式, 研究者揭示了自我控制失败的认知机制并建构了多种理论, 包括能量模型、加工模型、中央管理器模型和前额叶−皮层下脑区的平衡模型。相关脑成像研究主要聚焦于额下回、杏仁核、眶额叶皮质等脑区。未来研究应侧重不同理论之间的融合与补充, 强化自我控制失败潜在神经机制的探索, 并推动自我控制与社会决策行为的关系研究。     

视觉观点采择中自我中心性偏差的抑制和归因之争

自我中心性偏差是社交失败的重要原因, 但其产生机制还存在争议。以往研究存在抑制性选择模型与流利性错误归因两种理论观点：前者认为对自身观点的抑制失败会导致自我中心性偏差; 后者则认为错误地选择自身更为流畅的信息会导致自我中心性偏差。为整合上述争论, 提出抑制-归因协同作用模型, 认为抑制和归因两种加工或可共同导致自我中心性偏差。未来研究应借助精巧的研究范式和特殊被试群体, 进一步验证该模型。     

从自我到社会认知:默认网络和镜像神经元系统

自我知觉和社会认知是人类生活的基础。自我的概念包括身体自我和心理自我两个方面,社会认知被广泛定义为一系列的社会表征、社会互动和理解过程。默认网络主要表征自我和他人的心理层面特征以及社会认知加工,而镜像神经元系统连接着自我和他人的物理特性表征。默认网络由三个分系统组成,其中内侧前额叶皮层在社会认知中起了关键的作用,默认网络中的子系统也对社会理解起了重要的作用。默认网络和镜像神经元系统功能性地相互连接,动态地表征自我、他人以及支持社会互动。未来的研究将着重探讨默认网络和镜像神经元系统两个系统内外部的功能连接。     

反应抑制的心理加工模型与神经机制

反应抑制是指抑制不符合当前需要的或不恰当行为反应的能力, 也是执行控制加工的重要成分。解释反应抑制的心理加工模型有两种: 反应与抑制相互独立的赛马模型和交互作用的赛马模型。近年来对反应抑制神经机制的研究表明: 额叶－基底神经节系统内的超直接通路和间接通路可能共同负责对优势反应的抑制, 而额下回、辅助运动区/辅助运动前区和前部扣带回皮层等脑区可能是抑制控制的关键脑区; 反应抑制与反应选择、工作记忆和注意的神经加工之间存在密切联系, 它们的激活脑区既相互重叠, 又相互区别; 右背外侧前额皮层的激活可能反映与抑制任务相关的注意和工作记忆的加工。未来的研究需要将脑损伤、神经功能成像和经颅磁刺激等多种技术结合起来, 进一步阐明上述脑区在反应抑制中的相互作用机制。     

情感预测偏差的相关研究评述

情感预测是预测将来的情绪状态。情感预测时会表现出各种偏差, 例如免疫性忽略、聚焦错觉和共情鸿沟。本文从认知–体验自我理论和心理模拟的角度对情感预测偏差的原因进行了整合, 对情感预测偏差的个体差异和矫正进行了分析。情感预测的未来研究方向应该从心理-行为机制、进化机制和脑机制几个方面展开。     

儿童心理理论对责任教育的启示

心理理论是指对自己和他人心理状态的认识,并由此对相应行为作出因果性的预测和解释。心理理论的发展不仅是儿童脱离自我中心、建立良好同伴关系的重要条件,而且还通过影响儿童的观点采择等心理机制影响儿童责任意识的形成与发展。这一理论对于当前的责任教育具有重要启示意义。     

人际互动中的“自我-他人”区分:多水平的探索

人际互动的根本问题在于我们如何在表征自身想法和感受的同时试图去理解他人的心理和情感状态, 以驾驭复杂的社交环境。最近研究发现个体主要通过模拟自我加工过程实现对他人的理解, 但这种自我加工以及心理模拟在一定程度上混淆了自我与他人。因此, 为进行成功的人际互动, 大脑必须灵活区分自我和他人相关的表征, 这种能力被称为“自我-他人”区分(self-other distinction, SOD)。通过探讨感知、动作、认知以及情感等不同加工水平社会认知过程中的“自我-他人”区分及相应的研究范式, 实现对人际互动过程更全面而深入的理解, 为改善社会认知、情感障碍以及自闭症的干预提供依据。在此基础上, 提出了具体的研究展望。     

Can the Innate Right to Freedom Alone Ground a System of Public and Private Rights?

