Primacy of functional knowledge in semantic representations: the case of living and nonliving things

In 3 experiments, participants decided whether sensory and functional features were true of living and nonliving concepts. In Experiments 1 and 2, concepts were presented twice: test phase followed study phase after either 3 min (Experiment 1) or 3 s (Experiment 2). At test, concepts were paired with the same feature as that at study, or a different feature from either the same modality (within-modality priming) or another modality (cross-modality priming). In both experiments functional decisions were faster than sensory decisions for living and nonliving concepts. Whilst no semantic priming occurred between study and test in Experiment 1, the shorter study-test interval of Experiment 2 did lead to test phase semantic priming. Here there was greater within- than cross-modality priming for sensory decisions, but equivalent within- and cross-modality priming for functional decisions owing to significantly greater facilitation of functional decisions from prior sensory decisions than vice versa. Experiment 3 involved a single verification phase: For half the participants the feature name preceded the concept name, and for half the concept name preceded the feature name. The functional processing advantage persisted irrespective of presentation order. Results suggest that functional information is central to the representation of all concepts: Function is processed faster than sensory information and is activated obligatorily.     

Names,concepts, features and the living/nonliving things dissociation

The present paper evaluates different hypotheses for explaining the living/nonliving things dissociation phenomenon in terms of feature type, considering the role of this dimension in the organization of conceptual semantic representations and in the activation of name representations. For this purpose we used Sloman and associates' (Memory and Cognition 27(3) (1999) 526; Cognitive Science 22(2) (1998) 189) name centrality and conceptual centrality tasks and asked subjects to judge functional and perceptual/visual features of living and nonliving items. Conceptual centrality results are more in accordance with a "single feature-domain connection hypothesis" where visual features are more important than functional features for the representation of living things and no feature type advantage is found for nonliving things. Name centrality results show that functional features are more important than sensory/visual features overall, a result that is not predicted by any of the hypotheses considered. The fact that the two judgments diverge emphasizes their importance for evaluating the role of feature type in the living/nonliving dissociation. Implications for explaining this phenomenon are also discussed.     

Semantic satiation affects category membership decision time but not lexical priming

Experiments 1 and 2 examined the effects of semantic satiation on category membership decision latency. Subjects overtly repeated the name of a category either 3 or 30 times, and then decided whether or not a target exemplar was a member of the repeated category. Experiment 1 obtained some evidence that member decisions are slower and nonmember decisions are faster following 30 repetitions, but only the interaction was reliable. Experiment 2 confirmed only that member decisions are slower following satiation of the category name. The results support the hypothesis that prolonged repetition of a word reduces the availability of semantic information related to that word. Experiment 3 showed that the magnitude of priming in the lexical decision task is unaffected by satiation of the prime. Several general approaches to understanding semantic satiation are discussed. The most parsimonious account assumes that satiation affects the links or pathways connecting concepts in the satiated category. The net effect is to decrease the rate of search and associative spread of activation in conceptual structures.     

Crowded and sparse domains in object recognition: consequences for categorization and naming

Some models of object recognition propose that items from structurally crowded categories (e.g., living things) permit faster access to superordinate semantic information than structurally dissimilar categories (e.g., nonliving things), but slower access to individual object information when naming items. We present four experiments that utilize the same matched stimuli: two examine superordinate categorization and two examine picture naming. Experiments 1 and 2 required participants to sort pictures into their appropriate superordinate categories and both revealed faster categorization for living than nonliving things. Nonetheless, the living thing superiority disappeared when the atypical categories of body parts and musical instruments were excluded. Experiment 3 examined naming latency and found no difference between living and nonliving things. This finding was replicated in Experiment 4 where the same items were presented in different formats (e.g., color and line-drawn versions). Taken as a whole, these experiments show that the ease with which people categorize items maps strongly onto the ease with which they name them.     

A computational model of semantic memory impairment: modality specificity and emergent category specificity.

It is demonstrated how a modality-specific semantic memory system can account for category-specific impairments after brain damage. In Experiment 1, the hypothesis that visual and functional knowledge play different roles in the representation of living things and nonliving things is tested and confirmed. A parallel distributed processing model of semantic memory in which knowledge is subdivided by modality into visual and functional components is described. In Experiment 2, the model is lesioned, and it is confirmed that damage to visual semantics primarily impairs knowledge of living things, and damage to functional semantics primarily impairs knowledge of nonliving things. In Experiment 3, it is demonstrated that the model accounts naturally for a finding that had appeared problematic for a modality-specific architecture, namely, impaired retrieval of functional knowledge about living things. Finally, in Experiment 4, it is shown how the model can account for a recent observation of impaired knowledge of living things only when knowledge is probed verbally.     

