Preference for oddity: uniqueness heuristic or hierarchical choice process?

Traditional economic theories assume decision makers in multialternative choice tasks "assign" a value to each option and then express rational preferences. Here, I report an apparent violation of such rationality in gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis). I tested the jays' preference in a quaternary choice task where three options were the same color and the fourth option was a different color. All options offered an identical food reward and so the strictly rational expectation was that subjects would choose the odd-colored option in 25% of choices. In clear disagreement, every subject chose the odd option more frequently than expected. I speculate as to how this surprising preference for oddity might have been ecologically rational: by using a unique-choice heuristic, the jays might have been able to bypass a deliberative phase of the decision process and devote more attention to scanning for predators. Alternatively, it is conceivable that the jays did not prefer oddity per se. Instead, they might have used a hierarchical process, assigning options to color categories and then choosing between categories. If so, their behavior matches expectation after all (on average, subjects chose the odd option 50% of the time). It should be straightforward to test these competing hypotheses. The current results can be viewed as a new example of how simple mechanisms sometimes produce economically puzzling yet ecologically rational decision making.     

Choice-induced preferences in the absence of choice: Evidence from a blind two choice paradigm with young children and capuchin monkeys

In two studies, we provide a test of the revealed-preferences account of choice-induced preferences. To do so, we introduce a blind two-choice task in which preferences cannot guide choices. Children chose between two similar objects while ignorant of the objects’ identities, and then chose between the rejected alternative and a third similar object. Monkeys were given an illusion of choice between two similar objects, and then chose between the rejected object and a third similar object. Both children and monkeys preferred the third object, indicating that they devalued the rejected object. This response pattern did not occur when the children and monkeys were not given the opportunity to choose between the two initial items. These results provide evidence against a revealed-preferences account of choice-induced preferences and demonstrate that the process of making a choice itself induces preferences.     

Erroneous choice and foregone gains in hoarding gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis)

Under the conventional assumption that natural selection favors choice behavior that maximizes some fitness-related currency, a forager making repeated binary choices should consistently choose the more valuable option. Under the alternative assumption that natural selection favors choice behavior that minimizes costly errors, erroneous choice is not only expected but is expected to be common when the cost of errors is low. This cost depends on the potential rate of return: the higher this rate, the smaller the cost of choosing the less valuable option. When this rate is very high, a forager may err frequently and yet forego no appreciable fitness gain. Errors should thus be more common when interruptions to foraging are shorter. Our experimental results supported this prediction: gray jays chose the less valuable option more frequently when subjected to shorter interruptions (experimentally imposed delays to access to food rewards). This tendency is consistent with the idea that an adaptive decision-making process may routinely produce errors, not because errors are in some way adaptive but because their fitness cost is minimal, particularly when delays are short. From a proximate perspective, this tendency to commit errors more frequently following shorter delays may be due to constraints on the jays’ information-processing capacity. In general, choice behavior should be viewed as the joint byproduct of adaptive decision making and cognitive constraints. Received: 8 June 2000 / Accepted after revision: 21 October 2000     

The Politics of Choice: Political Ideology and Intolerance of Ambiguity

The authors examine how political ideology impacts consumer preferences for hedonic and utilitarian choices and the underlying reasons for these differences. Five studies indicate that conservatives are less tolerant of ambiguity than liberals, leading to a preference for utilitarian options, whereas liberals are more tolerant of ambiguity leading to a preference for hedonic options. However, these preferences were reversed when utilitarian options were framed as ambiguous and hedonic options were framed as explicit and clear.     

What should we expect from a dual-process theory of preference construction in choice?

Dhar and Gorlin (2013) proposed a dual-process framework for understanding the effects of preference construction in choice. Drawing on the distinction operating principles and operating conditions, it is argued that their emphasis on cognitive elaboration fails to specify the mental operations involved in preference construction. This limitation makes their dual-process framework circular and susceptible to the criticism of single-process alternatives. The distinction between associative and propositional processes has the potential to fill this conceptual gap, thereby providing a more thorough understanding of preference construction effects in choice.     

