When is a cause the "same"? Coherent generalization across contexts

Two competing psychological approaches to causal learning make different predictions regarding what aspect of perceived causality is generalized across contexts. Two experiments tested these predictions. In one experiment, the task required a judgment regarding the existence of a simple causal relation; in the other, the task required a judgment regarding the existence of an interaction between a candidate cause and unobserved background causes. The task materials did not mention assessments of causal strength. Results indicate that causal power (Cartwright, 1989; Cheng, 1997) is the mental construct that people carry from one context to another.     

When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

When is a Deleuzian becoming ?

Much has been written recently about the Deleuzian concept of becoming. Most of that writing, especially in feminist criticism, has drawn from the later collaborations with Guattari. However, the concept of a becoming arises earlier and appears more consistently across the trajectory of Deleuze's work than the discussion of specific becomings might lead one to believe. In this paper, I trace the concept of becoming in Deleuze's work, and specifically in the earlier works. By doing so, I hope to shed some light on the specific becomings that are the focus of the collaborative work with Guattari, and to deepen an understanding of the concept in general.     

When is a Concrete Property Basic?

We more or less understand how composition works in the case of objects. We cement bricks together to build a wall. We stir together red paint and yellow paint to get orange paint. In both cases, one way or another, A = B + C. This paper examines composition in the case of concrete natural properties. It explains why property composition is so much less straightforward than object composition. Then it distinguishes strictly basic properties (like the mass of an electron), compositely basic properties (like the mass of a planet), and fully non-basic properties (like the saltiness of blood). It shows how strictly basic properties compose, or result in, compositely basic and fully non-basic properties, which differ from, yet depend for their natures on, the strictly basic properties they result from. It explains the characteristics and differences of these types of properties. It notes that the existence of compositely basic and non-basic properties grounds an argument for the genuine existence of composite properties as well as the composite objects they characterize. Finally, it defends the usefulness of these distinctions by identifying projects they assist, and by applying them both to mark off distinct metaphysical views too often conflated and to correct sundry metaphysical mistakes.     

When is a weight not illusory?

Weight illusions occur whenever some aspect of an object--such as its size, material or colour--arouses the expectation that its weight will be heavier or lighter than it actually is. The direction of the illusion normally contrasts with the expected weight. When objects are hidden from sight and lifted by strings they can provide no misleading cues, and a correct weight-expectation should be achieved after one or two trials. When a visible object has the same physical and apparent weight as a hidden object, it can be defined as non-illusory. Weighted tins and polystyrene blocks of various sizes were compared with hidden weights. Tins were found to be non-illusory when their density was about 1.7, and polystyrene blocks when their density was about 0.14.

Weight illusions may be due to a central scaling process which enables a wide range of weights to be estimated, different ranges being selected according to the expected value of the weight. If the selected range is inappropriate an illusion occurs. Changes in expected value could also allow for the operation of “weight-constancy” during changes in proprioceptive stimulation.     

When is a cognitive system embodied?

For cognitive systems, embodiment appears to be of crucial importance. Unfortunately, nobody seems to be able to define embodiment in a way that would prevent it from also covering its trivial interpretations such as mere situatedness in complex environments. The paper focuses on the definition of embodiment, especially whether physical embodiment is necessary and/or sufficient for cognitive systems. Cognition is characterized as a continuous complex process rather than ahistorical logical capability. Furthermore, the paper investigates the relationship between cognitive embodiment and the issues of understanding, representation and task specification.     

When does length cause the word length effect?

The word length effect, the finding that lists of short words are better recalled than lists of long words, has been termed one of the benchmark findings that any theory of immediate memory must account for. Indeed, the effect led directly to the development of working memory and the phonological loop, and it is viewed as the best remaining evidence for time-based decay. However, previous studies investigating this effect have confounded length with orthographic neighborhood size. In the present study, Experiments 1A and 1B revealed typical effects of length when short and long words were equated on all relevant dimensions previously identified in the literature except for neighborhood size. In Experiment 2, consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) words with a large orthographic neighborhood were better recalled than were CVC words with a small orthographic neighborhood. In Experiments 3 and 4, using two different sets of stimuli, we showed that when short (1-syllable) and long (3-syllable) items were equated for neighborhood size, the word length effect disappeared. Experiment 5 replicated this with spoken recall. We suggest that the word length effect may be better explained by the differences in linguistic and lexical properties of short and long words rather than by length per se. These results add to the growing literature showing problems for theories of memory that include decay offset by rehearsal as a central feature.     

When is peer rejection justifiable? Children's understanding across two cultures

This study investigated how Korean (N = 397) and U.S. (N = 333) children and adolescents (10 and 13 years of age) evaluated personality (aggression, shyness) and group (gender, nationality) characteristics as a basis for peer rejection in three contexts (friendship rejection, group exclusion, victimization). Overall, peer rejection based on group membership was viewed as more unfair than peer rejection based on personality traits. Children viewed friendship rejection as more legitimate than group exclusion or victimization and used more personal choice reasoning for friendship rejection than for rejection in any other context. Although there were a few cultural differences, overall, the findings provided support for the cultural generalizability of social reasoning about peer rejection.     

