Attachment-related strategies during thought suppression: ironic rebounds and vulnerable self-representations

The authors conducted 2 studies of attachment-related variations in thought suppression. Participants were asked, or not asked, to suppress thoughts about a relationship breakup and then to perform a Stroop task under high or low cognitive load. The dependent variables were the rebound, of previously suppressed separation-related thoughts (Study 1) and the accessibility of self-traits (Study 2). Under low cognitive load, avoidant individuals did not show any rebound of separation-related thoughts and activated positive self-representations. Under high cognitive load, avoidant participants failed to suppress thoughts of separation and were more likely to activate negative self-representations. Attachment anxiety was associated with high activation of negative self-representations and unremitting separation-related thoughts. The results are discussed in terms of the hidden vulnerabilities of avoidant individuals.     

Ironic effects of performance are worse for neurotics

ObjectivesTo conduct the first examination of neuroticism as a predictor of (1) the incidence of what Wegner (1989, 2009) terms ironic processes of mental control and (2) the precision of ironic performance errors under high- and low-anxiety conditions.DesignAcross two studies we employed a repeated-measures design.MethodIn a football penalty-shooting task (Study 1) and a dart-throwing (Study 2) task, under high-anxiety and low-anxiety conditions, participants gained maximum points for hitting a target zone and fewer points for hitting a designated non-ironic error zone. Additionally, we instructed participants to be particularly careful not to hit a designated ironic error zone, because such hits would score minimum points.ResultsAcross both studies within-subjects moderation analyses revealed a consistent moderating effect of neuroticism on the incidence of ironic errors in the high-anxiety condition. Specifically, when anxious, neurotics displayed a significant increase in ironic performance error and a significant decrease in target hits. Importantly, non-ironic error did not differ across anxiety conditions. Additionally, Study 2 results revealed that neuroticism moderated the precision of ironic errors when anxious. Specifically, when anxious, neurotics' ironic error zone hits were significantly farther from the target zone and significantly farther into the ironic error zone than their relatively emotionally stable counterparts’ errors.ConclusionWe provide the first evidence that neuroticism moderates both the incidence and precision of ironic performance errors. These results will enable practitioners in coaching environments to make evidence-based predictions and interventions regarding which individuals are most prone to ironic performance breakdown when anxious.     

The Putt and the Pendulum: Ironic Effects of the Mental Control of Action

People sometimes find themselves making movement errors that represent the ironic opposite of what they intended to do. These studies examined this tendency in the case of putting a golf ball and swinging a handheld pendulum, and found that ironic errors were particularly likely when participants who were instructed to avoid them tried to do so under mental load or physical load. The idea that such errors may be prompted by a monitoring process that increases sensitivity to the most undesirable outcome of an intention was supported by the finding of a tendency for ironic errors to be more evident when participants were allowed to monitor their action visually than when they could not.     

Selective attention to threat: A test of two cognitive models of anxiety

Two experiments evaluated differential predictions from two cognitive formulations of anxiety. According to one view, attentional biases for threat reflect vulnerability to anxiety; and as threat inputs increase, high trait anxious individuals should become more vigilant, and low trait individuals more avoidant, of threat (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988, 1997). However, according to a “cognitive-motivational” view, trait anxiety influences the appraisal of stimulus threat value, rather than the direction of attentional bias, and both high and low trait anxious individuals should exhibit greater vigilance for high rather than mild threat stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). To test these predictions, two experiments examined the effect of manipulating stimulus threat value on the direction of attentional bias. The stimuli included high threat and mild threat pictorial scenes presented in a probe detection task. Results from both studies indicated a significant main effect of stimulus threat value on attentional bias, as there was increased vigilance or reduced avoidance of threat, as threat value increased. This effect was found even within low trait anxious individuals, consistent with the “cognitive-motivational” view. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.     

