Priming and stimulus-response learning in perceptual classification tasks

Participants often respond more quickly and more accurately to a repeated stimulus compared to a non-repeated one, a phenomenon known as repetition priming. In semantic classification tasks priming appears to be largely attributable to the learning of stimulus-decision and stimulus-response associations, which allow participants to bypass many of the processes engaged during initial stimulus analysis. The current study tested whether stimulus-response learning plays a similarly dominant role in priming that occurs in perceptual classification tasks. Unfamiliar objects were used as stimuli to reduce the influence of semantic processes on priming and the task switched for all test trials to eliminate stimulus-decision learning. The results showed across-task priming as measured by reaction time facilitation and improved accuracy when the response remained the same during the encoding and test phases. When the response switched, similar levels of reaction time facilitation were observed, but priming as measured by accuracy was significantly reduced and no longer significant. These findings indicate that stimulus-response learning contributes to priming in perceptual classification tasks, but does not play a dominant role. Significant stimulus-level learning that is independent of the task and response also occurs and likely indexes facilitated perceptual processing of the objects.     

Task switches under Go/NoGo conditions and the decomposition of switch costs

Alternating switches between two simple S-R tasks are combined with Go/NoGo tasks. Non-switches after Go trials are assumed to selectively profit from stimulus driven repetition benefits, whereas switches after NoGo trials are assumed to be selectively delayed by stimulus driven negative priming. Intentionally driven reconfiguration costs are assessed by RT differences between switches after Go trials (no negative priming) and non-switches after NoGo trials (no repetition benefits). Experiment 1 indicates that with short preparation time repetition benefits, negative priming costs, and intentional components contribute approximately additively to switch costs. Experiment 2 confirms that the delay of switches after NoGo trials is indeed due to negative priming. Experiments 3 and 4 show that repetition benefits and intentional components of switch costs are properly assessed only if the settings assure that participants reconfigure the required task set in NoGo as well as Go trials.     

Interaction of task readiness and automatic retrieval in task switching: Negative priming and competitor priming

When subjects switch between tasks, performance is slower after a task switch than after a task repetition, even when preparation time is long. We report two experiments that support the idea that a large part of these residual task shift costs can be due to stimulus-cued retrieval of previous task episodes. We demonstrate that there are two different factors at work: (1) facilitation of response to the current distractor stimulus, appropriate to the previously relevant, competing task (competitor priming), and (2) impaired processing of previously suppressed responses (negative priming). Negative priming was contingent on the size of the stimulus set, suggesting that distractor suppression comes into effect only if the distractors are highly activated. Importantly, both types of interference interacted with task readiness: Whereas in the nondominant task (picture naming), switch and nonswitch trials were equally affected, the dominant task (word reading) showed priming effects on switch trials only. Thus, the retrieval of previous processing episodes has a selective impact on situations in which task competition is high.     

Task-switching and long-term priming: role of episodic stimulus-task bindings in task-shift costs

When subjects switch between two tasks, performance is slower after a task switch than after a task repetition. We report five experiments showing that a large part of these "task-shift-costs" cannot be attributed to a control operation, needed to configure the cognitive system for the upcoming task (e.g., ). In all experiments subjects switched between picture-naming and word-reading. We presented different stimuli either in just one of the two tasks, or in both of them. Shift-costs were larger for stimuli presented in both tasks than for those presented in only one task, even after more than 100 intervening trials between prime and probe events. We suggest (as proposed by ) that stimuli acquire associations with the tasks in which they occur. When the current task activation is weak, as on a switch of tasks, stimuli can trigger retrieval of the associated, competing task, provoking larger time costs.     

Task-set reconfiguration with predictable and unpredictable task switches

Participants switched frequently between high/low and odd/even classification of a digit. The interval between a task cue and the next digit varied between blocks. In Experiment 1, the task switched predictably every two, four, or eight trials. In Experiment 2, switching predictably every four trials was compared with random switching. With predictable switching, the cost was limited to the first trial of a run. Random switching produced a more gradual approach to asymptotic performance. After one performance, control processes attenuate the resulting change in task-set bias if a further switch is likely, but this strategic modulation is soon overwhelmed by task-set priming through further performances. Preparation reduced switch costs but not interference from the irrelevant attribute: Control of interference appears to be reactive, not proactive. Switch costs did not increase with run length, suggesting that retrieval of the task set last associated with the stimulus did not contribute to switch costs.     