Differential predictability of preferences and choices

A combined multi-attribute utility and expectancy-value model has repeatedly been found to yield a worse fit to choices than to preference ratings. The present study investigated two possible explanations for this finding. First, people's belief-value structures may change in the choice task as they try to find the best alternative. Second, a difficult choice task may cause the decision maker to use simplifying heuristics. In the first of two experiments, subjective belief-value structures were measured on two occasions separated by about one week. Immediately before the second measurement, different groups of subjects performed a choice task, gave preference ratings, or performed a control task. The results did not support an interpretation of the greater difficulty of predicting choices in terms of changes in belief-value structures. However, the notion of simplifying heuristics received support by the finding that adopting simpler versions of the original model improved the predictions of the choices. In the second experiment, beliefs were measured immediately before or after each of a series of choices or preference ratings. The results indicated that although temporary changes in beliefs may occur, they can hardly provide a full account of the differential predictability of preferences and choices.     

Developmental trends in everyday conditional reasoning: the retrieval and inhibition interplay

Two experiments examined developmental patterns in children’s conditional reasoning with everyday causal conditionals. In Experiment 1, a group of pre-, early, young, and late adolescents generated counterexamples for a set of conditionals to validate developmental claims about the counterexample retrieval capacity. In Experiment 2, participants in the same age range were presented with a conditional reasoning task with similar conditionals. Experiment 1 established that counterexample retrieval increased from preadolescence to late adolescence. Experiment 2 showed that acceptance rates of the invalid affirmation of the consequent inference gradually decreased in the same age range. Acceptance rates of the valid modus ponens inference showed a U-shaped pattern. After an initial drop from preadolescence to early adolescence, modus ponens acceptance ratings increased again after the onset of adolescence. Findings support the claim that the development of everyday conditional reasoning can be characterized as an interplay between the development of a counterexample retrieval and inhibition process.     

On self-referencing differences in judgment and choice

Compared to judgment, choice is argued to elicit more self-referent processing and thereby produce greater subsequent recall of evaluated information. This response mode effect is shown to be dependent upon sufficient visualization to overcome the use of heuristic processing during choice. When visualizing prior to the task, choice leads to increased thinking about personal consumption occasions relative to judgment, leading to enhanced recall of vivid (vs. non-vivid) attributes. This proposed interaction of task and visualization was found in two experiments that assessed incidental recall following a choice or judgment task. In experiment 1, participants recalled more vivid product attribute information after choosing between options than after rating each option separately, but only when instructed to visualize during evaluation. To eliminate a comparison-based explanation of this effect, a second experiment was conducted that presented only one option in each category. Participants who evaluated their intention to purchase the option (a judgment equivalent of choice) demonstrated greater recall of vivid product attribute information than did participants who rated their liking for the option, and this recall difference was again moderated by instructions to visualize.     

Looking behaviour and preference for artworks: The role of emotional valence and location

The position of an item influences its evaluation, with research consistently finding that items occupying central locations are preferred and have a higher subjective value. The current study investigated whether this centre-stage effect (CSE) is a result of bottom-up gaze allocation to the central item, and whether it is affected by item valence. Participants (n = 50) were presented with three images of artistic paintings in a row and asked to choose the image they preferred. Eye movements were recorded for a subset of participants (n = 22). On each trial the three artworks were either similar but different, or were identical and with positive valence, or were identical and with negative valence. The results showed a centre-stage effect, with artworks in the centre of the row preferred, but only when they were identical and of positive valence. Significantly greater gaze allocation to the central and left artwork was not mirrored by equivalent increases in preference choices. Regression analyses showed that when the artworks were positive and identical the participants' last fixation predicted preference for the central art-work, whereas the fixation duration predicted preference if the images were different. Overall the result showed that item valence, rather than level of gaze allocation, influences the CSE, which is incompatible with the bottom-up gaze explanation. We propose that the centre stage heuristic, which specifies that the best items are in the middle, is able to explain these findings and the centre-stage effect.     