The state regulates the way in which social power is exercised. It sometimes permits, enables, constrains, forbids how we may touch others, make offers, draw up contracts, use, alter, possess and destroy things that matter to people, manipulate, induce weakness of the will, coerce, engage in physical force, persuade, selectively divulge information, lie, enchant, coax, convince, … In each of these cases, we (sometimes unintentionally) get others to act in ways that serve our interests. Which such exercises of power should the state forbid? Which should it permit? An intuitively appealing way to answer this question is, with Ripstein and Kant, to point to the role of freedom: exercises of social power can be legitimately prohibited when (and only when) they restrict people's freedom. But this raises a further question: How do we identify when such exercises of power make people unfree in the relevant sense? Ripstein, in defending Kant, draws a crucial distinction between actions that subject others’ wills to our choices (and which it would therefore be presumptively legitimate for the state to forbid) and actions that merely affect the contexts in which others act (and which it would therefore be presumptively illegitimate for the state to forbid). I query that distinction, and argue that the idea of independence cannot bear, on its own, the weight it is expected to bear within the Kantian framework.     

Simulation, Theory and Collapse

Recent philosophical discussions of our capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings, and to produce accurate predictions and informative explanations of their behavior which make reference to the content of those states have focused on two apparently contrasting ways in which we might hope to account for these abilities. The first is that of regarding our competence as being under-girded by our grasp of a tacit psychological theory. The second builds on the idea that in trying to get a grip on the mental lives of others we might be able to draw on the fact that we are ourselves subjects of mental states in order to simulate their mental processes. Call these the theory view and the simulation view. In this paper I wish to discuss an argument—which I shall call Collapse—to the effect that if our capacities can be explained in the way that the simulationist supposes then they can also be explained along lines that the advocate of the theory view favours. I am not the first person with simulationist sympathies to have addressed this argument. However, my response is somewhat less concessive than others in the literature: while they attempt to soften its force by attempting to reformulate the simulationist view in a way that evades the conclusion of the argument, I attempt to meet it head on and to show that it does not even succeed in refuting the version of simulationism which it takes as its target.

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Implication and reasoning in mental state attribution: Comments on Jane Heal's theory of co-cognition

Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.     

汉语确定性无界否定句模拟加工的时间进程

以往关于否定句理解的心理模拟过程是一步完成的还是两步完成的, 结果并不一致, 这与各个研究使用的实验材料类型有关。本研究以汉语确定性无界否定句为研究对象, 采用句-图匹配范式和2(句子类型：汉语确定性无界肯定句和汉语确定性无界否定句) × 2 (图片描绘事物状态与句子描述的事物状态的匹配类型：匹配与不匹配)被试内实验设计, 以对图片判断的反应时和正确率为指标, 探讨其理解的早期(250 ms)、中期(750 ms)和晚期(1500 ms)的心理模拟过程。研究结果表明：确定性无界否定句理解的心理模拟是分两步进行的, 首先模拟的是否定句的被否定状态, 随着加工时间的推进, 完成了对确定性无界否定句的第二步模拟即对实际状态的模拟。但是, 比其他类型否定句的模拟过程所用的时间要短, 即在阅读理解的中期就完成了心理模拟。     

Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory?

Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor’s genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones’ own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors’ own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided by revised simulation theory.     

Care for one's own future experiences

We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to explain what it means to say that a future experience will be mine and how knowledge of this fact renders it rational for me to care for this experience in a special way. Indeed most philosophers take this route. But in doing so, they quickly stumble on insuperable problems. I shall argue that the problem of egocentric care, as it is sometimes called, can be solved by turning things upside down: it is much more fruitful to think that the special kind of care we feel for some future experiences (and not others) is part of what makes them ours should they occur. This requires an explanation of egocentric care for future experiences that does not draw in a theory of personal identity, but rather contributes to one. I will attempt to provide this explanation by making use of the idea of a diachronic mental holism.     

Selecting a Relevant Mental State in Young Children’s Persuasion

Previous studies have found that understanding another person’s mental states is a requirement for effective responding to that person. This study examined whether effective responding also requires selecting a relevant mental state of another person. Using a hypothetical persuasion paradigm, we investigated if late 4- and 5-year-olds (N = 120) could present information to counter a receiver’s opposition. For example, a boy is attempting to persuade his mother to let him have a bird. If the mother objects to her son having the bird because bird is noisy, then the boy should ask her to have a quiet bird. Presenting appropriate information (e.g., a quiet bird) was found to be more difficult when the person had plural beliefs (e.g., a bird would be clean and noisy) and children had to select the source of opposition (e.g., a bird would be noisy). This suggests that selecting an appropriate mental state of another person is necessary for effective responding. Contingency and developmental analyses revealed that children could present appropriate information only when they could select the source, indicating that the ability to select an appropriate mental state is a key factor in responding effectively to others.     

Trust in the Guise of Belief

Abstract

What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state. This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit, or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had. Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to explain agents’ actions) and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of the mental.     

Lost in dissociation: The main paradigms in unconscious cognition

Contemporary studies in unconscious cognition are essentially founded on dissociation, i.e., on how it dissociates with respect to conscious mental processes and representations. This is claimed to be in so many and diverse ways that one is often lost in dissociation. In order to reduce this state of confusion we here carry out two major tasks: based on the central distinction between cognitive processes and representations, we identify and isolate the main dissociation paradigms; we then critically analyze their key tenets and reported findings.