Task switching and the measurement of “switch costs”

The measurement of “switch costs” is held to be of interest because, as is widely believed, they may reflect the control processes that are engaged when subjects switch between two (or more) competing tasks. [In task-switching experiments, the reaction time (RT) switch cost is typically measured as the difference in RT between switch and non-switch (repeat) trials.] In this report we focus on the RT switch costs that remain even after the subject has had some time to prepare for the shift of task, when the switch cost may be approximately asymptotic (so-called residual switch costs). Three experiments are presented. All three experiments used Stroop colour/word, and neutral stimuli. Participants performed the two tasks of word-reading and colour-naming in a regular, double alternation, using the “alternating runs” paradigm (R. D. Rogers & S. Monsell, 1995). The experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that RT switch costs depend on a form of proactive interference (PI) arising from the performance of a prior, competing task. A. Allport, E. A. Styles and S. Hsieh (1994) suggested that these PI effects resulted from “task-set inertia”, that is, the persisting activation-suppression of competing task-sets, or competing task-processing pathways. The results confirmed the existence of long-lasting PI from the competing task as a major contributor to switch costs. Non-switch trials, used as the baseline in the measurement of switch costs, were also shown to be strongly affected by similar PI effects. However, task-set inertia was not sufficient to account for these results. The results appeared inconsistent also with all other previous models of task switching. A new hypothesis to explain these between-task interference effects was developed, based on the stimulus-triggered retrieval of competing stimulus-response (S-R) associations, acquired (or strengthened) in earlier trials. Consistent with this retrieval hypothesis, switch costs were shown to depend primarily on the S-R characteristics of the preceding task (the task that was switched from) rather than the upcoming task. Further, the effects of the other, competing task were found to persist over many successive switching trials, affecting switch costs long after the stimulus overlap (and hence the principal S-R competition) between the current tasks had been removed. Switch costs were also found to be affected by recent, item-specific experience with a given stimulus, in either the same or the competing task. Finally, the results showed that switch costs were massively affected by the ratio of the number of prior trials, in response to the same stimuli, that had implemented either the currently intended or the competing S-R mappings. None of these effects are predicted by current models of residual switch costs, which appeal to the differences in control processes assumed to be engaged in switch versus non-switch trials. Received: 31 March 1999 / Accepted: 23 July 1999     

The kinds of information that support novel associative object priming and how these differ from those that support item priming

We investigated how the information that supports novel associative and item object priming differs under identical study/test conditions. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants rated the meaningfulness of sentences linking two object pictures at study. At test, they performed either a size judgement or an associative recognition memory task on intact, recombined and novel picture (Experiment 1) or word (Experiment 2) associations. Associative priming was modulated by subjective meaningfulness of the encoded links, and depended on study/test perceptual overlap. In contrast, item priming was neither affected by the meaningfulness of the sentences nor by study/test changes in the stimulus presentation format. Associative priming and recognition were behaviourally dissociated, and associative recognition was probably too slow to have seriously contaminated associative priming. In Experiment 3, participants performed a perceptually oriented task during both experimental phases, and both associative and item priming were observed. These results suggest that associative priming depends on stored associative semantic and perceptual information when the test task requires flexible retrieval of associative information. Under the same conditions, item priming may only require activation of items' semantic properties. When both study and test tasks stress perceptual processing, retrieval of perceptual information is sufficient to support both kinds of priming.     