Sadness and consumption

Sadness influences consumption, leading individuals to pay more to acquire new goods and to eat more unhealthy food than they would otherwise. These undesirable consumption effects of sadness can occur without awareness, thus representing more than just conscious attempts at “retail therapy.” In an experiment with real food consumption, the present paper examines the hypothesis that sadness' impact on consumption could be attenuated if the choice context counteracted appraisals of helplessness and enhanced a sense of individual control. Results revealed that: (1) sadness elevates self-reports of helplessness in response to the emotion-inducing situation, (2) helplessness mediates the sadness–consumption effect, and (3) inducing a sense of control (via choice) attenuates sadness' effect.     

Probability as a psychological distance: Construal and preferences

We argue that probability, like space and time, instantiates psychological distance. Unlikely outcomes may seem more remote than likely outcomes and may therefore be construed at a relatively high level. Specifically, when the probability of an outcome is low, ends-related primary features should be more salient than means-related secondary features, but as the probability of the outcome increases, means-related features may become no less and even more salient than ends-related features. Thus, increases in probability should increase the weight of means-related features relative to the weight of ends-related features in decisions, thereby decreasing (or even reversing) the preference for a more desirable/less feasible outcome over a less desirable/more feasible outcome. We observed this pattern in two experiments. Analyses of judgments, monetary decisions, and self-reported reasons for decisions showed that the weight of means-related features was more sensitive to changes in probability than the weight of ends-related features in decisions.     

Modeling the Stroop phenomenon: processes, processing flow, and development

A model of the Stroop phenomenon is proposed which postulates that the classic effect is an additive function of three parameters, that is, dimension selection (decision making about which dimension to respond to), dimension identification (encoding and identification of the relevant dimension), and interference control (filtering out of interference from non-relevant dimensions). The study used stimuli addressed to three symbol systems (verbal, numerical, and figural), two types of stimulus composition (compatible vs. incompatible), and two types of dimension selection (decision needed about the to-be-identified dimension vs. no decision needed). Participants were 9, 11, 13, and 15 years old and they were tested twice. The model was found to hold under all stimulus and presentation conditions. Moreover, it was found that the three parameters are differentially related to age. The implications of the model for general theories of cognition and cognitive development are discussed.     

A Comparison of American and Nepalese Children's Concepts of Freedom of Choice and Social Constraint

Recent work has shown that preschool‐aged children and adults understand freedom of choice regardless of culture, but that adults across cultures differ in perceiving social obligations as constraints on action. To investigate the development of these cultural differences and universalities, we interviewed school‐aged children (4–11) in Nepal and the United States regarding beliefs about people's freedom of choice and constraint to follow preferences, perform impossible acts, and break social obligations. Children across cultures and ages universally endorsed the choice to follow preferences but not to perform impossible acts. Age and culture effects also emerged: Young children in both cultures viewed social obligations as constraints on action, but American children did so less as they aged. These findings suggest that while basic notions of free choice are universal, recognitions of social obligations as constraints on action may be culturally learned.     

Rankings,standards, and competition: Task vs. scale comparisons

Research showing how upward social comparison breeds competitive behavior has so far conflated local comparisons in task performance (e.g. a test score) with comparisons on a more general scale (i.e. an underlying skill). Using a ranking methodology ( Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006) to separate task and scale comparisons, Studies 1–2 reveal that an upward comparison on the scale (e.g. being surpassed in rank), rather than in the mere task (e.g., being outperformed), is necessary to generate competition among rivals proximate to a standard (e.g. ranked #3 vs. 4, near “the top”); rivals far from a standard (e.g. ranked #203 vs. 204), on the other hand, still tend to cooperate. Study 3 illustrates this finding with player trades in Major League Baseball. Study 4 further shows how an implicit scale comparison, instead of the commonly assumed explicit task comparison, may account for those classical competition findings in the literature. Study 5 then reveals how scale ranking becomes all important in the proximity of a standard, leading rivals to tolerate even an upward scale comparison to increase their proximity to the standard. Implications for the increasingly popular “forced ranking” management systems (e.g., at General Electric) are also discussed.