Explaining action∗

This paper is an attempt to re‐interpret some of the results of contemporary studies of action and explanation by philosophers who may loosely be called ‘post‐Wittgensteinian’, e.g. G. E. M. Anscombe, A. Kenny, A. I. Melden. One of the themes which recurs in these’ discussions is that of the non‐contingent connection between desires, intentions, etc., and the actions which we explain by them — although not all the authors concerned understand this in the same way, and many would not accept the term ‘non‐contingent connection’. The thesis that there is a non‐contingent connection between, e.g., desire and action is strongly contested, and I attempt in this paper to show (a) that our language for the factors which we cite in explaining action, desires, intentions (Sect. II), feelings (Sect. III), sensations (Sect. IV), etc. is inescapably dispositional in a strong sense, i.e. that it characterizes these factors as disposing us to act in certain ways. But I argue (b) that this does nothing to show that these factors are not causes of the actions they explain (Sect. I). The seeming oddity of causes which are non‐contingently linked with their consequences is explained when we see (c) that the account of action embedded in our ordinary language is teleological, i.e. refers us ultimately to the inclinations of the subject, and intentional (Sects. V and VI).     

The role of action effects in infants’ action control

In adults, the selection and the planning of actions are influenced by the anticipation of desired action effects. However, the role of action effects for action control in infants is still an unresolved issue. One important prerequisite for infants action control is that infants are able to relate certain movements to certain effects. To test this assumption, it was investigated how infants action control is affected by action effects. By applying an imitation paradigm, we studied 12- and 18-month-old infants who first observed an adult experimenter demonstrating a three-step action sequence on a toy bear. In three experimental groups, the second action step, the third action step, or no action step elicited an arbitrary sound as an additional acoustic action effect. It was coded how often each of the target actions was performed by the infant in a subsequent 90-s test phase. As predicted, the frequency of the infants target action varied depending on which action step elicited the action effect. In both age groups, the target action that was combined with an acoustical effect was not only produced more often but also occurred with lower latency and was in most cases the first target action shown by the infants. These results are interpreted as evidence of the important role of action effects in infants action control.     

Is thinking an action?

I argue that entertaining a proposition is not an action. Such events do not have intentional explanations and cannot be evaluated as rational or not. In these respects they contrast with assertions and compare well with perceptual events. One can control what one thinks by doing something, most familiarly by reciting a sentence. But even then the event of entertaining the proposition is not an action, though it is an event one has caused to happen, much as one might cause oneself to see a book by looking at it. I also discuss how this may support the view that thinking about the world is a source of information about it.     

No anticipation–no action: the role of anticipation in action and perception

This paper reviews psychophysical evidence for the existence and the nature of two types of anticipation in goal-oriented action. The first one relates to attained changes of the perceptual world, thus to action goals. These anticipations determine appropriate motor output. We argue that goal codes do not only serve as a reference unit, against which currently produced behavioral effects are compared. Rather voluntary actions appear to be planned literally in terms of intended behavioral effects. The second type of anticipation relates to the environmental conditions that have to be met to bring an intended effect into being. These anticipations serve to trigger selected actions, when appropriate execution conditions are encountered. Altogether, the behavioral evidence portrays a remarkable automaticity of goal-oriented action. Once a goal exists (wherever it might come from), corresponding efferent output is generated and executed under appropriate conditions.     

is affirmative action still necessary?

The influences of socio‐race, racial identity development, gender, educational level, and age on promotion and compensation decisions by midlevel supervisors in industry were examined in this analogue study of 74 midlevel business and industry supervisors. The participants varied in socio‐racial classifications, gender, educational levels, and age. Results of this study indicated statistically significant differences in promotion rates of female analogue employees, rates of promotion between White male and Black male supervisors, and the rate of promotion when comparing older versus younger supervisors.     

What is ‘mental action’?

There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.     

Do action systems resist visual illusions?

Arguments about the relative independence of visual modules in the primate brain are not new. Recently, though, these debates have resurfaced in the form of arguments about the extent to which visuomotor reaching and grasping systems are insensitive to visual illusions that dramatically bias visual perception. The first wave of studies of illusory effects on perception and action have supported the idea of independence of motor systems, but recent findings have been more critical. In this article, I review several of these studies, most of which (but not all) can be reconciled with the two-visual-systems model.     

Topics on the bordergrounds of action∗

The psychological conceptualization of phenomena involves characteristic explanations of animal movement. Conscientious attention to this fact results in a kind of behaviorism I call ‘conceptual epiphenomenalism’. This doctrine at once explains the characteristic ‘opacity’ of psychological predicables and helps to show the way around difficulties opacity is felt to create, and it also frees our thinking from the tyranny of the distinction between necessity and contingency, too often misapplied to facts rather than to things said or thought. An important challenge to conceptual epiphenomenalism is to account for the facts of introspective certainty and privileged testimony. This challenge can be met by identifying the nature of and displaying the behavioral conditions for the various grades of self‐consciousness or reflective knowledge. The methodology of conceptual epiphenomenalism is schematically applied to elucidate first the general conception of animal action and then a variety of phenomena plausibly thought to be exponible by reference to the conception of action, specifically the broader category of animal behavior, intention, and hoping and wishing.     

Do muscles matter for coordinated action?

This article investigates coordination stability when 2 fingers of each hand periodically tap together. The main question concerns the functional origin of the symmetry tendency, which has widely been conceived as a bias toward coactivation of homologous fingers and homologous muscular portions. In Experiment 1, the symmetry tendency was independent of finger combination. In Experiment 2, virtually identical stability characteristics were revealed under full vision and no vision. In Experiment 3, symmetrical and parallel visual labels on the fingers neither stabilized nor destabilized symmetrical and parallel tapping patterns. In Experiment 4, in which the relative position of the hands was varied, it revealed that the observed stability characteristics are to be defined in a hand-centered reference frame. Because the symmetry tendency was always independent of finger combination, the authors suggest that it is not a bias toward coactivation of homologous muscle portions but instead originates on a more abstract, functional level.     