Orienting and maintenance of gaze to facial expressions in social anxiety

In 2 experiments, the authors tested predictions from cognitive models of social anxiety regarding attentional biases for social and nonsocial cues by monitoring eye movements to pictures of faces and objects in high social anxiety (HSA) and low social anxiety (LSA) individuals. Under no-stress conditions (Experiment 1), HSA individuals initially directed their gaze toward neutral faces, relative to objects, more often than did LSA participants. However, under social-evaluative stress (Experiment 2), HSA individuals showed reduced biases in initial orienting and maintenance of gaze on faces (cf. objects) compared with the LSA group. HSA individuals were also relatively quicker to look at emotional faces than neutral faces but looked at emotional faces for less time, compared with LSA individuals, consistent with a vigilant-avoidant pattern of bias.     

Hindsight bias doesn't always come easy: causal models, cognitive effort, and creeping determinism

Creeping determinism, a form of hindsight bias, refers to people's hindsight perceptions of events as being determined or inevitable. This article proposes, on the basis of a causal-model theory of creeping determinism, that the underlying processes are effortful, and hence creeping determinism should disappear when individuals lack the cognitive resources to make sense of an outcome. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to read a scenario while they were under either low or high processing load. Participants who had the cognitive resources to make sense of the outcome perceived it as more probable and necessary than did participants under high processing load or participants who did not receive outcome information. Experiment 3 was designed to separate 2 postulated subprocesses and showed that the attenuating effect of processing load on hindsight bias is not due to a disruption of the retrieval of potential causal antecedents but to a disruption of their evaluation. Together the 3 experiments show that the processes underlying creeping determinism are effortful, and they highlight the crucial role of causal reasoning in the perception of past events.     

Thought suppression enhances memory bias for threat material

The current study examined the impact of thought suppression on indices of anxiety, including memory indices (implicit and explicit memory biases) and physiological indices (heart rate). The participants, 81 undergraduates scoring in the top quartile of a self-report measure of trait anxiety, were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups: thought suppression (TS), thought concentration (TC), and thought wandering (TW). The TC and TW groups were included to control for the effects of effortful processing and exposure to stimuli, respectively. One block of threat words and one block of neutral words were presented under conditions of cognitive load, and participants' physiological responses and memory biases were measured. The thought suppression group exhibited an enhanced overall memory bias for threat words, driven by an elevated explicit memory bias, relative to the other two groups, a result that has implications for ironic processes theory and may inform information-processing models of anxiety.     

A Working Memory Model of a Common Procedural Error

Systematic errors In performance are an important aspect of human behavior that have not received adequate explanation. One such systematic error is termed postcompletion error; a typical example is leaving one's card In the automatic teller after withdrawing cash. This type of error seems to occur when people have an extra step to perform in a procedure after the main goal has been satisfied. The fact that people frequently make this type of error, but do not make this error every time, may best be explained by considering the working memory load at the time the step is to be performed: The error is made when the load on working memory is high, but will not be made when the load is low. A model of performance In the task was constructed using Just and Carpenter's (1992) CAPS that predicted that high working memory load should be associated with postcompletion errors. Two experiments confirmed that such errors can be produced in a laboratory as well as a naturalistic setting, and that the conditions under which the CAPS model makes the error are consistent with the conditions under which the errors occur in the laboratory.     

Anxiety not only increases,but also alters early error-monitoring functions

Anxiety has profound influences on a wide range of cognitive processes, including action monitoring. Eventrelated brain potential (ERP) studies have shown that anxiety can boost early error detection mechanisms, as reflected by an enhanced error-related negativity (ERN) following errors in high-anxious, as compared with low-anxious, participants. This observation is consistent with the assumption of a gain control mechanism exerted by anxiety onto error-related brain responses within the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). However, whether anxiety simply enhances or, rather, alters early error detection mechanisms remains unsolved. In this study, we compared the performance of low-versus high-trait-anxious participants during a go/no-go task while high-density EEG was recorded. The two groups showed comparable behavioral performance, although levels of state anxiety increased following the task for high-anxious participants only. ERP results confirmed that the ERN/Ne to errors was enhanced for high-anxious, relative to low-anxious, participants. However, complementary topographic analyses revealed that the scalp map of the ERN/Ne was not identical between the two groups, suggesting that anxiety did not merely increase early error detection mechanisms, but also led to a qualitative change in the early appraisal of errors. Inverse solution results confirmed a shift within the ACC for the localization of neural generators underlying the ERN/Ne scalp map in high-anxious participants, corroborating the assumption of an early effect of anxiety on early error-monitoring functions. These results shed new light on the dynamic interplay between anxiety and error-monitoring functions in the human brain.     

