Memory for questions and amount of processing

Two experiments were carried out on how questions are remembered. Subjects watched a videotape of a series of simple events and then answered 18 questions about these events. The questions were all of the same general syntactic form (e.g., “Did the pencil fall against the jug on A?”, where A refers to a particular location). They were designed to elicit three sorts of answer: “yes,” “no” because the event took place at another location, and “no” because the event did not take place at all. After the subjects had answered the questions, they were given an unexpected test of their ability to recall them. A difference in the memorability of the questions was predicted on the basis of a procedural theory of comprehension and a hypothesis about memory subjects should cease to process a question when they realize that it concerns an event that did not take place, and such questions should be harder to remember because they are processed to a lesser degree than the other sorts of question. Experiment 1 confirmed the predictions, but its results in part could be accounted for by assuming that subjects recalled the original events and used them as a cue to remembering the questions. Experiment 2 eliminated this explanation by showing that when subjects do not have to answer certain questions, their recall of them is very poor. However, the same differences in the memorability of the three sorts of question were obtained for both answered and unanswered questions.     

Training and Generalization of a ”Yes-No” Discrimination with a Developmentally Delayed Child

By watching and responding to the way a shill answered “yes-no” questions about food items, a developmentally delayed preschool boy not only greatly improved over his poor baseline “yes-no” answers to these same items, but also to “yes-no” answers during generalization probe sessions to untrained objects that included picture cards and body parts. Correct “yes-no” answers during follow-up sessions was also high for both the trained and untrained objects. The suggested mechanism for improvement was the elaborated from of answers the shill issues, which served to highlight and prompt “yes” versus “no” answers. Generalized “yes-no” answers improved as the training components (removing the shill and prior labeling questions) approximated the form of the generalized probe sessions. Experiment II confirmed that as soon as the labels for new objects were taught, “yes-no” answers to all labeled objects was immediately perfect and remained so thereafter. To nonlabled objects, “yes-no” answers were initially at chance level, but these answers for certain nonlabeled objects subsequently improved and their names were learned without explicit training, apparently through prior correct “yes-no” responding.     

Feeling happy and (over)confident: the role of positive affect in metacognitive processes

The relationship between affect and metacognitive processes has been largely overlooked in both the affect and the metacognition literatures. While at the core of many affect-cognition theories is the notion that positive affective states lead people to be more confident, few studies systematically investigated how positive affect influences confidence and strategic behaviour. In two experiments, when participants were free to control answer interval to general knowledge questions (e.g. question: “in what year”, answer: “it was between 1970 and 1985”), participants induced with positive affect outperformed participants in a neutral affect condition. However, in Experiment 1 positive affect participants showed larger overconfidence than neutral affect participants. In Experiment 2, enhanced salience of social cues eliminated this overconfidence disadvantage of positive affect relative to neutral affect participants, without compromising their enhanced performance. Notably, in both experiments, positive affect led to compromised social norms regarding the answers’ informativeness. Implications for both affect and metacognition are discussed.     

Developing the Receptive and Productive Use of Pronouns in an Autistic Child:

In Experiment I, a preschooler with language delays and unable to answer “my-your” questions was successfully trained to answer “my-your” questions when reinforced for modeling an adult's answers to questions about possessive pronouns. Despite acquisition of the expressive use of the possessive case, generalization probes under conditions of nonmodeling and nonreinforcement showed no transfer at the receptive and expressive levels. Modeling and reinforcement training procedures in Experiment II improved the receptive use of “my-your” performance, but generalization probes revealed no receptive transfer. These same procedures in Experiment III improved the expressive use of “his-her” answers and, this time, immediate generalization of training for “his-her” occurred at the expressive and receptive levels. To facilitate generalization from the expressive to the receptive level, special programming-for-generalization procedures were used, involving reduced rated of reinforcement during training (Experiment I) and intermixing training trails with generalization probe trails (Experiment II).     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: the plurality option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.     

