从心理理论的脑机制研究看心理理论与执行功能的关系

心理理论发展与执行功能的关系以及心理理论脑机制的研究是近年来心理理论研究中的一个热点。文章首先对心理理论与执行功能关系的研究现状进行了分析与概括,提出了目前研究中的问题;然后从介绍了心理理论脑机制研究现状,并以此为基础探讨了心理理论与执行功能的关系。     

心理自我调控理论的研究进展

摘要：Stemberg在整合已有风格理论的基础上,提出了一种全新的风格理论一心理自我调控理论。该理论重新激活了人们对风格的研究兴趣,并引发了一系列的相关实证研究。该文对该理论及其相关研究的进展进行了评述。     

内隐联想测验中他人重要性对自我心理表征的影响

联合采用联想匹配任务和内隐联想测验（IAT）任务,考察了自我—他人分类中的他人重要性对自我—高奖赏相似性的影响。研究将中性的几何图形与自我、不同重要性的他人（实验一为陌生人,实验二为朋友）建立联结,并将自我（暂时建立联结的图形）高奖赏联合任务与自我低奖赏联合任务下的反应差异（即IAT值）作为自我—高奖赏相似性的指标,结果表明：（1）联想匹配任务中自我和朋友以及自我和陌生人之间都存在显著的自我优势效应;（2）IAT任务中,自我和高奖赏只在他人为朋友的自我—他人分类判断时才具有相似性,而他人为陌生人时二者不具有相似性。这说明他人重要性改变了自我的心理表征。     

内隐联想测验中他人重要性对自我心理表征的影响

联合采用联想匹配任务和内隐联想测验（IAT）任务,考察了自我—他人分类中的他人重要性对自我—高奖赏相似性的影响。研究将中性的几何图形与自我、不同重要性的他人（实验一为陌生人,实验二为朋友）建立联结,并将自我（暂时建立联结的图形）高奖赏联合任务与自我低奖赏联合任务下的反应差异（即IAT值）作为自我—高奖赏相似性的指标,结果表明：（1）联想匹配任务中自我和朋友以及自我和陌生人之间都存在显著的自我优势效应;（2）IAT任务中,自我和高奖赏只在他人为朋友的自我—他人分类判断时才具有相似性,而他人为陌生人时二者不具有相似性。这说明他人重要性改变了自我的心理表征。     

儿童区分自我—他人时的自我参照效应

研究基于不同任务的自我参照效应对探讨儿童自我—他人的区分有重要意义。本研究使用三个实验探讨了4～9岁儿童出现自我参照效应的时间。研究操纵了由自我所有权和自我参照评价引发的两种自我意识:以物体为基础的自我意识和以概念为基础的自我意识。实验1用所属物的类别任务、实验2和实验3使用特质评价任务进行测量。结果表明:(1)5岁儿童记自己的物品比别人更多,表明儿童能以物体为基础区分自我与他人;(2)7岁儿童出现对自己人格特质形容词的记忆优势,表明儿童能以概念为基础区分自我与他人。研究结果证明了在儿童区分自我与他人的过程中,自我所有权为基础和自我参照评价为基础的自我意识存在明显的分离。     

儿童自我控制心理机制的理论述评

自我控制是个体抑制和调节自身冲动的能力,是个体适应社会的主要标志。对自我控制心理机制的探讨在此领域的研究中居于核心地位。在精神分析理论、认知发展理论和行为主义理论早期观点的基础上,A.Gifford、W.Mischel和J.kuhl等人在近期研究中分别强调了情绪、认知和注意过程以及自我调节策略在个体自我控制过程中的作用,在此基础上,该文总结了关于自我控制心理机制研究中较为一致的结论和仍然存在的分歧。     

ASD儿童表征自我和他人错误信念

威廉斯(williams)和哈皮(Happ?的一项最新实验显示,传统实验中自闭症谱系障碍(ASD)儿童表征自我错误信念和他人错误信念难度相当是因为ASD儿童采用了陈述记忆策略所致,若排除该策略干扰,他们表征自我错误信念比表征他人错误信念更加困难.通过两项实验表明,ASD儿童表征自我错误信念的难度可能受自我动手行为的影响,而不是受陈述记忆策略的影响.     

