Feelings of error in reasoning—in search of a phenomenon

Recent research shows that in reasoning tasks, subjects usually produce an initial intuitive answer, accompanied by a metacognitive experience, which has been called feeling of rightness. This paper is aimed at exploring the complimentary experience of feeling of error (FOE), that is, the spontaneous, subtle sensation of cognitive uneasiness arising from conflict detection during thinking. We investigate FOE in two studies with the “bat-and-ball” (B&B) reasoning task, in its standard and isomorphic control versions. Study 1 is a generation study, in which participants are asked to generate their own response. Study 2 is an evaluation study, in which participants are asked to choose between two conflicting answers (normative vs. intuitive). In each study, the FOE is measured by the FOE questionnaire. Results show that the FOE is significantly present in the standard B&B task when participants give a wrong answer, that our questionnaire can measure it, and furthermore, that it is diagnostic of genuine error.     

The role of part—whole information in reasoning about relative size

Models of comparative judgment have assumed that relative magnitude is computed from knowledge about absolute magnitude rather than retrieved directly. In Experiment 1, participants verified the relative size of part-whole pairs (e.g., tree-leaf) and unrelated controls (e.g., tree-penny). The symbolic distance effect was much smaller for part-whole pairs than for unrelated controls. In two subsequent experiments, participants determined either which of two objects was closer in size to a third object or which of two pairs had a greater difference in the size of its constituents. In contrast to the paired comparison task in Experiment 1, judgments of part-whole items were more sensitive to the influence of symbolic distance than were unrelated controls. The fact that the part-whole relation attenuates the effects of symbolic distance in a paired comparison task but not in tasks that require an explicit comparison of size differences suggests that the part-whole relation provides a source of information about relative magnitude that does not depend on knowledge about absolute magnitude.     

Ockham’s razor and reasoning about information flow

What is the minimal algebraic structure to reason about information flow? Do we really need the full power of Boolean algebras with co-closure and de Morgan dual operators? How much can we weaken and still be able to reason about multi-agent scenarios in a tidy compositional way? This paper provides some answers.     

Is inferential reasoning just probabilistic reasoning in disguise?

Oaksford, Chater, and Larkin (2000) have suggested that people actually use everyday probabilistic reasoning when making deductive inferences. In two studies, we explicitly compared probabilistic and deductive reasoning with identical if-then conditional premises with concrete content. In the first, adults were given causal premises with one strongly associated antecedent and were asked to make standard deductive inferences or to judge the probabilities of conclusions. In the second, reasoners were given scenarios presenting a causal relation with zero to three potential alternative antecedents. The participants responded to each set of problems under both deductive and probabilistic instructions. The results show that deductive and probabilistic inferences are not isomorphic. Probabilistic inferences can model deductive responses only using a limited, very high threshold model, which is equivalent to a simple retrieval model. These results provide a clearer understanding of the relations between probabilistic and deductive inferences and the limitations of trying to consider these two forms of inference as having a single underlying process.     

Metacognitive-like information seeking in lion-tailed macaques: a generalized search response after all?

Previous research has demonstrated that Old World primates (both apes and monkeys) seek information about the location of a hidden food item, unless they are privy to the hiding process. This has been cited as evidence of metacognition. However, these results could also be interpreted using non-metacognitive accounts, including a generalized search response to uncertainty, in which subjects reach for food when it is seen, or search for food until it is spotted. In the present research, lion-tailed macaques were tested on an object-choice task. Conditions varied with respect to the visibility of the baiting process, and whether the location of the hidden food could be inferred by logical exclusion. Additionally, the hidden food could be located visually before a choice was made, by peering under the objects through a Plexiglas tray. Across conditions, monkeys consistently looked for the food when it had not been seen, even if its location could be inferred, despite the fact that these monkeys are capable of inference by exclusion. This suggests that apparently ‘metacognitive’ information seeking in monkeys may instead reflect a generalized search strategy. Alternatively, it is possible that monkeys only have metacognitive access to certain types of knowledge, including that obtained visually. Results are discussed with respect to the likelihood of metacognition in this species and the evolutionary emergence of metacognition across species.     