状态焦虑对时距知觉的影响：认知评价和注意偏向有调节的中介作用

探讨状态焦虑对时距知觉的影响以及注意偏向与认知评价在其中的中介和调节作用。招募大学生60人, 随机分为高、低状态焦虑组, 用情绪诱导程序诱导高、低状态焦虑; 用点探测范式测量注意偏向; 用时间再现任务测量时距知觉; 用视觉模拟心境量表测量认知评价。结果发现：(1)状态焦虑会导致对2000 ms时距的高估; (2)注意偏向在状态焦虑对2000 ms时距知觉的影响中具有部分中介作用; (3)状态焦虑通过注意偏向影响时距知觉的中介过程受到认知评价的调节作用：只有当认知评价得分较高时, 即个体认为焦虑对心理健康有害程度较高时, 状态焦虑通过注意偏向影响2000 ms时距知觉。研究结果揭示了焦虑个体时距知觉的内部过程, 丰富了焦虑通过注意偏向影响时距知觉的解释视角, 为通过认知评价和注意偏向的调整改善焦虑个体时距偏差现象提供了重要参考。     

Busy perceivers and ineffective suppression goals: a critical role for distracter thoughts

With limited cognitive resources, suppressing thoughts can be ineffective. The detrimental effects of cognitive load on suppression have typically been attributed to increased accessibility of avoided thoughts. However, little research has examined distracter thoughts and their contribution to these effects. In three studies, participants pursued suppression goals related to social judgments (e.g., avoid negative thoughts about a target's performance) with sufficient or diminished cognitive resources. Compared to suppressors not under cognitive load, suppressors under load drew more negative social inferences when pursuing a negative suppression goal and more positive inferences under a positive suppression goal; load did not similarly disrupt a concentration goal (i.e., focus on positive thoughts). Across studies, load reduced high-quality oppositely valenced distracter thoughts, and these distracter thoughts mediated the detrimental effects of load on social inferences. The discussion focuses on mechanisms underlying the effects of load on suppression, implications, and future directions for research on ironic processes.     

Processing of task-irrelevant natural scenes in social anxiety

In this study, by manipulating perceptual load, we investigated whether socially anxious people process task-irrelevant, non-emotional, natural scenes. When attention was directed to letters and perceptual load was low, task-irrelevant natural scenes were processed, as evidenced by repetition priming effects, in both high and low socially anxious people. In the high perceptual load condition, repetition-priming effects decreased in participants with low social anxiety, but not in those with high social anxiety. The results were the same when attention was directed to pictures of animals: even in the high perceptual load condition, high socially anxious participants processed task-irrelevant natural scenes, as evidenced by flanker effects. However, when attention was directed to pictures of people, task-irrelevant natural scenes were not processed by participants in either anxiety group, regardless of perceptual load. These results suggest that high socially anxious individuals could not inhibit task-irrelevant natural scenes under conditions of high perceptual load, except when attention was focused on people.     