When is a counselor …?

A work experience project for low income adults is described. “Counselors” in this project were found to have little experience; little training in interviewing, statistics, psychological analysis, or other guidance and counseling techniques; and inadequate supervision. Results on aptitude tests were reported on the average 26 days after test administration. Occupational information was sadly lacking. The question is raised: When is a counselor… ?     

Why is loving a thief not the same as loving all men for the Mohists?

The purpose of this article is to explain the Mohists’ perceived inconsistences of the following three propositions in the Mojing since we attribute to them an unconditional love toward human beings: (A) A thief is a man. Killing a thief is not killing men. (B) A thief is a man. Loving a thief is not loving men. (C) Zang is a man. Loving Zang is loving men. The attribution of unconditional love toward human beings is not unusual to the Mohists when we render the Mohist idea of jian’ai as universal love. My interpretation first suggests that we can consistently interpret the Mohist ethical position as intentional utilitarianism. Second, I claim that Mohist universal love includes some generality, though it does not have to mean universality without exception. This Mohist generality will be explained through the generic use of nouns.     

When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

When is a Schema Not a Schema? On a Remark by Suszko

Studia Logica - A 1971 paper by Roman Suszko, ‘Identity Connective and Modality’, claimed that a certain identity-free schema expressed the condition that there are at most two objects...     

When is motion 'motion'?

Examples of visual motion have become more and more abstract over the years, leading up to 'third-order' stimuli where direction is actually determined by the observer through top - down attention. But how far can this be pushed--are there motion stimuli that are yet more arbitrary and abstract? Actually, there is a broad class of 'conceptual motion' stimuli--things like a moving grating of faces, or a shifting pattern of words--that are perfect analogs to traditional 'perceptual motion' stimuli, solvable by the same motion computation and for which observers can readily make direction-of-motion judgments. Interestingly though, these do not produce a sensation of motion (among other automatic consequences of motion detection). Here we compare a luminance-based perceptual motion stimulus to a semantic-based conceptual motion stimulus to contrast the psychophysical hallmarks of these motion categories.     

Telling a “baby story”: Mothers narrating their pre-schoolers' past across two cultural contexts

Mothers from two middle-class contexts from Berlin, Germany (n = 35), and Delhi, India (n = 28) told a baby story to their 3-year olds about an event that had happened during the children's first year of life. The contexts represented two cultural models: the model of psychological autonomy (Berlin) and the model of autonomy-relatedness (Delhi). We investigated the culture-specific functions of this reminiscing task as reflected in the structure, content and specificity of the stories. The stories in both contexts were minimally interactive and the children contributed few elaborations themselves. Stories told by the Berlin mothers were longer, and more specific. Mothers in both contexts were similarly elaborative relative to being repetitive. The stories were highly child-centred in both contexts but even more child-centred for Delhi. Importantly, maternal narrations from the Berlin context were embedded in a frame story that characterised the child's individual past; stories thus constructed “exclusive baby stories”. Most stories told by the Delhi mothers had no frame story but instead were about what the child used to do as a baby in general; they thus constructed “routine baby stories”. Results are interpreted in the view of the underlying self, social and directive functions of this reminiscing task.     

Actions,contexts, memory—what is the relation?

Whole list contexts have been found to influence action memory differently than item-specific contexts. Usually there is no recall enhancement with item-specific contexts, but considerable improvement with whole-list contexts. Three experiments investigated the effect of both kinds of context upon action memory. The results showed that whole-list contexts gave the beneficial effect, probably through their ability to string together actions within a common frame. Contrary to expectation the effects of item-specific contexts were not found to differ between motor and nonmotor encoding conditions, irrespective of whether these contexts were self-generated or provided by the experimenter. The experimental results suggest that the function of item-specific contexts has more to do with helping item differentiation than relational encoding. Since action events possess a high degree of distinctiveness, there is not much to gain by the addition of item-specific contexts in action memory tasks.     

“What is a class?”

Conclusion The argument of this paper suggests that for the last hundred years or so fundamental premisses of logic have been incorrect. From these premisses a vast superstructure has been developed which, it would seem, is no more meaningful than a game such as chess.The basic errors in current class theory, it seems to me, have impeded progress in the fields of mathematics and logic. I am certain that on the theory proposed, the correct definition of a natural number can be provided. I can, in fact, provide this. What benefits it will bring to logic only time will tell.Of the greatest importance is the fact that if the theory is true, at last, there will be a firm link between the Humanities and the Sciences.     

Where is here? When is now?1

With a Kleinian perspective influenced by Betty Joseph, the author describes the distinctive ‘here and now’ of a psychoanalysis as the place and the time of the patient’s inner subjective world as it emerges in the work of patient and analyst. This psychoanalytic ‘here’ and ‘now’ is examined with clinical material from the analysis of Mr X; first, with an account of the way his analysis begins and then through a detailed session five years later.The author identifies Mr X’s problems with place and time, and how these change over the course of the analysis. He moves from sequestered dyadic relationships towards an Oedipal and family space, and from disconnection and timelessness to acquiring a sense of duration, of being in the present with a past and a future – all of which, the paper aims to show, has implications for technique.