When does action resist visual illusions?

Over the past decade, many studies of non-pathological individuals have reported functional dissociations between perceptual judgments and motor responses. These results suggested an interpretation of the ventral and dorsal streams in the primate visual system as independent modules for visual awareness and the visual guidance of actions. However, recent comparisons of perception and grasping responses in size-contrast displays have been widely reported to show that apparent dissociations are actually experimental artifacts. An overview of the literature suggests that the issue of visuomotor dissociations in healthy individuals is far from settled. Some results suggest that immunity from visual illusions might be found when task requirements emphasize observer-relative reference frames. These results suggest that the functional specialization of the two visual subsystems might be less rigid than originally posited.     

Why do employees undertake creative action?

There is much research identifying factors that lead to a creative outcome, but little on what leads employees to begin the creative process in the first place. This research used semi‐structured interviews with 65 engineers to explore the factors and processes involved in this phenomenon. We found that general work motivation, creativity requirements, cultural support for creativity, time resources, and autonomy were all used as cues in deciding whether undertaking creative action would be worthwhile via judgmental processes of expectancy and instrumentality. We also discovered overlaps with the cognate literatures of organizational citizenship and proactivity and explore these in discussing new areas for research.     

Overcoming action crises in personal goals – Longitudinal evidence on a mediating mechanism between action orientation and well-being

An action crisis is defined as an intra-psychic conflict between further goal pursuit and disengagement from the goal and frequently signifies the beginning of disengagement processes. By analyzing dispositional predictors of the development of goal-related action crises over time, we applied a process-based approach to goal disengagement. In two longitudinal studies, we evaluated the effect of action (vs. state) orientation on the development of action crises. Using change-regression models, the hypothesis could be confirmed that action orientation enables individuals to overcome action crises in personal goals. Furthermore, in two cross-sectional studies, previously reported effects of action orientation on health and well-being could be replicated and shown to be partially mediated by a decreased overall prevalence of action crises.     

Is ‘human action’ A category?

It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of human action. But before drawing such a conclusion an ancient but terrible question must be faced: What sorts of things happen in the world ? This ancient question is faced but not answered. It is brought up because the failure to find a satisfactory answer to the question, Is human action a category? is a failure even to find a satisfactory assumption about what kind of reference the term ‘human action’ is supposed to have.     

Action–effect anticipation in infant action control

There is increasing evidence that action effects play a crucial role in action understanding and action control not only in adults but also in infants. Most of the research in infants focused on the learning of action-effect contingencies or how action effects help infants to infer goals in other persons' actions. In contrast, the present research aimed at demonstrating that infants control their own actions by action-effect anticipation once they know about specific action-effect relations. About 7 and 9-month olds observed an experimenter demonstrating two actions that differed regarding the action-effect assignment. Either a red-button press or a blue-button press or no button press elicited interesting acoustical and visual effects. The 9-month olds produced the effect action at first, with shorter latency and longer duration sustaining a direct impact of action-effect anticipation on action control. In 7-month olds the differences due to action-effect manipulation were less profound indicating developmental changes at this age.     

Intentional action and limitation of personal autonomy. Do restrictions of action selection decrease the sense of agency?

The experience of being an intentional agent is a key component of personal autonomy. Here, we tested how undermining intentional action affects the sense of agency as indexed by intentional binding. In three experiments using the Libet clock paradigm, participants judged the onset of their action (key presses) and resulting effect (auditory stimuli) under conditions of no, partial, or full autonomy over selecting and timing their actions. In all cases, we observed a moderate to strong intentional binding effect. However, we found no evidence for an influence of personal autonomy on intentional binding. These findings thus suggest that being unable to decide how and when to perform actions does not affect the perceived temporal binding between action and effect, a phenomenon suggested to be associated with the implicit sense of agency. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of research on personal autonomy and goal-directed behavior.     

Understanding the flexibility of action–perception coupling

The idea that observing an action triggers an automatic and obligatory activation of an imitative action in the motor system of the observer has recently been questioned by studies examining complementary actions. Instead of a tendency for imitation, cooperative settings may facilitate the execution of dissimilar actions, resulting in a relative disadvantage for imitative actions. The present study aimed at clarifying the contribution of associative learning and interference of task representations to the reversal of congruency effects. To distinguish between the two, an experiment was designed, in which we increased the effects of associative learning and minimized the effects of task interference. Participants completed a series of imitation and complementary action runs, in which they continuously imitated or complemented the actions of a virtual co-actor. Each run was alternated with a test run showing the same actions but including color-cues, and the participants were instructed to respond to color instead of the actor’s posture. Reaction times to test runs showed no reversal of facilitation effects between the imitation and complementary action conditions. This result strongly argues that associative learning cannot adequately account for reversed facilitation effects. Our study provides additional support for action–perception models that allow flexible selection of action–perception coupling and challenges the existing models purely based on stimulus–response associations.

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Spreading activation or spooky action at a distance?

How do preexisting connections among a word's associates facilitate its cued recall and recognition? A spreading-activation model assumes activation spreads to, among, and from a studied word's associates, and that its return is what strengthens its representation. An activation-at-a-distance model assumes strengthening is produced by the synchronous activation of the word's associates. The spread model predicts that connections among the studied word's associates will have a greater effect on memory when more of its associates return activation. The distance model predicts that total connections are important, not their direction. The results of cued recall experiments supported the distance model in showing that that connections among the associates facilitated recall regardless of the number of returning connections.