Do the right thing: The assumption of optimality in lay decision theory and causal judgment

Human decision-making is often characterized as irrational and suboptimal. Here we ask whether people nonetheless assume optimal choices from other decision-makers: Are people intuitive classical economists? In seven experiments, we show that an agent’s perceived optimality in choice affects attributions of responsibility and causation for the outcomes of their actions. We use this paradigm to examine several issues in lay decision theory, including how responsibility judgments depend on the efficacy of the agent’s actual and counterfactual choices (Experiments 1–3), individual differences in responsibility assignment strategies (Experiment 4), and how people conceptualize decisions involving trade-offs among multiple goals (Experiments 5–6). We also find similar results using everyday decision problems (Experiment 7). Taken together, these experiments show that attributions of responsibility depend not only on what decision-makers do, but also on the quality of the options they choose not to take.     

Fairness‐related behaviour modulation by friendship is moderated by American primes in Chinese participants

Empirical studies from the fields of psychology and behavioural economics indicate that people do not like being treated unfairly and may punish those who violate the norm, even at a cost to themselves. Recent research has emphasized the relationship effect on fairness‐related behaviour but has shown conflicting results and has not focused much on the characteristics of culture. This study used the cultural priming paradigm and the Ultimatum Game (UG) to explore whether cultural primes could moderate the relationship effect on fairness‐related decision making. We primed Chinese participants with either Chinese cultural symbols or American cultural symbols and asked them to play as responders with friends or strangers in the two‐party UG (experiment 1) or in the three‐party UG (experiment 2). Results from the two experiments confirm that Chinese participants accepted unfair offers more often when the offers were made by friends than when the offers were made by strangers. However, the relationship effect was diminished after American cultural priming. These results suggest that American primes can moderate the relationship effect on fairness‐related behaviour in Chinese people. This finding may shed new light on the likelihood of exiting from the heavy reliance on social relationships in Chinese society.     

计算模型视角下信任形成的心理和神经机制——基于信任博弈中投资者的角度

人际信任渗透在社会交互的各个方面, 是促进和维持合作的重要基石。以往研究者借助信任博弈范式, 主要探讨了人际信任的理论模型、生物基础和影响因素等方面。近年来, 研究者开始将计算模型应用于信任博弈的数据分析中, 深入挖掘人际信任行为背后的心理机制, 将计算模型与神经影像技术结合, 加深对信任行为背后脑机制的理解。目前将计算模型应用于信任博弈范式中的研究主要针对“信任是如何形成的”这一科学问题, 未来要进一步发展计算模型方法, 结合非侵入性脑刺激技术, 应用于精神疾病人群中, 以深入理解正常和异常信任形成的心理和神经机制。     

Focusing failures in competitive environments: explaining decision errors in the Monty Hall game,the Acquiring a Company problem,and multiparty ultimatums

This paper offers a unifying conceptual explanation for failures in competitive decision making across three seemingly unrelated tasks: the Monty Hall game (Nalebuff, 1987), the Acquiring a Company problem (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985), and multiparty ultimatums (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997). We argue that the failures observed in these three tasks have a common root. Specifically, due to a limited focus of attention, competitive decision makers fail properly to consider all of the information needed to solve the problem correctly. Using protocol analyses, we show that competitive decision makers tend to focus on their own goals, often to the exclusion of the decisions of the other parties, the rules of the game, and the interaction among the parties in light of these rules. In addition, we show that the failure to consider these effects explains common decision failures across all three games. Finally, we suggest that this systematic focusing error in competitive contexts can serve to explain and improve our understanding of many additional, seemingly disparate, competitive decision‐making failures. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The spiral of distrust: (Non‐)cooperation in a repeated trust game is predicted by anger and individual differences in negative reciprocity orientation

This study investigated state anger and individual differences in negative reciprocity orientation as predictors of individuals' willingness to cooperate with strangers. In order to observe real behaviour, we used a trust game that was played over six periods. In the trust game, a first player (sender) determines how much of a certain endowment she/he wants to share with a second player (trustee), who then can give something back. We varied whether participants received feedback [feedback (yes, no)] about the trustee's behavioural decision (amount sent back). Supporting our hypotheses, the results suggest that feedback compared with no feedback about the trustee's behaviour increased anger. Specifically, information about low back transfers triggered anger and non‐cooperation in return. Importantly, participants with a strong negative reciprocity orientation reported higher levels of anger and were less willing to cooperate with the trustee compared with those with low negative reciprocity orientation. Moreover, even when anger was low, individuals with a strong negative reciprocity orientation were less willing to cooperate compared with those with a low negative reciprocity orientation. Thus, negative reciprocity orientation seems to arouse a spiral of distrust. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.