Questions versus statements: challenging an assumption about semantic illusions

In previous semantic-illusion research the tacit assumption has been that questions and statements-to-be-verified of similar semantic content lead to a similar proportion of semantic illusions. This assumption was made despite the fact that questions are thought to have different processing demands from those of statements. This paper presents empirical evidence that questions tend to lead to more semantic illusions than do statements-to-be-verified. Two experiments were carried out to provide a direct comparison between the semantic-illusion rates for statements and for questions. In Experiment 1, open-ended questions led to significantly more semantic illusions than did true/false statements. Experiment 2 replicated this effect using multiple-choice response options in the question condition. It is concluded that the syntactic form of a sentence affects the way in which semantic information is processed, and the implications of the findings are discussed.     

The informative value of type of repetition: Perceptual and conceptual fluency influences on judgments of truth

We contrast the effects of conceptual and perceptual fluency resulting from repetition in the truth effect. In Experiment 1, participants judged either verbatim or paraphrased repetitions, which reduce perceptual similarity to original statements. Judgments were made either immediately after the first exposure to the statements or after one week. Illusions of truth emerged for both types of repetition, with delay reducing both effects. In Experiment 2, participants judged verbatim and paraphrased repetitions with either the same or a contradictory meaning of original statements. In immediate judgments, illusions of truth emerged for repetitions with the same meaning and illusions of falseness for contradictory repetitions. In the delayed session, the illusion of falseness disappeared for contradictory statements. Results are discussed in terms of the contributions of recollection of stimulus details and of perceptual and conceptual fluency to illusions of truth at different time intervals and judgmental context conditions.     

How focus at encoding affects children’s source monitoring

Retention of source information is enhanced by focus on speakers’ feelings about statements even though recognition is reduced for both adults and children. However, does any focus on another person lead to enhanced source monitoring, or is a particular kind of focus required? Does other-focus enhance source monitoring, or does self-focus detract from it? In Experiment 1, 4- and 6-year-olds watched two speakers make statements in a no-focus control or with focus directed on how they (or a speaker) felt about the statements or on perceptual features about themselves (or the speaker). Source monitoring decisions were enhanced by other-focus in both the perceptual and emotional conditions. However, the effect was larger for the emotional condition, and source monitoring exceeded no-focus controls only for this condition. Experiment 2 showed no effect of other-focus versus self-focus on source monitoring when questions were semantic.     

Fluency, familiarity, aging, and the illusion of truth

Research has shown that repeated statements are rated as more credible than new statements. However, little research has examined whether such "illusions of truth" can be produced by contextual (nonmnemonic) influences, or compared to the magnitude of these illusions in younger and older adults. In two experiments, we examined how manipulations of perceptual and conceptual fluency influenced truth and familiarity ratings made by young and older adults. Stimuli were claims about companies or products varying in normative familiarity. Results showed only small effects of perceptual fluency on rated truth or familiarity. In contrast, manipulating conceptual fluency via semantic/textual context had much larger effects on rated truth and familiarity, with the effects modulated by normative company familiarity such that fluency biases were larger for lesser-known companies. In both experiments, young and older adults were equally susceptible to fluency-based biases.     

Fluency,Familiarity, Aging,and the Illusion of Truth

ABSTRACT

Research has shown that repeated statements are rated as more credible than new statements. However, little research has examined whether such “illusions of truth” can be produced by contextual (nonmnemonic) influences, or compared to the magnitude of these illusions in younger and older adults. In two experiments, we examined how manipulations of perceptual and conceptual fluency influenced truth and familiarity ratings made by young and older adults. Stimuli were claims about companies or products varying in normative familiarity. Results showed only small effects of perceptual fluency on rated truth or familiarity. In contrast, manipulating conceptual fluency via semantic/textual context had much larger effects on rated truth and familiarity, with the effects modulated by normative company familiarity such that fluency biases were larger for lesser-known companies. In both experiments, young and older adults were equally susceptible to fluency-based biases.     

The effect of working memory load on semantic illusions: What the phonological loop and central executive have to contribute

When asked how many animals of each kind Moses took on the Ark, most people respond with “two” despite the substituted name (Moses for Noah) in the question. Possible explanations for semantic illusions appear to be related to processing limitations such as those of working memory. Indeed, individual working memory capacity has an impact upon how sentences containing substitutions are processed. This experiment examined further the role of working memory in the occurrence of semantic illusions using a dual-task working memory load approach. Participants verified statements while engaging in either articulatory suppression or random number generation. Secondary task type had a significant effect on semantic illusion rate, but only when comparing the control condition to the two dual-task conditions. Furthermore, secondary task performance in the random number generation condition declined, suggesting a tradeoff between tasks. Response time analyses also showed a different pattern of processing across the conditions. The findings suggest that the phonological loop plays a role in representing semantic illusion sentences coherently and in monitoring for details, while the role of the central executive is to assist gist-processing of sentences. This usually efficient strategy leads to error in the case of semantic illusions.     