Question Design Affects Students' Sense-Making on Mathematics Word Problems

Mathematics word problems provide students with an opportunity to apply what they are learning in their mathematics classes to the world around them. However, students often neglect their knowledge of the world and provide nonsensical responses (e.g., they may answer that a school needs 12.5 buses for a field trip). This study examined if the question design of word problems affects students' mindset in ways that affect subsequent sense-making. The hypothesis was that rewriting standard word problems to introduce inherent uncertainty about the result would be beneficial to student performance and sense-making because it requires students to reason explicitly about the context described in the problem. Middle school students (N = 229) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the standard textbook condition, students solved a set of six word problems taken from current textbooks. In the modified yes/no condition, students solved the same six problems rewritten so the solution helped answer a “yes” or “no” question. In the disfluency control condition, students solved the standard problems each rewritten in a variety of fonts to make them look unusual. After solving the six problems in their assigned condition, all students solved the same three “problematic” problems designed to assess sense-making. Contrary to predictions, results showed that students in the modified yes/no condition solved the fewest problems correctly in their assigned condition problem set. However, consistent with predictions, they subsequently demonstrated more sense-making on the three problematic problems. Results suggest that standard textbook word problems may be able to be rewritten in ways that mitigate a “senseless” mindset.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eyewitness memory: Balancing the accuracy,precision and quantity of information through metacognitive monitoring and control

Although memory deteriorates over time, people may be able to maintain high accuracy by metacognitively monitoring the quality of their memories and strategically controlling their memory reports. We test two mechanisms of metacognitive control: Exercising a report option (withholding uncertain responses) and adjusting response precision (providing imprecise, but likely accurate, responses). Participants observed a mock crime and were interviewed after 10 minutes or 1 week. Interviews consisted of answerable questions in one of three formats (free narrative, cued recall, yes/no), allowing participants to exert more or less control over their answers. Participants' reports showed tradeoffs between accuracy, quantity and precision of information. Depending on the question format, participants maintained high accuracy even at the delayed report either by opting not to answer (yes/no or cued recall) or by providing imprecise answers (cued recall or free narrative). We discuss implications for experimental research, metacognitive theory and the criminal justice system. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Clever hands: uncontrolled intelligence in facilitated communication

Five studies examined how people who are answering questions on behalf of another person may use their own knowledge to answer correctly while attributing authorship of their answers to the other. Experiments 1 and 2 found that participants instructed to answer yes/no questions randomly were unable to do so. They were more often correct on easy than hard questions, and extended opportunity and incentive did not reduce this effect. Experiments 3-5 found similar correctness for participants who were asked to answer yes/no questions by sensing either the ostensible keyboard finger movements or unvoiced inclinations of another person who had been admonished not to answer, and who was infact a confederate and was not even given the questions. In this paradigm, the answers were often attributed to the other.     

Answering yes-no questions about causes: Question acts and question categories

Three experiments examined the cognitive process of answering yes-no questions about causes. Singer’s VAIL model of question answering predicted that readers would take longer to correctly answer “no” than “don’t know” to such questions. In Experiment 1, the antecedent sentences used either the causal conjunction so orbecause. Experiment 2 compared so with an implicit causal link. In all conditions, the main prediction was strongly supported. However, when the questions referred to brief stories in Experiment 3, correct “no” and “don’t know” response latencies did not differ. It was concluded that (1) VAIL identifies the cognitive operations underlying the answering of causal questions; (2) answering yes-no questions about causes resembles answering yes-no questions about case-filling elements; (3) the yes-no versus wh- distinction is orthogonal to the type of relation asked about; and (4) studying question answering about sentences will contribute to the understanding of question answering about text.     

Information selection and use in hypothesis testing: What is a good question,and what is a good answer?

The process of hypothesis testing entails both information selection (asking questions) and information use (drawing inferences from the answers to those questions). We demonstrate that although subjects may be sensitive to diagnosticity in choosing which questions to ask, they are insufficiently sensitive to the fact that different answers to the same question can have very different diagnosticities. This can lead subjects to overestimate or underestimate the information in the answers they receive. This phenomenon is demonstrated in two experiments using different kinds of inferences (category membership of individuals and composition of sampled populations). In combination with certain information-gathering tendencies, demonstrated in a third experiment, insensitivity to answer diagnosticity can contribute to a tendency toward preservation of the initial hypothesis. Results such as these illustrate the importance of viewing hypothesis-testing behavior as an interactive, multistage process that includes selecting questions, interpreting data, and drawing inferences.     