想象重要他人对自我评价转移的影响

研究目的：本研究的目的是在中国文化背景下,考察想象不同的重要他人对于个体自我评价转移的影响,并探讨自尊在其中的调节作用。考虑到大学生年龄相当,拥有相似的角色经验,故本研究选用了大二女生作为被试。研究选择了三类重要他人：父母、同性朋友、异性朋友（包括男朋友）,由于每一类重要他人所对应的关系自我各不相同,所以研究编制了针对不同重要他人的自我评价特质词表,作为因变量测量的工具。过程与方法：本研究设计了两个实验,实验中将用到录音机。实验一为单因素实验设计,在三个实验室同时展开,各个实验室的想象重要他人分别为父母、同性朋友、异性朋友。主试告知参与者,本实验将进行一项大学女生的想象力测试,首先聆听一段描写风景的散文录音,进行想象练习。然后请她们在头脑中想象一位指定的重要他人,比如想象重要他人的形象、语言、行为等特征,尽可能详细生动。想象结束,首先请被试回忆并填写刚才想象的主要内容。然后告诉被试,另一个课题组正在搜集有关“当代大学生自我形象”的资料,请她们帮忙填写《自我评价特质词表》,对自己的一些特质进行评价。最后,主试向参与者致谢并进行了解释。实验二的想象重要他人为同性朋友和男朋友,实验过程与实验一基本一致,在自我评价测量中采用了专门针对“同性朋友”和“男朋友”的量表,并在想象完成后填写自尊量表。结果与结论：本研究所有统计检验的显著性水平在a<0.05的水平上进行。研究探讨了中国文化背景下大学女生的关系自我评价特质,发现其与西方文化背景下的关系自我评价特质显著不同。证明了想象重要他人影响个体自我评价的维度,并会产生自我评价转移的现象,没有发现自尊变量的调节作用。     

“福柯说真话”——“直言”的自我、他人与现代伦理

福柯批判了康德在《什么是启蒙?》中对\"启蒙\"意义的阐释,但他同时也肯定并拓展了康德在自我批判的本体论上的意义。在此意义上,福柯发展出一套自我关怀与治理他人之间的伦理关系:\"直言\"的实践形式。\"直言\"产生于古希腊时期,它具有坦率、危险、真理、批判、责任的特征,并与\"关照自己\"产生密切联系,这种实践技艺致力于处理自我和他人的关系,进而指导个人步入政治领域而治理他人。福柯运用\"直言\"这一古代形式来回应当下现实,让知识分子说出真话,关心他人与这个时代。     

左脑还是右脑？—— 自我觉知神经机制的述评

自我觉知是个体对自己有所认识或意识的内部主观状态, 自我认知加工的任务都激发了自我觉知, 因此, 其复杂性导致脑机制研究存在很多的争议。对自我觉知神经机制的研究多从认知神经精神医学和涉及自我觉知任务的脑成像的角度进行, 很多研究发现自我觉知更多地激活了右脑, 针对具体的任务而激活不同脑区;但复杂的、高水平的自我觉知任务往往涉及内部言语加工, 需要左脑的加入。现在越来越多的研究认为皮质中线结构对自我觉知具有重要作用。今后有关自我觉知神经机制的研究可望从自我觉知的性质、所涉及的具体任务水平及社会文化背景的差异等方面有所进展。     

Validation d’une version francophone de l’inventaire de la Théorie de l’Esprit (ToMI-vf)

Introduction and objectiveThis article presents the translation method, in French, of the ‘Theory of Mind Inventory’ questionnaire (ToMI, Hutchins, Prelock, & Bonazinga, 2012) assessing adults’ perception about children’ abilities in Theory of Mind.MethodIt reports results of three validation studies of the French-version of ToMI (ToMI-vf) filled by parents of preschoolers.ResultsThe study 1 (n = 107) shows a very high internal consistency and a structure in three factors. The study 2 (n = 54) confirms criterion-related validity. The study 3 (n = 45) shows a good temporal stability of parental answers.ConclusionThe three studies indicate that the ToMI-vf has psychometric properties comparable with those reported by authors about the initial ToMI.     

Commentary on Ted Ruffman’s “Belief or not belief: …”

I applaud Ruffman for cautioning us against interpreting early sensitivity to others’ beliefs as evidence for an innate theory of mind and for making room for learning. In turn, however, I caution against his claim that all infants need is to understand that people act depending on what they perceive. Instead, infants may keep experiential records (Perner & Roessler, 2010) for other people or records of what they have registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), which makes it less obvious that all required knowledge can be acquired by statistical learning. As a general criticism I remonstrate with current theory of mind research on its lack of concern that we understand people as acting for reasons which goes beyond detecting lawful regularities in behaviour.     