Disjunctive illusory inferences and how to eliminate them

The mental model theory of reasoning postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities in which the premises of an inference hold and that these models represent what is true but not what is false. An unexpected consequence of this assumption is that certain premises should yield systematically invalid inferences. This prediction is unique among current theories of reasoning, because no alternative theory, whether based on formal rules of inference or on probabilistic considerations, predicts these illusory inferences. We report three studies of novel illusory inferences that depend on embedded disjunctions—for example, premises of this sort: A or else (B or else C). The theory distinguishes between those embedded disjunctions that should yield illusions and those that should not. In Experiment 1, we corroborated this distinction. In Experiment 2, we extended the illusory inferences to a more stringently controlled set of problems. In Experiment 3, we established a novel method for reducing illusions by calling for participants to make auxiliary inferences.     

On the categorical nature of the semantic interference effect in the picture-word interference paradigm

Two picture-word interference experiments are reported in which the boundaries of the semantic interference effect are explored. In both experiments, participants named pictures (e.g., a picture of a car) that appeared with superimposed word distractors. Distractor words from the same semantic category as the word for the picture (e.g., CAR) produced semantic interference, whereas semantically related distractors from a different category (e.g.,Bumper) led to semantic facilitation. In Experiment 2, the semantic facilitation from semantically related distractors was replicated. These results indicate that a semantic relationship between picture and distractor does not necessarily lead to interference and in fact can lead to facilitation. In all but one case tested until now, a semantic relationship between picture and distractor has led to semantic facilitation. The implications of these results for the assumption that the semantic interference effect arises as a consequence of lexical competition are discussed.     

The detection of semantic illusions: Task-specific effects for similarity and position of distorted terms

The effect of task demands on the detection of semantic illusions was investigated. In Exp. 1, subjects were given a detection task with different instructions for accuracy. Less illusions occurred under instructions that stressed accuracy, indicating strategic control of detection rates. In Exp. 2, sentences with dissimilar distorted terms resulted in shorter latencies than sentences with similar distorted terms in a detection task, but in longer response times in a question-answering task. In Exp. 3, the similarity effect was found to vary with the position of the distorted term in combination with task demands. In a verification task, the similarity effect did not differ for the beginning or the end of sentences. In a question-answering task, a significant similarity effect was observed only for distorted terms at the beginning of sentences. We argue that the results indicate minimal depth of semantic processing with respect to different task requirements. Implications for different theoretical accounts of semantic illusions are discussed.     

A comparison of hyponym and synonym decisions

Is class inclusion (hyponymy) a more primitive or simpler semantic relation than synonymy? This question was addressed by comparing the time required to identify examples of the two relations in a semantic decision task. In two experiments subjects made truelfalse decisions about statements of the form “An A is a B.” In Experiment 1 category-member and synonym pairs were randomly intermixed; there was no difference between the two relations. In Experiment 2 one group was presented with the two relations randomly intermixed, as in Experiment 1 (mixed condition), while two other groups were each presented with just one of the relations (separate condition). In the separate condition responses were faster to class inclusion than to synonym pairs, while in the mixed condition there was no difference, as in Experiment 1. The results suggest that class inclusion may be a simpler relation than synonymity, although the difference may simply reflect the use to which the two relations are put in common use. The fact that the difference occurred in the separate but not in the mixed conditions suggests that the latencies reflected the evaluation of the relations against a decision criterion rather than directly reflecting lexical organization or everyday usage.     

Is this a question? Not for long. The statement bias

Four experiments demonstrate a fundamental ‘statement bias’: questions are more often misremembered as statements than vice versa. The bias increases with increasing item comprehensibility (Experiment 1) and is related to depth of processing at encoding (Experiment 2). When sentences are simply comprehended, the bias is not affected by the truth of the statement underlying the sentence (Experiment 3). The statement bias generalizes to contexts in which people have to express consent with the content of the sentence (Experiment 4) but is somewhat reduced when they are not sure what the correct answer is. Our findings are consistent with the idea that during processing of a sentence the content of the sentence is represented similar to a statement.     