Semantic feature knowledge and picture naming in dementia of Alzheimer's type: a new approach

This study addresses continuing controversies concerning the nature of semantic impairment in early dementia of the Alzheimer type (DAT), and the relationship between conceptual knowledge and picture naming. A series of analyses of fine-grained feature knowledge data show that: (1) distinctive features of concepts were more vulnerable than shared; (2) the amount of attribute knowledge about a concept was associated reliably, and in a graded fashion, with the ability to name a picture of that item; (3) sensory features were differentially important in naming; and (4) the degree of disruption to different types of attribute knowledge did not vary between items from living and nonliving domains. These findings are discussed in the context of contemporary cognitive and computational models of semantic memory organisation.     

Locus of Control and Implicit Memory

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the influence of locus of control on implicit and explicit memory. We hypothesized that internals would rely on semantic processing, externals on perceptual processing. In Experiment 1, 80 college students studied 36 words and completed an implicit memory test in either a consistent or cross-modality condition. The results revealed that externals had higher priming scores than did internals, regardless of modality. In Experiment 2, 80 college students took either an implicit or explicit test. The results again revealed that externals showed higher priming scores than internals. The higher priming scores exhibited by the externals do not necessarily mean that they are more perceptually oriented than the internals are.     

Preserved Semantic Priming Effect in Alexia

BH, a left-handed patient with alexia and nonfluent aphasia, was presented with a lexical-decision task in which words and pronounceable pseudowords were preceded by semantically related or unrelated picture primes (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, BH was given an explicit reading task using the word lists from Experiment 1. Performance on Experiment 2 disclosed severe reading deficits in both oral reading and semantic matching of the words to pictures. However, in Experiment 1, BH demonstrated a significant semantic priming effect, responding more accurately and more quickly to words preceded by related primes than by unrelated primes. The present results suggest that even in a patient with severe alexia, implicit access to semantic information can be preserved in the absence of explicit identification. The possibility of categorical gradient in implicit activation (living vs. nonliving) in BH was also discussed, which, however, needs to be clarified in the further investigation.     

Semantic processing of living and nonliving concepts across the cerebral hemispheres

Studies of patients with category-specific semantic deficits suggest that the right and left cerebral hemispheres may be differently involved in the processing of living and nonliving domains concepts. In this study, we investigate whether there are hemisphere differences in the semantic processing of these domains in healthy volunteers. Based on the neuropsychological findings, we predicted a disadvantage for nonliving compared to living concepts in the right hemisphere. Our prediction was supported, in that semantic decisions to nonliving concepts were significantly slower and more error-prone when presented to the right hemisphere. In contrast there were no hemisphere differences for living concepts. These findings are consistent with either differential representation or processing of concepts across right and left hemispheres. However, we also found a disadvantage for nonliving things compared to living things in the left hemisphere, which is not consistent with a simple representation account. We discuss these findings in terms of qualitatively different semantic processing in right and left hemispheres within the framework of a distributed model of conceptual representation.     

Enhanced processing fluency leads to biases in source memory

The present experiments were conducted to determine whether processing fluency affects source memory decisions. In the first three experiments, participants decided whether test items appeared in the same sensory modality (Experiments 1A, 1B) or perceptual form (font type, Experiment 2) at study and test. The results were consistent across the three studies and showed that perceptual priming leads to an increase in reports that stimuli were presented in the same sensory or perceptual form during the study and test phase. Experiment 3 showed that conceptual fluency affects source attributions in much the same way as perceptual fluency, and Experiment 4 showed that fluency is associated with a subjective experience of familiarity even when it might serve as a basis for source inference. These results are consistent with recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that familiarity-based processes contribute to source memory decisions under some circumstances, such as when items and contexts are unitized rather than merely bound together at encoding.     

Enhanced processing fluency leads to biases in source memory

The present experiments were conducted to determine whether processing fluency affects source memory decisions. In the first three experiments, participants decided whether test items appeared in the same sensory modality (Experiments 1A, 1B) or perceptual form (font type, Experiment 2) at study and test. The results were consistent across the three studies and showed that perceptual priming leads to an increase in reports that stimuli were presented in the same sensory or perceptual form during the study and test phase. Experiment 3 showed that conceptual fluency affects source attributions in much the same way as perceptual fluency, and Experiment 4 showed that fluency is associated with a subjective experience of familiarity even when it might serve as a basis for source inference. These results are consistent with recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that familiarity-based processes contribute to source memory decisions under some circumstances, such as when items and contexts are unitized rather than merely bound together at encoding.     