Two methods of reducing overconfidence

Prior research has suggested that most people are seriously overconfident in their answers to general knowledge questions. We attempted to reduce over-confidence in each of two separate experiments. In Experiment 1 half of the subjects answered five practice questions which appeared to be difficult. The remaining subjects answered practice problems which appeared to be easy but were actually just as difficult as the other group's practice questions. Within each of these two groups, half of the subjects received feedback on the accuracy of their answers to the practice questions, while the other half received no feedback. All four groups then answered 30 additional questions and indicated their confidence in these answers. The group which had received five apparently “easy” practice questions and then had been given feedback on the accuracy of their answers was underconfident on the final 30 questions. In Experiment 2 subjects who anticipated a group discussion of their answers to general knowledge questions took longer to answer the questions and expressed less overconfidence in their answers than did a control group.     

再探猜谜作业中“顿悟”的ERP效应

采用事件相关电位(ERP)技术探讨顿悟问题（字谜）解决中提供答案后的脑内时程动态变化。结果发现,在250~400 ms内,“有顿悟”和“不理解”比“无顿悟”的ERP波形均有一个更为负向的偏移。在“有顿悟—无顿悟”和“不理解—无顿悟”的差异波中,这个负成分的潜伏期约为320 ms (N320),地形图显示,N320在中后部活动最强。进一步对“有顿悟—无顿悟”差异波作偶极子溯源分析,发现N320主要起源于扣带前回（ACC）附近。这似乎表明,N320可能反映了提供答案瞬间新旧思路之间的认知冲突,但是却不能真正揭示顿悟问题解决中思维定势的成功突破以及“恍然大悟”所对应的独特脑内时程变化     

Using verification feedback to correct errors made on a multiple-choice test

A key educational challenge is how to correct students’ errors and misconceptions so that they do not persist. Simply labelling an answer as correct or incorrect on a short-answer test (verification feedback) does not improve performance on later tests; error correction requires receiving answer feedback. We explored the generality of this conclusion and whether the effectiveness of verification feedback depends on the type of test with which it is paired. We argue that, unlike for short-answer tests, learning whether one's multiple-choice selection is correct or incorrect should help participants narrow down the possible answers and identify specific lures as false. To test this proposition we asked participants to answer a series of general knowledge multiple-choice questions. They received no feedback, answer feedback, or verification feedback, and then took a short-answer test immediately and two days later. Verification feedback was just as effective as answer feedback for maintaining correct answers. Importantly, verification feedback allowed learners to correct more of their errors than did no feedback, although it was not as effective as answer feedback. Overall, verification feedback conveyed information to the learner, which has both practical and theoretical implications.     

Please May I Have a Bike? Better Yet, May I Have a Hug? An Examination of Children’s and Adolescents’ Happiness

Academic research on children’s and adolescents’ happiness has been slow to develop. This research provides an empirical investigation to answer the question, “What makes children and adolescents happy?” We explore this question in two studies with a total of 300 participants ages 8–18. Study 1 asks participants to answer the open-ended question, “What makes me happy?” There were five emergent themes—“people and pets,” “achievements,” “material things,” “hobbies,” and “sports”. Study 2 also asks participants to answer the question, “What makes me happy?”, but uses two different measures (a semi-structured thought listing task and a collage task). Using three different happiness measures, we found consistent age differences in what children perceive to make them happy.     

Using verification feedback to correct errors made on a multiple-choice test

A key educational challenge is how to correct students' errors and misconceptions so that they do not persist. Simply labelling an answer as correct or incorrect on a short-answer test (verification feedback) does not improve performance on later tests; error correction requires receiving answer feedback. We explored the generality of this conclusion and whether the effectiveness of verification feedback depends on the type of test with which it is paired. We argue that, unlike for short-answer tests, learning whether one's multiple-choice selection is correct or incorrect should help participants narrow down the possible answers and identify specific lures as false. To test this proposition we asked participants to answer a series of general knowledge multiple-choice questions. They received no feedback, answer feedback, or verification feedback, and then took a short-answer test immediately and two days later. Verification feedback was just as effective as answer feedback for maintaining correct answers. Importantly, verification feedback allowed learners to correct more of their errors than did no feedback, although it was not as effective as answer feedback. Overall, verification feedback conveyed information to the learner, which has both practical and theoretical implications.     