Effects of interviewer behavior on accuracy of children's responses

Previous research has shown that certain interviewer behaviors can evoke inaccurate answers by children. In the current study, we examined the effects of approving and disapproving statements on the accuracy of 3 children's answers to questions in an interview (Experiment 1). We then evaluated 3 questioning techniques that may be used by interviewers during a forensic interview in which a child provides eyewitness testimony (Experiment 2). All participants responded with more inaccurate answers when approving statements followed inaccurate information and disapproving statements followed accurate information in Experiment 1. During Experiment 2, 1 participant responded most inaccurately when she was requestioned after providing an initial answer, whereas the remaining 2 participants responded most inaccurately when the interviewer provided cowitness information and suggestive questions.     

Event-related potentials indicate different processes to mediate categorical and associative priming in person recognition

Whether representations of people are stored in associative networks based on co-occurrence or are stored in terms of more abstract semantic categories is a controversial question. In the present study, participants performed fame decisions to unfamiliar or famous target faces (Experiment 1) or names (Experiment 2), which were primed, either by highly associated celebrity names or by names from the same occupational category, or were unprimed. Reaction times and event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Reaction times yielded significant priming effects for both associated and same category conditions. ERPs to targets in the associated condition were significantly more positive than were ERPs in all other conditions over central and parietal areas (300-600 ms; N400 priming effect). By contrast, a more posterior effect was found for categorical priming. These findings held for both cross-domain (Experiment 1) and within-domain conditions (Experiment 2). Results (a) demonstrate behavioral and ERP evidence for categorical priming in person recognition, consistent with the assumption that shared semantic information units can mediate semantic priming, and (b) suggest that associative and categorical priming are based on mechanisms that are at least partially different.     

Comparing color-word and picture-word Stroop-like effects: A test of the Glaser and Glaser (1989) model

Summary Glaser and Glaser (1989) assume that the processing of colors and pictures is highly similar in that, compared to words, both kinds of stimulis have privileged access to semantic information. This assumption was tested in the present research. In Experiment 1, the season corresponding to the color or to the word of color-word Stroop stimuli had to be named (e.g., green for spring). In Experiment 2, subjects had to name the season corresponding to the picture or the word of a picture-word stimulus (e. g., flower for spring). According to Glaser and Glaser (1989), privileged semantic processing of colors and pictures should be evidenced by a larger interfering power of color and picture distractors than of word distractors. However, the asymmetric pattern of interference was observed only with picture-word stimuli (Experiment 2), but not with color-word stimuli (Experiment 1), suggesting that, unlike pictures, colors do not have privileged access to semantic information. It was also found that word distractors interfered with the semantic processing of pictures, a result that is incompatible with the dominance rule postulated by Glaser and Glaser (1989). From these results, an adapted version of the Glaser and Glaser model is proposed: colors are assumed to have privileged access to a separate color processing system and the pattern of interference depends upon the relative activation strength of the response alternatives activated by the target and the distractor.     

Some effort for some: further evidence that scalar implicatures are effortful

Under the assumption of the principle of cooperation (Grice, 1989), a statement such as "some eels are fish" is thought to be false since it contains less information than is considered sufficient. However, the statement is logically sound since the meaning of "some" is compatible with "all". Currently, the primary interpretation of such underinformative statements remains subject to debate. According to Levinson (2000), the pragmatic "some but not all" interpretation is the default interpretation, while others (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995) argue that this pragmatic interpretation only comes to the fore when relevant within the context and is thus considered secondary to the logical "some and perhaps all" interpretation. In this study, three factors that may influence the answer pattern are studied: task load, working memory capacity, and repetition of the statements. In Experiment 1, we used a secondary task paradigm to manipulate the cognitive load under which a number of underinformative statements had to be judged. We observed that for participants with a rather limited working memory span it is harder to reach a pragmatic interpretation under cognitive load. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the repetition of the statements. We observed that with a higher number of filler statements, participants produced fewer consistent answer patterns. This study provides further evidence against the automaticity of the pragmatic interpretation: It shows that the pragmatic interpretation requires more cognitive effort than the logical interpretation and that increasing the number of filler statements inhibits the development of a response strategy.     