Contextual dependencies in a stimulus equivalence paradigm

Two experiments with human subjects assessed contextual dependencies in a stimulus equivalence paradigm. Subjects learned to form two sets of stimuli in a matching-to-sample training procedure. Each set was presented against one of two different background colours, the contextual cues. At test, the influence of a context change--that is, presenting each set against the other context--was measured on baseline, symmetry, and equivalence trials. These three trial types reflect a difference in task complexity. It was predicted that the magnitude of context-dependent effects would be a positive function of task complexity. In Experiment 1, the context change was realized by switching the stimulus set at test while keeping the background colour constant. In Experiment 2, the stimulus set remained constant, and the background colour was switched. In both experiments, a change in context only resulted in an increase in response latency on equivalence trials; no effect was seen on symmetry and baseline trials. Results were discussed in the framework of switch costs, habituation to contextual stimuli, and a model based on Shea and Wright (1995) that explains the differential influence of a context switch on easy versus difficult tasks.     

Stimulus-related priming during task switching

Task switch cost (the deficit of performing a new task vs. a repeated task) has been partly attributed to priming of the repeated task, as well as to inappropriate preparation for the switched task. In the present study, we examined the nature of the priming effect by repeating stimulus-related processes, such as stimulus encoding or stimulus identification. We adopted a partial-overlap task-switching paradigm, in which only stimulus-related processes should be repeated or switched. The switch cost in this partial-overlap condition was smaller than the cost in the full-overlap condition, in which the task overlap involved more than stimulus processing, indicating that priming of a stimulus is a component of a switch cost. The switch cost in the partial-overlap condition, however, disappeared eventually with a long interval between two tasks, whereas the cost in the full-overlap condition remained significant. Moreover, the switch cost, in general, did not interact with foreknowledge, suggesting that preparation on the basis of foreknowledge may be related to processes beyond stimulus encoding. These results suggest that stimulus-related priming is automatic and short-lived and, therefore, is not a part of the persisting portion of switch cost.     

Components of competitor priming in task switching

Executing an action in response to a stimulus is thought to result in the creation of an event code that integrates stimulus and action features (Allport, 1987; Hommel in Visual Cognition 5: 183-216, 1998). When switching between tasks, competitor priming occurs if a distractor stimulus cues the retrieval of a previously established event code in which that distractor is bound to a competing task, creating a source of interference with the current task whereby the observer is encouraged to apply the competing task to the distractor. We propose a second aspect of competitor priming: the misapplication of the retrieved competing task to the target stimulus. We report two task-switching experiments in which tasks applied to picture-word compound stimuli were manipulated to create conditions in which this second aspect of competitor priming could be revealed and distinguished from other sources of task- and stimulus-based priming. A substantial increase in competitor priming was observed when subjects switched between tasks that required very different processing operations and the competing task was highly relevant to the target stimulus. These results are consistent with our claim that competitor priming can result from applying the competing task either to the distractor that cued it or to the target stimulus.     

Unmixing the mixing cost: contributions from dimensional relevance and stimulus-response suppression

When participants repeat the same task in a context in which the task may also switch (a mixed block), performance deteriorates compared to when there is only one task repeating (a pure block). Three experiments were designed to assess how perceptual and motor transitions influenced this mixing cost. Experiment 1 provided three pure block baselines for perceptual and motor transitions. Experiments 2 and 3 examined these transitions in a mixed block. Results show that most of the mixing cost comes from two factors: (a) episodic interference in the mixed block when the stimulus changes and the response repeats, and (b) increased suppression in mixed blocks affecting trials where stimulus-response mappings repeat. We propose that these mechanisms are strategically applied when adopting a sustained "switching set" in mixed blocks. The purpose of this set would be to avoid perseveration errors in the most demanding trials (the task-switching trials), but remaining active during task-repetitions. Results regarding the mixing cost are thus relevant to the assessment of models of task-switching, which at present mainly rely on data from task switch trials.     

No-go trials can modulate switch cost by interfering with effects of task preparation

It has recently been shown that the cost associated with switching tasks is eliminated following ‘no-go’ trials, in which response selection is not completed, suggesting that the switch cost depends on response selection. However, no-go trials may also affect switch costs by interfering with the effects of task preparation that precede response selection. To test this hypothesis we evaluated switch costs following standard go trials with those following two types of non-response trials: no-go trials, for which a stimulus is presented that indicates no response should be made (Experiment 1); and cue-only trials in which no stimulus is presented following the task cue (Experiment 2). We hypothesized that eliminating no-go stimuli would reveal effects of task preparation on the switch cost in cue-only trials. We found no switch cost following no-go trials (Experiment 1), but a reliable switch cost in cue-only trials (i.e., when no-go stimuli were removed; Experiment 2). We conclude that no-go trials can modulate the switch cost, independent of their effect on response selection, by interfering with task preparation, and that the effects of task preparation on switch cost are more directly assessed by cue-only trials.     