Working memory and spatial judgments: Cognitive load increases the central tendency bias

Previous work demonstrates that memory for simple stimuli can be biased by information about the distribution of which the stimulus is a member. Specifically, people underestimate values greater than the distribution’s average and overestimate values smaller than the average. This is referred to as the central tendency bias. This bias has been explained as an optimal use of both noisy sensory information and category information. In largely separate literature, cognitive load (CL) experiments attempt to manipulate the available working memory of participants in order to observe the effect on choice or judgments. In two experiments, we demonstrate that participants under high cognitive load exhibit a stronger central tendency bias than when under a low cognitive load. Although not anticipated at the outset, we also find that judgments exhibit an anchoring bias not described previously.     

Context-dependent activation of reduced autobiographical memory specificity as an avoidant coping style

According to the affect-regulation hypothesis (Williams et al., 2007), reduced autobiographical memory specificity (rAMS) or overgeneral memory (OGM) might be considered a cognitive avoidance strategy; that is, people learn to avoid the emotionally painful consequences associated with the retrieval of specific negative memories. Based on this hypothesis, one would predict significant negative associations between AMS and avoidant coping. However, studies investigating this prediction have led to equivocal results. In the present study we tested a possible explanation for these contradictory findings. It was hypothesized that rAMS (in part) reflects an avoidant coping strategy, which might only become apparent under certain conditions, that is, conditions that signal the possibility of 'danger.' To test this hypothesis, we assessed AMS and behavioral avoidance but experimentally manipulated the instructions. In the neutral condition, two parallel versions of the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) were presented under neutral instructions. In the threat condition, the first AMT was presented under neutral instructions, while the second AMT was presented under 'threat instructions.' Results showed no significant correlations between avoidance and OGM under neutral conditions but significant and markedly stronger correlations under threat conditions, with more avoidance being associated with fewer specific and more categoric memories. In addition, high avoiders showed a stronger reduction in AMS in the threat condition as compared with the neutral condition, while low avoiders showed no such difference between conditions. The data confirm that OGM can be considered as part of a broader avoidant coping style. However, more importantly, they show that, at least in nonclinical individuals, the activation of this coping style may depend on the context.     

Social anxiety and cognitive expectancy of aversive outcome in avoidance conditioning

Fear conditioning studies have shown that social anxiety is associated with enhanced expectancy of aversive outcome. However, the relation between cognitive expectancy and social anxiety has never been tested in avoidance conditioning paradigms. We compared 48 low (LSA) and high socially anxious individuals (HSA) on subjective expectancy of aversive outcome during an avoidance conditioning task. Displays of neutral faces were coupled with an aversive outcome (US): a shout and a shock. Participants could avoid the US by pressing a correct button from a button box. First, HSA showed higher US expectancy than LSA during the initial phase of avoidance conditioning, supporting the view that socially anxious individuals have an expectancy bias when social situations are ambiguous. Second, when the avoidance response became unavailable, LSA showed lower US expectancy than HSA, suggesting that low socially anxious individuals are prone to a positive bias when perceived threat is high. A lack of such positive bias in socially anxious individuals may lead to higher susceptibility to safety behavior interpretations. Together, these findings support the role of cognitive processes in avoidance conditioning and underscore the relevance to encounter avoidance learning when studying social anxiety.     

Neural and behavioral effects of regulating emotional responses to errors during an implicit racial bias task

Affect regulation plays a key role in several theories of racial bias reduction. Here, we tested whether engaging in emotion regulation strategies while performing an implicit racial bias task (Weapons Identification Task; WIT) would alter neural and behavioral manifestations of bias. Participants either suppressed or reappraised in a positive light the distress associated with making errors during the WIT, while an electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. We hypothesized that engaging in emotion regulation strategies would reduce the distress associated with making errors indicative of bias, resulting in smaller error-related negativity (ERN) amplitude during errors and increased expression of racial bias. Results of within-subjects comparisons (Experiment 1) generally supported these predictions. However, when emotion regulation strategies were manipulated between subjects (Experiment 2) there was no effect of suppression or reappraisal on bias expression. Across both experiments, engaging in emotion regulation led to larger ERNs for errors occurring on Black- relative to White-primed trials. In addition, a number of significant order effects were observed, indicating important differences in the effects of engaging in emotion regulation strategies when those strategies are attempted in participants’ first versus second block of trials. No such order effects were evident when a second trial block was completed with no emotion regulation instructions. Findings are discussed in terms of the need for greater specificity in experimental tests of emotion regulation on error processing and cognitive performance.     