The mental representation of living and nonliving things: differential weighting and interactivity of sensorial and non-sensorial features

Warrington and colleagues (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) claimed that sensorial and functional-associative (FA) features are differentially important in determining the meaning of living things (LT) and nonliving things (NLT). The first aim of the present study was to evaluate this hypothesis through two different access tasks: feature generation (Experiment 1) and cued recall (Experiment 2). The results of both experiments provided consistent empirical support for Warrington and colleagues' assumption. The second aim of the present study was to test a new differential interactivity hypothesis that combines Warrington and colleagueS' assumption with the notion of a higher number of intercorrelations and hence of a stronger connectivity between sensorial and non-sensorial features for LTs than for NLTs. This hypothesis was motivated by previoUs reports of an uncrossed interaction between domain (LTs vs NLTs) and attribute type (sensorial vs FA) in, for example, a feature verification task (Laws, Humber, Ramsey, & McCarthy, 1995): while FA attributes are verified faster than sensorial attributes for NLTs, no difference is observed for LTs. We replicated and generalised this finding using several feature verification tasks on both written words and pictures (Experiment 3), including in conditions aimed at minimising the intervention of priming biases and strategic or mnemonic processes (Experiment 4). The whole set of results suggests that both privileged relations between features and categories, and the differential importance of intercorrelations between features as a function of category, modulate access to semantic features.     

The mental representation of living and nonliving things: Differential weighting and interactivity of sensorial and non-sensorial features

Warrington and colleagues (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) claimed that sensorial and functional-associative (FA) features are differentially important in determining the meaning of living things (LT) and nonliving things (NLT). The first aim of the present study was to evaluate this hypothesis through two different access tasks: feature generation (Experiment 1) and cued recall (Experiment 2). The results of both experiments provided consistent empirical support for Warrington and colleagues' assumption. The second aim of the present study was to test a new differential interactivity hypothesis that combines Warrington and colleagues' assumption with the notion of a higher number of intercorrelations and hence of a stronger connectivity between sensorial and non-sensorial features for LTs than for NLTs. This hypothesis was motivated by previous reports of an uncrossed interaction between domain (LTs vs NLTs) and attribute type (sensorial vs FA) in, for example, a feature verification task (Laws, Humber, Ramsey, & McCarthy, 1995): while FA attributes are verified faster than sensorial attributes for NLTs, no difference is observed for LTs. We replicated and generalised this finding using several feature verification tasks on both written words and pictures (Experiment 3), including in conditions aimed at minimising the intervention of priming biases and strategic or mnemonic processes (Experiment 4). The whole set of results suggests that both privileged relations between features and categories, and the differential importance of intercorrelations between features as a function of category, modulate access to semantic features.     

Evaluating feature-category relations using semantic fluency tasks

The issue of the relationship between semantic features and semantic categories has been raised by Warrington and colleagues, who claimed that sensory and functional-associative features are differentially important in determining the meaning of living and nonliving things (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). In the present study, the effectiveness of semantic memory search for living and nonliving things with sensory and functional-associative search cues was evaluated through eight different adaptations of the semantic fluency task. More living thing responses and clusters were generated from sensory than from functional-associative search cues, while the reverse pattern holds for nonliving things responses and clusters. The results thus provide consistent empirical support for the assumption that sensory properties are fundamental in the representation of living things, while functional-associative properties are fundamental in the semantic representation of nonliving things.     

Interference in memory for pictorial information

Subjects studied either faces composed from visual features or verbal facts composed from concepts. Recognition times were increased for both faces and facts when they were composed of elements that occurred in multiple study items. In Experiment 1 the interfering effect of other study items was much larger for verbal facts than for faces. This difference was largely eliminated in Experiment 2 where care was taken to control the features by which the faces were encoded. Experiment 2 also showed that verbal information could interfere with pictorial information and vice versa. However, this cross-modality interference was much weaker than within-modality interference. The data are consistent with the ACT theory in which pictorial material and verbal material are stored together in an abstract propositional network. The subnode model (Anderson, Language, memory, and thought, Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1976) can account for the greater within- than cross-modality interference.     

