Can Semantics Guide Ontology?

Since the linguistic turn, many have taken semantics to guide ontology. Here, I argue that semantics can, at best, serve as a partial guide to ontological commitment. If semantics were to be our guide, semantic data and semantic treatments would need to be taken seriously. Through an examination of plurals and their treatments, I argue that there can be multiple, equally semantically adequate, treatments of a natural language theory. Further, such treatments can attribute different ontological commitments to a theory. Given this, I argue that semantics can fail to deliver determinate ontological commitments and determinate answers to ontological questions, more generally.     

Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard,Meaning and Normativity

In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard’s preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving ‘oughts’. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis – a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.     

Are Computational Transitions Sensitive to Semantics?

The formal conception of computation (FCC) holds that computational processes are not sensitive to semantic properties. FCC is popular, but it faces well-known difficulties. Accordingly, authors such as Block and Peacocke pursue a ‘semantically-laden’ alternative, according to which computation can be sensitive to semantics. I argue that computation is insensitive to semantics within a wide range of computational systems, including any system with ‘derived’ rather than ‘original’ intentionality. FCC yields the correct verdict for these systems. I conclude that there is only one promising strategy for semantically-laden theorists: identify special computational systems that help generate their own semantic properties, and then show that computation within those systems is semantically-laden. Unfortunately, the few existing discussions that pursue this strategy are problematic.     

The Conjunction Effect: Fallacy or Bayesian Inference?

It has been suggested by Wolford, Taylor, and Beck (1990) that the conjunction fallacy is not really a fallacy at all but arises when individuals misconstrue the judgmental problem providing estimates of the kind P(X|A&B) or P(X|B) (reverse probabilities) instead of the actual quantities that are being sought by the experimenter: P(A&B|X) or P(B|X). As pointed out by Wolford and co-workers, while the following judgment, P(A&B|X) > P(B|X), is a violation of the conjunction rule, outcomes such as P(X|A&B) > P(X|B) do not necessarily violate any probabilistic law. In an attempt to de-bias the judgment process, in Study 1 participants were requested to provide both types of probabilities at the same time. The results revealed a drop in the incidence of the conjunction fallacy to 32% averaged over all scenarios compared with 57% for the same scenarios in an earlier study. In each scenario the two sets of estimates, normal and reverse, were significantly different from each other indicating that participants were capable of distinguishing between the two concepts. Despite this fact in two of the four scenarios a significant minority of participants (44 and 49%) continued to commit the fallacy. These combined outcomes cast doubt on Wolfordet al.’s (1990) account of the fallacy. In addition, Studies 2 and 3 showed that under certain conditions, most participants’ judgments of the kind P(X|A&B) > P(X|B), far from being normative, were inconsistent with Bayes’ theorem even in broad terms.     

Can Facebook Informational Use Foster Adolescent Civic Engagement?

The findings on the association between Social Networking Sites and civic engagement are mixed. The present study aims to evaluate a theoretical model linking the informational use of Internet‐based social media (specifically, Facebook) with civic competencies and intentions for future civic engagement, taking into account the mediating role of civic discussions with family and friends and sharing the news online. Participants were 114 Italian high school students aged 14–17 years (57 % boys). Path analysis was used to evaluate the proposed theoretical model. Results showed that Facebook informational use was associated with higher levels of adolescent perceived competence for civic action, both directly and through the mediation of civic discussion with parents and friends (offline). Higher levels of civic competencies, then, were associated with a stronger intention to participate in the civic domain in the future. Our findings suggest that Facebook may provide adolescents with additional tools through which they can learn civic activities or develop the skills necessary to participate in the future.     

Is Modernism Really Modern? Uncovering a Fallacy in Postmodernism

Some postmodernists criticize the view that the logics of Western thought can be employed universally. In doing so, they assume without adequate proof that different human societies have greatly different rationalities and employ completely different logics. This essay argues that, on the contrary, widely different cultures often share noteworthy similarities in rationality.     

Attitude Change During College: Normative or Informational Social Influence?

Students from a small, tightly knit military college participated in a longitudinal study which assessed attitudes toward sociopolitical issues as well as military attitudes at entrance and three years later. A college-wide change in a conservative direction was predicted and observed (p < .001). While a normative influence explanation argues that peer group pressure is responsible for such attitude change, an explanation based on informational influence would argue that the knowledge communicated by faculty also plays a role. The results confirmed the existence of peer group influence on measures of military attitudes but not on measures of sociopolitical attitudes. Rather, and consistent with a process of informational influence, the academic major pursued by the students emerged as a significant predictor of change in sociopolitical attitudes, regardless of reference group identification.     

Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’

Much of our ordinary thought and talk about responsibility exhibits what I call the ‘pie fallacy’—the fallacy of thinking that there is a fixed amount of responsibility for every outcome, to be distributed among all those, if any, who are responsible for it. The pie fallacy is a fallacy, I argue, because how responsible an agent is for some outcome is fully grounded in facts about the agent, the outcome and the relationships between them; it does not depend, in particular, on how responsible anyone else is for that same outcome. In this paper, I explore how the pie fallacy can arise by considering several different kinds of case in which two or more agents are responsible for the same outcome. I’ll end with some brief remarks on the potential consequences of my arguments for how to think about responsibility in war.

     

Who's Gay? Does It Matter?

ABSTRACT— To answer the question "Who's gay?"—and its logical follow-up, "Does it matter?"—researchers usually define homosexuality with reference to one of three components or expressions of sexual orientation: sexual/romantic attraction or arousal, sexual behavior, and sexual identity. Yet, the three components are imperfectly correlated and inconsistently predictive of each other, resulting in dissimilar conclusions regarding the number and nature of homosexual populations. Depending on which component is assessed, the prevalence rate of homosexuality in the general population ranges from 1 to 21%. When investigators define the homosexual population based on same-sex behavior or identity, they enhance the possibility of finding a biological basis for homosexuality and a compromised mental health (suicidality).