Social anxiety and interpretation biases for facial displays of emotion: emotion detection and ratings of social cost

The current study assessed the processing of facial displays of emotion (Happy, Disgust, and Neutral) of varying emotional intensities in participants with high vs. low social anxiety. Use of facial expressions of varying intensities allowed for strong external validity and a fine-grained analysis of interpretation biases. Sensitivity to perceiving negative evaluation in faces (i.e., emotion detection) was assessed at both long (unlimited) and brief (60 ms) stimulus durations. In addition, ratings of perceived social cost were made indicating what participants judged it would be like to have a social interaction with a person exhibiting the stimulus emotion. Results suggest that high social anxiety participants did not demonstrate biases in their sensitivity to perceiving negative evaluation (i.e. disgust) in facial expressions. However, high social anxiety participants did estimate the perceived cost of interacting with someone showing disgust to be significantly greater than low social anxiety participants, regardless of the intensity of the disgust expression. These results are consistent with a specific type of interpretation bias in which participants with social anxiety have elevated ratings of the social cost of interacting with individuals displaying negative evaluation.     

Response inhibition and attentional control in anxiety

Traditionally, anxiety has been associated with a selective attentional bias for threat and a decreased capacity in attentional control. In two different experiments, we investigated whether individuals with different levels of self-reported state anxiety (Experiment 1) and induced anxiety (Experiment 2) had impaired response inhibition processes (attentional control deficit) as characterized by a different response style in the presence of negative stimuli under low and high perceptual load conditions. A go/no-go paradigm with emotional distractors (angry, happy, and neutral faces) was used to provide measures of perceptual sensitivity, inhibition, and response style. Our findings showed that perceptual sensitivity, as assessed by the d' parameter of signal detection theory, was reduced in all participants for angry faces under low perceptual load, where enough perceptual resources were available to be attracted by distractors. Importantly, despite similar perceptual sensitivity, the beta parameter indicated that high state anxiety individuals in both experiments were less flexible at adjusting to task demands in the presence of angry face distractors by adopting a stricter criterion. Implications of findings are discussed within current models of attentional control in anxiety.     

Stress and accessibility of proximity-related thoughts: exploring the normative and intraindividual components of attachment theory

Three studies examine the effects of stress on the accessibility of proximity-related thoughts. In all the studies, participants reported on their attachment style, and the accessibility of proximity themes and worries in a lexical decision task was assessed upon the priming of a stress or neutral word. In Study 2, the primed stress word was semantically related to attachment themes. In Study 3, lexical decisions were made under low or high cognitive load conditions. Overall, the priming of a stress word led to increased accessibility of proximity themes, regardless of attachment style. Anxious-ambivalent people also showed high accessibility to proximity themes and worries in both neutral and stress contexts. In most conditions, avoidant persons' reactions were similar to those of secure persons. However, they showed no accessibility to proximity worries even after the priming of a semantically related word and reacted with high accessibility to these worries upon the addition of cognitive load.     

Testing a dual-process model of avoidant defenses

Research suggests that the defensive strategy used by people who score high on attachment-related avoidance when they encounter interpersonal threats involves two stages: automatic vigilance followed by effortful avoidance. In two studies we varied stimulus exposure times and cognitive load to determine how attention is regulated by avoidant individuals. Results indicate that avoidant individuals were vigilant toward contempt faces when the faces were presented for 100 ms but quickly disengaged from them when the faces were presented for 750 ms. Moreover, avoidant participants could disengage from contempt faces presented for 750 ms while rehearsing a simple 1-digit number, but not when rehearsing a 7-digit number, suggesting that avoidant disengagement is a cognitively effortful process. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.