Dual processes in reasoning?

Previous results have shown that the introduction of negatives into the sentences used in a deductive problem affected behavior in a systematic way which was independent of the logical structure of the problem. In the present investigation, the subjects were asked to justify their responses when reasoning about such sentences. In accordance with previous results, the responses were dominated by the terms in the sentences regardless of whether they were negated. However, the justifications did vary when negatives were introduced in accordance with the logical consequences of the responses. The interpretation of these justifications as causes of behavior seemed implausible. It was suggested that they were rationalizations, or that there was at least some form of dual processing between behavior and conscious thought.     

Is there a search in fixed-set memory search?

We discuss the hypothesis that structural factors in the fixed-set memory-search task may contribute to the standard linear set-size effect typically observed in this task. We constructed a lexical decision task that contained the same structural factors as the memory-search task. Two structural factors are discussed: (1) the priming of the probe by the memory set, and (2) the confounding of repetitions per item with set size. Our experiment demonstrated that these structural factors play a role in the set-size effect. The implications of these effects for the memory-search task and for models proposed to account for memory-search data are discussed.     

Response and encoding factors in “ignoring” irrelevant information

Subjects classified either the numerosity or numeric value of elements in successive stimulus displays. In separate experiments, responses were indicated by oral naming, card sorting, manual tapping, and oral “tapping.” Incongruent levels of numeric value slowed naming and sorting, but not tapping, when numerosity was the cue for responding. Incongruent numerosity slowed tapping, but not naming and sorting, when numeric value was the cue. Changes in stimulus response mapping may thus critically alter the ability to ignore an irrelevant stimulus dimension.     

First insights on “neuropedagogy of reasoning”

Statements that share an explanation tend to lend inductive support to one another. For example, being told that Many furniture movers have a hard time financing a house increases the judged probability that Secretaries have a hard time financing a house. In contrast, statements with different explanations reduce one another s judged probability. Being told that Many furniture movers have bad backs decreases the judged probability that Secretaries have bad backs. I pose two questions concerning such discounting effects. First, does the reduction depend on explanations being mutually incompatible or does it occur when explanations are deemed irrelevant to one another? I found that a small discounting effect occurred with statements that were blatantly unrelated. However, the discounting effect also depended on a factor external to the argument being judged; the composition of the argument set. Second, are explanation effects attributable to changes in the belief afforded statements or to response-specific changes resulting from misunderstanding of the probability rating task or response bias? The results implicate changes in belief. Prior belief influenced conditional probability more than argument strength judgements, as it would if participants understood the tasks in the same way as the experimenter. Also, conditional probability true and false judgements were complementary, suggesting no response bias.     

Diagrammatic reasoning in Frege’s Begriffsschrift

In Part III of his 1879 logic Frege proves a theorem in the theory of sequences on the basis of four definitions. He claims in Grundlagen that this proof, despite being strictly deductive, constitutes a real extension of our knowledge, that it is ampliative rather than merely explicative. Frege furthermore connects this idea of ampliative deductive proof to what he thinks of as a fruitful definition, one that draws new lines. My aim is to show that we can make good sense of these claims if we read Frege??s notation diagrammatically, in particular, if we take that notation to have been designed to enable one to exhibit the (inferentially articulated) contents of concepts in a way that allows one to reason deductively on the basis of those contents.     

Motivated reasoning in the prediction of sports outcomes and the belief in the “hot hand”

The present paper explores the role of motivation to observe a certain outcome in people’s predictions, causal attributions, and beliefs about a streak of binary outcomes (basketball scoring shots). In two studies we found that positive streaks (points scored by the participants’ favourite team) lead participants to predict the streak’s continuation (belief in the hot hand), but negative streaks lead to predictions of its end (gambler’s fallacy). More importantly, these wishful predictions are supported by strategic attributions and beliefs about how and why a streak might unfold. Results suggest that the effect of motivation on predictions is mediated by a serial path via causal attributions to the teams at play and belief in the hot hand.     