Inhibition of task set: Converging evidence from task choice in the voluntary task-switching paradigm

This study looked for evidence of task-set inhibition in a voluntary task-switching paradigm. Participants performed one of three tasks on a digit: parity (even or odd), size (less than or greater than 5), or distance (near or far from 5). On each trial, they were allowed to choose which task to perform, with encouragement to perform each task equally often overall and in a random sequence. The question was whether participants would avoid performing a task that they had recently switched away from (e.g., the task performed on trial n22), because the task set was still inhibited. Results confirmed that participants strongly avoided performing the n22 task (e.g., ABA) in favor of performing other tasks (e.g., ABC). This occurred both when participants were required to switch tasks every trial (Experiment 1) and when they were allowed to repeat tasks (Experiment 2). The results suggest that a task set is inhibited during switching to a new task, reducing the likelihood that this task will be selected in the near future.     

Reconfiguration of task-set: Is it easier to switch to the weaker task?

Switching between two tasks afforded by the same stimuli results in slower reactions and more errors on the first stimulus after the task changes. This “switch cost” is reduced, but not usually eliminated, by the opportunity to prepare for a task switch. While there is agreement that this preparation effect indexes a control process performed before the stimulus, the “residual” cost has been attributed to several sources: to a control process essential for task-set reconfiguration that can be carried out only after the stimulus onset, to probabilistic failure to engage in preparation prior to the stimulus, and to two kinds of priming from previous trials: positive priming of the now-irrelevant task set and inhibition of the now-relevant task-set. The main evidence for the carry-over of inhibition is the observation that it is easier to switch from the stronger to the weaker of a pair of tasks afforded by the stimulus than vice versa. We survey available data on interactions between task switching and three manipulations of relative task strength: pre-experimental experience, stimulus-response compatibility, and intra-experimental practice. We conclude that it is far from universally true that it is easier to switch to the weaker task. Either inhibition of the stronger task-set is a strategy used only in the special case of extreme inequality in strength, or its consequences for later performance may be masked by slower post-stimulus control operations for more complex tasks. Inhibitory priming may also be stimulus specific. Received: 31 March 1999 / Accepted: 23 July 1999     

Tracking hand movements captures the response dynamics of the evaluative priming effect

We tested the response dynamics of the evaluative priming effect (i.e. facilitation of target responses following evaluatively congruent compared with evaluatively incongruent primes) using a mouse tracking procedure that records hand movements during the execution of categorisation tasks. In Experiment 1, when participants performed the evaluative categorisation task but not the non-evaluative semantic categorisation task, their mouse trajectories for evaluatively incongruent trials curved more toward the opposite response than those for evaluatively congruent trials, indicating the emergence of evaluative priming effects based on response competition. In Experiment 2, implementing a task-switching procedure in which evaluative and non-evaluative categorisation tasks were intermixed, we obtained reliable evaluative priming effects in the non-evaluative semantic categorisation task as well as in the evaluative categorisation task when participants assigned attention to the evaluative stimulus dimension. Analyses of hand movements revealed that the evaluative priming effects in the evaluative categorisation task were reflected in the mouse trajectories, while evaluative priming effects in the non-evaluative categorisation tasks were reflected in initiation times (i.e. the time elapsed between target onset and first mouse movement). Based on these findings, we discuss the methodological benefits of the mouse tracking procedure and the underlying processes of evaluative priming effects.     