Phonological and semantic priming: Evidence for task-independent effects

The questions asked in the present experiments concern the generality of semantic and phonological priming effects: Do these effects arise automatically regardless of target task, or are these effects restricted to target tasks that specifically require the retrieval of the primed information? In Experiment 1, subjects produced faster color matching times on targets preceded by a masked rhyming prime than on targets preceded by an orthographic control or an unrelated prime. This result suggests that automatic priming effects on the basis of phonological similarity can be obtained even when the target task does not make use of phonological information. This claim was reinforced in Experiment 2 in which a rhyme priming effect and a semantic priming effect were found in a semantic categorization task. In Experiment 3, the target task was phonological (rhyme detection), and, again, both phonological and semantic priming effects were observed. Finally, in Experiments 4 and 5, in a replication and an extension of Experiment 1, phonological and semantic priming effects were found in a color matching task, a task involving neither phonological nor semantic processing. These results are most straightforwardly interpreted by assuming that both semantic and phonological priming effects are, at least in part, due to automatic activation of memorial representations.     

Why is a verb like an inanimate object? Grammatical category and semantic category deficits

Semantic category effects, such as difficulties in naming animate things relative to inanimate objects, have been explained in terms of the relative weightings of perceptual and functional features within the semantic representations of these concepts. We argue that grammatical category deficits, such as difficulties in naming nouns relative to verbs, can be explained within the same framework. We hypothesize that verb concepts are richer in functional than sensory features and present a model of the semantic representations of animate nouns, inanimate nouns, and verbs. The model demonstrates that sensory feature damage results in a deficit for naming living things but spares verb naming, and functional feature damage results in a deficit for naming inanimate objects and verbs. We then report the assessment results of two patient groups. In accordance with the model's predictions, the "verb spared" patients were consistently worse at naming living things than inanimate objects, and their definitions of both living and nonliving items were lacking in sensory information. We conclude that damage to sensory features in semantic representations causes difficulties in naming concrete nouns relative to action verbs, and within the grammatical category of nouns, animate items will be more severely affected. Imageability was shown to be a strong predictor of naming performance in the "verb deficit" patients, and when this variable was controlled no class effect remained. Production of definitions revealed no differential damage to sensory or functional features, and no consistent effect of animacy in naming was shown. While the model suggests that verb deficits might occur in patients for whom functional features are damaged relative to sensory features, we conclude that the "verb deficit" shown in our patients (and potentially in many previously reported cases) was an artifact of the lower imageability of verbs in confrontation naming tasks.     

Sometimes a noun is just a noun: comments on Bird, Howard, and Franklin (2000)

Bird, Howard, and Franklin (2000) have proposed a semantic-conceptual explanation of grammatical category-specific deficits that attributes impairments in noun and verb processing to two distinct mechanisms. According to their account, apparent deficits in verb production are not category specific, but rather result from the lower imageability of verbs compared to concrete nouns. Noun deficits are said to result from differences in the distribution of semantic feature types such that damage to sensory features results in disproportionate impairments in naming nouns, especially animate nouns, compared to verbs. However, this hypothesis, which we call the "extended sensory/functional theory" (ESFT), fails on several counts. First, the assumption that representations of living things are more heavily freighted with sensory features than are those of nonliving objects does not have any reliable empirical basis. Second, the ESFT incorrectly predicts associations between deficits in processing sensory features and living things or functional features and nonliving things. Finally, there are numerous cases of patients with grammatical category-specific deficits that do not seem to be consistent with damage at the semantic level. All of this suggests that the ESFT is not a useful model for considering grammatical (or semantic) category-specific deficits.     

Recognizing the un-real McCoy: priming and the modularity of face recognition

Fodor (1983) has proposed that face perception is carried out by an informationally encapsulated module, whose operation is unaffected by context or expectancies. We tested the modularity hypothesis by examining whether discriminations between normal and distorted versions of famous faces can be primed, either by the name of an associated person (semantic context) or by a valid cue as to the identity of the target face (expectancy). A preliminary experiment showed that, in the absence of priming, discriminations between normal and distorted versions of a face were unaffected by whether the target faces were familiar or not, confirming that these judgments tap perceptual, not postperceptual (semantic), coding processes. In Experiment 1, accuracy was significantly higher when target face pairs were preceded by related name primes, as compared with unrelated ones. In Experiment 2, reaction times were significantly faster for targets preceded by a valid identity cue than for targets preceded by an invalid one. Neither effect could be explained as a speed—accuracy tradeoff. These results fail to support Fodor’s conjecture that face processing is encapsulated.