Testing the tilt-constancy theory of visual illusions

Prinzmetal and Beck (2001) Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 27 206 - 217) argued that a subset of visual illusions is caused by the same mechanisms that are responsible for the perception of vertical and horizontal a theory they referred to as the tilt-constancy theory of visual illusions. They argued that these illusions should increase if the observer's head or head and body are tilted because extra reliance would then be placed on the illusion-inducing local visual context. Exactly that result had previously been reported in the case of the tilted-room and the rod-and-frame illusions. Prinzmetal and Beck reported similar increases in the tilt illusion (TI), as well as the Z?llner, Poggendorff, and Ponzo illusions. In two experiments, we re-examined the effect of head tilt on the TI. In experiment 1, we used more conventional TI stimuli, more standard experimental methods, and a more complete experimental design than Prinzmetal and Beck, and additionally extended the investigation to attraction as well as repulsion effects. Experiment 2 more closely replicated the Prinzmetal and Beck stimuli. Although we found that head tilt did increase TIs in both experiments, the increases were of the order of 1 degrees -2 degrees, more modest than the 7 degrees reported by Prinzmetal and Beck. Significantly, the TI increase was larger when inducing tilts and head tilts were in the same direction than when they were in opposite directions, suggesting that the tilt-constancy theory may be oversimplified. In addition, because previous evidence renders unlikely the claim that the Poggendorff illusion can be explained simply in terms of misperceived orientation of the transversals, the question arises whether there might be some other explanation for the increase in the Z?llner, Poggendorff, and Ponzo illusions with body tilt that Prinzmetal and Beck reported.     

Memory illusions: false recall and recognition in adults with Asperger's syndrome

As persons on the autistic spectrum are known not to use semantic features of word lists to aid recall, they might show diminished susceptibility to illusory memories that typically occur with lists of associated items. Alternatively, since such individuals also have poor source monitoring, they might show greater susceptibility. The authors found that adults with Asperger's syndrome (n = 10) recalled similar proportions of a nonpresented strong associate of the study list items, compared with controls (n = 15). In Experiment 2, rates of true and false recognition of study list associates did not differ significantly between Asperger (n = 10) and control (n = 10) participants. Moreover, the Asperger participants made fewer remember and more know judgments than controls for veridical but not for false recognitions. Thus, deficits found in some aspects of memory in people with Asperger's syndrome do not affect their susceptibility to memory illusions.     

祈使句和反问句中双重否定的加工机制

采用句-图匹配范式,以可预测对立意义的句子和图片为实验材料,考察汉语双重否定的加工方式以及句子的形式与语义对句子加工的影响,包括2个实验。研究发现：（1）双重否定是整体加工的;（2）在理解初期（250ms）,否定反问句、双重否定祈使句与肯定祈使句的加工模式一致,都是直接表征事件的实际状态;（3）当句子形式与语义不一致时,读者更多地受到句子语义的影响。这表明,在双重否定加工机制的理论解释中,命题表征理论忽略语义,注重句子形式结构,而基于经验模拟理论的两步模拟假设则立足语义,忽略句子形式结构,两者都有一定的合理性,但也都存在一定的片面性。     

The cumulative semantic cost does not reflect lexical selection by competition

The cumulative semantic cost describes a phenomenon in which picture naming latencies increase monotonically with each additional within-category item that is named in a sequence of pictures. Here we test whether the cumulative semantic cost requires the assumption of lexical selection by competition. In Experiment 1 participants named a sequence of pictures, while in Experiment 2 participants named words instead of pictures, preceded by a gender marked determiner. We replicate the basic cumulative semantic cost with pictures (Exp. 1) and show that there is no cumulative semantic cost for word targets (Exp. 2). This pattern was replicated in Experiment 3 in which pictures and words were named along with their gender marked definite determiner, and were intermingled within the same experimental design. In addition, Experiment 3 showed that while picture naming induces a cumulative semantic cost for subsequently named words, word naming does not induce a cumulative semantic cost for subsequently named pictures. These findings suggest that the cumulative semantic cost arises prior to lexical selection and that the effect arises due to incremental changes to the connection weights between semantic and lexical representations.     

Phonological and semantic priming: Evidence for task-independent effects

The questions asked in the present experiments concern the generality of semantic and phonological priming effects: Do these effects arise automatically regardless of target task, or are these effects restricted to target tasks that specifically require the retrieval of the primed information? In Experiment 1, subjects produced faster color matching times on targets preceded by a masked rhyming prime than on targets preceded by an orthographic control or an unrelated prime. This result suggests that automatic priming effects on the basis of phonological similarity can be obtained even when the target task does not make use of phonological information. This claim was reinforced in Experiment 2 in which a rhyme priming effect and a semantic priming effect were found in a semantic categorization task. In Experiment 3, the target task was phonological (rhyme detection), and, again, both phonological and semantic priming effects were observed. Finally, in Experiments 4 and 5, in a replication and an extension of Experiment 1, phonological and semantic priming effects were found in a color matching task, a task involving neither phonological nor semantic processing. These results are most straightforwardly interpreted by assuming that both semantic and phonological priming effects are, at least in part, due to automatic activation of memorial representations.