Congruency sequence effect in cross-task context: Evidence for dimension-specific modulation

The congruency sequence effect refers to a reduced congruency effect after incongruent trials relative to congruent trials. This modulation is thought to be, at least in part, due to the control mechanisms resolving conflict. The present study examined the nature of the control mechanisms by having participants perform two different tasks in an alternating way. When participants performed horizontal and vertical Simon tasks in Experiment 1A, and horizontal and vertical spatial Stroop task in Experiment 1B, no congruency sequence effect was obtained between the task congruencies. When the Simon task and spatial Stroop task were performed with different response sets in Experiment 2, no congruency sequence effect was obtained. However, in Experiment 3, in which the participants performed the horizontal Simon and spatial Stroop tasks with an identical response set, a significant congruency sequence effect was obtained between the task congruencies. In Experiment 4, no congruency sequence effect was obtained when participants performed two tasks having different task-irrelevant dimensions with the identical response set. The findings suggest inhibitory processing between the task-irrelevant dimension and response mode after conflict.     

积极情绪对任务转换的影响

通过两个行为实验考察了积极情绪图片所诱发的情绪状态对任务转换的影响及其机制。研究任务是数字分类任务,分为保持和转换两个阶段。首先要求被试对靶刺激形成一定的习惯化反应,然后改变任务要求。实验1以53名大学生为被试,分别在积极情绪、消极情绪和中性条件下完成任务,发现在与中性条件相比时,积极情绪促进任务转换,消极情绪延缓任务转换。实验2以37名大学生为被试,增加了一种转换条件,考察积极情绪促进任务转换的心理原因,结果表明积极情绪因偏好新异刺激而促进任务转换     

The role of crossmodal competition and dimensional overlap in crossmodal attention switching

Crossmodal selective attention was investigated in a cued task switching paradigm using bimodal visual and auditory stimulation. A cue indicated the imperative modality. Three levels of spatial S–R associations were established following perceptual (location), structural (numerical), and conceptual (verbal) set-level compatibility. In Experiment 1, participants switched attention between the auditory and visual modality either with a spatial-location or spatial-numerical stimulus set. In the spatial-location set, participants performed a localization judgment on left vs. right presented stimuli, whereas the spatial-numerical set required a magnitude judgment about a visually or auditorily presented number word. Single-modality blocks with unimodal stimuli were included as a control condition. In Experiment 2, the spatial-numerical stimulus set was replaced by a spatial-verbal stimulus set using direction words (e.g., “left”). RT data showed modality switch costs, which were asymmetric across modalities in the spatial-numerical and spatial-verbal stimulus set (i.e., larger for auditory than for visual stimuli), and congruency effects, which were asymmetric primarily in the spatial-location stimulus set (i.e., larger for auditory than for visual stimuli). This pattern of effects suggests task-dependent visual dominance.     

The costs of crossing paths and switching tasks between audition and vision

Switching from one functional or cognitive operation to another is thought to rely on executive/control processes. The efficacy of these processes may depend on the extent of overlap between neural circuitry mediating the different tasks; more effective task preparation (and by extension smaller switch costs) is achieved when this overlap is small. We investigated the performance costs associated with switching tasks and/or switching sensory modalities. Participants discriminated either the identity or spatial location of objects that were presented either visually or acoustically. Switch costs between tasks were significantly smaller when the sensory modality of the task switched versus when it repeated. This was the case irrespective of whether the pre-trial cue informed participants only of the upcoming task, but not sensory modality (Experiment 1) or whether the pre-trial cue was informative about both the upcoming task and sensory modality (Experiment 2). In addition, in both experiments switch costs between the senses were positively correlated when the sensory modality of the task repeated across trials and not when it switched. The collective evidence supports the independence of control processes mediating task switching and modality switching and also the hypothesis that switch costs reflect competitive interference between neural circuits.     

A PRP-study to determine the locus of target priming effects

Visual stimuli that are made invisible by a following mask can nonetheless affect motor responses. To localize the origin of these target priming effects we used the psychological refractory period paradigm. Participants classified tones as high or low, and responded to the position of a visual target that was preceded by a prime. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between both tasks varied. In Experiment 1 the tone task was followed by the position task and SOA dependent target priming effects were observed. When the visual position task preceded the tone task in Experiment 2, with short SOA the priming effect propagated entirely to the tone task yielding faster responses to tones on visually congruent trials and delayed responses to tones on visually incongruent trials. Together, results suggest that target priming effects arise from processing before and at the level of the central bottleneck such as sensory analysis and response selection.