Detecting true and false opinions: The Devil's Advocate approach as a lie detection aid

We examined the efficacy of a new approach to detect truths and lies in expressing opinions: the Devil's Advocate approach. Interviewees are first asked an opinion eliciting question that asks participants to argue in favour of their personal view. This is followed by a Devil's Advocate question that asks participants to argue against their personal view. People normally think more about reasons that support rather than oppose their opinion. Therefore we expected truth tellers to provide more information and shorter latency times in their responses to the opinion eliciting question than to the Devil's Advocate question. Liars are expected to reveal the opposite pattern as the Devil's Advocate question is more compatible with their beliefs than is the opinion eliciting question. In Experiment 1, we interviewed seventeen truth tellers and liars via the Devil's Advocate approach and measured the difference in number of words and latency times to the two questions. Our hypotheses were supported. In Experiment 2, 25 observers were shown these interviews, and made qualitative judgements about the statements. Truth tellers' opinion eliciting answers were seen as more immediate and plausible and revealed more emotional involvement than their Devil's Advocate answers. No clear differences emerged in liars' answers to the two types of question. We conclude that the Devil's Advocate approach is a promising lie detection approach that deserves attention in future research.     

意图信息在物权判断和道德判断中的作用

意图会影响人们的道德判断,但尚不清楚意图在物权判断中的作用。本研究以266名非法学专业的大学生为被试,通过包含不同意图（恶意/善意/无意）的故事情境,考察了在损失求偿和获益分享情境中人们的物权判断和道德判断。结果发现,在损失求偿情境中,不管是出于善意、恶意还是无意,被试均判断行为者应当赔偿他人损失,但不认为无意的行为者应受谴责。在获益分享情境中,被试认为善意的行为者应分享给他人带来的收益且应受赞扬,但恶意的行为者不应分享收益和受赞扬。综合来看,物权判断比道德判断较少受意图信息的影响,反映人们的物权判断具有领域特异性。     

Relating familiarity-based recognition and the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon: Detecting a word’s recency in the absence of access to the word

After viewing a list of single-word answers to general knowledge questions, participants received a test list containing general knowledge questions, some of whose answers were studied, and some of whose were not. Regardless of whether participants could provide the answer to a test question, they rated the likelihood that the answer had been studied. Across three experiments,participants consistently gave higher ratings to unanswerable questions whose answers were studied than to those whose answers were not studied. This discrimination ability persisted in the absence of reported tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states and when no information about the answer could be articulated. Studying a question's answer did not increase the likelihood of a later TOT state for that question, yet participants gave higher recognition ratings when in a TOT state than when not in a TOT state. A possible theoretical mechanism for the present pattern is discussed, as are relevant theories of familiarity-based recognition and of the TOT phenomenon.     

The Effect of Language-Specific Characteristics on English and Japanese Speakers' Ability to Recall Number Information

The current paper presents two experiments investigating the effect of presence versus absence of compulsory number marking in a native language on a speaker's ability to recall number information from photos. In Experiment 1, monolingual English and Japanese adults were shown a sequence of 110 photos after which they were asked questions about the photos. We found that the English participants showed a significantly higher accuracy rate for questions testing recall for number information when the correct answer was “2” (instead of “1”) than Japanese participants. In Experiment 2, English and Japanese adults engaged in the same task as in Experiment 1 with an addition that explored reasons for the results found in Experiment 1. The results of Experiment 2 were in line with the results of Experiment 1, but also suggested that the results could not be attributed to differences in guessing patterns between the two groups or the type of linguistic constructions used in the test situations. The current study suggests that native language affects speakers' ability to recall number information from scenes and thus provides evidence for the Whorfian hypothesis.