重要他人情境对青少年意图判断诺布效应的影响*

设置了母亲、朋友、老师三类重要他人,副作用结果为积极和消极两种性质的实验故事共六个,选取311名中学生阅读故事并回答问题,以此探讨青少年诺布效应的特点及其与心理状态理解的关系。结果表明：（1）青少年在对不同重要他人的积极副作用情境进行意图判断时,表现出典型的诺布效应,但在对不同重要他人的消极副作用情境进行意图判断时,没有表现出诺布效应;（2）母亲、朋友和老师这三类重要他人对于青少年意图判断的影响没有显著差异;（3）初中生和高中生、男生和女生的意图判断没有显著差异;（4）青少年认为,由消极副作用引起的被行为者的情绪以负性情绪为主,而行为者的情绪则以正性情绪为主。本研究的结论是：青少年在进行意图判断时仅出现了不完全的诺布效应。     

Preschoolers’ understanding of multiple orientations to reality: The adjectives task

Preschoolers’ understanding that an object can be accurately described using two different non-synonymous words was investigated using a task in which children (N = 36) had to judge which of two animals had provided correct adjectival labels for a series of pictures. For some pictures, only one animal provided a correct adjective, for some both animals were correct, and for some neither was correct. For all types of judgement, 4-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds. Children in both age groups performed worst on trials where both animals were correct. Children's performance on the adjectives task related to concurrent understanding of the appearance–reality distinction, but not to false-belief task performance. Implications for children's mentalizing development are discussed.     

Children's knowledge of the relation between intentional action and pretending

Two experiments investigated preschoolers’ understanding of the relation between pretending and intentional action. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year olds recognized that characters whose actions were intended as pretense were pretending. However, children also judged that characters whose actions gave them the appearance of an entity unintentionally were pretending to be that entity. In Experiment 2, 3-year olds reliably chose a character whose pretense actions were intentional as pretending over a character whose actions were guided by another intention. These data suggest that preschoolers have some understanding of the role of intentional action in pretense.     

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.     

What is “theory of mind”? Concepts,cognitive processes and individual differences

Research on “theory of mind” has traditionally focused on a narrow participant group (preschool children) using a narrow range of experimental tasks (most notably, false-belief tasks). Recent work has greatly expanded the age range of human participants tested to include human infants, older children, and adults, has devised new tasks, and has adopted methods from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, theoretical work has not kept pace with these changes, with the result that studies using one kind of method or participant group often inherit assumptions about the nature of theory of mind from other research, with little regard for whether these assumptions are appropriate. I argue that three distinct approaches to thinking about theory of mind are already implicit in research practice, and that future work, whether with infants, children, or adults, will benefit from articulating these approaches more clearly and following their different implications for what theory of mind is and how it should be studied.     

Enabling conditions and children’s understanding of pretense

Two experiments examined whether preschoolers’ difficulties on tasks that required relating pretending and knowledge (e.g., Lillard, A. S. (1993a). Young children’s conceptualization of pretense: Action or mental representational state? Child Development, 64, 372-386) were due to children’s inability to appreciate the causal mechanism behind enabling conditions. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were told about a character who knew about one kind of animal and did not know about another. The character acted in a manner consistent with both animals. Children were asked whether the character was pretending to be the animal of which he was ignorant. The character’s knowledge was either represented in a generic manner (as a picture) or in a manner that suggested a particular enabling condition relation that children found accessible (as a battery, which most 4-year-olds recognize is critical for making toys work). Children were more successful at relating knowledge and pretending in the battery condition. This improvement in performance extended to another task in which children had to identify the enabling condition relation between knowledge and identification, in which there were reduced demands on the inhibitory mechanisms necessary for success. Experiment 2 found that the results in Experiment 1 were not due to demands of the procedure used in Experiment 1. These results are discussed in the context of recent theories of theory of mind that focus on the importance of causal relations among mental states.     

Young children's selective learning of rule games from reliable and unreliable models

We investigated preschoolers’ selective learning from models that had previously appeared to be reliable or unreliable. Replicating previous research, children from 4 years selectively learned novel words from reliable over unreliable speakers. Extending previous research, children also selectively learned other kinds of acts – novel games – from reliable actors. More important, – and novel to this study, this selective learning was not just based on a preference for one model or one kind of act, but had a normative dimension to it. Children understood the way a reliable actor demonstrated an act not only as the better one, but as the normatively appropriate or correct one, as indicated in both their explicit verbal comments and their spontaneous normative interventions (e.g., protest, critique) in response to third-party acts deviating from the one demonstrated. These findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of children's social cognition and cultural learning.