Policy information or information policy? information types in economics and policy

The economic distinction between technological and market information offers a useful guide to the relationship between information and policy. The two types create different problems for markets and require different emphases in public policy, focusing on either the production or the distribution of information. The interaction of the two types creates familiar policy problems such as underinvestment in information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Indicators and other means of dealing with such problems constitute policies and demonstrate not only the importance of information for policy but the necessity of policy for information. where he is also affiliated with the Environmental Studies Center. His primary research interests are in public policy, expecially environmental policy and science and technology policy, and in the relationship between policy, economics and information.     

Male pragmatism in negotiators’ ethical reasoning

Across four studies, we explored why a gender gap emerges in negotiator ethics, such that men set lower ethical standards than women. The male pragmatism hypothesis suggests men, more than women, are motivationally biased in setting ethical standards. Experiment 1 demonstrated how negotiations’ masculinity implications underlie this gender gap in ethics. Experiment 2 demonstrated that, by viewing ethics from a self-interested perspective, men were more egocentric in their ethical reasoning than women. Experiment 3 demonstrated that, by granting themselves more leniency in ethics than others, men exhibited more moral hypocrisy than women. Experiment 4 examined how implicit negotiation beliefs affect the relation between gender and ethical standards. As hypothesized, fixed beliefs predicted lower ethical standards, particularly for men. These findings suggest a robust pattern by which men are more pragmatic in their ethical reasoning at the bargaining table than women.     

Why is information displaced from visual working memory during visual search?

Research has shown that performing visual search while maintaining representations in visual working memory displaces up to one object's worth of information from memory. This memory displacement has previously been attributed to a nonspecific disruption of the memory representation by the mere presentation of the visual search array, and the goal of the present study was to determine whether it instead reflects the use of visual working memory in the actual search process. The first hypothesis tested was that working memory displacement occurs because observers preemptively discard about an object's worth of information from visual working memory in anticipation of performing visual search. Second, we tested the hypothesis that on target absent trials no information is displaced from visual working memory because no target is entered into memory when search is completed. Finally, we tested whether visual working memory displacement is due to the need to select a response to the search array. The findings rule out these alternative explanations. The present study supports the hypothesis that change-detection performance is impaired when a search array appears during the retention interval due to nonspecific disruption or masking.     

What is “marked” in visual marking? evidence for effects of configuration in preview search

Visual search for a conjunction target is facilitated when distractor sets are segmented over time: the preview benefit. Watson and Humphreys (1997) suggested that this benefit involved inhibition of old items (visual marking, VM). We investigated whether the preview benefit is sensitive to the configuration of the old distractors. Old distractors changed their location prior to the occurrence of the new items, while also either changing or maintaining their configuration. Configuration changes disrupted search. The results are consistent with object-based VM, which is sensitive to the configuration of old stimuli.     

Object-based inhibitory priming in preview search: Evidence from the “top-up” procedure

Visual search in a conjunction task can be facilitated if half the distractor items are previewed prior to the other half of the distractors and the target item. Here, we investigate the nature of this preview by using a top-up procedure, which presents an initial preview followed by a secondary preview after a period of time (the offset period). In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that increasing the time of the offset period decreases search efficiency. If the offset period is increased to 2 sec, the previewed items are searched to a greater extent than when the offset period is 450 msec. This holds even when the old items remain in the same positions across presentations and when they differ in color from new search stimuli. However, when the offset intervals are reduced, the preview can be discounted from search even when the old items change locations between exposures (Experiment 2) and when they are not distinguished from search displays by their color (Experiment 3). The last result occurs only as long as the preview items can be grouped in terms of form. When the preview stimuli are heterogeneous, they are no longer discounted from search if their locations change across the offset period (Experiment 4). We interpret the data in terms of object-based priming, which enables the repeated form of the old distractors to be filtered more easily from search.